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27 июня, 12:00

Draghi Doesn't See "Bubbles" - Let Me Show You Some

Authored by Daniel Lacalle via The Mises Institute, Mario Draghi has again missed an exceptional opportunity to adjust monetary policy. By ignoring the huge risks that are being created from the brutal inflation of financial assets, saying that “there are no signs of a bubble,” the European Central Bank (ECB) remains adamantly focused on creating inflation by decree, denying the effects of technology, demography, and overcapacity. “No signs of bubble”? I’ll show you some of them myself. The percentage of debt of major countries “bought” by the ECB: Germany, 17%, France 14%, Italy 12%, and Spain 16%. In all cases, in 2016 and 2015 the ECB was the largest buyer of said countries’ net emissions. Ask yourself a question: On the day the ECB stops buying, which of you would buy peripheral or European bonds at these prices? Clearly, the first sign of a bubble is the absence of demand in the secondary that offsets the impact of the ECB. It indicates that the current price is simply unacceptable in an open market, even if the recovery is confirmed, especially because rates do not even reflect a minimum real return, being below inflation. European Union high-yield bonds are trading at record-low yields despite the fact that cash generation and debt repayment capacity, according to Moody’s and Fitch, have not improved significantly. European largest stocks (Eurostoxx 50) trade at 20x PE and 8.3x EV/EBITDA despite eight years of flat earnings and downgrades, which have only just recently reversed. Infrastructure deals’ multiples have increased five-fold in three years to an astonishing average of 16-19x EBITDA. Excess liquidity in the euro zone already reaches 1.2 trillion euros. It has multiplied by almost seven since the “stimulus” program was launched. Anything for Inflation There is a problem in the huge amount of assets bought by the ECB, whose balance sheet already exceeds 25% of the European Union’s GDP. At the beginning of the repurchase program, it could be argued that risky assets, especially sovereign bonds, could have been cheap or under-valued because of the risk of break-up of the euro and overall negative sentiment. However, that statement cannot be made today, with bond yields at historic lows and debt levels at historic highs. Monetary policy is a perverse incentive to spend more and add more debt. Of course, what the ECB expects is the arrival of the inflation mantra, that mirage that deficit states yearn for and no consumer has ever wanted. But the search for inflation by decree meets the pitfall of reality. The positive disinflation that technological advances generate adds to the logical change of consumption patterns due to aging of the population and the elephant in the room: The European Union has never had a problem of lack of investment, but of excess spending on dozens of industrial and infrastructure plans that have left behind some positive effects, but — due to excess — greater debt and overcapacity . Now that prices are moderating again with the dilution of the base effect, the opportunity to moderate this unnecessary monetary stimulus is lost. As I explained at CNBC on May 29, the supposed positive effects of the buyback program cannot make us ignore the accumulation of risk in sovereign and corporate bonds and the dangerous impact on the financial sector. Draghi, at Least, Warns The president of the ECB does not stop alerting governments about the importance of reforms to drive growth, lower taxes and reduced imbalances, but no one hears. When Draghi warns banks of their weaknesses, they don’t listen either. When he reminds deficit spending governments that monetary policy has an expiration date, they look the other way. It’s party time . Monetary policy is “like Coca-Cola,” said Jens Weidmann , president of the Bundesbank. A drink that stimulates, but has too much sugar and no real healing qualities. The problem of losing this opportunity to moderate monetary policy is that it is highly unlikely that the necessary measures will be taken to correct excesses when they are no longer a debate of economic analyst, but evident to all citizens. Because then, the central bank will be afraid of a financial market correction, after a bubble inflated by its policies. European governments make a huge mistake thinking that prosperity is going to be generated from debt and not from savings. But they make an even bigger mistake if they think that by perpetuating the imbalances, they will prevent a crisis. At the press conference, Draghi said that “nobody knows when or where the next crisis will come: the only sure thing is that it will come.” What Draghi did not explain is that the artificial creation of money without support, well above real economic growth, is always behind those crises. But that is another problem, that will be dealt with by the next president of the Central Bank, who will offer the “new” solution … Yes, you have guessed it: Cut rates and increase liquidity.

27 июня, 11:44

По оценкам Бундесбанка, темпы роста ВВП Германии в текущем году составят 1,9%

Вчера, 26 июня, Бундесбанк опубликовал ежемесячный отчет, в котором отмечается оживленный рост экономики Германии в первом квартале, а также представил свои прогнозы на 2017, 2018 и 2019 гг. Ожидается, что ВВП Германии в текущем году увеличится на 1,9%, а в 2018 и 2019 годах темпы роста экономики страны замедлятся до 1,7% и 1,6% соответственно. В числе основных факторов экономического роста Бундесбанк называет благоприятную ситуацию на рынке труда, при этом сообщается, что в ближайшее время станет заметен дефицит квалифицированных кадров, что может стать предпосылкой для роста зарплат. Кроме того, в ежемесячном отчете сообщается, что соотношение внешнего долга к ВВП может упасть к 2019 году ниже 60% впервые с 2002 года.

27 июня, 09:48

По оценкам Бундесбанка, темпы роста ВВП Германии в текущем году составят 1,9%

Вчера, 26 июня, Бундесбанк опубликовал ежемесячный отчет, в котором отмечается оживленный рост экономики Германии в первом квартале, а также представил свои прогнозы на 2017, 2018 и 2019 гг. Ожидается, что ВВП Германии в текущем году увеличится на 1,9%, а в 2018 и 2019 годах темпы роста экономики страны замедлятся до 1,7% и 1,6% соответственно. В числе основных факторов экономического роста Бундесбанк называет благоприятную ситуацию на рынке труда, при этом сообщается, что в ближайшее время станет заметен дефицит квалифицированных кадров, что может стать предпосылкой для роста зарплат. Кроме того, в ежемесячном отчете сообщается, что соотношение внешнего долга к ВВП может упасть к 2019 году ниже 60% впервые с 2002 года.

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23 июня, 03:35

How Central Banks Intend To Fight CryptoCurrencies

Submitted by Louis Cammarosano of Smaulgld * * * Based on remarks to Bundesbank Policy Symposium in a Speech “Frontiers in Central Banking – Past, Present and Future” contain clues of the battleplan. What if they fail? As cryptocurrencies, which trade outside the banking system attract more capital, governments and central banks are devising ways to try and stop and or control their rise. In “Cryptocurrencies Fiat Killers or Strengtheners” we noted how some Ethereum projects aim to make blockchain assets spendable through the banking system via connecting them to Visa and Mastercard. In “Bill Would Require a Declaration of Digital Currency Holdings at the Border” we noted that the US Congress has tasked the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to devise a plan to stop the flows of cryptocurrencies into the country. Last week, at the Bundesbank Policy Symposium, in a speech entitled “Frontiers in Central Banking – Past, Present and Future” Dr Jens Weidmann, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements gave a speech outlining some ideas on how to best address the challenges that cyrptocurrencies pose to central banks. The Plan After explaining that central banks are creatures born of crisis in that they are designed to come to the rescue when there are financial crisis, Dr. Weidman, noted that market interventions by central banks often provide financial stability, but not with out creating additional risks. Towards the end of his speech, Dr. Weidman remarked that policy intervention may be required, not to address a crisis, but to address technology. Digitalization has the potential to provide financial benefits to the economy, with the risk, however, of disintermediating central banks. As such, the ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy diminishes proportionally to the increase of digitalization. Dr. Weidman dismisses the notion that privately issued digital currencies may eliminate central bank currencies, reasoning that “central banks are better able to deliver price stability than a rigid monetary rule or an algorithm.” Therefore, one consideration might be that the central banks themselves would issue their own digital currencies- something that the central banks of Russia and China are considering. If central banks created digital currencies it would make those holding their liquid assets in the form of central bank digital currencies, the public would have greater protection because “central banks cannot become insolvent.” Dr. Weidman notes that in times of crisis, money holders would withdraw their bank deposits and transfer them into the official digital currency, thereby rapidly withdrawing liquidity from the private banking sector in a digital bank run. Without deposits, Dr. Weidman observes, banks could not make loans. Weidman’s Conclusion “My personal take on this is that central banks should strive to make existing payment systems more efficient and still faster than they already are – instant payment is the buzzword here. I am pretty confident that this will reduce most citizens’ interest in digital currencies.” Discussion 1. Will “instant payment systems” run by central banks render public interest in private cryptocurrencies irrelevant or keep them at the fringe? 2. What if the central banks create instant payment systems, but the public interest in cryptocurrencies does not abate? 3. Will central banks instead create their own digital currencies and in effect kill off the private banking sector and become the banking system in their respective countries with the abilities to create loans, make credit decisions, issue credit and track all transactions?

20 июня, 01:41

Links. High powered money in Greece, ECB transparancy reveales raw power, 50 years ago the Bundesbank combatted trade surpluses

High powered money in Greece. The EU is re-financing 8,5 billion of Greek debt. About 7 billion of this is just trading in one kind of government bonds for another kind of government bonds. Much ado about less than nothing. There is some welcome softening of the terms – but not enough. However: About 1,6 […]

17 июня, 22:00

Бундесбанк: цифровые валюты опасны для банков

Глава Центрального банка Германии Йенс Вайдманн заявил о том, что распространение цифровых валют представляет угрозу для банковской системы и властям необходимо подумать, как "снизить интерес граждан к цифровым валютам".

16 июня, 01:26

Billionaires Buy Gold

Billionaires Invest In Goldby Visual Capitalist There are always lessons that can be learned from the “smart money”. Source: Visual Capitalist Unlike regular investors, billionaire money managers like Ray Dalio and Stan Druckenmiller are professional investors. They have entire institutional teams at their disposal, dive deep into the nuances and complexities of the market, and spend every waking moment of their lives thinking about how to get more from their investments. They want to make money – but they also want to execute on strategies that will protect their wealth and build robust portfolios that can withstand any type of macro event. Family Offices and Billionaires invest in gold In recent months, some of these elite investors have turned to precious metals like gold as a part of their overall investment strategies. In the following infographic from Sprott Physical Bullion Trusts, Visual Capitalist explain why these investors are adding precious metals to their portfolios, the underlying tactics, and the best quotes each investor has on assessing today’s market. Why do these billionaires buy gold? Their cited reasons can basically be summed up with six categories: wealth preservation, store of value, inflation hedge, portfolio diversification, future upside, and investment fundamentals. What Billionaire Investors Are Doing? 1. Lord Jacob RothschildIn late summer 2016, Rothschild announced changes to the RIT Partners portfolio because he was worried about very low interest rates, negative yields, and quantitative easing, saying they are part of the “greatest monetary experiment in monetary policy in the history of the world”. His solution? Buy gold to help preserve wealth, and as a store of value for the future. Read original article on Visual Capitalist   News and Commentary Gold eases after Fed raises interest rate (MarketWatch.com) Fed raises rates, unveils balance sheet cuts in sign of confidence (Reuters.com) ETF rebalancing on Friday - Bumpy ride for junior gold miners (TheGlobeAndMail.com) Oil settles at a 7-month low under $45 a barrel (MarketWatch.com) Gold jumps, but traders see limited upside ahead of the Fed (CNBC.com) Is Gold Undervalued? (MorningStar.co.uk) Bundesbank's Weidmann: Digital Currencies Will Make The Next Crisis Worse (ZeroHedge.com) You won’t believe this stupid new law against Cash and Bitcoin (SovereignMan.com) How the U.S. government tried to convict a golden rooster (QZ.com) What’s next for the pound? Frisby (MoneyWeek.com) Avoid Digital & ETF Gold – Key Gold Storage Must Haves Gold Prices (LBMA AM) 15 Jun: USD 1,260.25, GBP 992.57 & EUR 1,127.67 per ounce14 Jun: USD 1,268.25, GBP 995.83 & EUR 1,131.41 per ounce13 Jun: USD 1,261.30, GBP 992.26 & EUR 1,125.33 per ounce12 Jun: USD 1,269.25, GBP 998.14 & EUR 1,131.28 per ounce09 Jun: USD 1,274.25, GBP 1,001.31 & EUR 1,139.18 per ounce08 Jun: USD 1,284.80, GBP 992.12 & EUR 1,142.70 per ounce07 Jun: USD 1,292.70, GBP 1,001.07 & EUR 1,146.62 per ounce Silver Prices (LBMA) 15 Jun: USD 16.86, GBP 13.19 & EUR 15.10 per ounce14 Jun: USD 16.96, GBP 13.32 & EUR 15.14 per ounce13 Jun: USD 16.82, GBP 13.21 & EUR 15.01 per ounce12 Jun: USD 17.13, GBP 13.50 & EUR 15.27 per ounce09 Jun: USD 17.35, GBP 13.60 & EUR 15.52 per ounce08 Jun: USD 17.60, GBP 13.60 & EUR 15.67 per ounce07 Jun: USD 17.60, GBP 13.64 & EUR 15.71 per ounce Recent Market Updates - Brexit and UK election impact UK housing- In Gold we Trust: Must See Gold Charts and Research- Pension Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Central Banks “Stock Up” on Gold “Amid Uncertainty”- 4 Charts Show Gold May Be Heading Much Higher- Gold in Pounds Surges 1.5% To £1,001/oz – UK Political Turmoil Likely- Gold Prices Steady On UK Election Risk; ECB Meeting and Geopolitical Risk- Gold Breaks 6-Year Downtrend On Safe Haven and 50% Surge In Chinese Demand- Deposit Bail In Risk as Spanish Bank’s Stocks Crash- Terrorist attacks see Gold Stay Firm- Trust in the Bigger Picture, Trust in Gold- Trump, UK and the Middle East drive uncertainty- Is China manipulating the gold market?- Why Sharia Gold and Bitcoin Point to a Change in Views Access Award Winning Daily and Weekly Updates Here

15 июня, 14:42

Is there gold "hype" and is gold an emotional trade?

Is there gold "hype" and is gold an emotional trade? - Very little hype in gold - Sentiment is important in the gold market as is other markets particularly stocks - Article ignores the large body of research showing gold is safe haven asset - Gold may struggle to breach $1,300 in short term - Trading gold and short term speculation is high risk and for professionals - Important for investors to focus on long term fundamentals which remain sound Cycle of Emotions - Hope Phase Now (GoldCore)   Earlier this week Shelley Goldberg , commodities strategist for Roubini Global Economics wrote  about how gold was set to disappoint the ‘gold bulls - again.’ Goldberg argued that we should ‘throw out all the fancy analysis and realize that gold is an emotional trade.’ Aside from yesterday’s little hiccup following the Fed announcement, the gold price has had a great year. Goldberg agrees, ’After breaking through a six-year downtrend line, gold rose last week to its highest level since Nov. 4, and is up an impressive 10.5 percent this year.’ Despite this performance Goldberg argues that we shouldn’t ‘believe the hype’ when it comes to gold. The hype she is referring to seems to be made up of the various op-eds and analysis that argue $1,300/oz is a key barrier for the metal to break through in order to set off on a bull run. A very straightforward presentation of the ‘number of reasons why gold is in demand’ makes up the bulk of Goldberg’s article, yet she concludes ‘with so many valid reasons for gold to rally further, why am I a doubter?  The most rudimentary reason is that gold is also an emotional trade and $1,300 is a round number. One need not be a superstar technical analyst. Just consider that for both psychological and systematic reasons, traders and algorithms like to sell on landmark numbers that also serve as a testing ground for a rally’s sustainability.’ Is the evidence that traders like to trade off ‘landmark numbers’ but analysis says it should go higher evidence that there is ‘hype’? We disagree. Rather we argue that not only is there relatively little hype in the gold market but that it is significantly outshone by all the reasons Goldberg gives herself, for why gold demand is up. Where is the hype? A brief google search of ‘$1,300 gold’ and my own daily experience of reading gold commentary does not bring me to the conclusion that there is hype. Gold has had a great year, but it has also surprised and disappointed many of us for the last couple of years. We are all aware that $1,300 is the next significant level, but most think that it needs to go higher than this in order to get any significant momentum. This is something most seem relatively balanced about. There is a huge amount going on both politically and economically at the moment. As we often conclude so many of these commentaries, there is uncertainty everywhere and that includes gold’s performance. We are not even seeing any ‘hype’ when it comes to physical gold buying. Gold demand is down in the US and we are not in any religious periods that mean manic gold buying as we often see during wedding season in India or New Year in China. The focus on $1,300 reduces the argument for gold down to one thing - people only care about gold because of the price. This isn’t true, partly because of the six very comprehensive and real reasons Goldberg herself gives to the bullish argument to own gold but also thanks to academic evidence, history and sentiment. Why is gold demand up? Goldberg offers six reasons for gold’s popularity at present: Role as an inflation hedge US Dollar performance Interest rates Only commodity showing strength Concerns over overvalued sectors Geopolitical risks pushing safe haven demand These are all very significant reasons for gold’s performance of late. What we tend to see in mainstream commentary regarding gold is the suggestion that when one of these issues begins to ‘improve’ then gold will begin to suffer. This is a very short-term perspective and one which is supported by traders and speculators. It does not take into account long term fundamentals, all of which these six listed factors feed into. The long term fundamentals are not just influenced by these factors but also history, gold’s performance in a portfolio and sentiment. Does the price matter? Of course the price matters, we all like to know what we can sell something for should we need to. But does it matter as much as Goldberg seems to think it does? For much of the time you are holding gold, you should perhaps look at the price in the same way one might view the price of their house. It’s nice to know what its worth but at that moment in time you know you have no plans to sell it and you still need a roof over your head. Short-term the price of gold may well struggle to breach $1,300. For now it is likely to stay between $1,260-$1,280, especially given the recent Fed announcement and various uncertainties in the global economy. This might sound like bad news for an investor who entered the gold market at nearly $2,000/oz in September 2011. But did the investor buy gold because of its US dollar price or because of the long-term fundamentals and gold’s role as a safe haven? Just like when you own a house, you also buy home insurance. So when you invest and have savings you should have a form of financial insurance. Of course, the price of this financial insurance matters, but you will also be considering all the factors that affect your investments both long and short-term, you are not just focused on the price. It’s a safe haven. It’s academic “…there is plenty of global geopolitical risk to popularize haven investments, from the spreading of radical Islamic terrorism, to unpredictable North Korean, Philippine and Russian strongmen, to Brexit and the potential for other European Union members to exit, to Gulf Cooperation Council nations severing ties with Qatar and heightening tensions in the Middle East. Add to that global warming, climate risk and wars over water. Then consider the U.S., where a special counsel has been set up to investigate Russian meddling in the 2016 election and where hopes are fading for a economic bump from President Donald Trump's pro-growth fiscal agenda.” Goldberg seems to think that gold’s role as a safe haven (or form of financial insurance) is only valid due to geopolitical risk. In fact, gold acts as a safe haven against the initial five reasons she lists for gold demand climbing. Back in February, we defined a safe haven as ‘An investment that is expected to retain its value or even increase its value in times of market turbulence. Safe havens are sought after by investors to limit their exposure to losses in the event of market downturns.’ In that same article we drew the reader’s attention to the growing body of research on gold and its financial role. Goldberg appears to be unaware of this academic evidence which appears to turn so called hype and emotional trading into real, analytical evidence for gold’s vital role in a portfolio, regardless of its price performance. The academic research does not define gold as just having one role, for instance ’Hedges and Safe Havens – An Examination of Stocks, Bonds, Oil, Gold and the Dollar’ by Dr Constantin Gurdgiev and Dr Brian Lucey is an excellent research paper which clearly shows gold’s importance to a diversified portfolio due to gold’s “unique properties as simultaneously a hedge instrument and a safe haven.” As Goldberg points out, sentiment for safe havens are high at present because of the geopolitical sphere. But, she also dismisses gold because it is an emotional investment. In truth, the two cannot really be separated; there is a fine line between sentiment and emotion. If sentiment is high then we can perhaps feel too confident about an investment and we act on that emotion, and vice versa. But Goldberg seems to think that gold investors are unable to keep these feelings in check or that these are invalid reasons for investing at all. Conclusion: What’s wrong with a bit of emotion? “The desire of gold is not for gold. It is for the means of freedom and benefit” Ralph Waldo Emerson Like any market, sentiment plays a big role in the price and demand for gold. There is also strong anecdotal evidence of gold demand being driven by emotion - the purchase of jewellery is the most obvious example but also consider demand for gold bars and coins during religious festivals. Additionally when people feel panicked or threatened (see Emerson’s quote) then demand for gold will go up. None of these reasons make gold an investment that feeds of hype and should be ignored. Human emotions and sentiment drive markets, they have throughout history and they will continue to do so. What’s wrong with a bit of emotion? Very few humans can honestly say that some of the biggest life decisions they have made have not been as a result of emotion. The key here is to be aware of when emotion is the only reason you are making an investment decision, rather than considering the other factors such as gold’s role in the wider economy, in your portfolio and its past performance. Is gold an emotional trade? It depends on the trader. To give a blanket statement that ‘gold is also an emotional trade’ is to suggest that everyone who buys and sells gold is blinded by emotion. Goldberg is dismissive of the multitude of factors that affect the decision to buy and hold gold, instead focusing on the price. Investors should always be aware of the risks when investing in gold, but investing in gold means you are considering and insuring yourself against the risks in the wider economy and political sphere. When you take these into account then you are unlikely to be worrying about so-called hype and an arbitrary number picked out of a price chart. News and Commentary Gold eases after Fed raises interest rate (MarketWatch.com) Fed raises rates, unveils balance sheet cuts in sign of confidence (Reuters.com) ETF rebalancing on Friday - Bumpy ride for junior gold miners (TheGlobeAndMail.com) Oil settles at a 7-month low under $45 a barrel (MarketWatch.com) Gold jumps, but traders see limited upside ahead of the Fed (CNBC.com) Is Gold Undervalued? (MorningStar.co.uk) Bundesbank's Weidmann: Digital Currencies Will Make The Next Crisis Worse (ZeroHedge.com) You won’t believe this stupid new law against Cash and Bitcoin (SovereignMan.com) How the U.S. government tried to convict a golden rooster (QZ.com) What’s next for the pound? Frisby (MoneyWeek.com) Avoid Digital & ETF Gold – Key Gold Storage Must Haves Gold Prices (LBMA AM) 15 Jun: USD 1,260.25, GBP 992.57 & EUR 1,127.67 per ounce14 Jun: USD 1,268.25, GBP 995.83 & EUR 1,131.41 per ounce13 Jun: USD 1,261.30, GBP 992.26 & EUR 1,125.33 per ounce12 Jun: USD 1,269.25, GBP 998.14 & EUR 1,131.28 per ounce09 Jun: USD 1,274.25, GBP 1,001.31 & EUR 1,139.18 per ounce08 Jun: USD 1,284.80, GBP 992.12 & EUR 1,142.70 per ounce07 Jun: USD 1,292.70, GBP 1,001.07 & EUR 1,146.62 per ounce Silver Prices (LBMA) 15 Jun: USD 16.86, GBP 13.19 & EUR 15.10 per ounce14 Jun: USD 16.96, GBP 13.32 & EUR 15.14 per ounce13 Jun: USD 16.82, GBP 13.21 & EUR 15.01 per ounce12 Jun: USD 17.13, GBP 13.50 & EUR 15.27 per ounce09 Jun: USD 17.35, GBP 13.60 & EUR 15.52 per ounce08 Jun: USD 17.60, GBP 13.60 & EUR 15.67 per ounce07 Jun: USD 17.60, GBP 13.64 & EUR 15.71 per ounce Recent Market Updates - Brexit and UK election impact UK housing- In Gold we Trust: Must See Gold Charts and Research- Pension Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Central Banks “Stock Up” on Gold “Amid Uncertainty”- 4 Charts Show Gold May Be Heading Much Higher- Gold in Pounds Surges 1.5% To £1,001/oz – UK Political Turmoil Likely- Gold Prices Steady On UK Election Risk; ECB Meeting and Geopolitical Risk- Gold Breaks 6-Year Downtrend On Safe Haven and 50% Surge In Chinese Demand- Deposit Bail In Risk as Spanish Bank’s Stocks Crash- Terrorist attacks see Gold Stay Firm- Trust in the Bigger Picture, Trust in Gold- Trump, UK and the Middle East drive uncertainty- Is China manipulating the gold market?- Why Sharia Gold and Bitcoin Point to a Change in Views Access Award Winning Daily and Weekly Updates Here

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15 июня, 08:44

Бундесбанк: цифровые валюты опасны для банков

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14 июня, 23:37

Бундесбанк: цифровые валюты опасны для банков

Глава Центрального банка Германии Йенс Вайдманн заявил о том, что широкое распространение цифровых валют представляет потенциальную угрозу для банковской системы и властям необходимо подумать, как "снизить интерес граждан к цифровым валютам".

14 июня, 23:37

Бундесбанк: цифровые валюты опасны для банков

Глава Центрального банка Германии Йенс Вайдманн заявил о том, что широкое распространение цифровых валют представляет потенциальную угрозу для банковской системы и властям необходимо подумать, как "снизить интерес граждан к цифровым валютам".

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14 июня, 16:48

Bundesbank's Weidmann: Digital Currencies Will Make The Next Crisis Worse

When global financial markets crash, it won't be just "Trump's fault" (and perhaps the quants and HFTs who switch from BTFD to STFR ) to keep the heat away from the Fed and central banks for blowing the biggest asset bubble in history: according to the head of the German central bank, Jens Weidmann, another "pre-crash" culprit emerged after he warned that digital currencies such as bitcoin would worsen the next financial crisis. As the FT reports, speaking in Frankfurt on Wednesday the Bundesbank’s president acknowledged the creation of an official digital currency by a central bank would assure the public that their money was safe. However, he warned that this could come at the expense of private banks’ ability to survive bank runs and financial panics. As Citigroup's Hans Lorenzen showed yesterday, as a result of the global liquidity glut, which has pushed conventional assets to all time highs, a tangent has been a scramble for "alternatives" and resulted in the creation and dramatic rise of countless digital currencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Citi effectively blamed the central banks for the cryptocoin phenomenon. Weidmann had a different take, and instead he focused on the consequences of this shift towards digitalisation which the Bundesbank president predicted, would be the main challenge faced by central banks. In an ironic twist, in order to challenge the "unofficial" digital currencies that have propagated in recent years, central banks have also been called on to create distinct official digital currencies, and allow citizens to bypass private sector lenders. As Weidmann explained, this will only make the next crisis worse: Allowing the public to hold claims on the central bank might make their liquid assets safer, because a central bank cannot become insolvent. This is an feature which will become relevant especially in times of crisis – when there will be a strong incentive for money holders to switch bank deposits into the official digital currency simply at the push of a button. But what might be a boon for savers in search of safety might be a bane for banks, as this makes a bank run potentially even easier. Essentially, Weidmann warned that digital currencies - whose flow can not be blocked by conventional means - make an instant bank run far more likely, and in creating the conditions for a run on bank deposits lenders would be short of liquidity and struggle to make loans. “My personal take on this is that central banks should strive to make existing payment systems more efficient and still faster than they already are – instant payment is the buzzword here,” the Bundesbank president said. “I am pretty confident that this will reduce most citizens’ interest in digital currencies.” Which, considering the all time highs in both bitcoin and ethereum, would suggest that citizens faith and confidence in the existing "payment systems", and thus central banks, is at all time lows.

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13 июня, 14:46

KPMG: «Мы развиваем приложение на базе блокчейна для ипотечных кредитов»

Как аудиторская компания из «большой четверки» видит будущее банков и какое влияние окажет на индустрию развитие высоких технологий?

11 июня, 17:34

New Gold Pool at the BIS Switzerland: A Who's Who of Central Bankers

This is an extract and summary from "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1" which was first published on the BullionStar.com website in mid-May.  Part 2 of the series titled "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle: Part 2 – Pool vs Gold for Oil" is also posted now on the BullionStar.com website. “In the Governor’s absence I attended the meeting in Zijlstra’s room in the BIS on the afternoon of Monday, 10th December to continue discussions about a possible gold pool. Emminger, de la Geniere, de Strycker, Leutwiler, Larre and Pohl were present.”     13 December 1979 – Kit McMahon to Gordon Richardson, Bank of England A central bank Gold Pool which many people will be familiar with operated in the gold market between November 1961 and March 1968. That Gold Pool was known as the London Gold Pool. This article is not about the 1961-1968 London Gold Pool. This article is about collusive central bank discussions relating to an entirely different and more recent central bank Gold Pool arrangement.  More than 11 years after the London Gold Pool had been abandoned, the very same central banks convened in late 1979 and early 1980 for a series of collusive central bank discussions aimed at reaching agreement on joint central bank action to subdue and manipulate downwards the free market gold price. These new discussions took place at the headquarters of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle, Switzerland, in the actual office of the President of the BIS, and were attended by a handful of the world's most powerful central bankers. These discussions also took place in an era of soaring free market gold prices, in the midst of the run-up in the gold price to US$850 in January 1980. Central to illustrating how the most powerful central bankers in the world colluded to attempt to establish a new Gold Pool are a number of internal documents from the Bank of England which provide a detailed blueprint on the evolution of these collusive discussions at the BIS, as well as providing detailed insights into the thinking of the senior Bank of England executives involved in the meetings. These internal correspondence documents from 1979 and 1980 can be thought of as the equivalent of internal emails in the era before corporate email systems. Above all, these collusive BIS meetings show intent. Intent by a group of the world's most powerful central banks to manipulate a free market gold price so as to distort free market gold pricing signals. Therefore, these documents are timeless in that regard. The documents also illustrate the concern that a rising gold price in the free market creates for senior central bankers, and importantly, also shows that these same central bankers have no qualms, at least from a legal or moral perspective, of intervening to manipulate a gold price when they see it as a threat to their fiat currency monetary system. Since many names of high level central bankers crop up in the discussions and documents, to provide context, it is helpful to provide some short background summaries on who these people were and what roles they occupied. It is also helpful to provide some brief context on gold price movements during the period under discussion. Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Headquarters, Basle, Switzerland The Gold Price Run-up during 1979 and 1980 When the London Gold Pool collapsed in mid-March 1968, a two-tier gold market took its place, with the private market gold price breaking higher, while central banks continued to trade gold with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and US Treasury at the official price of US$ 35 per ounce. However, in August 1971, Nixon closed this FRBNY / Treasury ‘Gold Window’ by ending the convertibility of US dollar liabilities into gold that had up to then still been an option for foreign central banks and foreign governments. This was the birth of the free-floating gold price. By the end of 1974, the US dollar gold price had soared to $187 per troy ounce. Following this, the next 3 years saw the gold price first trade down to near $100 during August 1976 before resuming its uptrend. Year-end gold prices over this period were in the $135 - $165 range. In 1978, the price again broke to a record high and finished the year at $226 per ounce. See chart below. Gold Price January 1971 to January 1980. Source: BullionStar charts But it was in 1979 that the US dollar gold price really took off, setting record after record, a bit like the records that are being set by cryptocurrencies right now. In July 1979, the $300 level was breached for the first time. During October 1979, the gold price then took out $400 for the first time. During December 1979, the gold price hit $500. While these late 1979 price increases were in themselves phenomenal, what then occurred in January 1980 was even more striking, for in the space of a few weeks, the price rocketed up first through $600, then $700, and then through the $800 level before peaking in late January 1980 at a then record of $850 per ounce. See chart below. Gold Price January 1979 to June 1980. Source: BullionStar Charts  The mid-1970s saw a flurry of official gold sales to the market which although strategically designed in part to subdue the gold price, in practice didn’t achieve that goal over the medium term. Between June 1976 and May 1980, the International Monetary Fund sold 25 million ounces (777 tonnes) of gold in 45 public auctions. Between May 1978 and November 1979, the US Treasury sold 8.05 million ounces of high grade gold (99.5% fine) and 7.75 million ounces of low grade gold (90% fine) in 23 auctions to the private market. That’s just over 15 million ounces (466 tonnes) of gold in total auctioned by the Treasury. The last US Treasury auctions were on 16 October 1979 when 750,000 ounces of low grade coin bars were auctioned, and then on 1 November 1979 when the Treasury implemented a variable sales quantity approach and auctioned 1,250,000 ounces of low grade coin bars. On 15 January 1980, the US Treasury Secretary announced an official end of US gold sales. As the 1980 annual report of the bank for International Settlements noted when reviewing the 1979 gold market: “The further increase in [gold] supplies was overshadowed by the dramatic rise in the demand for gold which, in the space of little over a year, caused the London market price to increase more than fourfold to a peak of $850 per ounce in January 1980.” “In addition to its sheer magnitude, last year’s [1979] gold price rise had three other remarkable features: firstly,  it took place against all major currencies, including those whose value had increased most during the 1970s. Secondly, it took place at a time of generally rising interest rates in the industrialised world, one effect of which was to increase the cost of holding gold. Thirdly, it took place at a time when, by and large, the dollar was strengthening in the exchange markets.” It is against this background of surging  gold prices, pre-existing gold auctions, turmoil in currency markets, slow growth and high inflation, that the first of the collusive Gold Pool discussions took place between September 1979 and January 1980 at the BIS. A Who's Who of Central Banksters The following document is the 4th main document in the Bank of England series of documents. all of which can be seen in "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1". This document, displayed in blue text below, is a briefing letter from Bank of England executive director Kit McMahon to the Bank of England's Governor Gordon Richardson, written on 13 December 1979, referring to the Gold Pool discussion meeting which took place in the office of the BIS President Jelle Dijlstra on Monday 10 December 1979. This is probably the most important documented featured in Part 1 of the two part article series, since it provides an in-depth insight into one of the collusive Gold Pool discussion meetings which the most powerful central bank governors of the time attended discussing the creation of a syndicate to manipulate down the free market price of gold. Christopher McMahon, known as ‘Kit’ McMahon, was an executive director at the Bank of England from 1970 to 1980, before becoming Deputy Governor of the Bank of England on 1 March 1980. Prior to McMahon’s promotion, Jasper Hollom was Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. Kit McMahon’s full name is Christopher William McMahon, hence he signed his his internal Bank of England memos and correspondence with the initials ‘CWM’. McMahon left the Bank of England in 1986 to take up the role of Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman of Midland Bank. In 1987, McMahon was also made Chairman of Midland Bank. McMahon left Midland in 1991. Since 1974, Midland Bank had also owned Samuel Montagu, one of the five traditional bullion firms of the London Gold Market. HSBC acquired full ownership of Midland in 1992 after acquiring a 15% stake in 1987 when McMahon was Chairman and Chief Executive of Midland. See profiles of McMahon here and here. THE GOVERNOR of the Bank of England - Gordon Richardson. Richardson was Governor of the Bank of England for 10 years from 1973 to 1983, and a non-executive director of the Bank of England between 1967 and 1973. He was chairman of J. Henry Schroder Wagg from 1962 to 1972, and chairman of Schroders from 1966 to 1973. Richardson was also a director of Saudi International Bank in London. Saudi International Bank was formerly known as Al Bank Al Saudi Al Alami when it was incorporated in London in 1975, and is now known as Gulf International Bank UK Limited. The following countries were represented at this 10 December meeting: UK, Switzerland, West Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium. The following central banks were represented at the meeting: Zijlstra – BIS and Netherlands central bank McMahon – Bank of England Emminger – Deutsche Bundesbank Pohl – Deutsche Bundesbank de la Geniere – Banque de France de Strycker – Belgian central bank Leutwiler – Swiss National Bank Larre – Bank for International Settlements Zijlstra refers to Dr. Jelle Zijlstra, Chairman and President of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) from 1967 to December 1981. Zijlstra was also simultaneously President of the Dutch central bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) from 1967 until the end of 1981. Notably, Zijlstra was also Dutch Prime Minister for a short period during 1966-67. Emminger refers to Otmar Emminger, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1 June 1977 to 31 December 1979. Emminger was one of the principal architects of the IMF’s synthetic Special Drawing Right (SDR) in 1969 which was designed to be a competitor of and replacement for gold. Pohl refers to Karl Otto Pohl, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1980 to 1991, and vice-President of the Bundesbank between June 1977 to December 1979. Note that Emminger retired in December 1979, with Karl Otto Pohl taking his place. Leutwiler refers to Fritz Leutwiler, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank (Switzerland’s central bank) from May 1974 to December 1984. Leutwiler was also a member of the board of the BIS from 1974 to 1984, and served as President of the BIS  between January 1982 and December 1984, as well as Chairman of the Board of the BIS from January 1982 to December 1984. De la Geniere refers to Renaud de La Genière, Governor of the Banque de France from 1979 to 1984. De Stryker refers to Cecil de Strycker, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium from February 1975 to the end of February 1982. At that time, De Stryker was also president of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund and then president of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community. In the meeting document, the name Larre refers to René Larre, General Manager of the BIS. Larre was BIS General Manager from May 1971 to February 1981. SECRET [From McMahon] To: The Governors               Copies to : Mr Payton, Mr Balfour, Mr Sangster , Mr Byatt  only GOLD POOL In the Governor’s absence I attended the meeting in Zijlstra’s room in the BIS on the afternoon of Monday, 10thDecember to continue discussions about a possible gold pool. Emminger, de la Geniere, de Strycker, Leutwiler, Larre and Pohl were present. Larre began by outlining a way in which a possible gold pool might be handled. The BIS could undertake all the operations on behalf of a group of central banks on the basis of rather general criteria which would be reviewed monthly.  The criteria would take into account not merely the developments of the price of gold but the affect any such developments appeared to be having on the dollar.   Thus they would envisage selling only when gold was relatively strong and the dollar relatively weak and buying only in the reverse circumstances.   They thought that they at least might start with a sum of around 20 tons (equals around $300 million at present prices).   They could take running profits of losses on their books for a considerable period and though participating central banks would have to envisage the possibility of an ultimate loss or gain in gold, in practice all that might be involved would be a loss or gain in dollars.    On this point both Zijlstra and Leutwiler emphasised that they were already liable to suffer substantial losses on their dollar reserves and would not be worried by the potential losses that they might they might sustain on this scheme. In answer to a question from me, Zijlstra confirmed that the US realised that if any gold pool were developed, the European central banks would intend to buy back in due course any gold they sold. He said they were unhappy that the Europeans were not prepared to sell gold outright but they accepted it.    Larre pointed out in parenthesis that Tony Solomon was probably the only American now or in the recent past that would be prepared to accept such a line. He knew that Wallich and probably Volcker was against the whole idea. Page 2 Zijlstra and Leutwiler said they were both strongly in favour of going ahead on the basis Larre had suggested.   They then asked what the other thought. Emminger said that he had put this proposition to his Central Bank Council who were unanimously against it.   His hands were therefore at present totally tied. De Strycker said he was extremely doubtful about the scheme.   He thought it was neither desirable nor necessary and carried considerable dangers.   De la Geniere was also negative stressing the great political dangers for him of selling any French gold in this indirect way. Leutwiler then suggested that they should do it the other way round:   wait until the gold price went below 400 and then start the operation by buying.   When the BIS had bought, say, 20 tons they would have a masse de manoeuvre which they could then sell.   La Geniere said that this might be easier for him and he would consider the possibility of doing something along these lines. Emminger also said, though without much confidence, that it was possible that if the operation were to start along these lines and if it appeared to be going well, it might be possible to persuade the Central Bank Council to join in. Leutwiler and Zijlstra then said that although they did not think a very large group was necessary to undertake the operation it probably had to be bigger than Two:    specifically they really needed either the French of the Germans.    Zijlstra said that although he had formal powers to do this he did not wish to do it without carrying his Government with him.    The Government was still doubtful and would probably need to know that a number of other countries were going along with it. At various points during the meeting there was a discussion about publicity for the operation and at an early point Zijlstra said that publicity was both inevitable and desirable if the operation was to have a maximum effect.    He brushed aside my suggestion that while the publicity for any selling operations would be helpful, that attached to the later (or on the revised scheme, earlier) buying could be rather inflammatory.   However, if the scheme were to be   Page 3 simply a BIS one, publicity would not necessarily, or perhaps desirably, arise.   This point was not really addressed in the discussion. I made a number of sceptical points about the failure of commodity stabilisation schemes of all kinds in the past and the dangers of getting drawn in gradually to bigger and bigger commitments. Leutwiler said that there was no danger because the losses would be small.   I said that I envisaged political dangers.    If it got known that the central banks were involving themselves in the price of gold, however much they said it was only a smoothing rather than a stabilising operation, they would find themselves on a tiger. If the price of gold went on rising they would either have to increase their efforts or add to the upward pressure o gold by pulling out. None of this carried any weight with anybody except perhaps de Strycker.   In any case I was not asked for any commitment from us.   There was, in fact, no discussion of whether or how contributions to the scheme would be based, but presumably it would be in relation to gold holdings so that they would not expect much from us. The meeting ended with Leutwiler saying he would approach the Canadians  and Japanese to see how they felt about the idea while Zijlstra would talk to the Italians.   All would then think further about it and revert in January. I must say I remain personally extremely sceptical about the desirability and efficacy of any scheme along the lines so far suggested. CWM 13th December 1979 The original pages of this meeting briefing written by McMahon can be seen here: Page 1,  Page 2 and Page 3. The links may take a little while to load first time clicked. The following key points are notable from McMahon’s briefing of the 10 December Gold Pool discussions meeting. Zijlstra and Leutwiler acted as the 2 main advocates of the proposed Gold Pool arrangement. This is important to remember because Zijlstra was the President of the BIS at that time and Leutwiler became President of the BIS at the beginning of 1982 taking over from Zijlstra. So the heads of the BIS in the early 1980s were both firm advocates of the need for a new Gold Pool. Zijlstra and Leutwiler probably also represented the two most independent central banks present at the discussions, namey the Dutch and Swiss central banks. The market mechanics of the proposals discussed in the meeting are also classic collusive Gold Pool tactics to torpedo the gold price by “selling only when gold was relatively strong and the dollar relatively weak and buying only in the reverse circumstances.”  The discussion also made it clear that the preferred approach would be to operate as both a selling syndicate and a buying consortium as “European central banks would intend to buy back in due course any gold they sold.” It was even suggested that the buying could occur first so as to create an inventory of physical gold with which to use to fund the selling interventions, i.e “wait until the gold price went below 400 and then start the operation by buying. When the BIS had bought, say, 20 tons they would have a masse de manoeuvre which they could then sell.” Given that René Larre, the BIS General Manager, began the meeting shows that he was meeting coordinator in his capacity as BIS General Manager. It is also very interesting that McMahon states that “the BIS could undertake all the operations on behalf of a group of central banks” that could  be “reviewed monthly”, which underlines the fact that overall, this could be viewed as a BIS led scheme, controlled and operated out of Basle. A BIS scheme would also allow the Gold Pool to operate in secrecy, out of public view. In the words of McMahon “if the scheme were to be simply a BIS one, publicity would not necessarily, or perhaps desirably, arise“. As mentioned, the above is just an extract from much more detailed article titled “New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1”. That article provides a full background to the above, including: There were an entire set of central banker discussions from September to December 1979, that led up to the meeting profile above. At the IMF annual conference in Belgrade in early October 1979, the US monetary authority delegation in the form of Paul Volcker, William Miller, Tony Solomon, and Henry Wallich approached Fritz Leutwiler, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank, and discussed a proposal to launch a joint central bank gold selling operation. During the discussions at the BIS, Zijlstra, who was BIS President until the end of 1981, and Leutwiler, who became BIS President in January 1982, were both strongly in favour of launching a new joint central bank gold pool to manipulate the gold price. The oil-producing cartel OPEC was at that time, “increasingly concerned that gold was outpacing oil”, but Al Quraishi, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) had made an assurance that the Saudi’s “would not rock the boat” and buy gold on the market if a new gold pool was activated. However, Al Quraishi and SAMA were still eager to “diversify” the reinvestment of the Saudi oil revenues into gold. The Bank of England recorded market intelligence in October 1979 that the “USA was planning to sell 10 million ounces of gold in four separate unannounced operations” before the end of 1979 so as to “placate the Saudi Arabians.“ The Bank of England’s foreign exchange and gold specialist at that time, John Sangster, thought that there was “a need to break the psychology of ‘the market can only go one way and that is up’.”  Sangster’s view was also that there was “no question of any permanent stabilisation of the gold price, merely at a critical time holding it within a target area”, an operation he called a “smoothing operation”. The first meeting to discuss a new collusive gold pool took place in the BIS office of Zijlstra on Monday 12 November 1979, whose invitees (in addition to Jelle Zijlstra) were Gordon Richardson, Governor of the Bank of England, Cecil de Strycker, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium, Fritz Leutwiler, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank, Bernard Clappier, Governor of the Banque de France, and Otmar Emminger, President of the Bundesbank. Following this 10 December meeting, the governors returned to their respective banks and recessed for Christmas and New Year, returning to Basle in early January 1980 where the next Gold Pool meeting took place on 7 January 1980, in a historic month in which the gold price rocket from $515 to $850 in a matter of weeks. Conclusion Did these discussions lead to the formation of a new Gold Pool operated out of the BIS in Basle? That is for you to decide. As well as reading "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle, Switzerland: Part 1", we encourage you to read "New Gold Pool at the BIS Basle: Part 2 – Pool vs Gold for Oil". Part 2 takes up where Part 1 left off, and begins by looking at developments in the BIS Gold Pool discussions during January 1980, a month in which the US dollar gold price rocketed more than 60% during a three-week period to reach a then record of $850 per ounce. Part 2 then looks at how the discussions involving these central banks evolved over the remainder of 1980 and 1981 as key high level central bankers continued to call for intervention into the gold market. Part 2 also looks at evidence that central bankers party to the discussions began advocating gold for oil exchanges between the West and the Saudi Arabia, exchanges which would provide real wealth (gold) to the Arabs in exchange for oil flowing to the West, while simultaneously keeping a lid on the gold price. In their own words: "If any operation were ever contemplated, it would have to be geared at some concept of the developing real price of gold and not attempt to hold any particular nominal level. It would almost certainly not be a pool with any significant potentail for recovery of gold sold. Rather it would enable OPEC to acquire some modicum of the chief inflation-proof asset without an excessive rise in the price."  “This is not to advocate gold for oil directly; the price haggling would be too acrimonious. Market intermediation should allow the G10 to move with the price while attempting to control its pace as well as break off the experiment when possible or necessary.”     - John Sangster to Gordon Richardson, Anthony Loenhis & Kit McMahon, Bank of England, 17 September 1980 “I feel that it is necessary for us, within the Group of Ten and Switzerland, to consider ways to regulate the price of gold, admittedly within fairly broad limits”      - Jelle Zjilstra, BIS Chairman and President and Dutch central bank President, 27 September 1981 “First, there is the meeting on the Gold Pool, then, after lunch, the same faces show up at the G-10″      - Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pohl to journalist Edward Jay Epstein, in a conversation at the Bundesbank in 1983 An extract from Part 2 will also appear on Zerohedge in the near future.

09 июня, 18:31

Бундесбанк повысил прогноз по темпам роста ВВП Германии

Центральный банк Германии повысил прогноз по темпам роста ВВП страны на 2017-2019 гг. Так, согласно оценке Бундесбанка, экономика Германии в текущем году расширится на 1,9% г/г, в 2018 году - на 1,7% г/г, а в 2019 году - на 1,6% г/г, что по всем пунктам на 0,1% выше предыдущего прогноза. Тем временем, прогноз по темпам роста индекса потребительских цен на текущий год был повышен до 1,5%, однако в 2018 г. ожидается замедление до 1,4%, а в 2019 году -ускорение до 1,8%, при этом ранее ожидалось повышение на 1,4%, 1,7% и 1,9% соответственно.

09 июня, 17:25

Бундесбанк: инфляция ФРГ не достигнет цели ЕЦБ

Москва, 9 июня - "Вести.Экономика". Инфляция в Германии будет оставаться значительно ниже целевого уровня Европейского центрального банка (ЕЦБ) в чуть менее 2% в течение еще одного года, свидетельствуют данные оценки центрального банка страны (Бундесбанка), пишет Reuters.

09 июня, 15:10

Профицит торгового баланса Германии не изменился в апреле

С учетом календарных и сезонных факторов профицит торгового баланса Германии составил 19,8 млрд. евро в апреле, также как в предыдущем месяце, сообщает Федеральное управление статистики. Аналитики прогнозировали профицит на уровне 20,3 млрд. евро. Без учета сезонных и календарных факторов профицит торгового баланса составил 18,1 млрд. евро в апреле по сравнению с 25,3 млрд. евро в предыдущем месяце, ниже прогнозируемого уровня 23,0 млрд. евро. В месячном исчислении с учетом сезонных и календарных факторов объем экспорта увеличился на 0,9%, при этом объем импорта вырос на 1,2%. В годовом исчислении объем экспорта снизился в апреле на 2,9%, а объем импорта увеличился на 5,4%. По сравнению с апрелем прошлого года, экспорт Германии в страны ЕС снизился на 0,5%, а импорт из этих стран увеличился на 3,9%. По предварительным данным Deutsche Bundesbank, профицит текущего счета платежного баланса Германии составил 15,1 млрд. евро в апреле по сравнению с профицитом в размере 28,1 млрд. евро годом ранее. Источник: FxTeam

15 августа 2013, 15:20

США отказываются возвращать немецкий золотой запас

Мир теряет веру в доллар как в самую надежную валюту. Волна недоверия поднялась после того, как Немецкий федеральный банк потребовал репатриации огромного количества золота, хранящегося в Федеральной резервной системе США. Некоторые обеспокоены тем, что национальные вклады других стран не будут в безопасности в США. Да и находятся ли они там вообще? Подробности в репортаже корреспондента RT Гаяне Чичакян. Подписывайтесь на RT Russian - http://www.youtube.com/subscription_center?add_user=rtrussian RT на русском - http://russian.rt.com/ Vkontakte - http://vk.com/rt_russian Facebook - http://www.facebook.com/RTRussian Twitter - http://twitter.com/RT_russian Livejournal - http://rt-russian.livejournal.com/

06 февраля 2013, 00:00

Утечка информации из МВФ: «золотое» мошенничество центральных банков

О GATA и «золотом картеле» Еще в конце ХХ века наиболее въедливые эксперты стали подозревать, что на рынке золота происходит что-то неладное. А именно: даже если жёлтый металл не дешевеет, то цены на него всё равно отстают по темпам роста от динамики цен на многие другие товары мирового рынка. Золото дешевело также на фоне индексов фондовых рынков, цен на недвижимость и т.п. Никаких крупных месторождений золота в это время не было открыто, золотые метеориты на Землю не падали. Заниженные цены на желтый металл больно били по компаниям золотодобывающей промышленности. Представители нескольких компаний этой отрасли решили разобраться в загадке, для чего и создали организацию под названием GATA (Gold Anti-Trust Action). В буквальном переводе - «Действие против Золотого Треста». Как следует из названия, учредители GATA подозревали, что на мировом рынке золота действует группа злоумышленников, объединенных в трест, который манипулирует ценами на золото в сторону их занижения. В своих публикациях GATA чаще использовала термин «золотой картель». Постепенно удалось вычислить основных участников этого картеля. Среди них - Казначейство США, Федеральный резервный банк Нью-Йорка (главный из 12 федеральных банков, составляющих ФРС США), Банк Англии, ряд крупнейших коммерческих и инвестиционных банков США и Западной Европы (здесь особо выделяется «Голдман Сакс» - инвестиционный банк с Уолл-стрит). Это – ядро картеля. Время от времени в поле зрения GATA попадали и другие организации, участвовавшие в операциях картеля. В том числе центральные банки некоторых стран.  1990-е годы были периодом наибольшей активности США на мировых рынках активов. Проще говоря, американцы организовывали приватизации государственных предприятий по всему миру (в том числе в России), а для таких операций нужен был сильный доллар. Финансовые аналитики и спекулянты прекрасно знают простое правило: чем ниже цена на золото, тем крепче доллар. Самый простой и дешевый способ укрепить доллар – «прижать» цену на «желтый металл», который явно и неявно выступает конкурентом этой резервной валюты. Однако чтобы «прижать» цену, надо обеспечить повышенное предложение этого металла на мировом рынке. У тех, кто хотел сыграть на «понижение» золота, взоры обратились к несметным запасам золота, сосредоточенным в подвалах казначейств и центральных банков. Эти запасы лежали там без движения с тех пор, как в 1970-е гг. рухнула Бреттон-Вудская валютно-финансовая система. В новой Ямайской валютно-финансовой системе золото перестало быть деньгами, оно было объявлено одним из биржевых товаров – таким как нефть, пшеница или бананы. Версия о золотых манипуляциях центральных банков Как можно использовать это золото для манипуляций ценами?  Первое и главное условие сводится к тому, чтобы полностью засекретить официальные запасы желтого металла и все операции денежных властей с ними. Еще более повысить независимый статус центральных банков, для того чтобы «народные избранники», органы финансового контроля и прочие любопытствующие элементы не совали свои носы в дела этих институтов. Не допускать государственных аудиторов до «золотых закромов». В США, например, Главное контрольное управление (Счётная палата Конгресса) последний раз посещало главное хранилище официального золотого запаса США Форт Ноксболее 60 лет назад.  Далее под завесой секретности можно начинать операции с золотом. Однако не продавать его, а передавать разным частным структурам «на время», оформляя эти операции как кредиты или лизинг желтого металла. А вместо золотых слитков оставлять в хранилищах бумажки, которые являются с бухгалтерско-юридической точки зрения «требованиями», «расписками», «сертификатами» и т.п. То есть золото на балансе центрального банка сохраняется, только оно имеет не металлическую, а виртуально-бумажную (или даже электронную) форму. А «народу» это знать не обязательно. Если в эти «золотые аферы» втянуть десяток-другой центральных банков, то каждый год на рынок можно выкидывать не одну сотню тонн драгоценного металла и сбивать на него цену.  Эксперты (в том числе эксперты GATA) находили многочисленные подтверждения тому, что все это не вымысел, а результат преступного сговора центральных банков с частными банкирами и спекулянтами. И тут сразу возникают вопросы: кому центральные банки передавали золото? Было ли это золото возвращено назад в сейфы центральных банков? Известны ли эти махинации законодателям? Сколько на сегодняшний день реально осталось физического золота в хранилищах центральных банков (и государственных казначейств)? Отметим, что отдельные попытки разобраться в том, что представляют собой официальные золотые запасы, насколько официальная статистика золота отражает истинное положение дел, кто и как управляет официальным золотым запасом, предпринимались парламентариями, политиками, общественными активистами в разных странах. Например, в США такие попытки регулярно предпринимал член Конгресса США Рон Пол. Регулярные запросы в разные инстанции делала также GATA.  Денежные власти предпочитали отмалчиваться. Или же ответы были крайне лаконичными и сводились к тому, что «золотой запас страны находится в неприкосновенности». Такую же позицию занимали на протяжении последних 15 лет (с тех пор, как начались разговоры о «золотом картеле») и международные финансовые организации: Банк международных расчетов (который, кстати, активно занимается операциями с желтым металлом и был заподозрен в участии в «золотом картеле»), Всемирный банк, Международный валютный фонд (1).  Утечка информации из МВФ И вот последняя новость в этой области. Речь идет о материале, размещенном на сайте GATA в декабре 2012 года (2). Это полученное одним из экспертов GATA секретное исследование Международного валютного фонда 13-летней давности. Оно касается мирового рынка золота и роли центральных банков в операциях на этом рынке в 1999 году. Поскольку оно секретное, то его автор позволяет себе писать полную правду об операциях центральных банков.  «Информация о рынке золота неоднородна», – говорится в исследовании. «Для транзакций характерна высокая степень секретности. Наряду с относительно небольшим количеством открытых торгов на биржах, продажи золота представляют собой приватные внебиржевые сделки, о таких операциях сообщается скупо. … Официальные данные о ссудах в золоте практически отсутствуют». Вот ключевые факты и цифры из этого материала МВФ. В 1999 годуболее 80 центральных банков ссудили 15 процентов официальных золотых запасов рынку (имеется в виду величина непогашенных обязательств по золотым кредитам). В числе центральных банков, предоставлявших ссуды в золоте, были Бундесбанк Германии, Швейцарский национальный банк, Банк Англии, Резервный банк Австралии и центральные банки Австрии, Португалии и Венесуэлы. В исследовании подтверждается, что центральные банки играли на рынке золота на «понижение»: «…высокая степень мобилизации резервов центробанка через кредитные операции в золоте оказала понижающее влияние на наличную цену золота, поскольку перекредитуемое золото обычно связано с продажами золота на наличном рынке». Далее в исследовании МВФ говорится, что «кредитование в золоте заставило центробанки проявлять активность на рынке производных финансовых инструментов золота, где участвуют банки по операциям с драгоценными металлами и производители золота, продавая золото через форвардные сделки и опционы. В свою очередь, банки по операциям с драгоценными металлами приложили все усилия для защиты и укрепления долгосрочных отношений с центральными банками». Вот еще выдержка из документа МВФ: «Доля промышленно развитых стран на всём рынке официального кредитования в золоте выросла с 33 процентов в конце 1995 года до 46 процентов к концу 1998 года, поскольку некоторые центральные банки промышленных стран повысили уровень кредитования; в то же время на рынке появились новые кредиторы, в частности Бундесбанк и Швейцарский национальный банк». А вот комментарий эксперта GATA, разместившего данный материал:«При столь значительном количестве центральных банков, секретно предоставляющих ссуды в золоте тем финансовым организациям, чей основной талант, как можно было видеть в последнее время, состоит в рыночных махинациях, кто станет отрицать, кроме обычных агентов дезинформации, что рынком золота манипулируют именно для того, чтобы не позволить всему миру пользоваться свободными рынками?» 2013 год: ждём новых «золотых» скандалов и «золотых» сенсаций Раскрытия страшной тайны золота ждут уже много лет. Ещё в 2004 году Лондонский банк Ротшильдов заявил о своем выходе из «золотого фиксинга» - процедуры ежедневного определения в узком кругу цены на жёлтый металл в лондонском Сити. Тем самым Ротшильды заявили миру, что они выходят из золотого бизнеса, которым занимались на протяжении двух столетий. Однако это – всего лишь эффектный жест. Из золотого бизнеса они не ушли, а продолжили заниматься им через структуры с другими вывесками. Чувствуя угрозу надвигающегося скандала с разоблачениями «золотого картеля», эти олигархические круги решили своевременно отойти от эпицентра возможного взрыва…  Возбуждение общественности и политиков по поводу официальных запасов золота резко обострилось в 2012 году. Выяснилось, что на мировом рынке активно идет торговля фальшивым золотом в виде вольфрамовых позолоченных слитков (хотя специалистам об этом стало известно еще в 2004 году, трубить об этом мошенничестве мировые СМИ начали только в 2012 году). Возникли подозрения, что в подвалах центральных банков и казначейств находятся груды вольфрама. Рон Пол добился проведения выборочной проверки брусков металла в подвалах Форт-Нокс и Федерального резервного банка Нью-Йорка. Германия потребовала от США вернуть золото из своего официального запаса (Бундесбанк), которое хранилось в подвалах ФРБ Нью-Йорка, но встретила глухое сопротивление со стороны казначейства и ФРС США. Кончилось это тем, что председатель Федерального резерва Бен Бернанке заявил, что недавний ураган Сэнди… «уничтожил» немецкое золото. Ничего лучшего он придумать не смог. Все это лишь подкрепило мнение тех, кто давно обвиняет ФРС и другие центральные банки в мошенничестве с золотом.  Думаю, что в 2013 г. тема золота центральных банков станет еще более горячей. Например, все с нетерпением ждут обнародования результатов выборочной физической проверки слитков золота из закромов Казначейства США. Власти обещали сообщить об этом в начале 2013 года. От Германии все напряженно ожидают реакции на заявление Бернанке о таинственном исчезновении немецкого золота.  Появились вопросы и к Банку международных расчетов (БМР), активно практикующему коммерческие операции с желтым металлом - и собственным, и тем, который центральные банки предоставляют БМР в виде депозитов или кредитов. Отчётность БМР об этих операциях крайне лаконична и не даёт представления о деталях сделок, их контрагентах и конечных бенефициарах.  Международный валютный фонд будет продолжать настойчиво требовать от Китая раскрытия истинной информации об официальном золотом запасе. В 2009 г. Народный банк Китая (НБК) сообщил, что его золотые запасы увеличились сразу на 76% и составили 1054 тонны. С тех пор официальные цифры золотого запаса НБК не менялись. Мало кто верит в то, что эти цифры отражают реальное положение дел. Считается, что денежные власти Китая сильно занижают цифры, тайно переводя часть своих несметных валютных резервов в желтый металл. В Конгрессе США ожидается окончательное решение вопроса о том, будет ли ФРС подвергнута серьезному аудиту - впервые за век ее существования. Если такой аудит всё-таки состоится, то полной проверке должны подвергнуться все операции Федерального резерва с золотом. Почти все серьезные эксперты ждут от этой проверки сенсационных разоблачений.  (1) Подробнее о манипуляциях «золотого картеля» см.: В.Ю. Катасонов. Золото в экономике и политике России. – М.: Анкил, 2009, с. 57-63.  (2) «IMF study in 1999 found 80 central banks lending 15% of official gold reserves». December 9, 2012 (http://www.gata.org/files/IMFGoldLendingFullStudy1999.pdf)