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07 декабря, 19:01

Forex reserves drop to lowest in nearly 6 years last month

CHINA’S foreign exchange reserves fell to the lowest level since March 2011 in November, the country’s forex regulator said yesterday. China’s reserves, the world’s largest, dropped by US$69.06 billion,

07 декабря, 19:01

Safer platform to trade bills of exchange starts

A platform to trade bills of exchange starts today as China’s central bank aims to clamp down on potential fraud in bills trading at major state banks. To be supervised by the People’s Bank of China,

07 декабря, 12:00

Trump Could Be in Violation of the Constitution His First Day in Office

Unless he divests himself of his business holdings, the president-elect could violate constitutional rules meant to guard against corruption.

07 декабря, 08:44

Die Presse, Австрия. Почему Россия и Китай закупают сейчас золото

Цена падает, но эмиссионные банки продолжают закупки. Вкладчики и инвесторы могут брать с них пример и следовать за гигантами. Сейчас он снова сделал это. Путин купил золото. То есть, не он сам лично. Но Россия купила золото. Эмиссионный банк. И не мало, а 48 тонн в течение одного месяца. Это уже что-то значит. Москва сразу получила ровно 1,5% годовой добычи золота. Это была самая крупная покупка золота Россией за последние 20 лет. В течение 24 месяцев золотой запас Кремля вырос почти на 50% и достиг между тем 1542 тонн. Таким образом, Россия только немного отстает от второго крупного покупателя золота на планете. Китай между тем накопил 1840 тонн. Это кажется странным — после столь сильного 2016 года цена на золото снова упала. Шока от победы Трампа не было. Вместо этого выиграли фондовые рынки, в то время когда государственные облигации и золото были в упадке. Вкладчики из разряда безопасных сразу попали в рискованные богатые разряды. Но Россия и Китай продолжают покупать золото. Что же происходит? Как это совместить?

02 декабря, 23:03

Why Trump Would Almost Certainly Be Violating The Constitution If He Continues To Own His Businesses

The meaning of the Emoluments Clause is fairly clear. And it all goes back to a diamond-encrusted snuffbox Ben Franklin got from Louis XVI. by Richard Tofel Far from ending with President-elect Trump’s announcement that he will separate himself from the management of his business empire, the constitutional debate about the meaning of the Emoluments Clause — and whether Trump will be violating it — is likely just beginning. That’s because the Emoluments Clause seems to bar Trump’s ownership of his business. It has little to do with his management of it. Trump’s tweets last Wednesday said he would be “completely out of business operations.” But unless Trump sells or gives his business to his children before taking office the Emoluments Clause would almost certainly be violated. Even if he does sell or give it away, any retained residual interest, or any sale payout based on the company’s results, would still give him a stake in its fortunes, again fairly clearly violating the Constitution. The Emoluments Clause bars U.S. officials, including the president, from receiving payments from foreign governments or foreign government entities unless the payments are specifically approved by Congress. As ProPublica and others have detailed, Trump’s business has ties with foreign government entities ranging from loans and leases with the Bank of China to what appear to be tax-supported hotel deals in India and elsewhere. The full extent of such ties remains unknown, and Trump has refused to disclose them, or to make public his tax returns, through which many such deals, if they exist, would be revealed. Foreign government investments in Trump entities would also be covered by the clause, as would foreign government officials paying to stay in Trump hotels, so long as Trump stands to share in the revenues. One misconception about the Emoluments Clause in early press coverage of it in the wake of Trump’s election is being clarified as scholars look more closely at the provision’s history. That was the suggestion that it would not be a violation for the Trump Organization to conduct business with foreign government entities if “fair market value” was received by the governments. This view had been attributed to Professor Richard Painter, a former official of the George W. Bush administration, and privately by some others. But Professor Laurence Tribe, the author of the leading treatise on constitutional law, and others said the Emoluments Clause was more sweeping, and mandated a ban on such dealings without congressional approval. Painter now largely agrees, telling ProPublica that no fair market value test would apply to the sale of services (specifically including hotel rooms), and such a test would apply only to the sale of goods. The Trump Organization mostly sells services, such as hotel stays, golf memberships, branding deals and management services. The Emoluments Clause appears in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. It bars any “person holding any office of profit or trust under” the United States from accepting any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Price, or foreign state” “without the consent of the Congress.” The word “emolument” comes from the Latin emolumentum, meaning profit or gain. The language of the clause was lifted in its entirety from the Articles of Confederation which established the structure of the government of the United States from 1781 until the ratification of the Constitution in 1788-89. The clause was derived from a Dutch rule dating to 1751. The clause was added to the draft Constitution at the Constitutional Convention on Aug. 23, 1787 on a motion by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. As Gov. Edmund Randolph of Virginia explained to his state’s ratification convention in 1788, Pinckney’s motion was occasioned by Benjamin Franklin, who had been given a snuffbox, adorned with the royal portrait and encrusted with small diamonds, by Louis XVI while serving as the Continental Congress’s ambassador to France. As Randolph said, “An accident which actually happened, operated in producing the restriction. A box was presented to our ambassador by the king of our allies. It was thought proper, in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving emoluments from foreign states.” The Continental Congress in 1786 had consented, after a debate, to Franklin keeping the snuffbox, as it had earlier with a similar gift to envoy Arthur Lee. At the same time, consent also was given to diplomat John Jay receiving a horse from the King of Spain. The clause was part of the basis for Alexander Hamilton’s defense of the Constitution, in Federalist 22, as addressing “one of the weak sides of republics”: “that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption.” There is no question that the Emoluments Clause applies to the president. President Obama’s counsel sought an opinion in 2009 on whether it barred him from accepting the Nobel Peace Prize. The Justice Department concluded that it did not, in part based on historical precedent (the Prize had also been awarded to Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Vice President Charles Dawes and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger), but primarily because the Norwegian group that awards the prize was not deemed a governmental entity. The clause does not seem ever to have been interpreted by a court, but it has been the subject of a number of opinions, over the years, of the attorney general and the comptroller general. Nearly all of these opinions have concluded that the clause is definitive. In 1902, an attorney general’s opinion said it is “directed against every kind of influence by foreign governments upon officers of the United States.” In 1970, a comptroller general opinion declared that the clause’s “drafters intended the prohibition to have the broadest possible scope and applicability.” A 1994 Justice Department opinion said “the language of Emoluments Clause is both sweeping and unqualified.” Among the ties deemed to violate the clause was a Nuclear Regulatory Commission employee undertaking consultant work for a firm retained by the government of Mexico. Congress has passed one law giving blanket approval to a set of payments from foreign government entities. Known as the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, it is limited to gifts of “minimal value” (set as of 1981 at $100), educational scholarships and medical treatment, travel entirely outside the country “consistent with the interests of the United States,” or “when it appears that to refuse the gift would likely cause offense or embarrassment or otherwise adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States.” The specificity of these few exceptions reinforces the notion that other dealings with foreign government entities is forbidden without congressional approval. One attorney-general opinion from the Reagan administration offers the possibility of a more permissive interpretation of the Emoluments Clause, indicating it could be limited to “payments which have a potential of influencing or corrupting the recipient.” But whatever the meaning of this, it was the same Reagan Justice Department that banned the NRC employee from the Mexican-funded consultancy a year later. Ironically, an “originalist” reading of the clause — usually favored these days by conservatives as exemplified by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and current Justice Clarence Thomas — would seem to bind Trump more stringently, while a “living constitution” approach — exemplified by liberals such as the late Justices Louis Brandeis and Thurgood Marshall — might offer him greater latitude. Clearly, deciding what the Emoluments Clause means in a specific case is a complicated legal question. (The opinion on Obama’s acceptance of the Nobel Prize runs to 13 printed pages.) But just as clearly, the judges of its meaning with respect to President Trump will be politicians rather than the Supreme Court. The controversies that swirled around Presidents Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton established a number of key points. Among them are that the sole remedy for a violation of the Constitution by a president in office is impeachment, and that the House of Representatives is the sole judge of what constitutes an impeachable offense, while the Senate is the sole judge of whether such an alleged violation warrants removal from office. (Impeachments are very rare: articles of impeachment have been voted against only two presidents, Andrew Johnson and Clinton, both of whom were acquitted by the Senate, while Nixon resigned ahead of likely impeachment. Fifteen federal judges have also been impeached, and eight removed, while four resigned.) The arguments of scholars and lawyers on the meaning of the Emoluments Clause may influence the public, and their elected representatives. But if Trump decides not to dispose of his business, it will be up to Congress to decide whether to do anything about his apparent violation of the Constitution. Like this story? Sign up for ProPublica’s daily newsletter to get more of our best work.   -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

02 декабря, 03:39

What Is The Emoluments Clause And How Does It Apply To Donald Trump?

WASHINGTON ― When the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia to debate and write a new constitution for the United States, there was a concerted effort to ensure that the new nation would break from the corrupt practices of the Old World. European kings and princes bestowed gifts and payments to diplomats, dignitaries and politicians in their own legislatures and in foreign states. To the new Americans, these gifts and payments could corrupt the new nation’s sovereignty. They had already thrown off control by the British crown, and many questioned the growing relationship with their new ally, France. Some U.S. generals during the revolution were found to have accepted payment from these foreign states. Those debating the Constitution did not want to divorce themselves from the politics of Europe, but they also wanted to insulate the new government from these inducements to corruptions. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 22, “One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption.” The answer to this question was written into Article I, Section 9, Clause 8: the Emoluments Clause. It is a very broad and clear statement against the foreign corruption of U.S. government and military officials: “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” “We weren’t going to fight the revolution, have a Constitution and next thing you know members of Congress and the president are getting stipends from the British Crown or from the French,” said Richard Painter, former ethics advisor to President George W. Bush. “We’re not going to allow that type of foreign corruption to get into our country.” The election of billionaire real estate mogul Donald Trump to the presidency has suddenly swung the Emoluments Clause out of the “odd clauses” closet and into the center of political controversy. Ethics experts and constitutional law scholars have raised the specter that the president of the United States will be in direct violation of the Constitution on the day he takes office, with his many business deals in foreign countries, a hotel soon to be frequented by foreign dignitaries and hundreds of millions in debt to the government-owned Bank of China. “When he takes the oath to uphold the Constitution he would be lying,” said Laurence Tribe, constitutional law professor at Harvard Law School. “He can’t uphold the Constitution, one of whose central provisions he would be a walking, talking violation of.” While there is some scholarly debate over whether the Emoluments Clause does apply to the president, for most of American history U.S. presidents have acted as though it has. The Congressional Research Service says that the clause is one of a handful of ethics statutes that “potentially” apply to the president. The Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has routinely ruled on whether the president and other lower officers could receive certain gifts, titles or emoluments (this basically just means payments) under the clause. The record also goes back before the existence of the Office of Legal Counsel and the Department of Justice. These past rulings and actions show a record of government lawyers and past presidents applying the clause to the presidency for close to 200 years. A 2009 OLC opinion that determined President Barack Obama could accept the monetary award that came with the Nobel Peace Prize stated rather clearly that the president “surely” holds an office that would fall under the Emoluments Clause. A past opinion on the government of Ireland’s bestowal of Irish citizenship on President John Kennedy presumed the clause applied to the presidency as well. President Andrew Jackson was a recipient of a gold medal given by the Latin American revolutionary turned Colombian president Simon Bolivar. Under the belief that he could not accept such a gift without the consent of Congress, Jackson asked for their advice on whether he could keep it. Congress determined that he could not. In 1840, merchants sailing from the Middle East informed President Martin Van Buren that they carried with them many gifts for him from the imam of Muscat (present-day Oman). The imam had sent two Arabian horses, rose oil and rose water, cashmere shawls, a Persian rug and a sword for the president. Van Buren was under the assumption that the Emoluments Clause forbade these gifts, but he also did not want to insult the imam and send them back with the merchants. He asked Congress if the gifts could be sold and the proceeds deposited into the Treasury. They voted to allow this. This same gift sale repeated itself when the imam sent the president two more horses in 1843. Congress eventually ruled in 1845 that the horses could be sold and the profit given to the Treasury. There is one person who seemed to think that the clause did not apply to him. President George Washington received gifts from both the French ambassador to the United States and from the Marquis de Lafayette. The latter sent Washington the key to the Bastille after its storming during the early days of the French Revolution. This occurred when Lafayette was a member of the Estates-General and commander in chief of the national guard. Where precedent points toward the clause applying to the president, a further dispute arises over whether it simply covers gifts or other payments. “In my view, having studied the Emoluments Clause ever since 1978, it’s always been clear to me that its language is deliberately very broad, that it covers any kind of payment, not just a gratuity or a gift, but an ordinary payment to a profit-making enterprise,” Tribe said. Norm Eisen, the former top ethics advisor to Obama and former ambassador to the Czech Republic, notes that there is some dispute as to whether the payment must be favorable or any fair market payment. “Some scholars say it’s any payment,” he said. “Some scholars say it has to be a payment that is not an exchange for consideration ― more than a fair arms length exchange.” The nature of Trump’s business enterprise, however, makes it very difficult to determine whether the business successes he has during his administration are won fair and square. When a foreign government green-lights permits for a new Trump-named building, or if he or his business partners are granted tax breaks from those governments, it will be impossible to know whether he received those because of his government position. The same goes for the business that foreign governments are already directing to the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C. Would these governments rent out event space or luxury rooms if he were not the president? One area that is rather unprecedented is that these payments would be going to a corporation and would eventually materialize as profit for Trump. The key here is that the Trump Organization is a privately held corporation and is, in essence, an extension of Trump. If it were a publicly held corporation these questions would probably not arise, although potential conflicts of interest could still certainly exist, as they did for former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. As for whether the Emoluments Clause applies to payments to a corporation that distributes profit to the government official in question, there is at least one OLC opinion that presents some kind of answer. In 1993, members of the Administrative Conference of the United States, an agency that includes unpaid private citizens advising the government on administrative procedure law, asked whether the receipt of payment from partnership earnings at a law firm that held foreign governments as paying clients would be a violation of the clause even if the recipient did not work with the foreign government client. The opinion ruled that this payment through partnership earnings would indeed be prohibited under the clause. “Because the amount the Conference member would receive from the partnership’s profits would be a function of the amount paid to the firm by the foreign government, the partnership would in effect be a conduit for that government,” the opinion reads. “Thus, some portion of the member’s income could fairly be attributed to a foreign government. We believe that acceptance of that portion of the member’s partnership share would constitute a prohibited emolument.” For these questions alone, Eisen, Tribe and Painter believe Trump needs to totally divest himself from his business, liquidate the assets and place the profit into a true blind trust governed by an independent trustee who is not one of his children. Federal ethics laws do not mandate this, but previous presidents have acted as though it does. The Office of Government Ethics issued a memorandum in 1983 stating that presidents should act as though the laws apply to them. As for whether the Emoluments Clause can be adjudicated in any legal manner, the only recourse appears to be the extreme action of impeachment. “The remedy in the Constitution for someone who does that kind of thing would be impeachment,” Painter said. “You do not want to go in that direction.” That is why the suggestion to liquidate Trump’s assets and place the profits in a blind trust may be an extremely onerous move, but, the experts believe, would be essential to maintain the integrity of national sovereignty that the Constitution demands. So far, Trump has said that he will hand his business over to his three adult children, Ivanka, Donald Jr. and Eric Trump. He has also appointed them to the executive committee of his presidential transition, negating any separation between government and corporation. On Wednesday he tweeted that he would announce a full plan for his transferal of the business to his children on Dec. 15. The simple temporary transfer of the business from the president-elect to his children during his term in office does little to assuage concerns about the potential for conflicts of interest or even the Emoluments Clause. “The family business is essentially occupying or about to occupy the White House,” Tribe said. “And the idea that that can be done consistent with our Constitution is hard for me to square with either the language of the document or its original purposes or with our history. We’ve never experienced anything like this.” -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

01 декабря, 13:13

Дружба в стиле «чабудо»

Стихия в развитии российско-китайской торговли с участием компаний малого и среднего бизнеса наносит взаимный ущерб. Пришла пора системной работы

01 декабря, 10:10

ICBC готовит эмиссию облигаций в юанях

АйСиБиСи Банк работает с Минфином и Центробанком РФ по проекту эмиссии юаневых облигаций на Московской бирже. Об этом рассказал президент российского банка Ли Вэньцун. По его словам, который является 100% дочкой крупнейшего банка мира по активам Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, ICBC, важен этот проект. Специально для него мы получили лицензию по ценным бумагам. Специально для этого мы также создали команду по работе с ценными бумагами , цитирует банкира РИА Новости . Что касается вариантов размещения, в Китае, либо на Московской бирже, то второй вариант представляет больше трудностей. При этом варианте китайские инвесторы должны четко знать российские правила, законодательство и русский язык, отметил он. Напомним, в сентябре Народный банк Китая (НБК) принял решение о назначении АйСиБиСи Банка клиринговым центром по операциям в юанях на территории РФ.

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01 декабря, 09:47

АйСиБиСи Банк поможет российским эмитентам разместить «панда-облигации» в Китае

АйСиБиСи Банк (100-процентная «дочка» крупнейшего банка мира по активам Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, ICBC) будет помогать российским эмитентам выходить на китайский рынок с помощью так называемых панда-облигаций, заявил президент российского банка Ли Вэньцун.

01 декабря, 09:22

АйСиБиСи Банк работает с Минфином и ЦБ по эмиссии облигаций в юанях

АйСиБиСи Банк (100-процентная «дочка» крупнейшего банка мира по активам Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, ICBC) работает с Минфином и Центробанком РФ по проекту эмиссии юаневых облигаций на Московской бирже, рассказал президент российского банка Ли Вэньцун.

01 декабря, 09:18

Китайский банк намерен провести эмиссию облигаций в юанях на Московской бирже

АйСиБиСи-банк ("дочка" крупнейшего банка по активам Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, ICBC) прорабатывает с Минфином России и российским Центробанком проект по эмиссии юаневых облигаций на Московской бирже. Об этом ...

30 ноября, 14:52

Trump's vow to leave business raises more questions

President-elect Donald Trump announced Wednesday morning that he will leave his “great business in total in order to fully focus on running the country” in the White House.The Manhattan billionaire made the announcement on Twitter and said he will hold a formal press conference to discuss it further on Dec. 15.“I will be holding a major news conference in New York City with my children on December 15 to discuss the fact that I will be leaving my,” Trump wrote on social media, breaking his announcement up into multiple posts. “Great business in total in order to fully focus on running the country in order to MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! While I am not mandated to ....do this under the law, I feel it is visually important, as President, to in no way have a conflict of interest with my various businesses.”“Hence, legal documents are being crafted which take me completely out of business operations. The Presidency is a far more important task!” he continued.Trump promised throughout the presidential campaign to hand over control of his business empire to his adult children if he were to win the White House, but that has done little to assuage the concerns of those who have been critical of the real estate mogul. Trump’s plan to have his children run his businesses leaves much room for skeptics who believe he will still be able to influence his companies to benefit from the policies he pursues as president.Candidates have historically pledged to place their assets into a blind trust should they win the presidency, but Trump’s plan to hand control to his children would fall short of that threshold. He did not clarify Wednesday morning twitter flurry what, if any, further steps he would take to ensure that no conflicts of interest would occur.Appearing on MSNBC's "Morning Joe" on Wednesday, incoming White House chief of staff Reince Priebus would not say whether handing control of the Trump businesses to the president-elect's children remained the plan, telling panelist Willie Geist that, "I'm not ready to reveal any of that." Priebus did insist that the issue is being taken seriously by the president-elect and his transition team, despite the fact that laws governing such situations were not written with politicians of Trump's wealth in mind."This is the first president we've had at least in modern history that's had so many successful businesses and so many diverse areas across the country and in many cases retail and hospitality business that is dependent on people's business. So, it's not the easiest thing to work out," Priebus said. "You should know that he’s got the best people in America working on it. And I think what you see in those tweets is a person at the top that understands and is willing and showing the American people that he's working hard on it and he’s taking it seriously."That Trump's businesses interests are so vast is actually something American voters celebrated in electing the Manhattan billionaire, Priebus said, adding that his supporters knew what they were getting when they cast a ballot for Trump"Here's the thing. He was elected by the American people with all of this knowledge in mind. I mean, there's nothing to be ashamed of," the incoming chief of staff said. "there’s nothing different today than there was three weeks ago. I mean, people in this country knew and accepted and celebrated this business that Donald Trump has built throughout his entire life. So now we're working on making sure that all of those conflicts are taken care of and doing the best job we can given the fact that the laws actually are very vague and don't contemplate this scenario but we're doing the best we can for the American people."The president-elect’s business holdings include entanglements with multiple foreign governments, including financing for one property coming in the form of a loan from the Bank of China. Donald Trump Jr., one of the children expected to assume control of the company, said in 2008 that “Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets. … We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia.”

28 ноября, 19:01

No change in China’s outbound strategies

CHINA reiterated yesterday that it will stick to its opening-up policy and “going out” strategies, facilitating investment abroad while guarding against risks. The nation will adhere to outbound investment

28 ноября, 12:28

China reiterates healthy development of outbound investment

CHINA reiterated Monday that it will stick to its opening up policy and "going out" strategies, facilitating investment abroad while guarding against risks, according to a government statement. The nation

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26 ноября, 18:20

China Unveils New Capital Controls

Back in March, when China's various forms of soft capital controls had failed to stem China's relentless capital outflows, we reported that "bizarro M&A" deals were rapidly becoming "China's Most Innovative Capital Outflow Yet." We pointed out several M&A deals that simply made no sense from the fiduciary perspective of a rational buyer, and had all the signs of a panicked attempt to park cash offshore in the form of mergers and acquisitions with zero regard for cost or return on investment. Among these were: Zoomlion, a lossmaking Chinese machinery company that is partially state-owned: its total debt stands at 83 times its EBITDA. Fosun, a serial Chinese acquirer that spent $6.5bn on stakes in 18 overseas companies during a six-month period last year, had a a 55.7x total debt/EBITDA in June 2015. "Fosun has bought brand names such as Club Med and Cirque du Soleil as well as a host of other assets including the German private bank Hauck & Aufhaeser." China Cosco Holdings acquisition of the Greek Piraeus Port Authority for €368.5m. Cosco has promised to invest €500m in the Greek port despite having total debt at 41.5x its EBITDA! Cofco Corporation, which recently reached an agreement with Noble Group under which its subsidiary, Cofco International, would acquire a stake in Noble Agri for $750m (in the process preventing the insolvency of the biggest Asian commodities trader), has total debt equivalent to 52 times its EBITDA! Bright Food, which bought the breakfast group Weetabix for $1.2bn last year, and has total debt at 24 times EBITDA! This "bizarro" scramble to park cash offshore culminated with "China's Most Innovative Capital Outflow Yet: Buying Legendary Italian Football Club AC Milan." After nearly a year of capital trickling out of China through the M&A back door, Beijing has finally come around to closing this most notorious loophole, one which incidentally has had a major role in boosting stock valuations to beyond bubble levels due to the constant possibility of a totally unpredictable "Chinese M&A premium" in which a Chinese conglomerate (coughanbangcough) would swoop in and aquire some failing business at a 50-100% premium. As the WSJ reported, China is set to clamp down with tighter controls on Chinese companies seeking to invest overseas, confirming what we had observed since the start of the year in "intensifying efforts to slow a surge in capital fleeing offshore amid tepid growth and an uncertain economic outlook." Having launched various capital controls last September (noted here, when we correctly predicted that bitcoin would be the biggest beneficiary of Beijing efforts to stem the outflow of Chinese capital), the new measures are the first to go after big deals by China Inc. According to the paper, the State Council, China’s cabinet, will soon announce new measures that subject many overseas deals to reviews of “strict control,” according to people with direct knowledge of the matter and documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Beijing is said to focus on “extra-large” foreign acquisitions valued at $10 billion or more per deal, property investments by state-owned firms above $1 billion and investments of $1 billion or more by any Chinese company in an overseas entity unrelated to the investor’s core business. The new controls will apply to deals yet to receive approval from China’s top economic planning agency, the people familiar with the matter say. The latest round of capital controls underscore Beijing concerns about capital flight and a weakening currency. As a reminder, according to Goldman's calculations, in September Chinese capital flight accelerated far more than the officially reported number of $19 billion and hit $78 billion, the highest monthly total since the start of the year.  The crackdown also comes amid an overseas buying binge by Chinese companies unlike any other since a similar Japanese merger scramble briefly resulted in a Japanese owner for the Rockefeller Center in the '80s. This was profiled here previously in Eight Things The Chinese Are Scrambling To Buy In America, and courtesy of the following charts showing China's unprecedented contribution to global M&A activity, which we now know was nothing but another form of capital flight. Total overseas direct investment rose more than 50% to $145.9 billion in the first nine months of this year from the same time a year earlier, according to official data. We showed a representation of the torrid Chinese dealmaking pace earlier in the year: Not all Chinese M&A, however, has been gratuitous: Chinese companies have been moving to scoop up needed technology and management expertise, much of it at Beijing’s blessing. Headline-grabbing deals include petrochemical giant China National Chemical Corp.’s pending $43 billion acquisition of Swiss pesticide maker Syngenta AG, and a bevy of real estate, finance and other investments by Anbang Insurance Group Co., a recently obscure company that has emerged as global deal maker. In all, Chinese buyers have announced $212.7 billion of overseas acquisitions in 2016, a year in which announced global deal volume has reached $3.28 trillion. The WSJ adds that the latest set of capital controls will likely remain for a long time, in effect killing all notable cross-border M&A: "the new controls, once in place, are to remain in effect until the end of September and thus are intended as a temporary tool to stabilize outflows ahead of a major reshuffle of the top echelon of the ruling Communist Party late next year, the people familiar with the matter said. That’s in keeping with other efforts by Beijing to try to keep the economy on an even keel before the leadership change." Why implement this latest hurdle to stem capital flight now? Simple: as a result of the surging dollar, the Yuan has plunged, crashing to record lows since the Trump election, which in turn has prompted even more capital outflows as the local population scrambles to preserve its purchasing power and put its savings offshore. A steady depreciation of the Chinese yuan, after years of overall strength, has ensued, and as businesses and individuals try to take more money out, the pressure for further weakening is piling on. In the past week the yuan has fallen to its lowest level against the dollar in eight years.   Late last week, the offshore Yuan tumbled as low at 6.96 against the dollar, just shy of the 7.00 level at which point the PBOC is said will begin selling reserves in earnest to stabilize the currency. Cracking down on M&A is not China's only recent overture: earlier this week, the central bank announced it will use a new risk-control system to monitor capital flows through Shanghai’s much promoted free trade zone, which previously was hailed as a bold experiment to liberalize China’s financial markets; instead it has emerged as yet another conduit to transfer funds out of China instead of welcoming foreign capital in. A five-page action plan released by the Shanghai branch of the People’s Bank of China stresses efforts to ensure that currency inflows exceed outflows in the zone—a backhanded suggestion that more money may be moving out of the zone than coming in. * * * So is major Chinese outbound M&A effectively over for the next year? It would appear so: the soon-to-be announced controls empower the Commerce Ministry and the top economic planning agency to take a closer look at larger deals, the people familiar with the matter said. Under the current rules, companies trying to undertake many of the targeted transactions in foreign markets only need to register with the authorities and don’t have to go through any lengthy approval process. Aside from the major transactions, other deals covered by the pending rules are: overseas direct investments made by limited partnerships, investments in overseas-listed companies that are less than 10% of those firms’ total equity, and Chinese capital trying to participate in the delisting of overseas-listed Chinese companies. The elimination of the Chinese M&A bid premium from stock valuations will likely serve as another cooling factor on already record high stock market valuations, which are best summarized in the following chart courtesy of David Rosenberg.

25 ноября, 10:29

Фондовые индексы АТР изменяются незначительно и разнонаправленно в пятницу

Фондовые индексы Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона (АТР) изменяются слабо и разнонаправленно на торгах в пятницу.

24 ноября, 11:00

Seth Meyers Rips 'Tricky Dick' Donald Trump Over His Substantial Conflicts Of Interest

Seth Meyers took aim at Donald Trump’s significant conflicts of interest on Wednesday. The “Late Night” host said the president-elect continues to face “a barrage of questions over his foreign business ties” and how they may affect his administration. Meyers recalled how Trump had promised throughout his presidential campaign to get tough on China, but the comedian said that vow was now compromised after it emerged a Chinese state-run bank rents office space from him inside Trump Tower. “To be fair to Trump, he might not have realized the bank was owned by China,” said Meyers, before delivering the killer line, “What’s the bank’s name? The Bank of China.” “We keep getting more reasons to worry that Trump could use his office to benefit himself,” he later added, before likening Trump to former President Richard Nixon. “Just a couple of tricky dicks,” he said of the duo. Check it out in the clip above, and watch Meyers further explore Trump’s foreign business ties and the issues they pose on Wednesday night’s show below: type=type=RelatedArticlesblockTitle=Related Coverage + articlesList=583409e6e4b058ce7aacc9c2,5833f16de4b099512f84825a,58296e98e4b0c4b63b0d4443,5833f9dbe4b030997bc11a90 -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

24 ноября, 11:00

Seth Meyers Rips 'Tricky Dick' Donald Trump Over His Substantial Conflicts Of Interest

Seth Meyers took aim at Donald Trump’s significant conflicts of interest on Wednesday. The “Late Night” host said the president-elect continues to face “a barrage of questions over his foreign business ties” and how they may affect his administration. Meyers recalled how Trump had promised throughout his presidential campaign to get tough on China, but the comedian said that vow was now compromised after it emerged a Chinese state-run bank rents office space from him inside Trump Tower. “To be fair to Trump, he might not have realized the bank was owned by China,” said Meyers, before delivering the killer line, “What’s the bank’s name? The Bank of China.” “We keep getting more reasons to worry that Trump could use his office to benefit himself,” he later added, before likening Trump to former President Richard Nixon. “Just a couple of tricky dicks,” he said of the duo. Check it out in the clip above, and watch Meyers further explore Trump’s foreign business ties and the issues they pose on Wednesday night’s show below: type=type=RelatedArticlesblockTitle=Related Coverage + articlesList=583409e6e4b058ce7aacc9c2,5833f16de4b099512f84825a,58296e98e4b0c4b63b0d4443,5833f9dbe4b030997bc11a90 -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

23 ноября, 20:30

Trump's Dismantling of Trade Deals Won't Bring Most Jobs Back

Dramatic promises to restrict international trade were a signature element of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. So far, he seems to be following through. On Tuesday, he announced that he will withdraw U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership as one of his first acts in office. Trump’s aggressive stance on trade helped him win working-class voters in Midwestern manufacturing states, where upset wins swept him into the White House. As president, Trump will be able to act on trade without approval by Congress. Both the U.S. Constitution and past acts of Congress give the president ample authority to do things like withdraw from the TPP and the North American Free Trade Agreement, label China a currency manipulator and impose retaliatory tariffs on any country he sees as a threat to U.S. economic security. But American workers would actually not fare well under a protectionist regime, especially older workers and those with few skills and little education, who voted for Trump by wide margins.   The jobs that come back won’t be the ones Trump fans need. If Trump were to impose tariffs of 35 to 45 percent on Mexican and Chinese goods, as he has threatened, there is no doubt that some manufacturing operations would return to the U.S. However, that is not the same as saying that manufacturing jobs would return. The problem is that while international trade has contributed to a decline in manufacturing jobs in the U.S., it has not been the only or the largest contributor. Total manufacturing employment in the U.S. peaked in the 1970s, when China was still suffering under the Cultural Revolution and long before NAFTA was even conceived. However, the share of manufacturing in GDP has barely changed over the last half century. The decline in manufacturing employment is due to increased labor productivity, not a decline in manufacturing output. Many people are surprised to learn that even in the highly symbolic automobile sector, the U.S. produced more cars in 2015 than it did 25 years earlier. It's not that workers at Ford are losing jobs to workers in China and Mexico. Workers in all of these countries are losing their jobs to robots. Those trends are not unique to the U.S. As Harvard economist Dani Rodrik has shown, manufacturing employment, as a share of all jobs, reached its peak in Mexico in 1980, in Brazil in 1986, in Korea in 1989 and in India in 2002. Reliable data are harder to come by for China, but the most recent available numbers suggest that manufacturing jobs in that country are approaching their peak now or perhaps are even a year or two past it. To put it simply, it is not so much that workers at Ford are losing jobs to workers in China and Mexico as it is that workers in all of these countries are losing their jobs to robots. What is more, automation is not affecting all manufacturing jobs equally. Rodrik shows that low-skill manufacturing jobs have been most strongly affected, not just in the U.S. but everywhere you look. The next chart, based on data from a broad sample of 40 countries, shows that in just 13 years, from 1996 to 2009, low-skill manufacturing jobs as a percentage of all low-skill jobs in the economy fell by 4 percent. Meanwhile, even though total manufacturing employment was falling, high-skill manufacturing jobs actually increased as a share of all high-skill jobs. By implication, even if harshly protectionist policies brought manufacturing operations back to the U.S., our newly made-in-America T-shirts and Christmas ornaments would be fabricated and packaged largely by machines. There might be new jobs for technicians to install and operate those machines, but the low-skill workers who voted en masse for Trump would remain at the cash registers in the big box stores where the products were sold ― if they had jobs at all.   We can’t blame job losses on currency manipulation. Trump has repeatedly blamed U.S. trade deficits and job losses on currency manipulation, especially by China. He has promised to impose retaliatory tariffs on countries that have purposely weakened their currencies to keep their exports artificially cheap. But the reality is more complicated. Far from holding down the value of their currencies, two of the main countries Trump targets for retaliation, China and Mexico, have, at least recently, been fighting to keep their currencies strong. Policy details differ in the two countries. When Chinese authorities want to weaken the renminbi, they do so by asking China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, to buy dollars to add to foreign exchange reserves. The Chinese did that consistently until early 2014. But since then, as the following chart shows, China has been selling reserves at a frantic pace in an attempt to keep the renminbi strong. Despite those efforts, fear of a trade war has pushed the renminbi sharply lower since Election Day in the U.S.  Mexican policy works a little differently. Instead of directly manipulating exchange rates by buying and selling reserves, Mexico’s central bank, like the U.S. Federal Reserve, focuses its monetary policy on interest rates. Interest rates, in turn, can be used to affect exchange rates indirectly, since raising rates encourages capital to flow toward Mexico and boosts the value of the peso. Twice this year, once before and once after the election, Mexico has raised its rates. But as in the case of China, its efforts have not been fully successful. The peso has fallen to record lows anyway. There is a deep irony here. Contrary to Trump’s claim that our trading partners manipulate their currencies to undercut American workers, China and Mexico have been fighting to keep their currencies strong. Yet Trump’s protectionist bluster has spooked the markets so badly that renminbi and the peso have depreciated anyway. On the currency front, the more Trump rants, the harder he makes it for his American working-class supporters to hang onto their jobs.   Falling labor mobility means U.S. workers are less adaptable. Economists have long acknowledged that free trade produces losers as well as winners. To be sure, the Pollyannas among them have assured us that the losses are transitory. Trade-displaced workers, they have said, get back on their feet as they move to new jobs in export industries. Meanwhile, as cheap goods flood the stores, those workers, like everyone else, enjoy a lower cost of living. Recent research suggests, however, that the picture is not quite so bright. Globalization has brought many benefits, to be sure, but the losses have been more persistent and more concentrated than the optimists expected. A widely cited study by David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson examines the effect of sudden changes in patterns of trade, or what the authors call “trade shocks.” Focusing on the largest of these, “the China shock,” they reach a number of pessimistic conclusions. Most importantly, they find that the impact of trade shocks is far from temporary. Job losses and lower wages in hard-hit regions persist for years. Furthermore, because the effects are geographically concentrated, labor mobility is not sufficient to ensure that losses by workers are widely shared across regions and industries. Nor is it true, as some optimists have promised, that workers displaced by trade shocks quickly find comparable jobs in export industries. Moreover, Autor and his colleagues find that trade shocks disproportionately affect low-wage workers within affected regions and industries. Those who do find work often end up in services or other sectors where jobs do not fit their skills and wages are lower. Others turn to government assistance, as evidenced by sharp increases in the uptake of unemployment benefits, disability benefits, food stamps and other forms of government assistance. What is more, evidence from other studies suggests that it has become harder over time for the U.S. labor market to adjust to trade shocks. One major reason is decreased labor mobility. As evidenced in the chart below, in the 2000s, fewer Americans left one state for another, as compared to the 1980s. Disincentives in the social safety net affect workers who fall back on food stamps and other programs when trade displaces them from their jobs. Less than fully portable health care can also make it hard for displaced workers to move to where the jobs are, especially if their coverage comes through the employer of another family member. President Obama’s Affordable Care Act has made some improvements but since much health care coverage is still employer-based and because options vary widely from state to state, it has not fully solved the problem of portability. The spread of occupational licensing to a third of all jobs today, way up from 5 percent in the 1950s, is another factor that undermines mobility. The fact that licenses are not automatically transferable from state to state creates an obvious problem for any trade-displaced worker in a licensed profession. Even a displaced worker in a unlicensed profession may find it hard to move to a new job if the family depends on income from a spouse who is a state-licensed math teacher, manicurist or pest control worker.   The protectionist cure is worse than the globalization disease. The decreasing flexibility of the labor market matters because a sudden turn toward protectionism would impose a tremendous shock. Today, after years of painful adjustment to globalization, wrenching moves and costly retraining, most workers displaced by the China shock, the NAFTA shock and other trade shocks have found new jobs and new homes. Imposition of new tariff barriers and withdrawal from trade agreements would make it necessary to go through all of that pain again. Turning away from trade might make America more self-sufficient. But as with globalization, it would create losers as well as winners. Millions of American workers in export industries would lose their jobs as trading partners retaliated or as those countries simply became too poor to buy Boeing aircraft or U.S.-made MRI machines. Millions of other Americans who work in finance and transportation services that support trade would also find their jobs threatened, as would those who work in sales, marketing and retailing of goods the U.S. now imports. In short, the dream that protectionism could make America great again in the way many Trump supporters imagine is an illusion. Yes, at considerable cost, a sharp turn away from trade might make America more self-sufficient, but that process, like globalization itself, would create losers as well as winners. The lower-skilled, less-educated and older workers who voted most heavily for Trump would almost certainly be among the losers. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

23 ноября, 20:30

Trump's Dismantling of Trade Deals Won't Bring Most Jobs Back

Dramatic promises to restrict international trade were a signature element of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. So far, he seems to be following through. On Tuesday, he announced that he will withdraw U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership as one of his first acts in office. Trump’s aggressive stance on trade helped him win working-class voters in Midwestern manufacturing states, where upset wins swept him into the White House. As president, Trump will be able to act on trade without approval by Congress. Both the U.S. Constitution and past acts of Congress give the president ample authority to do things like withdraw from the TPP and the North American Free Trade Agreement, label China a currency manipulator and impose retaliatory tariffs on any country he sees as a threat to U.S. economic security. But American workers would actually not fare well under a protectionist regime, especially older workers and those with few skills and little education, who voted for Trump by wide margins.   The jobs that come back won’t be the ones Trump fans need. If Trump were to impose tariffs of 35 to 45 percent on Mexican and Chinese goods, as he has threatened, there is no doubt that some manufacturing operations would return to the U.S. However, that is not the same as saying that manufacturing jobs would return. The problem is that while international trade has contributed to a decline in manufacturing jobs in the U.S., it has not been the only or the largest contributor. Total manufacturing employment in the U.S. peaked in the 1970s, when China was still suffering under the Cultural Revolution and long before NAFTA was even conceived. However, the share of manufacturing in GDP has barely changed over the last half century. The decline in manufacturing employment is due to increased labor productivity, not a decline in manufacturing output. Many people are surprised to learn that even in the highly symbolic automobile sector, the U.S. produced more cars in 2015 than it did 25 years earlier. It's not that workers at Ford are losing jobs to workers in China and Mexico. Workers in all of these countries are losing their jobs to robots. Those trends are not unique to the U.S. As Harvard economist Dani Rodrik has shown, manufacturing employment, as a share of all jobs, reached its peak in Mexico in 1980, in Brazil in 1986, in Korea in 1989 and in India in 2002. Reliable data are harder to come by for China, but the most recent available numbers suggest that manufacturing jobs in that country are approaching their peak now or perhaps are even a year or two past it. To put it simply, it is not so much that workers at Ford are losing jobs to workers in China and Mexico as it is that workers in all of these countries are losing their jobs to robots. What is more, automation is not affecting all manufacturing jobs equally. Rodrik shows that low-skill manufacturing jobs have been most strongly affected, not just in the U.S. but everywhere you look. The next chart, based on data from a broad sample of 40 countries, shows that in just 13 years, from 1996 to 2009, low-skill manufacturing jobs as a percentage of all low-skill jobs in the economy fell by 4 percent. Meanwhile, even though total manufacturing employment was falling, high-skill manufacturing jobs actually increased as a share of all high-skill jobs. By implication, even if harshly protectionist policies brought manufacturing operations back to the U.S., our newly made-in-America T-shirts and Christmas ornaments would be fabricated and packaged largely by machines. There might be new jobs for technicians to install and operate those machines, but the low-skill workers who voted en masse for Trump would remain at the cash registers in the big box stores where the products were sold ― if they had jobs at all.   We can’t blame job losses on currency manipulation. Trump has repeatedly blamed U.S. trade deficits and job losses on currency manipulation, especially by China. He has promised to impose retaliatory tariffs on countries that have purposely weakened their currencies to keep their exports artificially cheap. But the reality is more complicated. Far from holding down the value of their currencies, two of the main countries Trump targets for retaliation, China and Mexico, have, at least recently, been fighting to keep their currencies strong. Policy details differ in the two countries. When Chinese authorities want to weaken the renminbi, they do so by asking China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, to buy dollars to add to foreign exchange reserves. The Chinese did that consistently until early 2014. But since then, as the following chart shows, China has been selling reserves at a frantic pace in an attempt to keep the renminbi strong. Despite those efforts, fear of a trade war has pushed the renminbi sharply lower since Election Day in the U.S.  Mexican policy works a little differently. Instead of directly manipulating exchange rates by buying and selling reserves, Mexico’s central bank, like the U.S. Federal Reserve, focuses its monetary policy on interest rates. Interest rates, in turn, can be used to affect exchange rates indirectly, since raising rates encourages capital to flow toward Mexico and boosts the value of the peso. Twice this year, once before and once after the election, Mexico has raised its rates. But as in the case of China, its efforts have not been fully successful. The peso has fallen to record lows anyway. There is a deep irony here. Contrary to Trump’s claim that our trading partners manipulate their currencies to undercut American workers, China and Mexico have been fighting to keep their currencies strong. Yet Trump’s protectionist bluster has spooked the markets so badly that renminbi and the peso have depreciated anyway. On the currency front, the more Trump rants, the harder he makes it for his American working-class supporters to hang onto their jobs.   Falling labor mobility means U.S. workers are less adaptable. Economists have long acknowledged that free trade produces losers as well as winners. To be sure, the Pollyannas among them have assured us that the losses are transitory. Trade-displaced workers, they have said, get back on their feet as they move to new jobs in export industries. Meanwhile, as cheap goods flood the stores, those workers, like everyone else, enjoy a lower cost of living. Recent research suggests, however, that the picture is not quite so bright. Globalization has brought many benefits, to be sure, but the losses have been more persistent and more concentrated than the optimists expected. A widely cited study by David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson examines the effect of sudden changes in patterns of trade, or what the authors call “trade shocks.” Focusing on the largest of these, “the China shock,” they reach a number of pessimistic conclusions. Most importantly, they find that the impact of trade shocks is far from temporary. Job losses and lower wages in hard-hit regions persist for years. Furthermore, because the effects are geographically concentrated, labor mobility is not sufficient to ensure that losses by workers are widely shared across regions and industries. Nor is it true, as some optimists have promised, that workers displaced by trade shocks quickly find comparable jobs in export industries. Moreover, Autor and his colleagues find that trade shocks disproportionately affect low-wage workers within affected regions and industries. Those who do find work often end up in services or other sectors where jobs do not fit their skills and wages are lower. Others turn to government assistance, as evidenced by sharp increases in the uptake of unemployment benefits, disability benefits, food stamps and other forms of government assistance. What is more, evidence from other studies suggests that it has become harder over time for the U.S. labor market to adjust to trade shocks. One major reason is decreased labor mobility. As evidenced in the chart below, in the 2000s, fewer Americans left one state for another, as compared to the 1980s. Disincentives in the social safety net affect workers who fall back on food stamps and other programs when trade displaces them from their jobs. Less than fully portable health care can also make it hard for displaced workers to move to where the jobs are, especially if their coverage comes through the employer of another family member. President Obama’s Affordable Care Act has made some improvements but since much health care coverage is still employer-based and because options vary widely from state to state, it has not fully solved the problem of portability. The spread of occupational licensing to a third of all jobs today, way up from 5 percent in the 1950s, is another factor that undermines mobility. The fact that licenses are not automatically transferable from state to state creates an obvious problem for any trade-displaced worker in a licensed profession. Even a displaced worker in a unlicensed profession may find it hard to move to a new job if the family depends on income from a spouse who is a state-licensed math teacher, manicurist or pest control worker.   The protectionist cure is worse than the globalization disease. The decreasing flexibility of the labor market matters because a sudden turn toward protectionism would impose a tremendous shock. Today, after years of painful adjustment to globalization, wrenching moves and costly retraining, most workers displaced by the China shock, the NAFTA shock and other trade shocks have found new jobs and new homes. Imposition of new tariff barriers and withdrawal from trade agreements would make it necessary to go through all of that pain again. Turning away from trade might make America more self-sufficient. But as with globalization, it would create losers as well as winners. Millions of American workers in export industries would lose their jobs as trading partners retaliated or as those countries simply became too poor to buy Boeing aircraft or U.S.-made MRI machines. Millions of other Americans who work in finance and transportation services that support trade would also find their jobs threatened, as would those who work in sales, marketing and retailing of goods the U.S. now imports. In short, the dream that protectionism could make America great again in the way many Trump supporters imagine is an illusion. Yes, at considerable cost, a sharp turn away from trade might make America more self-sufficient, but that process, like globalization itself, would create losers as well as winners. The lower-skilled, less-educated and older workers who voted most heavily for Trump would almost certainly be among the losers. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

03 марта, 21:04

Bank of Сhina предоставит «Газпрому» рекордный кредит: €2 млрд на 5 лет

Гости: замдиректор Института Дальнего Востока РАН Андрей Островский; политолог Дмитрий Орешкин; зампред комитета Госдумы по конституционному законодательству и госстроительству Вадим Соловьёв. Подпишитесь на канал РБК: http://www.youtube.com/user/tvrbcnews?sub_confirmation=1 ------------------------ Получайте новости РБК в социальных сетях: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/rbc.ru Twitter: https://twitter.com/ru_rbc ВКонтакте: https://vk.com/rbc Одноклассники: http://ok.ru/rbc

03 ноября 2015, 23:05

Регуляторы обновили список системно значимых банков

Совет по финансовой стабильности и Базельский комитет по финансовому надзору обновили список из 30 наиболее значимых банков в финансовой системе мировой экономики.

22 сентября 2014, 17:22

IPO китайской Alibaba установило мировой рекорд

Первичное публичное размещение акций (IPO) китайской Alibaba официально стало крупнейшим в истории, после того как банки-организаторы исполнили опцион «green shoe» – право разместить дополнительные акции в условиях высокого спроса. Андеррайтеры IPO (35 банков) продали 48 млн акций, исполнив опцион в полном объеме, сообщила компания в пресс-релизе. В результате сумма размещения увеличилась на 15% – до $25 млрд – и на те же 15% увеличились комиссионные банков. Предыдущий мировой рекорд принадлежал также китайскому эмитенту: в 2010 году Agricultural Bank of China провел IPO на $22,1 млрд (с учетом опциона). Гигант электронной коммерции Alibaba разместился в Нью-Йорке в минувшую пятницу: компания и акционеры продали 320 млн бумаг (около 13% уставного капитала) по $68 за штуку. Весь бизнес был оценен в $168 млрд. Дебют Alibaba на Нью-йоркской фондовой бирже, как и ожидалось, оказался сверхудачным: в первый день акции подорожали на 38% (до $93,9), а рыночная капитализация достигла $231 млрд. Ни одна компания до этого не росла так сильно в первый день торгов после IPO размером от $10 млрд, проверил Bloomberg. Банки-андеррайтеры могли реализовать опцион до 15 октября по цене размещения ($68 за акцию). На практике банки выкупают бумаги у эмитента с небольшой скидкой к цене IPO, зарабатывая на этой разнице. В сделке Alibaba скидки и комиссионные андеррайтерам составили 1,2% от суммы размещения, раскрыла компания в понедельник в финальной версии проспекта IPO. Это означает, что банки заработали $300 млн. В размещении участвовало 35 банков, а ключевую роль играли шесть – Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase и Morgan Stanley (совместные букраннеры). К рекордному IPO хотели быть причастны абсолютно все ведущие инвестбанки, но трем – Bank of America, UBS и Barclays – пришлось уйти в сторону: ранее в этом году они вели IPO китайского ретейлера JD.com (конкурента Alibaba), получился конфликт интересов. Из 48 млн доразмещенных акций 26,1 млн пришлись на долю самой Alibaba, 18,3 млн – на долю американской Yahoo. Основатель Alibaba, председатель совета директоров Джек Ма дополнительно реализовал 2,7 млн бумаг, а вице-председатель Джозеф Тсаи – 903 тыс. Таким образом, Yahoo увеличила свою выручку от продажи акций Alibaba в рамках IPO до $9,5 млрд, а Джек Ма – до $1 млрд. Alibaba установила не только рекорд по размеру IPO, но и по стоимости компании на IPO, отмечает Dealogic. Оценка Alibaba с учетом опциона «green shoe» составила $169,4 млрд, прежний рекорд удерживал все тот же Agricultural Bank of China с капитализацией $133,4 млрд на IPO. Акции Alibaba на NYSE в понедельник вечером торговались в минусе после впечатляющего пятничного роста. По состоянию на 19:45 мск бумаги подешевели на 4,1% (до $90). Alibaba в цифрах (2013 год): Годовой оборот - $296 млрд Число покупателей - 279 млн человек Число продавцов - 8,5 млн человек Число заказов - 14,5 млрд заказов Иван Ткачев

24 января 2014, 08:14

Под чьим контролем глобальная фин.система?

Не стоит лишний раз теребить рану на Украине, по крайней мере, до поступления новых разведданных. Нефин.сектор достаточно рассмотрел, но что там с банками? Активы публичных банков и инвестиционных фондов планеты (2110 фин.организации) составляют по оценочным данным около 109.2 трлн долл, из которых 90 трлн (82%) приходится на первые 150 банка. 50 самых крупных фин.организаций держат 67 трлн, а первые 25 почти 50 трлн по данным за 2012 год. Здесь не учитываются страховые, пенсионные, ипотечные, взаимные, денежные, хэдж фонды и гос.фонды. И еще. Здесь не учитываются деривативы и забалансовые активы коммерческих банков, что весьма мощно развито в США. Только банки и инвест.банки по данным из корп.отчетов. Вот собственно под чьим контролем глобальная фин.система - крупнейшие банки и инвестфонды с активами свыше 500 млрд на 3 квартал 2013.  Самый крупный банк в мире находится в Китае - Industrial and Commercial Bank of China – уже более 3 трлн долларов активов. Для сравнения наш мега монстр Сбер всего 515 млрд долларов и в конце списка. Удивляет нашествие китайских банков? Ну-ну ) Сейчас 4 китайских банка превзошли таких гигантов, как Citi и Bank of America. Получается, что всего 1% публичных банков держит до половины всех активов глобальной фин.системы. Сейчас в мире 242 банка и инвест.фонда с активами более 50 млрд, 145 с активами более 100 млрд, всего 50 с активами более 500 млрд и 25 банков с активами свыше 1 трлн. Из этих 109 трлн около 62 трлн сосредоточено в 5 странах (США, Китай, Япония, Англия и Франция).  Мои расчеты по США - 16.6 трлн (624 организации) по всем и 12.3 трлн только по коммерческим банкам отчасти совпадают с расчетами ФРС из Z1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/FOF/Guide/P_76_coded.pdf Однако, следует понимать, что говоря о США в расчетах я имею в виду банки, имеющие американскую нац.принадлежность, а сами эти активы распределены по всему миру в различных фин.инструментах, т.е. далеко не только в США. Но из этого выходит, что американские банки не столь огромные по сравнению с тем, насколько выросли китайские? На истории это смотрится еще более невероятно.  В 2007 китайские банки имели немногим более 4 трлн активов и выросли с тех пор в 2.5 раза(!) В 2009 обогнали французские и английские, в прошлом году превзошли японские и в этом году обойдут американские! Всего за один год китайские банки «рожают» больше активов, чем все развитые страны вместе взятые. Активы банков БРИК выросли с 6 трлн в 2007 до 17 трлн в 2013 (!) 11 трлн за 6 лет! Активы Франции, Англии, Германии, Испании, Италии, Швейцарии, Швеции, Нидерландов, Дании, Австрии, Норвегии, Греции, Португалии и Бельгии в совокупности в 2007 были 32.7 трлн долл, а в 2013 32.2 трлн, т.е. упали на пол триллиона. В таблице выборка по ТОП 500 мировых банков и инвест.банков для 30 крупнейших стран.  Но это были данные в долларах, где динамика может искажаться из-за валютного курса. Теперь в нац.валюте, процентное отношение к 2007.  Из 30 крупнейших стран наибольший процентный прирост по отношению к 2007 по настоящий момент в России – в 3.5 раза активы выросли, потом Индия (в 3 раза), в 2.8 раза увеличились активы в Турции, в 2.6 раза – Бразилия и в 2.5 раза у китайских банков. Все в нац.валюте. Сократились в Германии (-3%), Нидерланды (-14%), Бельгия (-30%) Швейцария (-35%). Интересно, что активы греческих банков выросли во многом из-за переоценки активов по причине мощного роста облигаций в 2013 и рекапитализации. Рост активов в США и Японии почти полностью за счет ФРС и Банк Японии, но причем рост активов значительно меньше, чем влили денег. Куда ушли деньги от QE – более 5 трлн, которые раздали банкам? А черт его знает. Основной поток QE ушел в различные забалансовые схемы через ряд жульнических махинаций. Часть на компенсацию убытков, часть на выкуп акций, которые прямым образом не отобразили в балансах. Много мути. ДОП. Из расчета в таблицах выпала Австралия, Ирландия и Южная Африка. Как нибудь потом добавлю. Первичные данные из Eikon