23 ноября, 15:55

Стать расой бессмертных – главная эволюционно-историческая задача человечества в III тысячелетии

В суете, суматохе текущих проблем мы часто забываем, что мир – непостоянен, что человек – смертен, и что все, что кажется таким насущным сейчас, – это, по сути, пустышка-обманка по сравнению с разрушительной силой времени. Нам не приходит в голову, что все это – не так уж важно с точки зрения времени и вечности, и даже не вечности, а каких-нибудь ближайших 100–500 лет, что все это – очень-очень временно. Мы живем 80–90 лет и называем это нашей жизнью, а Его Величество Великое Время оперирует септиллионами, октиллионами, нониллионами и дециллионами лет, центиллионами и центиллиардами, и для него они – как будто мгновения, подобные миганию глаза. Оно легко играет умопомрачительными масштабами – гуглами лет и гуголплексами, зиллионами и зиллиардами лет, числами Грэма и числами Мозера, – словно ребенок играет оловянными солдатиками. Но мы не осознаем этого, потому что не понимаем, что есть жизнь, кто есть мы, куда идем и где мы в самом деле живем. Так же как не понимают себя и своей среды бактерии, живущие в теле человека. Мы поглощены собственными маленькими жизнями и сиюминутными проблемами так сильно, как будто они и есть главный смысл нашего существования. Мы слепы, потому что не знаем природы сознания, мы подобны детям, потому что живем, не думая о непостоянстве этого мира. Мы как будто бы не помним, что непостоянство мира сего висит над нами дамокловым мечом. Оно, непостоянство, лишает нас, как индивидов, смысла существования. Мы смирились с ним и престали думать о том, как его превзойти. Именно этим объясняется ментальность нашей человеческой расы. Это – ментальность смертных людей-временщиков, людей, ищущих лишь земное, лишь временное и тленное, существ, которым не удается толком понять, кто они такие сами, зачем живут и в каком направлении им надо развиваться, из-за того, что срок их жизни по космическим меркам весьма скромен. Никому из нас не приходит в голову думать о себе в масштабах тысячелетий, строить планы на следующие 200 миллионов лет. Мы слишком увлечены сиюминутным, мы не верим в будущее, в перспективу, потому что наша жизнь – коротка и временна. Если мы стремимся стать как боги, описанные в любой древней культуре – в индийской, скандинавской, египетской или греко-римской, – нам нужно учиться думать как они, привыкать сначала на уровне ума быть бессмертными, привыкать оперировать сотнями тысяч временных циклов. Изменить мышление, доминирующую парадигму смертных – это только первый шаг. Нужен спектр, целый каскад новых идеологий жизни грядущего бессмертного человека. Параллельно с этим – нужны прорывные проекты, технологии, такие как проект «Аватар». Имея мышление бессмертных, парадигму бессмертных в качестве мировоззренческой основы, такие люди обязательно реализуют подобные технологии, и мир радикально изменится. Эволюционная ветвь гомо сапиенс в очередной раз сделает крутой вираж и вынесет человечество к невообразимым высотам, туда, где раньше парили только избранные одиночки – бессмертные и боги. Судьбой нам уготована особая миссия – жить на изломе эпох, когда старый мир с его атавизмами – старостью, болезнями, смертью – постепенно, медленно, но неумолимо, миллиметр за миллиметром вытесняется в прошлое. Возможно, нам предстоит пройти еще сотни тысяч миль, но начало положено, верное направление выбрано, и это оттеснение уже не остановить. Вопрос сугубо практический: когда это произойдет? Как быстро? Когда появится первый бессмертный человек, живущий в искусственном теле? Когда появится тот первый человек, кто пригласит друзей на свой 200-летний юбилей, а затем и на 300-летний, 500-летний, 1000-летний, 30 000-летний и так далее? Чтобы это произошло уже при нашей жизни, нам нужна тотальная, предельная концентрация умов, сил, ресурсов на достижении подобных прорывных технологий, гораздо большая, чем концентрация усилий всего руководства СССР при запуске первого спутника и первого человека в космос во времена Королева и Гагарина. Бо́льшая, чем при создании спутника, ядерной бомбы, компьютера и адронного коллайдера, вместе взятых. Концентрация по типу той, которая уже была однажды в СССР под знаменитым лозунгом «Всё для фронта, всё для Победы!». И ученые, организаторы, идеологи, менеджеры, стоящие сейчас за идеей проекта «Аватар», готовы к такой тотальной и предельной концентрации и самоотдаче. Но этого для победы мало. Ученым нужны лаборатории, исследовательские центры, оборудование и зарплата, чтобы делать свое дело. Организаторам, менеджерам нужна широкая поддержка общества и меценатов. Итак, господа бизнесмены из списка «Форбс» и из всех других списков – теперь ваш ход. Господа политики из ООН, G8, G20, из всех элитных политических клубов мира – теперь дело за вами. Если, конечно, вы стремитесь жить долго и не умирать. Ибо тот, кто не вкладывает в бессмертие, все равно будет вынужден вкладывать, но уже в старость и болезни – по принципу «Если вы не занимаетесь своим телом, тело займется вами». А оно займется, обязательно займется. Любой проект бессмертия, подобный «Аватару», – это гораздо больше, чем просто проект. Это – метафизическая битва человеческого гения с гением, создавшим законы Вселенной для смертных. Это – смертельная схватка с безжалостной, неумолимой биологической природой за нашу общую человеческую жизнь, за ее победу. Человеческая раса уже достаточно созрела, чтобы осознать, что ее главный враг – не внутри нее самой. Он не среди людей. Он – это законы природы, заставляющие каждого стареть, болеть и умирать. Поэтому главный конфликт XXI века и всего третьего тысячелетия – не газовые войны и не битвы за ресурсы, не межрелигиозные и не межнациональные конфликты. Это – конфликт между человеком и его смертной, телесной природой, его смертностью и возможностью обретения бессмертия. Линия фронта сейчас проходит между смертью и бессмертием, а цена победы здесь – вечная жизнь. И кто знает, может быть, спустя 30–60 лет мы вспомним об этих строках с сожалением – что, дескать, увы, не вышло... Или наоборот – с гордостью за одержанную победу в этой великой битве. Но очень хочется сказать: «Мы победим! Победа будет за нами!». Андрей Ариянов

22 ноября, 23:26

Путин обсудил с президентом Аргентины вопросы двустороннего сотрудничества

Президенты России и Аргентины Владимир Путин и Маурисио Макри в ходе телефонного разговора обсудили актуальные вопросы дальнейшего развития сотрудничества между странами. Об этом сообщает пресс-служба Кремля

Выбор редакции
22 ноября, 18:54

Суд в Гамбурге отпустил задержанного за беспорядки во время саммита G20 россиянина

  • 0

В Гамбурге суд освободил задержанного за участие в беспорядках во время саммита G20 31-летнего россиянина, сообщили в пресс-службе инстанции. Отмечается, что приказ об аресте отменили, гражданин России на свободе, но он должен будет явиться на следующее судебное заседание, которое состоится 12 декабря, передает РИА «Новости». В пресс-службе суде пока не располагают информацией о причинах такого решения. Напомним, 19 октября другого гражданина России признали виновным в совершении ряда правонарушений в ходе беспорядков на G20 в Гамбурге и приговорили к году заключения условно. Как сообщала полиция Гамбурга, по делу о беспорядках на саммите G20 были задержаны шестеро россиян, четверо из которых были вскоре отпущены. Они подозревались в нанесении телесных повреждений и сопротивлении силовикам.

22 ноября, 18:50

Positive Feedback Loops, Financial Instability, & The Blind Spot Of Policymakers

  • 0

Authored by Francesco Filia of Fasanara Capital, “Learn how to see. Realize that everything connects to everything else.” – Leonardo da Vinci A Dangerous Market Structure is More Worrying than Expensive Asset Valuations and Record Debt Levels Macro-prudential regulations follow financial crises, rarely do they precede one. Even when evidence is abundant of systemic risks building up, as is today, regulators and policymakers have a marked tendency to turn an institutional blind eye, hoping for imbalances to fizzle out on their own – at least beyond the duration of their mandates. It does not work differently in economics than it does for politics, where short-termism drives the agenda, oftentimes at the expenses of either the next government, the broader population or the next generation. It does not work differently in the business world either, where corporate actions are selected based on the immediate gratification of shareholders, which means pleasing them at the next round of earnings, often at the expenses of long-term planning and at times exposing the company itself to disruption threats from up-and-comers. Long-term vision does not pay; it barely shows up in the incentive schemes laid out for most professions. Economics is no exception. Orthodoxy and stillness preserve the status quo, and the advantages hard earned by the few who rose from the ranks of the establishment beforehand. Yet, when it comes to Central Banking, and more in general policymaking, financial stability should top the priority list. It honorably shows up in the utility function, together with price stability and employment, but is not pursued nearly as actively as them. Central planning and interventionism is no anathema when it comes to target the decimals of unemployment or consumer prices, yet is residual when it comes to master systemic risks, relegated to the camp of ex-post macro-prudential regulation. This is all the more surprising as we know all too well how badly a deep unsettlement of financial markets can reverberate across the real economy, possibly leading into recessions, unemployment, un-anchoring of inflation expectations and durable disruption to consumer patterns. There is no shortage of reminders for that in the history books, looking at the fallout of dee dives in markets in 1929, 2000 and 2007, amongst others. Intriguingly, the other way round is accepted and even theorized. Manipulating bond and stock prices, directly or indirectly, is mainstream policy theory today. From Ben Bernanke’s ‘portfolio balance channel theory’, to the relentless pursuit of the ‘wealth effect’ via financial repression under Janet Yellen and Haruhiko Kuroda, to Mario Draghi tackling the fragmentation of credit markets across the EU via direct asset purchases, the practice has become commonplace. To some, like us, the ‘wealth effect’ may be proving to be more of an ‘inequality effect’ than much, leading to populism and constantly threatening regime change, but that is beyond the scope of this note today. What we want to focus on instead is the direct impact that monetary interventionism like Quantitative Easing (‘QE’) and Negative or Zero Interest Rate Policies (‘NIRP’ or ’ZIRP’) have on the structure of the market itself, how they help create a one-sided investment community, oftentimes long-only, fully invested when not levered up, relying on record-highs for bonds and stocks to perpetuate themselves endlessly - despite a striking disconnect from fundamentals, life-dependent on the lowest levels of volatility ever seen in history. The market structure morphed under the eyes of policymakers over the last few years, to become a pressure cooker at risk of blowing-up, with a small but steadily growing probability as times goes by and the bubble inflates. The positive feedback loops between monetary flooding and the private investment community are culpable for transforming an ever present market risk into a systemic risk, and for masking as peaceful what is instead an unstable equilibrium and market fragility. Positive Feedback Loops create divergence from general equilibrium, and Systemic Risks Positive feedback loops, in finance like in biology, chemistry, cybernetics, breed system instability, as they orchestrate a further divergence from equilibrium. An unstable equilibrium is defined as one where a small disturbance is sufficient to trigger a large adjustment. QE and NIRP have two predominant effects on markets: (i) relentless up-trend in stocks and bonds (the ‘Trend Factor’), dominated by the buy-the-dip mentality, which encapsulates the ‘moral hazard’ of investors knowing Central Banks are prompt to come to their rescue (otherwise known as ‘Bernanke/Yellen/Kuroda/Draghi put’), and (ii) the relentless down-trend in volatility (the ‘Volatility Factor’). Two Factors Explain All: Trend and Volatility The most fashionable investment strategies these days are directly impacted by either one or both of these drivers. Such strategies make the bulk of the overall market, after leverage or turnover is taken into account: we will refer to them in the following as ‘passive’ or ‘quasi-passive’. The trend impacts the long-only community, crowning it as a sure winner, making the case for low- cost passive investing. The low volatility permeates everything else, making the case for full- investment and leverage. The vast majority of investors these days are not independent from the QE environment they operate within: ETFs and index funds, Risk Parity funds and Target Volatility vehicles, Low Volatility / Short Volatility vehicles, trend-chasing algos, Machine Learning-inspired funds, behavioral Alternative Risk Premia funds. They are the poster children of the QE world. We estimate combined assets under management of in excess of $8trn across the spectrum. They form a broad category of ‘passive’ or ‘quasi-passive’ investors, as are being mechanically driven by two main factors: trend and volatility. Source: Fasanara Presentations | Market Fragility - How to Position for Twin Bubbles Bust, 16th October 2017. The slide is described in details in this video recording. Extraordinary monetary policies have feedback loops with the asset management industry as a whole, reinforcing the effects on markets of such policies in a vicious – or virtuous - cycle. QE and NIRP help a large number of investment strategies to flourish, validating their success and  supporting their asset gathering in the process, and are in return helped in boosting bond and stock markets by their flows joining the already monumental public flows. Private flows so reach singularity with public flows, and the whole market economy morphs into a one big common bet on ever-rising prices, in shallow volatility. Here is the story of how $15trn of money printing by major Central Banks in the last ten years, of which $3.7trn in 2017 alone, is joined by total assets of $8trn managed into buying the same safe and risk assets across, with leverage, indiscriminately. How Market Risk became Systemic Risk Let's give a cursory look at the main players involved (a recent presentation we did is recorded here). As markets trend higher, no matter what happens (ever against the shocked disbeliefs of Brexit, Trump, an Italian failed referendum and nuclear threats in North Korea), investors understand the outperformance that comes from pricing risks out of their portfolios entirely and going long-only and fully-invested. Whoever under-weighs positions in an attempt to be prudent ends up underperforming its benchmarks and is then penalized with redemptions. Passive investors who are long-only and fully invested are the winners, as they are designed to be bold and insensitive to risks. As Central Banks policies reduce the level of interest rates to zero or whereabouts, fees become ever more relevant, making the case for passive investing most compelling. The rise of ETF and passive index funds is then inevitable. According to JP Morgan, in the last 10 years, $2trn left active managers in equities and $2trn entered passive managers (pag.39 here). We may be excused for thinking they are the same $ 2trn of underlying investors progressively pricing risk provisions out of books, de facto, while chasing outperformance and lower fees. To be sure, ETFs are a great financial innovation, helping reducing costs in an expensive industry and giving entry to markets previously un-accessible to most investors. Yet, what matters here is their impact on systemic risks, via positive feedback loops. In circular reference, beyond Central Banks flows, markets are helped rise by such classes of valuations-insensitive passive investors, which are then rewarded with further inflows, with which they can then buy more. The more expensive valuations get, the more they disconnect from fundamentals, the more divergence from equilibrium occurs, the larger fat-tail risks become. In ever-rising markets, ‘buy-and-hold’ strategies may only possibly be outsmarted by ‘buy-the-dip’ strategies. Whatever the outcome of risk events, be ready to buy the dip quickly and blindly. As more investors design themselves up to do so, the dips are shallower over time, leading to an S&P500 that never lost 3% in 2017, an historical milestone. Machine learning is another beautiful market innovation, but what is there to learn from the time series of the last several years, if not that buy- the-dip works, irrespective of what caused the dip. Big Data is yet another great concept, shaping the future of us all. Yet, most data ever generated in humankind dates back three years only, in and by itself a striking limitation. The quality of the deduction cannot exceed the quality of the time series upon which the data science was applied. If the time series is untrustworthy, as is heavily influenced by monumental public flows ($300bn per months), what trust can we put on any model output originating from it? What pattern recognition can we really be hopeful of getting, in the first place? May some of it just be a commercial disguise for going long, selling volatility and leveraging up in various shapes or forms? What is hype and what is real? A short and compromised data series makes it hard, if not possible, to really know. Once public flows abate and price discovery is let free again, then and only then will we be in a position to know the difference. Low volatility does what trending markets alone cannot. A state of low volatility presents the appearance of stuporous, innocuous, narcotized markets, thus enticing new swathes of unfitting investors in, mostly retail-type ‘weak hands’. Weak hands are investors who are brought to like investments by certain characteristics which are uncommon to the specific investment itself, such as featuring a low volatility. It is in this form that we see bond-like investors looking at the stock market for yield pick-up purposes, magnetized by levels of realized volatility similar to what fixed income used to provide with during the Great Moderation. It is in this form that Tech companies out of the US have started filling the coffers of not just Growth ETF, where they should rightfully reside, but also Momentum ETF, and even, incredibly, Low-Volatility ETF. Low volatility is also a dominant input for Risk Parity funds and Target Volatility vehicles. The lower the volatility, the higher the leverage allowed in such players, mechanically. All of which are long-only players, joining public flows, again helping the market rise to record levels in the process,  in circular reference. Rewarded by new inflows, the buying spree gathers momentum, in a virtuous circle. Valuations are no real input in the process, volatility is what matters the most. Volatility is not risk, except for them it is. It goes further than that. It is not only the level of volatility that count, but its direction too. As volatility implodes, relentlessly, into historical lows never seen before in history, a plethora of investment strategies is launched to capitalize on just that, directly: Short Volatility vehicles. They are the best performing strategy of the last decade, by and large. The problem here is that, due to construction, as volatility got to single-digit territory, relatively small spikes are now enough to trigger wipe-out events on several of these instruments. Our analysis shows that if equity volatility doubles up from current levels (while still being half of what it was as recently as in August 2015), certain Short Vol ETFs may stand to lose up to 75% or more. Moreover, short positions on long-vol ETFs can lose up to 250% of capital. For some, ‘termination events’ are built into contracts  for sudden losses of this magnitude, meaning that the notes would be prematurely withdrawn. It is one thing to expect a spike in volatility to cause losses, it is quite another to know that a minor move is all it takes to trigger a default event. On such spikes in volatility, Morgan Stanley Quant Derivatives Strategy desk warns further that market makers may be forced to rebalance their exposure non-linearly on a spike in volatility. A drop in the S&P 500 of 5% in one day may trigger approximately $ 400mn of Vega notional of rebalancing (pag.48 here). We estimate that half a trillion dollars of additional selling on S&P stocks may occur following a correction of between 5% and 10%. That is a lot of selling, pre-set in markets, waiting to strike. Unless you expect the market to not have another 5% sell-off, ever again. For more details, we describe the role of these different players in a recent video presentation and in our June Investment Outlook and May Investment Outlook. It's All One Big Position What do ETFs, Risk Parity and Target Vol vehicles, Low Vol / Short Vol vehicles, trend-chasing algos, Machine Learning, behavioral Alternative Risk Premia, factor investing have in common? Except, of course, being the ‘winners take all’ of QE-driven markets. They all share one or more of the following risk factors: long-only, fully invested when not leveraged-up, short volatility, short correlation, short gamma. Thanks to QE and NIRP, the whole market is becoming one single big position. The ‘Trend Factor’ and the ‘Volatility Factor’ are over-whelming, making it inevitable for a high- beta, long-bias, short-vol proxy to disseminate across. Almost inescapably so, given the time series the asset management industry has to deal with, and derive its signals from. Several classes of investors may move to sell in lock-steps if and when markets turn. The boost to asset prices and the zero-volatility environment created the conditions for systemic risks in the form of an over-compensation to the downside. Record-low volatility breeds market fragility, it precedes system instability. Flows Matter, Both Ways! We will know soon if the fragility of markets is that bad. The undoing of loose monetary policies (NIRP, ZIRP) will create a liquidity withdrawal of over $1 trillion in 2018 alone (pag.61-62 here). The reaction of the passive and quasi-passive communities will determine the speed of the adjustment in the pricing for both safe and risk assets, and how quickly risk provisions will re- enter portfolios. Such liquidity withdrawal will represent the first real crash-test for markets in 10 years. As public spending on Wall Street abates, the risk is evident of seeing the whole market turning with it. The shocks of Trump and Brexit did not manage to derail markets for long, as public flows were overwhelming. Flows is what mattered, above all elusive, over-fitting economic narratives justifying price action at the margin. Flows may matter again now as they fade. Systemic Risk is Not Just About Banks: Look at Funds The role of trending markets is known when it comes to systemic risks: a not sufficient but necessary condition. Most trends do not necessarily lead to systemic risks, but hardly systemic risks ever build up without a prolonged period of uptrend beforehand. Prolonged uptrends in any asset class hold the potential to instill the perception that such asset class will grow forever, irrespective of the fundamentals, and may thus lead to excessive risk taking, excess leverage, the formation of a bubble and, ultimately, systemic risks. The mind goes to the asset class of real estate, its undeterred uptrend into 2006/2007, its perception of perpetuity (”we have never had a decline in house prices on a nationwide basis’’ Ben Bernanke), the credit bubble built on banks hazardous activities on subprime mortgages as a result, and the systemic risks which emanated, with damages spanning well beyond the borders of real estate. The role of volatility is also well-researched, especially low volatility. Hayman Minsky, in his “Financial Instability Hypothesis’’ in 1977, analyses the behavioral changes induced by a reduction of volatility, postulating that economic agents observing a low risk are induced to increase risk taking, which may in turn lead to a crisis: “stability is destabilizing”. In a recent study, Jon Danielsson, Director of the Systemic Risk Centre at the LSE, finds unambiguous support for the ‘low volatility channel’, insofar as prolonged periods of low volatility have a strong predictive power over the incidence of a banking crisis, owing to excess lending and excess leverage. The economic impact is the highest if the economy stays in the low volatility environment for five years: a 1% decrease in volatility below its trend translates in a 1.01% increase in the probability of a crisis. He also finds that, counter-intuitively, high volatility has little predictive power: very interesting, when the whole finance world at large is based on retrospective VAR metrics, and equivocates high volatility for high risk. Both a persistent trend and prolonged low-volatility can lead banks to take excessive risks. But what about their impact on the asset management industry? Thinking at the hard economic impact of the Great Depression (1929-1932) and the Great Recession (2007-2009), and the eminent role played by banks in both, it comes as little surprise that the banking sector captures all the attention. However, what remains to be looked into, and perhaps more worrying in today’s environment, is the role of prolonged periods of uptrend and low-vol on the asset management industry. In 2014, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body that makes recommendations to G20 nations on financial risks, published a consultation paper asking whether fund managers might need to be designated as “global systemically important financial institution” or G-SIFI, a step that would involve greater regulation and oversight. It did not result in much, as the industry lobbied in protest, emphasizing the difference between the levered balance sheet of a bank and the business of funds. The reason for asking the question is evident: (i) sheer size, as the AM industry ballooned in the last few years, to now represent over [15trnXX] for just the top 5 US players!, (ii) funds have partially substituted banks in certain market-making activities, as banks dialed back their participation in response to tighter regulation and (iii) , funds can indeed do damage: think of LTCM in 1998, the fatal bailout of two Real Estate funds by Bear Stearns in 2007, the money market funds ‘breaking the buck’ in 2008 amongst others. But it is not just sheer size that matters for asset managers. What may worry more is the positive feedback loops discussed above and the resulting concentration of bets in one single global pot, life-dependent on infinite momentum/trend and ever-falling volatility. Positive feedback loops are the link for the sheer size of the AM industry to become systemically relevant. Today more than ever, they morph market risks in systemic risks. Volatility will not forever be low, the trend will not forever go: how bad a damage when it stops? As macro prudential policy is not the art of “whether or not it will happen” but of “what happens if”, it is hard not to see this as a blind spot for policymakers nowadays. The addiction that could not be let go In conclusion, we believe that markets are being brought into an unstable equilibrium, at risk of snapping violently. The stability of markets resembles the one of a pendulum held in vertical position: a small disturbance is able to create large swings. The swing can be so violent as to send tremors across the real economy, thus jeopardizing the hard earned progress on recovery in growth rates and unemployment of recent years. If positive feedback loops are ignored and bubbles are left unchecked, that may one day most unambiguously qualify as a policy mistake: the addiction to monetary steroids and price control that could not be let go, on time. A bust that was entirely predictable, if only macropru conditions had been a real target, and short termism had not prevailed. *  *  * Full Fasanara Letter below...  

Выбор редакции
22 ноября, 18:21

Суд освободил задержанного в Гамбурге за беспорядки россиянина

Суд Гамбурга освободил из-под ареста 31-летнего россиянина, задержанного в июле за участие в беспорядках во время саммита G20.

Выбор редакции
22 ноября, 18:10

Освобожден второй россиянин, задержанный после беспорядков в Гамбурге

В Гамбурге суд отменил указ об аресте 31-летнего россиянина, которого задержали за участие в беспорядках во время проходившего в июле саммита G20

22 ноября, 16:19

Офшор, ещё офшор

Чем «райские списки» мировых офшоров отличаются от панамских досье?

17 ноября, 00:21

Президенты России и Аргентины сыграют на выезде // Владимира Путина ждут на саммите G20, а Маурисио Макри — на чемпионате мира по футболу

Президент Аргентины Маурисио Макри посетит Россию с первым для себя визитом в 2018 году — возможно, во время чемпионата мира по футболу. Об этом шла речь на вчерашних переговорах между главой МИД России Сергеем Лавровым и его аргентинским коллегой Хорхе Фори. В свою очередь, Буэнос-Айрес рассчитывает принять высоких гостей, в том числе и президента РФ Владимира Путина, осенью 2018 года, на саммите G20. Как дал понять “Ъ” министр Фори, в победе российского лидера на мартовских президентских выборах аргентинцы не сомневаются.

Выбор редакции
16 ноября, 18:58

Standard stuff: Timelier provisions may make banks’ profits and lending choppier

Print section Print Rubric:  Timelier loan-loss provisions may make earnings and lending choppier Print Headline:  Stage fright Print Fly Title:  Accounting and banks UK Only Article:  standard article Issue:  The army sidelines Robert Mugabe, Africa’s great dictator Fly Title:  Standard stuff Main image:  20171118_FNP505.jpg IN THE first quarter of 2018 thousands of banks will look a little less profitable. A new international accounting standard, IFRS 9, will oblige lenders in more than 120 countries, including the European Union’s members, to increase provisions for credit losses. In America, which has its own standard-setter, IFRS 9 will not be applied—but by 2019 banks there will also have to follow a slightly different regime. The new rule has its roots in the financial crisis of 2007-08, in the wake of which the leaders of the G20 countries declared that ...

16 ноября, 18:51

Глава МИД Аргентины надеется, что Путин приедет на саммит G20 в следующем году

Министр иностранных дел Аргентины Хорхе Фори заявил, что рассчитывает увидеть президента России Владимира Путина на саммите Группы двадцати, который пройдёт в Буэнос-Айресе во второй половине 2018 года. Такое заявление Фори сделал в четверг в беседе с российскими журналистами, несмотря на то, что

Выбор редакции
16 ноября, 15:00

Лавров: РФ поддерживает повестку дня председательства Аргентины в G20

Лавров: РФ поддерживает повестку дня председательства Аргентины в G20

16 ноября, 15:00

Фьючерс на индекс РТС может протестировать рубеж 110600 пунктов

Фондовые площадки . Европейские индексы на торгах в четверг демонстрируют положительную динамику на фоне статистики по инфляции, показавшей рост потребительских цен в зоне евро на 1,4%. Так, немецкий DAX прибавляет порядка 0,5%, французский CAC40 растет на 0,59%, британский FTSE проводит торги возле нулевой отметки. По оценкам агенства Moody's, мировая экономика в 2018 году продемонстрирует рост на 3,2%. В то время как в странах G20 рост с 2017 по 2019 годы будет составлять порядка 2%, экономика Emerging Markets за тот же период прибавит более 5%. Тем временем, вышедшие в среду данные Евростата зафиксировали профицит внешнеторгового баланса еврозоны в сентябре на уровне 26,4 миллиарда евро, что в годовом выражении составило рост на 8,6%. Вкупе с опубликованной во вторник позитивной статистикой по ВВП Германии это привело к дальнейшему росту пары евро/доллар к отметке 1,1850, которая на данный момент выступает локальным сопротивлением.

16 ноября, 14:14

Аргентина надеется, что Путин приедет в Буэнос-Айрес на саммит G20

Власти Аргентины надеются, что президент России Владимир Путин примет участие в саммите G20, который пройдет в 2018 году в Буэнос-Айресе, сказал аргентинский министр иностранных дел Хорхе Фори.

16 ноября, 13:00

Trump And Putin: What Comes Next?

Authored by Nikolas Gvosdev via The Strategic Culture Foundation, Will a future, formal Trump-Putin summit be a game changer? Last week, I noted that any encounter between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin that would take place at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, would have to address two critical questions if there was to be any clarity in U.S.-Russia relations. We’ve now gotten a first draft of answers. I argued that, for the Russian side, the overarching issue is whether or not Donald Trump is calling the shots on U.S. policy. Seven days ago, the White House press operation was signaling that there would be a formal encounter between the two presidents, a scheduled meeting with a defined agenda. As the week progressed, the United States began to back away from those announcements. By the end of the week, the encounter was a far less structured event, essentially folded in around an informal stroll to a photo opportunity and brief chats in between APEC sessions - nothing at all like the meeting that took place at the G-20 summit in Hamburg in July. What happened? And does it suggest that Donald Trump has a George W. Bush problem - the apparent inability to take a personal rapport with Vladimir Putin and transform it into concrete policy directives? As the APEC summit drew nearer, it became clear that the Russian president would not bring any agenda to Vietnam that suggested a willingness to reverse course or offer major concessions to U.S. preferences regarding Russian policy on North Korea, Syria, Iran and Ukraine. At best, the Russian leader might seek to bargain with President Trump, seeking concessions from Washington in some areas in return for Russian acquiescence to American proposals in others. There are, of course, two major items being prepared for the president’s review and approval. First is the application of U.S. sanctions, authorized by congressional legislation, both against Russian companies and against third parties that do business with them. Here, a critical test is pending within weeks, should the Italian energy conglomerate ENI go ahead with a joint project with Rosneft in the Black Sea—a deal grandfathered in under European regulations, but one that will certainly draw the attention of U.S. regulators for any violations of U.S. financial or technological sanctions. The second is the final decision on whether or not the United States will provide advanced weaponry, especially antitank missiles, to the Ukrainian military. Because of the way the United States geographically boxes Russia in as only a “European” state, Trump’s “Russia hands” were not scheduled to join his delegation to APEC. Thus, there were concerns that any substantive meeting between Trump and Putin would occur without the U.S. officials who would be most likely to provide necessary expertise (and who would wind up implementing any results). Linked to that were fears that, if another meeting followed the Hamburg precedent (of just the two presidents and their chief diplomatic officers), Putin might convince Trump to accept a series of compromises: trading Russian support of Trump’s initiatives in return, for instance, for concrete sanctions relief and acceptance of Russian preferences for Syria and Ukraine. There had already been some advance warning of this, such as, when Saudi Arabia’s King Salman visited Moscow last month in an historic summit, the Saudi delegation seemed to suggest that a Russia playing a more constructive and stabilizing role in the Middle East would outweigh the logic of maintaining the full raft of U.S. sanction, imposed after the 2014 incursions into Ukraine and after the 2016 elections. Keeping the tenor of the encounters between the two presidents at Da Nang informal precluded the chance of any intense bargaining sessions on the sidelines. But for the Russian side, it also raises questions - of whether Trump is in fact inclined to bargain with the Kremlin, or whether he has the clout to carry through any agreement in the face of stiff domestic opposition, not only from his own national-security team, but from Congress, where opposition to any concessions to Vladimir Putin is one of the few genuine bipartisan issues left. There is no support (even from his own appointees) for any compromise with Moscow that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power in Damascus, or that ratifies any of the gains Russia has made in Ukraine since 2014 - not when there is still a sense that strong, concerted U.S. action could lead to different outcomes. Indeed, with the European Commission recognizing that Russian plans to bypass Ukraine by 2019 are moving ahead, even despite existing sanctions, new efforts are underway to find ways to block the expansion of the Nord Stream line and forestall the expansion of the Turkish Stream export route to Europe. There is confidence that expanded sanctions, plus a renewed commitment to the Syrian opposition, could change Russia’s calculations—and therefore there is no reason to prematurely concede anything to the Kremlin. But then we have Trump’s comments to the press following the Da Nang summit. Much of that coverage has focused on Trump’s willingness to accept Putin’s denials of Russian interference in the 2016 election at face value, but two other items deserve greater attention. The first is that the president, having been convinced, guided, or maneuvered into not having a formal sit-down with Putin in Vietnam, is apparently committing to a full-fledged summit meeting of the two presidents and their respective “teams” at some indefinite point in the future. If so, then how the agenda for that meeting is set, and what parameters are established for the negotiations, will be critical.   The second is what role Trump himself intends to play in Russia policy. What struck me at times about his comments on Air Force One was how he seemed to view himself, as “the president,” as something separate and distinct from the executive branch as a whole. As chief executive, Trump is in charge of the U.S. intelligence community, the diplomatic corps and the military. Yet his comments seem to suggest that, at times, the government is pursuing a policy towards Russia that he personally disagrees with but somehow has little power to change. So while we’ve gotten a first set of answers, the questions still remain unresolved. Sideline encounters at the G-20 and at APEC were not successful in changing the dynamic of the U.S.-Russia relationship. So will a direct Trump-Putin summit be a game changer? Only if those original questions can be answered definitively.

Выбор редакции
16 ноября, 09:44

ИК Финам: Локальным сопротивлением в индексе ММВБ выступает отметка 2150п.

По оценкам агенства Moody's мировая экономика в 2018 году продемонстрирует рост на 3,2%. В то время как в странах G20 рост с 2017 по 2019 годы будет составлять порядка 2%, экономика Emerging Markets за тот же период прибавит более 5%. Тем временем вышедшие в среду данные Евростата зафиксировали профицит внешнеторгового баланса Еврозоны в сентябре на уровне 26,4 миллиарда евро, что

15 ноября, 16:41

Россиянина, задержанного за беспорядки на G20 в Гамбурге, отпустили

Суд смягчил статью и отменил приказ об аресте

Выбор редакции
15 ноября, 13:59

Задержанному в ходе протестов в Гамбурге россиянину смягчили статью

Немецкий суд смягчил статью гражданину России, задержанному за участие в беспорядках на полях саммита G20 в Гамбурге, сообщает «РИА Новости».

14 ноября, 10:51

Главы МИД РФ и Аргентины обсудят совместную политику в ООН, ВТО и G-20

В ходе запланированной на 16 ноября в Москве встрече министры иностранных дел России и Аргентины Сергей Лавров и Хорхе Фори обсудят укрепление политического диалога и наращивание двустороннего торгово-экономического сотрудничества двух стран.

13 ноября, 19:09

Trump and Putin: What Comes Next?

Nikolas K. Gvosdev Politics, Eurasia Will a future, formal Trump-Putin summit be a game changer? Last week, writing in these pages, I noted that any encounter between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin that would take place at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, would have to address two critical questions if there was to be any clarity in U.S.-Russia relations. We’ve now gotten a first draft of answers. I argued that, for the Russian side, the overarching issue is whether or not Donald Trump is calling the shots on U.S. policy. Seven days ago, the White House press operation was signaling that there would be a formal encounter between the two presidents, a scheduled meeting with a defined agenda. As the week progressed, the United States began to back away from those announcements. By the end of the week, the encounter was a far less structured event, essentially folded in around an informal stroll to a photo opportunity and brief chats in between APEC sessions—nothing at all like the meeting that took place at the G-20 summit in Hamburg in July. What happened? And does it suggest that Donald Trump has a George W. Bush problem—the apparent inability to take a personal rapport with Vladimir Putin and transform it into concrete policy directives? Read full article

12 ноября, 19:00

Песков о встрече Путина и Трампа: «Американцы не проявили гибкости»

Пресс-секретарь президента РФ Дмитрий Песков заявил, что полноформатные переговоры президентов России и США Владимира Путина и Дональда Трампа не состоялись из-за отсутствия гибкости в подходах службы протокола главы американского государства, сообщает ТАСС.

16 июля, 09:45

Константин Черемных. Когда дым рассеялся

Во времена Барака Обамы саммиты G20 проходили чинно, гладко и с единодушным «одобрямсом» итогового документа о судьбоносных задачах вспоможения бедным и особенно - беззащитной природе. Саммит этого года в Гамбурге оказался триллером и по сюжету, и по стилистике. Не будем спорить, кто стал главным героем, - но точно не хозяйка.