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28 февраля, 17:48

Джим Мэттис объявил террористам войну

По истечении месяца новый глава Минобороны США Джим Мэттис, как и обещал, представил план уничтожения ИГИЛ. Террористов будут преследовать по всему миру, а Вашингтону все это грозит новой войной

11 января, 02:52

5 Major Myths About Syria Debunked

Syria’s civil war is a conflict rife with misinformation and reports that are difficult to prove. Much of the country is inaccessible to journalists on the ground, and news coming out of the country is often filtered through activists or state-controlled outlets. Social media platforms have also made it easier for myths and intentional falsehoods to spread. Viral videos purporting to expose hidden truths of the war have racked up millions of views, despite their claims falling apart under scrutiny. Although it’s completely rational to question the reliability of reports and sources of information from Syria, many people online have an unquestioning commitment to falsehoods that promote an alternate narrative to fact-based reporting.  Amid the daily torrent of inaccuracies that circulate about Syria, several ongoing myths have shown up over and over during the course of the conflict.    Myth 1: The White Helmets Are A Western Conspiracy The Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, is an organization that has received enormous international praise for its life-saving rescue efforts. But Syrian government officials and activists supporting President Bashar Assad have also accused the group of supporting terrorists and acting as a puppet of western governments to promote regime change. The more fringe conspiracy theorists insist that the group doesn’t carry out rescue operations at at all, instead using “crisis actors” in staged attacks. The White Helmets do receive significant funding from western governments, and advocate for a no-fly zone “if necessary” to stop the near-constant regime barrel bombings of civilians. The group also operates in areas under opposition control, which is one reason critics accuse the group of aiding terrorists. An ill-advised attempt to capitalize on the viral mannequin challenge also led the group to stage a rescue to make an obvious publicity video, fueling critics’ allegations that they had faked other footage. But as Snopes detailed in a report on allegations against the White Helmets, there is no credible evidence that the group has any sustained links to terror groups or carries out hoaxes. International funding also doesn’t mean the Syrian-run group necessarily has nefarious goals. Humanitarian access in conflict zones can involve negotiating with disreputable groups for access to areas with people in need, but such talks don’t mean aid organizations support those groups.   Instead, much of the vitriol directed toward the group appears to come from pro-Russia or Assad media outlets and activists who equate any actor within opposition areas with Islamist extremist groups like the Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al Sham. In reality, White Helmets civilian rescue efforts have been well documented and journalists have worked to investigate and authenticate the videos they produce.  Myth 2: 7-Year-Old Bana Alabed’s Tweets From Aleppo Are Fake One of the most prominent voices to emerge from Aleppo as pro-government forces besieged the rebel-held part of the city was 7-year-old Bana Alabed. Through her Twitter account, which her mom Fatemah manages, Bana shared bleak vignettes of life in wartime Aleppo along with occasional pleas for help. Bana’s tweets quickly became the subject of controversy as they gained media attention during the fall of Aleppo. Critics questioned why the English used in the tweets was so proficient and how she could tweet from inside a war zone, and alleged she was a stooge for opposition groups. On the extreme side, conspiracy sites and Twitter trolls targeted Bana with threats and claims the whole account was a calculated hoax to promote regime change. In reality, there is ample evidence that the basic facts surrounding Bana’s Twitter account are genuine. Many of the false claims against Bana’s account are easily fact-checked or ignore clearly stated information about her account. Bana’s Twitter bio openly acknowledges that her mother, an English teacher, runs the account, and Fatemah often signs off on tweets to indicate she wrote them rather than Bana. A detailed report from Bellingcat worked to authenticate the account and geolocate the tweets, finding that tweets were indeed coming from eastern Aleppo, and other events such as the bombing of Bana’s house did likely happen. Getting power and cell service within the eastern parts of Aleppo is difficult, but not impossible. Bellingcat also found that claims Bana’s family uses solar panels for power appear accurate.  The Bellingcat report also debunks some of the more convoluted attempts to discredit Bana, including one critic’s misrepresentation of metadata to claim the account was based in the U.K. and a fake Fatemah account trying to link her to al Qaeda. Other journalists, such as New York Times reporter Megan Specia and the New Yorker’s Ben Taub, have spoken with Fatemah as well and concluded her situation appears legitimate. Although not all of the information in Bana’s tweets can be verified, the evidence shows that the account is run by a mother and her daughter from eastern Aleppo. Myth 3: Victims And Attacks Are Staged Or “Recycled” The Syrian war has no lack of horrific footage showing civilians wounded in pro-government airstrikes, but many Assad supporters claim that these videos are fake. Conspiracy theorists believe that “crisis actors” play the role of victims, some of whom have been “recycled” and can be seen playing the same role in multiple staged attacks. Assad himself has even made the claim that opposition groups are carrying out these elaborate hoaxes. One frequently cited source for this claim is pro-Assad blogger Eva Bartlett, whose statements at a pro-Syrian-government panel held at the UN has been viewed millions of times on YouTube and Facebook. Many of these views come from the Facebook page In The NOW, which is an offshoot of the Russian state-sponsored media outlet RT.  Bartlett makes a number of claims about the Syrian war, including that White Helmets media workers recycle a child named “Aya” in two different reports. This claim, like much of what Bartlett says, has been debunked. A Snopes fact check on her statements found that the videos thought to be in question show distinctly different children, albeit with the same first name. Bartlett did not respond to a request for clarification on her statement or to what videos she was referring. Snopes’ report also notes that the “crisis actor” accusation is a common feature of conspiracy theories, including from Sept. 11 and Sandy Hook truthers. Other accusations of “crisis actors” in Aleppo have been similarly debunked. Although not every image or video out of Syria can be 100 percent verified, that does not mean there’s a widespread conspiracy to fake attacks or manufacture injured citizens. As any aid organization can attest, there are more than enough airstrikes and victims in Syria’s war to make that unnecessary. Myth 4: 2014 Elections Prove Syria Wants Assad To Be President Pro-Assad officials and activist often cite the 2014 Syrian presidential election as proof that Syria’s regime is legitimate and backed by popular support. From their perspective, the vote shows that the Syrian people see Assad as a democratically elected leader who is fighting off an unpopular and foreign-backed terrorist insurgency.  Assad did win the 2014 election with 88.7 percent of the vote, but there are an endless number of reasons not to take this result at face value. Voting only occurred in government-controlled areas, and Assad-friendly voters were bussed to polling stations and carefully watched by security services. International observers were on hand from Syrian allies like North Korea and Iran, but official EU, U.S. and OSCE observers weren’t present.  There is also the major issue of the 9 million refugees, many of whom couldn’t vote because of their circumstances. Candidates faced an extremely high bar to entry, and opponents believe that Assad’s use of repression and intimidation prevented any real political opposition in the election. In addition to all of these delegitimizing factors, Syria is not a country with a history of free and fair elections even before the revolution. Myth 5: The U.S. Government And Barack Obama Created ISIS A myth so pervasive that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump even used it to attack the Obama administration during last year’s election campaign, the idea that President Barack Obama and the U.S. created ISIS is a long-running conspiracy theory. There has also been a persistent belief in many Middle East countries, including Iraq, that the U.S. or Hillary Clinton is behind the rise of the ISIS. These theories say more about international distrust of American foreign policy than they do about the actual origins of ISIS. The formation of ISIS is exceedingly well documented, as are the myriad factors and policies that made it the powerful terror group it is today.  The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its destabilizing effect on the region did create conditions for an early incarnation of ISIS to thrive. Powerful figures in ISIS’s organization, including leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, also met while incarcerated in the U.S.-run Camp Bucca detention center in Iraq. Some experts also blame Obama’s partial withdrawal of forces from Iraq and reticence to intervene in Syria for creating space for the militant group to grow. But these are only some of a wide range of causes that explain how ISIS formed. Assad, for instance, bears much of the blame for ISIS after years of pursuing policies that boosted jihadist groups. For much of the Syrian war, Assad also overwhelmingly targeted more moderate opposition groups while letting ISIS take over much of Syria. There are also key militant figures such as Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who founded ISIS in the literal sense, that are key in understanding the group.  Pinning ISIS’s growth on any single cause ignores the complexity and nuance that is necessary to understand it. Like all these myths, it requires a selective reading of history and facts in order to come to an unsupported conclusion. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

03 декабря 2016, 11:16

Двойные стандарты в американском антитерроре

Так писал о Дамаске, о Сирии, о ее неповторимом культурно-историческом разнообразии признанный на арабском Востоке и в мире великий палестинский поэт, лауреат Ленинской премии Махмуд Дарвиш. Еще несколько лет назад столица Сирии, а также Пальмира, Алеппо, Кусейр и Хомс были очевидным воплощением того, о чем грезил Дарвиш, чем воодушевлялись другие поэты и творцы арабского мира. Того, что когда-то называли «арабской улицей» — звенящим, бурлящим сообществом, буквально дышащим переплетением и общением различных культур и языков. Здесь тысячелетиями мирно жили и трудились вместе мусульмане, христиане, друзы, курды, евреи, большей частью даже не задумываясь об этноконфессиональных различиях.

19 сентября 2016, 06:47

Apologizing To My Daughter For The Last 15 Years Of War

Cross-posted with TomDispatch.com I recently sent my last kid off for her senior year of college. There are rituals to such moments, and because dad-confessions are not among them, I just carried boxes and kept quiet. But what I really wanted to say to her -- rather than see you later, call this weekend, do you need money? -- was: I’m sorry. Like all parents in these situations, I was thinking about her future. And like all of America, in that future she won’t be able to escape what is now encompassed by the word “terrorism.” Everything Is Okay, But You Should Be Terrified Terrorism is a nearly nonexistent danger for Americans. You have a greater chance of being hit by lightning, but fear doesn’t work that way. There’s no 24/7 coverage of global lightning strikes or “if you see something, say something” signs that encourage you to report thunderstorms. So I felt no need to apologize for lightning. But terrorism? I really wanted to tell my daughter just how sorry I was that she would have to live in what 9/11 transformed into the most frightened country on Earth. Want the numbers? Some 40% of Americans believe the country is more vulnerable to terrorism than it was just after September 11, 2001 -- the highest percentage ever. Want the apocalyptic jab in the gut? Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley said earlier this month that the threat remains just as grave: “Those people, those enemies, those members of that terrorist group, still intend -- as they did on 9/11 -- to destroy your freedoms, to kill you, kill your families, they still intend to destroy the United States of America.” All that fear turned us into an engine of chaos abroad, while consuming our freedoms at home. And it saddens me that there was a different world, pre-9/11, which my daughter’s generation and all those who follow her will never know. Growing Up My kids grew up overseas while, from 1988 to 2012, I served with the State Department. For the first part of my career as a diplomat, wars were still discreet matters. For example, though Austria was a neighbor of Slovenia, few there were worried that the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s would spill across the border. Suicide bombers didn’t threaten Vienna when we visited as tourists in 1991. That a war could again consume large parts of the globe and involve multiple nations would have seemed as remote to us vacationers that year as the moon. Even the big war of the era, Desert Storm in 1991, seemed remarkably far away. My family and I were assigned to Taiwan at the time and life there simply went on. There was no connection between us and what was happening in Kuwait and Iraq, and certainly we didn’t worry about a terror attack. It’s easy to forget how long ago that was. Much of the Balkans is now a tourist destination, and a young soldier who fought in Desert Storm would be in his mid-forties today. Or think of it this way: either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump on entering the Oval Office next January will be the fifth president in succession to bomb Iraq. When September 11, 2001, arrived, I was on assignment to Japan, and like everyone, as part of a collective trauma, I watched the terrible events on TV. Due to the time difference, it was late at night in Tokyo. As the second plane hit the World Trade Center, I made sandwiches, suspecting the phone would soon ring and I’d be called to the embassy for a long shift. I remember my wife saying, “Why would they call you in? We’re in Tokyo!” Then, of course, the phone did ring, and I ran to grab it -- not out of national security urgency, but so it didn’t wake my kids. My daughter’s birthday falls on the very day that George W. Bush launched the invasion of Iraq. I missed her celebration in 2003 to stay at work preparing for the embassy to be overrun by al-Qaeda. I missed her birthday again in 2005, having been sent on temporary duty to Thailand to assist the U.S. Navy in setting up a short-term base there. When the naval officers mentioned the location they wanted to use to the Thai military liaison accompanying us, he laughed. That’s taken, he said, but you didn’t hear it from me, better ask your own people about it. Later, I would learn that the location was a CIA black site where the country I then represented was torturing human beings. Looking back, it’s remarkable to realize that, in response to a single day of terror, Washington set the Middle East ablaze, turned air travel into a form of bondage play, and did away with the best of our democracy. Nothing required the Patriot Act, Guantánamo, renditions, drone assassinations, and the National Security Agency turning its spy tools inward. The White House kept many of the nastiest details from us, but made no secret of its broader intentions. Americans on the whole supported each step, and later Washington protected the men and women who carried out each of the grim acts it had inspired. After all, they were just following orders. Protocols now exist allowing the president to select American citizens without a whit of due process for drone killing. Only overseas, he says, but you can almost see the fingers crossed behind his back. Wouldn’t an awful lot of well-meaning Americans have supported a drone strike in San Bernardino or at the Pulse club in Orlando? Didn’t many support using a robot to blow up a suspect in Dallas? Back in the Homeland The varieties of post-9/11 fear sneak up on us all. I spent a week this summer obsessively watching the news for any sign of trouble in Egypt while my daughter was there visiting some old embassy acquaintances. I worried that she was risking her life to see a high school friend in a country once overrun with tourists. So I want to say sorry to my daughter and her friends for all the countries where we Americans, with our awkward shorts and sandals, were once at least tolerated, but that are now dangerous for us to visit. Sorry that you’ll never see the ruins of Babylon or the Great Mosque of Samarra in Iraq unless you join the military. Arriving back in the U.S., my daughter called from the airport to say she’d be home in about an hour. I didn’t mention my worries that she’d be stopped at “the border,” a new name for baggage claim, or have her cell phone confiscated for daring to travel to the Middle East. An immigration agent did, in fact, ask her what her purpose was in going there, something even the Egyptians hadn’t bothered to question her about. I also wanted to apologize to my daughter because, in our new surveillance world, she will never really know what privacy is. I needed to ask her forgiveness for how easily we let that happen, for all those who walk around muttering that they have nothing to hide, so what’s to worry about. I wanted to tell her how sorry I was that she’s now afraid of the police, not just for herself but especially for her friends of color. I wanted to tell her how badly I felt that she’d only know a version of law enforcement so militarized that, taking its cues from the national security state, it views us all as potential enemies and believes that a significant part of its job involves repressing our most basic rights. I’m sorry, I want to say to her, that protesters can be confined in something called a “free speech zone” surrounded by those same police. I want to tell my daughter that the Founders would rise up in righteous anger at the idea of the police forcing citizens into such zones outside a political convention -- and at the fact that most journalists don’t consider such a development to be a major story of our times. As I sent her off to college, I wanted to say how sorry I was that we had messed up her world, sorry we not only didn’t defeat the terrorists the way Grandpa did the Nazis but, by our actions, gave their cause new life and endless new recruits. Al-Qaeda set a trap on 9/11 and we leaped into it. The prison American occupiers set up at Camp Bucca in Iraq became a factory for making jihadis, and the torture chambers at Abu Ghraib remain, like Guantánamo, an infomercial inviting others to pick up a weapon. The New Normal My daughter is not naïve. Like many of her classmates, she’s aware of most of these things, but she has no point of comparison. What fish truly sees the water around it? And imagine how much harder it’ll be for her future kids. Her adult life has been marked by constant war, so much so that “defeating the terrorists” is little more than a set phrase she rolls her eyes at. It’s a generational thing that’s too damn normal, like Depression-era kids still saving aluminum foil and paper bags in the basement after decades of prosperity. I’m truly sorry that her generation copes with this by bouncing between cynicism and the suspension of disbelief. It was, in a way, that suspension of disbelief that allowed so many, including older people who should have known better, to accept the idea that invading Iraq was a reasonable response to an attack on America by a group of Saudis funded by Saudi “charity” donations. By now, “well, it wasn’t actually a crime” is little short of a campaign slogan for acts that couldn’t be more criminal. That’s a world on a path to accepting 2+2 can indeed equal 5 -- if our leaders tell us it’s so. We allow those leaders to claim that the thousands of American troops now stationed in Iraq are somehow not “boots on the ground,” or “ground troops.” Drone strikes, we’re told, are surgical, killing only bad guys with magic missiles, and never purposely hitting civilians, hospitals, children, or wedding parties. The deaths of human beings in such situations are always rare and accidental, the equivalent of those scratches on your car door from that errant shopping cart in the mall parking lot. Cleaning Up After Dad If anyone is going to fix this mess, I want to tell my daughter, it’s going to have to be you. And I want to add, you’ve got to do a better job than I did -- if, that is, you really want to find a way to say thanks for the skating lessons, the puppy, and that night I didn’t get angry when you violated curfew to spend more time with that boy. After the last cardboard boxes had been lugged up the stairs, I held back my tears until the very end. Hugging my daughter at that moment, I felt as if I wasn’t where I was standing but in a hundred other places. I wasn’t consoling a smart, proud, twenty-something woman, apprehensive about senior year, but an elementary school student going to bed on the night that would forever be known only as 9/11. Back home, the house is empty and quiet. Outside, the leaves have just a hint of yellow. At lunch, I had some late-season strawberries nearly sweet enough to confirm the existence of a higher power. I’m gonna really miss this summer. I know I’m not the first parent to grow reflective watching his last child walk out the door, but I have a sense of what’s ahead of her: an American world filled with misplaced fears.  Fear is a terrible thing to be sorry for, and that in itself can be scary. Peter Van Buren blew the whistle on State Department waste and mismanagement during the “reconstruction” of Iraq in We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. A TomDispatch regular, he writes about current events at We Meant Well. His latest book is Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story of the #99Percent. His next work will be Hooper's War, a novel of World War II in Japan. Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Book, Nick Turse’s Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead, and Tom Engelhardt's latest book, Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars, and a Global Security State in a Single-Superpower World. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

18 июля 2016, 19:17

No, Donald, It's Not A 'World War'

Actually, the Nice horror was the demented suicide of a mentally impaired wretch who recently got fired, divorced and arrested for road rage, not a planned jihadi terrorist attack. Beyond that, the real jihadi threat is rooted in blowback, and combatting it is a domestic police function. So enough militaristic bellicosity already! The inconvenient truth is, Washington and its NATO vassals have brought bombs, drones, occupations and slaughter to towns and villages throughout the greater middle east for upwards of three decades. It is that senseless intervention and aggression that has fueled the rise of vengeful barbarians who operate under the ideological cover of a twisted Sunni jihadism. In fact, it was the Bush/Clinton/Obama wars which gave rise first to al-Qaeda and then to ISIS. In very substantial degree Washington trained them, armed them and then incited them to their anti-western rampages. The Imperial City's insidious doctrine of "regime change" also destroyed the states of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Afghanistan, thereby giving the jihadi vast lawless territories from which to operate and to even establish a murderous medieval caliphate in the desert backwaters of western Iraq and northern Syria.. The frightful violence that has been episodically erupting in France owing to internal cadres and in the U.S. owing to copycats does not originate in the religion of Islam. The latter confession is 1384 years old, but it was only 25 years ago that meaningful jihadi terrorism first impinged on the west. Donald Trump and tens of millions of voters are naturally appalled and angered by what appears to be an escalating terrorist threat. But in light of the latest episode in France it would be well to consider exactly what happened in 1991, and how Washington and the west foolishly brought this plague upon the world. In 1991 the earth moved. The cold war ended and the nuclear sword of Damocles was removed from its perch over mankind. The totalitarian menace of the Soviet Union disappeared and its vast military establishment was demobilized, abandoned and mainly sold for scrap. It was the moment for Washington to do the same. That is, to disband NATO -- whose only justification had ever been containment of an exaggerated Soviet threat on the central front -- and to demobilize and radically shrink its globe spanning war machine. But what General Eisenhower had warned about exactly 30 years earlier -- the deeply entrenched and unchecked military-industrial-congressional complex --was not about to let world peace breakout. Instead, it launched two maneuvers in 1991 to perpetuate itself and renew its raison d'etre. To wit, in a secret national security directive drafted by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and his neocon minions, Iran was declared the new global enemy to be demonized and contained. That indictment was wholly unwarranted even then, and over the next 25 years it metastasized into massive tissue of lies about Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons and terrorist ambitions. More importantly, Washington ostracized and debilitated the very indigenous force of the region---the so-called Shiite Crescent running from Iran through southern Iraq to the Alawite (Shiite) regime of the Assads in Syria to the Hezbollah controlled provinces of Lebanon---that was the natural, blood enemy of Sunni extremism. Indeed, pursuant to their hegemonic pretensions, the neocon claque which seized power in Washington under Bush the Elder ash-canned a 13 century-old counterforce to any religiously driven outbreak of Sunni expansionism. At the same time, Bush was bamboozled into a military intervention in a meaningless spate between two local potentates over directional drilling rights that was gussied-up into a false doctrine about oil security. Save for those two profoundly wrong-headed and destructive maneuvers and all that flowed from them, there would be no al-Qaeda and Islamic State today, and jihadi terrorism would have been but a shadow of its current extent. Needless to say, the implications are epic. Hundreds of millions of innocent people in the middle east, Europe and the US are now fearful, and sometimes tragically in harms' way, owing to the grievous misdeeds of our Washington based War Party rulers. Let's start with what history has now proven in spades regarding the phony excuse of energy security. To wit, the cure for high oil prices is the global market, not the 5th fleet. The real price of oil is lower today than it was in 1990 when Bush said Saddam's alleged aggression "will not stand". Yet that happy outcome has nothing whatsoever to do with the thousands of bombs we have dropped since then or the millions dead and maimed or the trillions of tax-dollars Washington has wasted on its multiple wars and far-flung military presence in the region. On the on hand, technology and business enterprise have generated vast alternatives to Persian Gulf oil on both the supply and conservation side of the energy ledger. On the other, it is an unassailable historic fact that whatever regime controls the oil reserves under the middle east sands will produce it because every regime in that region always needs more money, and desperately so. Saddam produced all he could extract and exported all he was allowed by the West. So did Kaddafi. So do the Kurds in the north of the old Iraq and the Shiite government in Baghdad which controls the bigger fields in the south. Even the Islamic State produces every oil well we have not yet bombed to smithereens. And once the sanction were lifted, the purportedly America-hating Iranians have raised production by 1 mb/d just in the last year. In short, every single military intrusion Washington has undertaken since the February 1991 invasion of Kuwait has nothing to do with the economics of oil. Nor has it enhanced the security of gasoline and heating oil supplies in Lincoln NE and Springfield MA by one wit. Indeed, the real dirty secret of this matter is that even if the contemptible House Of Saud were to fall, Saudi Arabia's 10 million barrels per day would---apart from any short-term disruption--- make its way onto the world market. That's because the eastern provinces where all the oil fields are located are primarily Shiite. Their Iranian cousins would absolutely come to their protection, and be more than happy to share in the $150 billion per year of oil revenues at today's prices. All along, therefore, oil has been about the rule of markets, but Washington is about the perpetuation of the state and the aggrandizement of its warfare branch. It is the latter, not protection of nature's bounty under the Arabian sands, that brought the American Imperium to the Persian Gulf and that generates today's jihadi blowback in the region and rest of the world. Moreover, that proposition is not just supposition. It was 500,000 American troops on the Arabian peninsula and "crusader boots" in the land of the two Islamic holy places that changed everything in 1991. Until then, the Sunni Mujahedeen in Afghanistan were Washington's very own mercenary terrorists. Washington had recruited, transported, trained, armed and paid them throughout the 1980s to carry on the anti-Soviet fight by proxy. Osama bin-Laden was the offspring of Charlie Wilson's war and the CIA payroll. He was heralded in the West as a freedom fighter. Bin-Laden is also a testament to the perils of the Warfare State. America did not need to fight the dying Soviet Union in the Hindu Kush, and not just because Alexander the Great had proved the pointlessness of such a campaign two and one-half millennia earlier. What was killing the Soviet Union was the asphyxiating regime of socialism, state bureaucracy and totalitarian rule. But 1980s' CIA director Bill Casey was mesmerized by the nostalgia of his OSS days during WWII, and his neocon confederates were ex-Trotskyites and statists who did not remotely understand that markets and economic freedom ultimately will out. Yet having fatuously and unnecessarily created the small time nuisance of the mujahedeen, the Washington War party turned it into a monster by virtue of the first gulf war and the subsequent campaign against Saddam Hussein, which eventuated in opening the gates to hell during the second gulf war. So under the false guise of "oil security", Washington plunged the American war machine into the politics and religious fissures of the Persian Gulf, and launched itself on the path to destroying the very institutions that had kept Sunni extremism in check. Namely, the secular Baathist regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Assad clan in Syria. To be sure, these regimes were an unsavory amalgam of socialism, nationalism, authoritarianism and vast corruption. But they brooked no armed threat to their rule, and understood that the state had to be secular if the sundry ancient sects and schisms of Islam and other religious minorities within their borders, including Christians, Druse, Copts and Jews, were to peaceably co-exist. Apart from false issue of oil security, the small potatoes conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, which occasioned the elder Bush's intervention, had no bearing whatsoever on the safety and security of American citizens. As US ambassador Glaspie rightly told Saddam Hussein on the eve of his Kuwait invasion, America had no dog in that hunt. Kuwait wasn't even a country; it was a bank account sitting on a swath of oilfields surrounding an ancient trading city that had been abandoned by Ibn Saud in the early 20th century. That's because he didn't know what oil was or that it was there; and, in any event, it had been made a separate protectorate by the British in 1913 for reasons that are lost in the fog of diplomatic history. Likewise, Saddam's contentious dispute with Kuwait had been over its claim that the Emir of Kuwait was "slant drilling" across his border into Iraq's Rumaila field. Yet it was a wholly elastic boundary of no significance whatsoever. In fact, the dispute over the Rumaila field started in 1960 when an Arab League declaration arbitrarily marked the Iraq-Kuwait border two miles north of the southernmost tip of the Rumaila field. And that newly defined boundary, in turn, had come only 44 years after a pair of English and French diplomats had carved up their winnings from the Ottoman Empire's demise by laying a straight edged ruler on the map. So doing, they thereby confected the artificial country of Iraq from the historically independent and hostile Mesopotamian provinces of the Shiite in the south, the Sunni in the west and the Kurds in the north. In short, it did not matter who controlled the southern tip of the Rumaila field---the brutal dictator of Baghdad or the opulent Emir of Kuwait. Not the price of oil, nor the peace of America nor the security of Europe nor the future of Asia depended upon it. But Bush the Elder got persuaded by Henry Kissinger's economically illiterate protégés at the national security council and his Texas oilman Secretary of State that the will-o-wisp of "oil security" was at stake, and that 500,000 American troops needed to be planted in the sands of Arabia. That was a catastrophic error. The arrival of crusader boots on the purportedly sacred soil of Arabia offended and reactivated the CIA-trained Mujahedeen of Afghanistan, who had become unemployed when the Soviet Union collapsed. In due course this feckless intervention enabled the neocons to pursue their deplorable doctrine of regime change to it's logical end. That is, the destruction of the tenuous Iraqi state and the resultant rise of the Frankenstein that became ISIS. In fact, the only real terrorists in the world which threaten normal civilian life in the West are the rogue offspring of Imperial Washington's post-1990 machinations in the middle east. The CIA's Mujahedeen mercenaries mutated into al-Qaeda not because Bin Laden suddenly had a religious epiphany that his Washington benefactors were actually the Great Satan owing to America's freedom and liberty. His murderous crusade was inspired by the Wahhabi fundamentalism loose in Saudi Arabia. This benighted religious fanaticism became agitated to a fever pitch by Imperial Washington's violent plunge into Persian Gulf political and religious quarrels, the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia, and the decade long barrage of sanctions, embargoes, no fly zones, covert actions and open hostility against the Sunni regime in Bagdad after 1991. Yes, Bin Laden would have amputated Saddam's secularist head if Washington hadn't done it first, but that's just the point. The attempt at regime change in March 2003 was one of the most foolish acts of state in American history. The Younger Bush's neocon advisers had no clue about the sectarian animosities and historical grievances that Hussein had bottled-up by adroitly parsing the oil loot and strategically wielding the sword under the banner of Baathist nationalism. But Shock and Awe blew the lid and the de-baathification campaign unleashed the furies. Indeed, no sooner had George Bush pranced around on the deck of the Abraham Lincoln declaring "mission accomplished" than Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a CIA recruit to the Afghan war a decade earlier and small-time specialist in hostage-taking and poisons, fled his no count redoubt in Kurdistan to emerge as a flamboyant agitator in the now disposed Sunni heartland. The founder of ISIS succeeded in Fallujah and Anbar province just like the long list of other terrorist leaders Washington claims to have exterminated. That is, Zarqawi gained his following and notoriety among the region's population of deprived, brutalized and humiliated young men by dint of being more brutal than their occupiers. Indeed, even as Washington was crowing about the demise of Zarqawi, the remnants of the Baathist regime and the hundreds of thousands of demobilized Republican Guards were coalescing into al-Qaeda in Iraq, and their future leaders were being incubated in a monstrous nearby detention center called Camp Bucca that contained more than 26,000 prisoners. As one former US Army officer, Mitchell Gray, later described it, You never see hatred like you saw on the faces of these detainees," Gray remembers of his 2008 tour. "When I say they hated us, I mean they looked like they would have killed us in a heartbeat if given the chance. I turned to the warrant officer I was with and I said, 'If they could, they would rip our heads off and drink our blood.' " What Gray didn't know -- but might have expected -- was that he was not merely looking at the United States' former enemies, but its future ones as well. According to intelligence experts and Department of Defense records, the vast majority of the leadership of what is today known as ISIS, including its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, did time at Camp Bucca. And not only did the US feed, clothe and house these jihadists, it also played a vital, if unwitting, role in facilitating their transformation into the most formidable terrorist force in modern history. Early in Bucca's existence, the most extreme inmates were congregated in Compound 6. There were not enough Americans guards to safely enter the compound -- and, in any event, the guards didn't speak Arabic. So the detainees were left alone to preach to one another and share deadly vocational advice. .......Bucca also housed Haji Bakr, a former colonel in Saddam Hussein's air-defense force. Bakr was no religious zealot. He was just a guy who lost his job when the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi military and instituted de-Baathification, a policy of banning Saddam's past supporters from government work. According to documents recently obtained by German newspaper Der Spiegel, Bakr was the real mastermind behind ISIS's organizational structure and also mapped out the strategies that fueled its early successes. Bakr, who died in fighting in 2014, was incarcerated at Bucca from 2006-'08, along with a dozen or more of ISIS's top lieutenants. The point is, regime change and nation building can never be accomplished by the lethal violence of 21st century armed forces; and they were an especially preposterous assignment in the context of a land rent with 13 century-old religious fissures and animosities. In fact, the wobbly, synthetic state of Iraq was doomed the minute Cheney and his bloody gang decided to liberate it from the brutal, but serviceable and secular tyranny of Saddam's Baathist regime. That's because the process of elections and majority rule necessarily imposed by Washington was guaranteed to elect a government beholden to the Shiite majority. After decades of mistreatment and Saddam's brutal suppression of their 1991 uprising, did the latter have revenge on their minds and in their communal DNA? Did the Kurds have dreams of an independent Kurdistan that had been denied their 30 million strong tribe way back at Versailles and ever since? Yes, they did. So the $25 billion spent on training and equipping the putative armed forces of post-liberation Iraq was bound to end up in the hands of sectarian militias, not a national army. In fact, when the Shiite commanders fled Sunni-dominated Mosul in June 2014 they transformed the ISIS uprising against the government in Baghdad into a vicious fledgling state in one fell swoop. It wasn't by beheadings and fiery jihadist sermons that it quickly enslaved dozens of towns and several million people in western Iraq and the Euphrates Valley of Syria. Its instruments of terror and occupation were the best weapons that the American taxpayers could buy. That included 2,300 Humvees and tens of thousands of automatic weapons, as well as vast stores of ammunition, trucks, rockets, artillery pieces and even tanks and helicopters. And that wasn't the half of it. The newly proclaimed Islamic State also filled the power vacuum in Syria created by its so-called civil war. But in truth that was another exercise in Washington inspired and financed regime change undertaken in connivance with Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These Sunni plutarchies were surely not interested in expelling the tyranny next door; they are the living embodiment of it. Instead, the rebellion was about removing Iran's Alawite/Shiite ally from power in Damascus and laying gas pipelines to Europe across the upper Euphrates Valley. In any event, ISIS soon had troves of additional American weapons. Some of them were supplied to Sunni radicals by way of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. More came up the so-called "ratline" from Gaddafi's former arsenals in Benghazi through Turkey. And still more came through Jordan from the "moderate" opposition trained there by the CIA, which more often than not sold them or defected to the other side. So that the Islamic State was Washington's Frankenstein monster became evident from the moment it rushed upon the scene 30 months ago. But even then the Washington war party could not resist adding fuel to the fire. Whooping up another round of Islamophobia among the American public after the vastly exagerated Yazidis episode, they forced the Obama White House into a futile bombing campaign for the third time in a quarter century. But if bombing really worked, the Islamic State would be sand and gravel by now. Indeed, as shown by the map below, it is really not much more than that anyway. The dusty, broken, impoverished towns and villages along the margins of the Euphrates River and in the bombed out precincts of Anbar province do not attract thousands of wannabe jihadists from the failed states of the middle east and the alienated Muslim townships of Europe because the caliphate offers prosperity, salvation or any future at all. What recruits them is outrage at the bombs and drones being dropped on Sunni communities by the US air force; and by the cruise missiles launched from the bowels of the Mediterranean which rip apart homes, shops, offices and mosques containing as many innocent civilians as ISIS terrorists. The truth is, the Islamic State was destined for a short half-life anyway. It was contained by the Kurds in the north and east and by Turkey with NATO's second largest army and air force in the northwest. And it was surrounded by the Shiite crescent in the populated, economically viable regions of lower Syria and Iraq. So absent Washington's misbegotten campaign to unseat Assad in Damascus and demonize his confession-based Iranian ally, there would have been nowhere for the murderous fanatics who pitched a makeshift capital in Raqqa to go. They would have run out of money, recruits, momentum and public acquiesce in their horrific rule in due course. But with the US Air Force functioning as their recruiting arm and France's anti-Assad foreign policy helping to foment a final spasm of anarchy in Syria, the gates of hell have been opened wide. What has been puked out is not an organized war on Western civilization as western politicians like Hollande so hysterically proclaim in response to the mayhem of each new incident. It is just blowback carried out by that infinitesimally small salient of mentally deformed young men who can be persuaded to strap on a suicide belt. Needless to say, bombing won't stop them; it will just make more of them. Ironically, what can stop them is the Assad government and the ground forces of its Hezbollah and the Iranian Republican Guard allies. Its time to let them settle an ancient quarrel that has never been any of America's business anyway. But Imperial Washington is so caught up in its myths, lies and hegemonic stupidity that it can not see the obvious. After decades in the region, it has done everything wrong that could be done. It has destroyed the Baathist states that kept religious fanaticism in check; it has alienated the vast crescent of Shiite forces, which are capably armed and have never advocated or launched terrorist attacks in the west; and it has aligned itself with a few thousand corpulent, tyrannical princes in Saudi Arabia and the gulf petro-states who would have a shorter tenure this side of Paradise, if the people were given a choice, than did the Romanovs. The truth is, the Fifth Fleet and its overt and covert auxiliaries should never have been there---going all the way back to the CIA's coup against Iranian democracy in 1953. It was in the name of protecting the oil fields that the Washington war machine installed the monstrous Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on the Peacock Throne and thereby inaugurated 25 years of plunder and Savak terror. Likewise, it was the Washington war machine that decided upon the "tilt to Saddam" in his 1980s war on the Islamic Republic, and which provided him with satellite based tracking and targeting services when he rained chemical weapons on barely armed Iranian forces. The truth is, there never were any Iranian "terrorists" at time the Berlin Wall fell. What existed was the smoldering hostility and nationalism that had arisen among the Iranian people after four decades of Washington intervention in their internal affairs, and a theocratic Shiite regime that had come to power owing to Washington's foolish embrace of a brutal megalomaniacal tyrant. Even then, the rulers of Tehran had been ratified twice in honest elections. And they were far more civilized, constitutionally-minded and economically egalitarian than the absolute monarchs of the House of Saud, whose gluttonous opulence was unspeakable and whose medievalist Wahhabi regime of religious fanaticism has recruited, trained, motivated and dispatched more jihadi terrorists than the Iranians ever have. And that gets to the heart of why there is no 'world war' emanating from Islam aimed at the west and America. The Islamic nations are at war with themselves, and have been for centuries, not with us. To stop the episodic incursions of jihadi terrorism -- organized or "inspired" -- in the west, Washington does not need to make the desert glow in the backwaters of the upper Euphrates valley. It only needs to vacate the region, and invite the Iranians and their Shiite Crescent allies to finish the job. The caliphate would be gone in no time. Then, there would be no war zone for recruiting, training and radicalizing the alienated young Muslim men of Europe to return to their home communities on missions of murder and mayhem. At length, there would be no jihadi fighters and martyrs "heroically" resisting the bombs and drones of the US Air Force to "inspire" copycat acts of violence in the US homeland, or to disseminate social media videos and propaganda that appeal to the alienated and mentally troubled losers who have been responsible for most of the recent "terrorist" episodes in the US. But for that constructive resolution to come about Washington's two Big Lies would need to be decisively refuted. Namely, that the Iranian regime has been hell-bent on obtaining nuclear weapons and that it is the leading exporter of terrorism in the middle east. As to the first, the Iranian nuclear agreement is a decisive refutation of the War Party's hoary claim that Iran is hell-bent upon obtaining nuclear weapons. This deafening but untruthful narrative was long ago debunked by the 2007 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). These authoritative findings were issued by the nation's 16 top intelligence agencies in November 2007, and they held that what had possibly been a small-scale Iranian weapons research effort was abandoned in 2003 and never restarted. That NIE verdict has been reiterated several times since then. Not surprisingly, it was also these NIE findings that stopped cold in its tracks George Bush's plan to bomb the alleged Iranian nuclear sites in late 2007. In his memoirs the Great Decider admitted that it would have been hard to explain to the American public why he was launching another war to eliminate an alleged Iranian WMD threat when his own intelligence agencies had just concluded it did not even exist! Indeed, it was the same crowd of Cheney, Wolfowitz, Bolton, Feith et.al. which had falsified the WMD claims against Saddam Hussein that had been beating the war drums so loudly about the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program. And, as it has turned out, they had resorted to the same kind of falsified intelligence which the first time around had generated the infamous "curveball" pictures of biological weapons labs that were actually pasturized milk plants. This time it was a bunch of falsified drawings and plans mysteriously found on a laptop computer that had been turned over by a Iranian dissident group called the MEK, which, ironically, had long been allied with Saddam Hussein and had been on the State Department terrorist list from 1997 to 2012. So it needs to be shouted from the rafters at the outset that all the arm-waving and screeching against the Iranian nuke deal by the GOP war-mongers and the Israeli lobby is grounded in a Big Lie. The whole Iran-is-after-the-bomb narrative is just WMD 2.0. Indeed, the War Party has been so shrill and unrelenting in promulgating this trumped-up story that the other side of the equation is hardly known to the American public. Namely, that the overwhelming weight of the evidence over more than three decades -- including information obtained by the IAEA during the course of extensive investigations -- is that Iran's primary aim has been to obtain enrichment capacity for its civilian reactors. In fact, when an incipient weapons research program was shutdown in 2003, the Ayatollah Khamenei took a decisive step to remove all doubt inside the Iranian government. He issued a fatwa (ban) against the possession of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic. This anti-WMD edict was in keeping with a similar fatwa against biological and chemical weapons issued by his predecessor, the Ayatollah Khomeini, in the midst of Iran's war with Iraq in the 1980s. At the time, Saddam was dropping these horrific weapons on Iranian battle forces -- some of them barely armed teenage boys -- with the spotting help of CIA tracking satellites and the concurrence of Washington. Thus, the real history demonstrates an Iranian posture that is wholly contrary to the War Party's endless blizzard of false charges about its quest for nukes. However benighted and medieval its religious views, the theocracy which rules Iran does not consist of demented war mongers. In the heat of battle they were willing to sacrifice their own forces rather than violate their religious scruples to counter Saddam's WMDs. At the end of the day, the War Party's narrative is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. Finally, there is the second giant lie that has been used to complete the demonization of the Iranian government. That is the utterly false claim that Iran is an aggressive would be hegemon that is a fount of terrorism and is dedicated to the destruction of the state of Israel, among other treacherous purposes. That giant lie was almost single-handedly fashioned by Bibi Netanyahu and his coterie of power-hungry henchman after the mid-1990s. Indeed, the false claim that Iran posses an "existential threat" to Israel is a product of the pure red meat domestic Israeli politics that have kept Bibi in power for much of the last two decades. But the truth is Iran is no better or worse than any of the other major powers in the Middle East. In many ways it is far less of a threat to regional peace and stability than the military butchers who now run Egypt on $1.5 billion per year of US aid. And it is surely no worse than the corpulent tyrants who squander the massive oil resources of Saudi Arabia in pursuit of unspeakable opulence and decadence to the detriment of the 27 million citizens which are not part of the regime, and who one day may well reach the point of revolt. And when it comes to the support of terrorism, the Saudis have funded more jihadists and terrorists throughout the region than Iran ever even imagined. In this context, the War Party's bloviation about Iran's leadership of the so-called Shiite Crescent is especially obnoxious. Yes, the Iranians support the Assad government in Syria, but that's a long-standing alliance that goes back to his father's era and is rooted in the historic confessional politics of the Islamic world. The Assad regime is Alawite, a branch of the Shiite, and despite the regime's brutality, it has been a bulwark of protection for all of Syria's minority sects, including Christians, against a majority-Sunni ethnic cleansing. The latter would surely occur if the Saudi supported rebels, led by ISIS, were ever to take power. Likewise, the fact that the government of the broken state of Iraq -- an artificial, non-sustainable 1916 concoction of two stripped pants European diplomats (Messrs. Sykes and Picot of the British and French foreign offices, respectively) -- is now aligned with Iran is also a result of confessional politics and geo-economic propinquity. For all practical purposes, the Kurds of the northeast have declared their independence and the western Sunni lands of the upper Euphrates have been conquered by ISIS with American weapons dropped in place by the hapless $25 billion Iraqi army minted by Washington's departing proconsuls. Accordingly, what is left of Iran is a population that is overwhelmingly Shiite, and which nurses bitter resentments from decades of Sunni repression under Saddam. Why in the world, therefore, wouldn't they ally with their Shiite neighbor? Likewise, the claim that Iran is now trying to annex Yemen is pure claptrap. The ancient territory of Yemen has been racked by civil war off and on since the early 1970s. And a major driving force of that conflict has been confessional differences between the Sunni south and the Shiite north. In more recent times, Washington's blatant drone war inside Yemen against alleged terrorists and its domination and financing of Yemen's governments eventually produced the same old outcome. That is, another failed state and an illegitimate government which fled at the 11th hour, leaving another vast cache of American arms and equipment behind. Accordingly, the Houthi forces now in control of substantial parts of the country are not some kind of advanced guard sent in by Tehran. They are indigenous partisans who share a confessional tie with Iran, but which have actually been armed by the US. And the real invaders in this destructive civil war are the Saudis, whose vicious bombing campaign against civilian populations controlled by the Houthis are outright war crimes if the word has any meaning at all. Finally, there is the fourth element of the purported Iranian axis -- the Hezbollah controlled Shiite communities of southern Lebanon and the Beka Valley. Like everything else in the Middle East, Hezbollah is a product of historical European imperialism, Islamic confessional politics and the frequently misguided and counter-productive security policies of Israel. In the first place, Lebanon was not any more a real country than Iraq was when Sykes and Picot laid their straight-edged rulers on a map. The result was a stew of religious and ethnic divisions -- Maronite Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Copts, Druse, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, Kurds, Armenians, Jews and countless more -- that made the fashioning of a viable state virtually impossible. At length, an alliance of Christians and Sunnis gained control of the country, leaving the 40 percent Shiite population disenfranchised and economically disadvantaged, as well. But it was the inflow of Palestinian refugees in the 1960s and 1970s that eventually upset the balance of sectarian forces and triggered a civil war that essentially lasted from 1975 until the turn of the century. It also triggered a catastrophically wrong-headed Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, and a subsequent repressive occupation of mostly Shiite territories for the next eighteen years. The alleged purpose of this invasion was to chase the PLO and Yassir Arafat out of the enclave in southern Lebanon that they had established after being driven out of Jordan in 1970. Eventually Israel succeeded in sending Arafat packing to north Africa, but in the process created a militant, Shiite-based resistance movement that did not even exist in 1982, and which in due course became the strongest single force in Lebanon's fractured domestic political arrangements. After Israel withdrew in 2000, the then Christian President of the county made abundantly clear that Hezbollah had become a legitimate and respected force within the Lebanese polity, not merely some subversive agent of Tehran: "For us Lebanese, and I can tell you the majority of Lebanese, Hezbollah is a national resistance movement. If it wasn't for them, we couldn't have liberated our land. And because of that, we have big esteem for the Hezbollah movement." So, yes, Hezbollah is an integral component of the Shiite Crescent and its confessional and political alignment with Tehran is entirely plausible. But that arrangement -- however uncomfortable for Israel -- does not represent Iranian aggression on Israel's northern border. Instead, it's actually the blowback from the stubborn refusal of Israeli governments -- especially the rightwing Likud governments of modern times -- to deal constructively with the Palestinian question. In lieu of a two-state solution in the territory of Palestine, therefore, Israeli policy has produced a chronic state of war with nearly half the Lebanese population represented by Hezbollah. The latter is surely no agency of peaceful governance and has committed its share of atrocities. But the point at hand is that given the last 35 years of history and Israeli policy, Hezbollah would exist as an unfriendly presence on its northern border even if the Shah or his heir was still on the Peacock Throne. At the end of the day, there is no reason for the vast war machine of Washington and its vassals to be in the middle east at all. The terrible violence it has inflicted on the region has generated far more terrorists than all the fiery sermons and social media propaganda that a few thousand Sunni fanatics have ever been able to muster. So if the Donald wants to really stop the blowback, eliminate the copycats and lone wolves and reduce the unjustified but palpable fears of terrorism among American voters, he only needs to do what Eisenhower did in 1952. That is, go to Tehran, make a deal and then bring Washington's vast, destructive and unaffordable war machine home. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

15 июня 2016, 20:11

Голливудское поражение ИГИЛ

Как смерть «халифа» аль-Багдади повлияет на операции группировки в Сирии и Ираке

Выбор редакции
04 июня 2016, 18:26

Студенты из США сделали игру про пытки

Студенты из Питсбургского Университета создали игру, в которой игроки участвуют в издевательствах над политзаключенными. Действие происходит во время войны в Ираке в находившейся в Кэмп-Букка тюрьме. Игроки выступают в роли американских солдат, которым любой ценой нужно выбить показания на допросе.

23 марта 2016, 15:01

Теракты в Брюсселе – это только тренировка?

Взрывы «в столице ЕС» стали очень серьезным вызовом всей Европе. Террористическая атака в Брюсселе, с точки зрения специалистов, идентична трагическим событиям в Париже, имеет единый центр управления и очень напоминает тренировку перед чем-то еще более зловещим, что может произойти в недалеком будущем, заявил первый заместитель председателя комитета по обороне и безопасности Совета Федерации Франц Клинцевич в московском эфире программы «Вести.doc».С 57 минуты – московский эфир «Вести.doc»Есть еще дальневосточный эфир (на Москву снимали отдельную передачу) – ссылкаВряд ли кому-то сегодно нужно доказывать, что США сделали очень многое для создания и становления ИГ. Военную и идеологическую верхушку ИГ создавали в оккупационном лагере Кэмп-Букка, где обрабатывались и обучались офицеры армии Саддама, сменившие идентчиность с националистически-светской на радикально исламистскую. Но началось все намного раньше. Обвиняемые в терактах в Париже и в Брюсселе – это зачастую граждане Франции и Бельгии, а не беженцы. И действует, судя по заявлениям специалистов (и просто здравому смыслу), серьезная сеть, обладающая мощным смысловым стрежнем, навыками, ресурсами и всем прочим, позволяющей ей вести террорестическую войну на территории ЕС. Это длинная закладка, которая начала себя проявлять, на фоне показательной беспомощности спецсслужб.Ответом же ЕС стало невнятное бормотание за все хорошее и закручиванеи гаек полицейкского государства. То есть никакого концептуального выхода ЕС не озвучивает. А ведь очевидно, что вопрос именно в концепции. В концепции мультикультурализма, о провале которой заявил ряд европейских лидеров (что не привело к делам, мультикультурализм не только не отменен, он усиливается). И в концепции европейской (шире Западной) политики по разрушению национальных государств на Большом Ближнем Востоке и в мире в целом (включая Украину).То есть плавильный котел (на котором и основано любое национальное государство) отменяется даже внутри ЕС, а на периферии создаются и усиливаются архаичные племена с постмодернистским конструктом в виде идеологии. Эти племена уже широко представлены в ЕС и продолжают туда массово проникать. В условия остановки плавильного котла, никакого собственного ответа у ЕС нет. Поправение Европы – это тоже не ответ, ибо там нет никакой новой концепции, кроме глумливо навязываемого Европе нового издания «Майн Кампф». Но кастрированная постмодернистская архаика – это не лучший ответ на другую архаику.Единственное, что точно может сделать и делает ЕС – это создание полицейского государства, которое, кстати, вовсе не обязательно отменит мультикультурализм, оно гарантированно отменяет только демократию.Современная Европа не может ответить на стоящие перед ней вызовы. И в дальнейшем, без резкого поворота, будет ослабляться – готовиться к переходу в свое новое качество, к чему холодно ведут Европу. Кто ведет? Ответьте на вопрос, чьим ключевым геополитическим конкурентом является ЕС?

21 января 2016, 19:27

The Pentagon's Progress

Will American “Successes” Lead to More Iraqi Military Failures? Cross-posted with TomDispatch.com There’s good news coming out of Iraq... again. The efforts of a 65-nation coalition and punishing U.S. airstrikes have helped local ground forces roll back gains by the Islamic State (IS).  Government forces and Shiite militias, for example, recaptured the city of Tikrit, while Kurdish troops ousted IS fighters from the town of Sinjar and other parts of northern Iraq. Last month, Iraqi troops finally pushed Islamic State militants out of most of the city of Ramadi, which the group had held since routing Iraqi forces there last spring. In the wake of all this, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter touted “the kind of progress that the Iraqi forces are exhibiting in Ramadi, building on that success to… continue the campaign with the important goal of retaking Mosul as soon as possible.”  Even more recently, he said those forces were “proving themselves not only motivated but capable.”  I encountered the same upbeat tone when I asked Colonel Steve Warren, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, about the Iraqi security forces.  “The last year has been a process of constructing, rebuilding, and refitting the Iraqi army,” he explained. “While it takes time for training and equipping efforts to take effect, the increasing tactical confidence and competence of the ISF [Iraqi security forces] and their recent battlefield successes indicate that we are on track.” “Progress.”  “Successes.”  “On track.”  “Increasing tactical confidence and competence.”  It all sounded very familiar to me. By September 2012, after almost a decade at the task, the U.S. had allocated and spent nearly $25 billion on “training, equipping, and sustaining” the Iraqi security forces, according to a report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.  Along the way, a parade of generals, government officials, and Pentagon spokesmen had offered up an almost unending stream of good news about the new Iraqi Army.  Near constant reports came in of “remarkable,” “big,” even “enormous” progress for a force that was said to be exuding increasing “confidence,” and whose performance was always improving.  In the end, the U.S. claimed to have trained roughly 950,000 members of the “steady,” “solid,” Iraqi security forces. And yet just two and a half years after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, that same force collapsed in spectacular fashion in the face of assaults by Islamic State militants who, by CIA estimates, numbered no more than 31,000 in all.  In June 2014, for example, 30,000 U.S.-trained Iraqi troops abandoned their equipment and in some cases even their uniforms, fleeing as few as 800 Islamic State fighters, allowing IS to capture Mosul, the second largest city in the country.  Blaming the Victim “When U.S. forces departed Iraq in 2011, it was after helping the Iraqi government create an entirely new Iraqi Security Force following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime,” Major Curtis Kellogg, a spokesman with U.S. Central Command, explained to me last year.  It almost sounded as if the old regime had toppled of its own accord, a new government had arisen, and the U.S. had generously helped build a military for it.  In reality, of course, a war of choice -- based on trumped up claims of nonexistent weapons of mass destruction -- led to a U.S. occupation and the conscious decision to dissolve Iraqi autocrat Saddam Hussein’s military and create a new army in the American mold.  “[T]he Iraqi security forces were a fully functioning element of the Iraq Government,” Kellogg continued, explaining how such an Iraqi military collapse could occur in 2014.  “However, the military standards established and left in place were allowed to atrophy following the departure of U.S. troops.”  More recently, Colonel Steve Warren brought up another problem with Iraq’s forces in an email to me.  “The Iraqi army that we left in 2011 was an army that had been trained for counterinsurgency. That means route clearance, checkpoint operations, and IED [improvised explosive device] reduction, for example.  The Iraqi army that collapsed in 2014 was... not trained and... not ready for a conventional fight -- the conventional assault that ISIL brought to Mosul and beyond.” Both Kellogg and Warren stopped short of saying what seems obvious to many.  Kalev Sepp, the adviser to two top American generals in Iraq and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and counterterrorism, shows no such hesitation. “We had 12 years to train the Iraqi Army... We failed.  It’s obvious.  So when this lightly-armed insurgent group, the so-called Islamic State, invaded the country, the Iraqi army collapsed in front of it.”  It’s taken billions of dollars and a year and a half of air strikes, commando raids, advice, and training to begin to reverse the Islamic State’s gains.  According to Warren, the U.S. and its partners have once again trained more than 17,500 ISF troops, with another 2,900 currently in the pipeline.  And once again we’re hearing about their successes. Secretary of Defense Carter, for example, called the fight for Ramadi “a significant step forward in the campaign to defeat this barbaric group,” while Secretary of State John Kerry claimed the Islamic State had “suffered a major defeat” there.  Still, the tiny terror group seems to have no difficulty recruiting new troops, is ramping up attacks in the district of Haditha, carrying out complex attacks in Baghdad and the town of Muqdadiya, and continues to hold about 57,000 square miles of Syrian and Iraqi territory, including Mosul. With questions already being raised by Pentagon insiders about just how integral the Iraqi security forces were to the retaking of Ramadi and doubts about their ability to clear cities like Mosul, it’s worth taking a look back at all those upbeat reports of “progress” during the previous U.S. effort to build an Iraqi Army from scratch.  Nothing “Succeeds” Like “Success” After the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein's government in April 2003 as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush administration began remaking the battered nation from the ground up.  One of the first acts of L. Paul Bremer III, the top American civilian official in the occupied country, was to dissolve Iraq’s military.  His plan: to replace Saddam Hussein’s 350,000-man army with a lightly armed border protection force that would peak at around 40,000 soldiers, supplemented by police and civil defense forces.  In an instant, hundreds of thousands of well-trained soldiers were unemployed, providing a ready source of fighters for a future insurgency. "In less than six months we have gone from zero Iraqis providing security to their country to close to a hundred thousand Iraqis... Indeed, the progress has been so swift that... it will not be long before [the Iraqi security forces] will... outnumber the U.S. forces,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested in a cheery assessment in October 2003.  Major General Paul Eaton, tasked with rebuilding the Iraqi Army, similarly articulated his upbeat vision for the force.  Schooled by Americans in “fundamental soldier and leadership skills” and outfitted with all the accoutrements of modern Western troops, including body armor and night-vision equipment, the new military would be committed to “defend[ing] Iraq and its new-found freedom,” he announced at a Baghdad briefing in January 2004.  Soon, Iraqis would even take over the task of instruction.  “I would like to emphasize that this will be an Iraqi Army, trained by Iraqis," he said. "As Iraq is reborn,” he added, “we believe that her armed forces can lead the way in unifying" the country.  “Paul Eaton and his team did an extraordinary amount for the Iraqi Security Force mission,” his successor Lieutenant General David Petraeus would say a couple of years later.  “They established a solid foundation on which we were able to build as the effort was expanded very substantially and resourced at a much higher level." Retired Special Forces officer Kalev Sepp, who traveled to Iraq as an adviser five times, had a different assessment. “General Eaton was direct in letting me know that he wanted to be remembered as the father of the new Iraqi Army,” he told me. “I thought his approach was conceptually wrong,” Sepp recalled, noting that Eaton “understood his mission was to create an army to defend Iraq from foreign invasion, but he completely overlooked the internal insurgency.” (A request to interview Eaton, sent to the American Security Project, a Washington D.C.-based think tank with which the retired general is affiliated, went unanswered.)  General Eaton would later blame the Bush administration for initial setbacks in the performance of the Iraqi Army, thanks to poor prewar planning and insufficient resources for the job.  "We set out to man, train, and equip an army for a country of 25 million -- with six men," General Eaton told the New York Times in 2006.  He did, however, accept personal responsibility for the most visible of its early failures, the mutiny of a freshly minted Iraqi battalion en route to its first battle in April 2004. In the years that followed, America’s Iraq exploded into violence as Sunni and Shiite militants battled each other, the U.S. occupiers, and the U.S.-backed Baghdad government.  On the fly, U.S. officials came up with new plans to build a large, conventional, heavily armed force to secure Iraq in the face of sectarian strife, multiple raging insurgencies, and ultimately civil war.  “The Iraqi military and police forces expanded rapidly from 2004 to 2006, adapting to the counterinsurgency mission,” according to a report by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.  As chaos spread and death tolls rose, estimates of the necessary numbers of Iraqi troops, proposals concerning the right types of weapons systems for them, and training stratagems for building the army were amended, adjusted, and revised, again and again.  There was, however, one constant: praise.  In September 2005, as violence was surging and more than 1,400 civilians were being killed in attacks across the country, General George W. Casey Jr., commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, reported that the security forces were "progressing and continuing to take a more prominent role in defending their country."  He repeatedly emphasized that training efforts were on track -- a sentiment seconded by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.  “Every single day, the Iraqi security forces are getting bigger and better and better trained and better equipped and more experienced,” he said. “I think we did a very effective job of training the Iraqi military recruits that were brought to us,” Casey told me last year, reflecting on U.S. efforts during his two and a half years in command.  The trouble, he said, was with the Iraqis.  “The political situation in Iraq through 2007 and even to this day is such that the leadership of the Iraqi government and the military never could instill the loyalty of the troops in the government.” At the time, however, American generals emphasized progress over problems.  After Petraeus finished his own stint heading the training effort, he was effusive in his praise. “The bottom line up front that I'd like to leave with you today is that there has been enormous progress with the Iraqi security forces over the course of the past 16 months in the face of a brutal insurgency,” he boasted in October 2005, adding that “considerable work” still lay ahead. “Iraqi security force readiness has continued to grow with each passing week.  You can take a percentage off every metric that's out there, whatever you want -- training, equipping, infrastructure reconstruction, units in the fight, schools, academies reestablished -- you name it -- and what has been accomplished... would still be remarkable.”  (Messages seeking an interview sent to Petraeus at Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., the investment firm where he serves as chairman of the KKR Global Institute, were not answered.)  In November 2005, President Bush voiced the same sentiments.  “As the Iraqi security forces stand up, their confidence is growing,” he told midshipmen at the Naval Academy.  “And they're taking on tougher and more important missions on their own.”  By the following February, General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was similarly lauding that military, claiming “the progress that they've made over this last year has been enormous.” The next month, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, who succeeded Petraeus as commander of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and later served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, chimed in with glowing praise: “What we're seeing now is progress on a three-year investment in Iraq's security forces.  It's been a big investment, and it's yielding big progress.” I asked retired Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich, a professor of history and international relations emeritus at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies, how so many American officials could have seen so much progress from a force that would later collapse so rapidly and spectacularly.  “I think there’s a psychological need to see progress and, of course, it’s helpful to parrot the party line.  I do think that, psychologically, you need to be able to persuade yourself that your hard-earned efforts -- this time spent away from home in lousy conditions -- actually produced something positive.” Kalev Sepp, who traveled all over Iraq talking to the commanders of more than 30 U.S. units while conducting a seminal counterinsurgency study known simply as the “COIN Survey,” told me that when he asked about the progress of the Iraqi units they were working with, U.S. officers invariably linked it to their own tour of duty. “Almost every commander said exactly the same thing.  If the commander had six months left in his tour, the Iraqis would be combat-capable in six months.  If the commander had four months left, then the Iraqis would be ready in four months.  Was a commander going to say ‘I won’t accomplish my mission.  I’m not going to be done on time'?  All the other units were saying their Iraqis were going to be fully trained.  Who was going to be the one commander who said ‘I don’t think my Iraqi unit is really ready’?” Official praise continued as insurgencies raged across the country and monthly civilian death tolls regularly exceeded 2,000, even topping 3,000 in 2006 and 2007.  “The Iraqi security force continues to develop and grow, assisted by embedded transition teams,” Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq, announced to the press in May 2007.  “Yes, there are still problems within the Iraqi security forces -- some sectarian, some manning, and some to do with equipping.  But progress is being made, and it's steady.”  A 2008 Pentagon review also indicated remarkable progress with 102 out of 169 Iraqi battalions being declared “capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with or without Iraqi or coalition support,” up from just 24 battalions in 2005. Years later, Odierno, still in charge of the command, then known as United States Forces-Iraq, continued to tout improvement.  “Clearly there's still some violence, and we still need to make more progress in Iraq," he told reporters in July 2010. "But Iraqi security forces have taken responsibility for security throughout Iraq, and they continue to grow and improve every day.”  The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Stuart Bowen, was also upbeat, noting in 2010 that the $21.3 billion already spent to build up the then-660,000-man security force had “begun to pay off significantly.”  Don Cooke, head of the State Department's Iraq assistance office, agreed.  “We have built an Iraqi security force which is capable of maintaining internal security in Iraq... And four or five or six years ago, there were people who were saying it was going to take decades."  In October 2011, as U.S. forces were preparing to end eight years of occupation, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta offered up his own mission-accomplished assessment.  “You know, the one thing... we have seen is that Iraq has developed a very good capability to be able to defend itself.  We've taken out now about a hundred thousand [U.S.] troops [from Iraq], and yet the level of violence has remained relatively low.  And I think that's a reflection of the fact that the Iraqis have developed a very important capability here to be able to respond to security threats within their own country,” he said of the by then 930,000-man security forces. Winners and Losers As the U.S. was training recruits at bases all over Iraq -- including Camp Bucca, where Iraqi cadets attended a U.S.-run course for prison guards -- another force was also taking shape.  For years, U.S.-run prison camps were decried by many as little more than recruiting and training sites for would-be insurgents, with innocents -- angered by arbitrary and harsh detentions -- housed alongside hardcore militants.  But Camp Bucca proved to be even more dangerous than that.  It became the incubator not just for an insurgency, but for a proto-state, the would-be caliphate that now lords over significant portions of Iraq and neighboring Syria.    Nine top commanders of the Islamic State did prison time at America’s Camp Bucca, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the group’s leader who spent nearly five years there.  “Before their detention, Mr. al-Baghdadi and others were violent radicals, intent on attacking America,” Andrew Thompson, an Iraq War veteran, and academic Jeremi Suri wrote in a 2014 New York Times piece. “Their time in prison deepened their extremism and gave them opportunities to broaden their following... The prisons became virtual terrorist universities: The hardened radicals were the professors, the other detainees were the students, and the prison authorities played the role of absent custodian.” So how could U.S. officials have so successfully (if inadvertently) fostered the leadership of what would become a truly effective fighting force that would one day best the larger, far more intensively trained, better-armed military they had built to the tune of tens of billions of dollars?  “The people we imprisoned didn’t leave with skills when they finally got out of prison, but they did leave with will,” says Andrew Bacevich.  “What we were doing was breeding resentment, anger, determination, disgust, which provided the makings of an army that turns out to be more effective than the Iraqi Army.” General George Casey, who went on to serve as Army Chief of Staff before retiring in 2011, sees the failure of Iraq’s Shiite government to reach out to minority Sunnis as the main driver of the collapse of significant portions of the country’s army in 2014.  “You hear all kinds of reasons why the Sunni forces [of the Iraqi military] ran out of Mosul, but it wasn’t a surprise to any of us who had been over there.  If your country doesn’t support what you’re doing, there’s no reason to fight for them,” Casey explained in a phone interview last year.  “People probably give short shrift to what we in the military call ‘the will to fight.’  When it comes right down to it, that’s what it’s all about.  And we can’t instill the will to fight in the heart of a soldier from another country.  We just can’t do it.” “We can talk about how appalling Daesh is,” adds Kalev Sepp, using the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State, “but their fighters believe in what they’re doing and that adds a particular steel to one’s backbone.”  Bacevich, who has recently finished writing a military history, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, echoed this sentiment, noting the stark difference between U.S.-trained Iraqi forces and their brutal opponents.  “Whatever else we may think of ISIS, their forces appear to be keen to fight and willing to die in order to promote their cause.  The same cannot be said of the Iraqi Army.” And yet, in the wake of the implosion of Iraq’s security forces, the United States -- as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, its campaign against IS -- began a new advisory and training effort to assist and re-rebuild Iraq’s army.  In June 2014, President Obama announced that up to 300 advisors would be sent to Iraq.  The size of the U.S. presence has increased steadily ever since to roughly 3,500.  “As per policy we do not disclose specific numbers of troops and their roles,” Colonel Warren, the U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, explained to me.  He did, however, note that there are approximately 5,500 Coalition personnel from 17 partner nations including the United States conducting advise and assist missions and training at “Building Partner Capacity sites.”  Despite the poor results of the prior training effort, even some of its critics are hopeful that the current mission may succeed.  “American advisors could have a positive effect,” Sepp, now a senior lecturer in defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, told me.  He explained that a pinpoint mission of training Iraqis to take back a particular city or defend a specific area stands a real chance of success.  Casey, his former boss, agreed but insisted that such success would not come easily or quickly.  “This is going to take a long time.  This is not a short-term thing.  People want to see ISIS defeated -- whatever that means -- quickly.  But it’s not going to be ‘quickly’ because the problems are political more than military and that’s going to take the Iraqis some time to come to grips with.” Doomed to Repeat It? History suggests that time is no panacea when Washington attempts to prop up, advise, or build armies.  In the early 1950s, the U.S. provided extensive support to the French military in Indochina -- eventually footing nearly 80% of the cost of its war there -- only to see that force defeated by a less advanced, less well-equipped Vietnamese army.  Not long after, the U.S. began an expensive process that continued into the mid-1970s of building, advising, equipping, and bankrolling the South Vietnamese military.  In those years, it ballooned into a million-man army, only to disintegrate two years after the U.S. ended its own long, unsuccessful combat effort in that country.  “The assumption that we know how to create armies in other parts of the world is a pretty dubious proposition,” Andrew Bacevich, a veteran of that war, told me.  “Yes, Vietnam was a vivid demonstration of a failed project to build an effective army, but you don’t even have to cite Vietnam.  Iraq obviously is another case.  And more generally, the Pentagon exaggerates its ability to create effective fighting forces in parts of the developing world.”  Indeed, recent U.S. training efforts around the globe have been marked by a string of scandals, setbacks, and failures.  Last year, for example, the Obama administration scrapped a $500 million program to train anti-Islamic State Syrian rebels.  It was supposed to yield 15,000 fighters over three years but instead produced only a few dozen.  Then there’s the 13-year, $65 billion effort in Afghanistan that has yielded a force whose rolls are filled with nonexistent “ghost” troops, wracked by desertions, and hobbled by increasing casualties.  It has been unable to defeat a small, unpopular, Taliban insurgency now growing in strength and reach. The short-term loss by U.S.-backed Afghan forces of the city of Kunduz late last year and recent Taliban gains in Helmand province have cast a bright light on this slow-motion fiasco.   These efforts have hardly been anomalies. A U.S.-trained Congolese commando battalion was, for example, implicated by the United Nations in mass rapes and other atrocities.  One effort to train Libyan militiamen ended up stillborn; another saw militants repeatedly raid a U.S. training camp and loot it of high-tech equipment, including hundreds of weapons; and still another saw advisers run out of the country by a militia soon after touching down. Then there were the U.S.-trained officers who overthrew their governments in coups in Mali in 2012 and Burkina Faso in 2014.  In fact, a December 2015 report by the Congressional Research Service noted: “Recent events, particularly the battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban over K[u]nduz, the inability of [Department of Defense]-led efforts to produce more than a ‘handful’ of anti-Assad, anti-Islamic State (IS) forces in Syria, and the collapse of U.S.-trained forces in Iraq in the face of the Islamic State, have called into question -- including in the Congress -- whether these [building partner capacity] programs can ever achieve their desired effects.” Despite all of this, the Pentagon remains committed to creating another Iraqi Army in the American mold with, as Colonel Warren recently explained to me, “modern American equipment, modern conventional training, and of course, supported by air power.”  The U.S. has, he notes, already spent $2.3 billion arming and equipping this new force.  Andrew Bacevich once again sees crucial flaws in the American plan.  “Our trainers, I suspect, are probably pretty good at imparting technical skills... I’m sure that they can teach them marksmanship, how to conduct a patrol, how to maintain their weapons, but I can’t imagine that we have much of a facility for imparting fighting spirit, sense of national unity, and that’s where Iraqi forces have been deficient. It’s this will versus skill thing.  We can convey skills.  I don’t think we can convey will.” For his part, Secretary of Defense Carter seems singularly focused on the skills side of the equation. “ISIL’s lasting defeat still requires local forces to fight and prevail on the ground.  We can and will continue to develop and enable such local forces,” he told the House Armed Services Committee in June 2015.  “That’s why [the Department of Defense] seeks to bolster… Iraq’s security forces to be capable of winning back, and then defending and holding the ISIL-controlled portions of the Iraqi state.”  Last month, Carter assured the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was still “urging the Iraqi government to do more to recruit, train, arm, and mobilize Sunni popular mobilization fighters in their communities.” This presumes, however, that there is a truly functioning Iraqi state in the first place.  Andrew Bacevich isn’t so sure.  “It may be time to admit that there is no Iraq.  We presume to be creating a national army that is willing to fight for the nation of Iraq, but I don’t think it’s self-evident that Iraq exists, except in the most nominal sense.  If that’s true, then further efforts -- a second decade’s worth of efforts to build an Iraqi army -- simply are not likely to pan out.”  Nick Turse is the managing editor of TomDispatch and a fellow at the Nation Institute. He is the author, most recently, of Tomorrow's Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa, as well as Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam. He has written for the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Nation, and is a contributing writer for the Intercept. Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Book, Nick Turse’s Tomorrow’s Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa, and Tom Engelhardt's latest book, Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars, and a Global Security State in a Single-Superpower World. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

11 января 2016, 13:57


Не знаю как у кого, но у меня название "Госдепартамент США" вызывает ассоциации с отрицанием очевидного, враньем и искажением истины. Возможно, это чисто субъективное, но тем не менее блиц-опрос среди знакомых выдал примерно такие же результаты, что Госдеп врёт и изворачивается. Принимая во внимание этот момент, в новостях недавно  ослепительным алмазом блеснула следующая новость о Госдепе:"Государственный департамент США обнародовал электронные письма Хиллари Клинтон, в которых говорится о мотивах международной интервенции в Ливию. В качестве причин вторжения в страну в документах названы её крупные золотые и нефтяные запасы, а также расширение французского влияния в североафриканском регионе."То есть, Госдеп сам обнародовал информацию, опровергающую предыдущую версию свержения Каддафи в Ливии, как освобождение от кровавого диктатора и начало движения в царство демократии. Госдеп прямо признал, что за всем стояли геополитические и экономические интересы США. Казалось бы, зачем Госдепу признавать то, в чем США обвиняли с самого начала, ведь отрицание очевидного это один из приемов взятых на вооружение Госдепартаментом давно и использует он его постоянно в промышленных масштабах. Так с чего вдруг Госдеп решил так подставляться? По величине это событие сопоставимо с признанием Пауэлла о фальсификации разведданных для вторжения в Ирак, не меньше.Я считаю, что имеет место классическая постановка информационного тумана, когда за одними фактами, скрываются другие. Если американцы на официальном уровне  подтверждают крайне неприятные для них сведения, то предполагая, что это постановка информационной завесы, скрываемые ими таким образом факты еще более неприятны для них и могут нанести больший урон, чем уже признанные. Какие же это могут быть сведения? Я думаю весь смысл тут скрыть от остальных одну из основных целей, которые преследовали США начиная от вторжения в Ирак по сегодняшний день. А именно, дестабилизация всего Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки и расчистка там "поляны" от национальных государств для радикальных исламистов и создание пояса нестабильности, направленного прежде всего против Китая и России. Чтобы понимать это, достаточно помнить что ИГИЛ (террористическая организация запрещенная в РФ) берет свое начало в американском лагере для пленных Кэмп-Букка, расположенном в Ираке.Именно от этого факта и пытается отвлечь внимание Госдепартамет такими  яркими прорывами "правды". От того, что именно американцы являются виновниками того кровавого хаоса, который сейчас творится в этих регионах.

11 января 2016, 12:35


Не знаю как у кого, но у меня название "Госдепартамент США" вызывает ассоциации с отрицанием очевидного, враньем и искажением истины. Возможно, это чисто субъективное, но тем не менее блиц-опрос среди знакомых выдал примерно такие же результаты, что Госдеп врёт и изворачивается. Принимая во внимание этот момент, в новостях недавно  ослепительным алмазом блеснула следующая новость о Госдепе:"Государственный департамент США обнародовал электронные письма Хиллари Клинтон, в которых говорится о мотивах международной интервенции в Ливию. В качестве причин вторжения в страну в документах названы её крупные золотые и нефтяные запасы, а также расширение французского влияния в североафриканском регионе."То есть, Госдеп сам обнародовал информацию, опровергающую предыдущую версию свержения Каддафи в Ливии, как освобождение от кровавого диктатора и начало движения в царство демократии. Госдеп прямо признал, что за всем стояли геополитические и экономические интересы США. Казалось бы, зачем Госдепу признавать то, в чем США обвиняли с самого начала, ведь отрицание очевидного это один из приемов взятых на вооружение Госдепартаментом давно и использует он его постоянно в промышленных масштабах. Так с чего вдруг Госдеп решил так подставляться? По величине это событие сопоставимо с признанием Пауэлла о фальсификации разведданных для вторжения в Ирак, не меньше.Я считаю, что имеет место классическая постановка информационного тумана, когда за одними фактами, скрываются другие. Если американцы на официальном уровне  подтверждают крайне неприятные для них сведения, то предполагая, что это постановка информационной завесы, скрываемые ими таким образом факты еще более неприятны для них и могут нанести больший урон, чем уже признанные. Какие же это могут быть сведения? Я думаю весь смысл тут скрыть от остальных одну из основных целей, которые преследовали США начиная от вторжения в Ирак по сегодняшний день. А именно, дестабилизация всего Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки и расчистка там "поляны" от национальных государств для радикальных исламистов и создание пояса нестабильности, направленного прежде всего против Китая и России. Чтобы понимать это, достаточно помнить что ИГИЛ (террористическая организация запрещенная в РФ) берет свое начало в американском лагере для пленных Кэмп-Букка, расположенном в Ираке.Именно от этого факта и пытается отвлечь внимание Госдепартамет такими  яркими прорывами "правды". От того, что именно американцы являются виновниками того кровавого хаоса, который сейчас творится в этих регионах.

14 декабря 2015, 15:27

СМИ: Лидер «Джабхат ан-нусры» заявил о планах Эрдогана усилить ДАИШ

По его словам, Анкара надеется создать «буферную зону» на севере Сирии для экстремистов.

10 декабря 2015, 00:26

Want to Defeat ISIS? Say No to War -- Part 1

Part One argues the case against direct American military intervention in Iraq and Syria. Part Two will focus on policy measures that can help defeat ISIS without requiring the United States to get bogged down in another costly war that further undermines national security There is no precedent for either the scale or the manner in which ISIS has possessed the popular imagination. From the outset coverage of the terrorist organization has been stylized in florid, apocalyptic prose. Competing narratives for its origins, motivations, capabilities and portentousness have resulted in much of the discourse being speculative and rife with dissension. Opportunistic politicians like Donald Trump and Ben Carson have engaged in a squalid endeavor to prey on the fear and stoke the hatred that has emanated from terrorist attacks to score political points and gain popularity. After the San Bernardino attacks it seems a critical mass has been attained in national sentiment. The war drum has started beating feverishly in Republican quarters and much of mainstream media appears to be following suit. If a major intervention including both air and ground offensives is launched, then it will be a tragic confirmation that any lessons that were learned from the Second Gulf War have been undone by the Republican revision of history that ascribes all blame for the consequences of the Iraq War to Obama's troop withdrawal. This dishonest narrative claims that had 10,000 or more troops stayed on in Iraq the country would never have descended into the sectarian fault lines and administrative failure that allowed ISIS to germinate. It ignores the sectarian carnage and Prime Minister Maliki's persecution and political disenfranchisement of Sunnis that occurred for years when over a hundred thousand American troops were still in Iraq. It conveniently omits the now well known fact that Baghdadi started planning and recruiting for ISIS while incarcerated at the Camp Bucca detention centre -- an American military prison. And there are more reasons why war could be catastrophic. The past savagery of ISIS leaves little doubt that in the event of a major bombing campaign they would hide among dense civilian populations and expose a large number of innocents to slaughter. Recent Russian airstrikes in the Syrian cities of Homs and Aleppo resulted in a significant number of civilian deaths, striking hospitals and a major marketplace. With the social media prowess that ISIS has exhibited, civilian casualties could become a powerful tool for ISIS to incite more anti-Western loathing and motivate terror attacks. The other question is what the future would hold even if ISIS were militarily defeated. The complex and ugly political intricacies in the region are, if anything, worse than what they were in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. Turkey has started to help train Kurdish Peshmerga fighters against ISIS but remains locked in a conflict with the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). If a Syrian Kurdistan is demanded by the Peshmerga in the event of an ISIS defeat this is likely to encourage the PKK and cause more security problems for Turkey. The hostility between the House of Al-Saud and the Iranian regime has worsened and their proxy war now extends into Syria and Yemen. With the amount of influence Iran currently has in Iraq and with the Syrian regime the political intrigues will only gain intensity if another power vacuum is created by Western military intervention. To the West the Israel-Palestine conflict has also heated up and remains an unsettling influence on the entire Middle East. This is the political quicksand where some want to bring another Western invasion, in a region where anti-Western sentiment is already at an all time high. Throw into this mix the vastly differing political interests of Russia. Will the Russians collaborate? Will they budge on the issue of Assad? Or will the man whose regime has killed and tortured far more people than ISIS itself remain in power and escape accountability? Russia's focus on bombing the anti-Assad Sunni rebels of the Free Syrian Army stands in direct contradiction to the American policy of arming and training "Moderate" Sunni rebels against ISIS and Assad. War is not the answer. ISIS is the misbegotten child of many parents, chief of whom are the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the atrocities committed by Bashar-al-Assad against his own people. Bringing further violence to a long-traumatized region infested by corrupt and destructive autocrats will not be astute policy, valiant resolve or strong leadership. It will be perilous idiocy. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

06 декабря 2015, 09:33

Как и почему появилось Исламское государство

Интересные видео-ролики на тему генезиса Халифата.Достаточно сжато изложены основные вехи "большого пути", которые привели к тому, что мы видим сейчас на политической карте мира.Как и почему появилось Исламское государствоКак формировалось руководство ИГИЛ

30 ноября 2015, 21:20

Is Defeating ISIS Impossible?

While working on a documentary about the self-professed Islamic State (ISIS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, I had the chance to meet Abu Omar, a former ISIS operative who was once an inmate in the infamous Camp Bucca facility that brought together all those who later became the ruling elite of the most notorious terrorist group in modern history. I asked Abu Omar whether there was any recipe to defeat ISIS, which seemed unbeatable. In response, he smiled and said, "First, the world will have to really believe it exists -- that it's not an American conspiracy, nor a Turkish secret project, nor an Iranian-Syrian backed organization -- that it's simply the most advanced edition of global jihad resulting from 30 years of experience. It also must not be conceded that no one can win this war." Since the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, the dream of reviving the caliphate has been alive in the souls of those adopting political Islam as a doctrine. Ordinary Muslims' feelings of weakness and a sense of disconnection with and lack of support from the regimes that have ruled the Arab and Muslim world grew over time and was inherited by members of the Muslim millennial generation who wanted to belong to an entity that blends power, religion and modernity. ISIS came with the three together. While many might debate the last point, ISIS is using cutting-edge technologies in many of their activities, including in the professional use of media tools that fulfill a feeling of superiority through well-crafted videos and clips. As for power, ISIS was able to prove its strength by creating a de facto state within the borders of Syria and Iraq, challenging the world powers and showing a high level of discipline in the areas under their control. The other element, religion, is the magnet that directly or indirectly attracts people to ISIS, for the group introduces itself as the guarantor for the application of God's rule on Earth, and that the caliph is a continuation of the Prophet Muhammad's legacy. The fact is that the Islamic State, as a doctrine and practice, has been an unbeatable model in the Sunni Muslim world to those seeking this blend of religion, power and modernity. Sunni and Shiite Islamists shared many similar aspirations until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran succeeded in toppling the Shah. At the time, Sunni Islamists such as Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, the co-founder of al-Qaeda with Osama bin Laden, celebrated Imam Ruhollah Khomeini's victory in one of Amman's mosques. Later it became clear that the revolution was more an answer to the aspirations of Shiite Islamists than Sunnis; therefore, the next stop for Azzam and his comrades was Afghanistan, and they later became what were called the Afghan Arabs. When the creation of the Islamic State was announced, one of the main strategies adopted by its leadership was social engagement. The de facto, self-styled state opened its doors to jihadi foreigners, and thousands came with their families and settled in cities under ISIS control; according to a UN report, more than 25,000 from over 100 nations have made it to ISIS territory. Some of them get married to women from tribes in the areas in order to strengthen ties and complicate any attempts to oust ISIS. The foreign jihadis are persona non grata in their home countries, and if ISIS falls, their lives and future may be endangered wherever they may be; they have no safe haven but the Islamic State and therefore will fight to the last man standing to keep it alive. Part of its social and economic strategy was to engage the main tribes in control of the oil business; this helps not only in providing profits but also in strengthening ties with local tribes. The thinking is that ISIS tied several knots around its core to make it extremely difficult for enemies to target it effectively. This apparently meant that three years of ground and air operations, international and regional attempts to counter ISIS and direct media and public campaigns did not effectively harm the group, and now it is able to function in several countries in several continents and is capable of carrying out its tactics with effective command and control, with the multiple attacks in Paris being a strong example. To defeat ISIS, the world needs to hit the core of the group, and this means untying the shroud of knots surrounding it and cutting blood off from ISIS' heart. A counter model is needed to fight the ISIS model, a model that is powerful, modern and shows real respect and appreciation for Islam. With such a model it would be easier to deprive the terrorist entity of sympathizers who might become future operatives. As former ISIS operative Abu Omar told me, "ISIS is very clever and smart in attracting people with potential; they know how to talk to them and how to address their ambitions. They are also very smart in exploiting mistakes committed by their enemies, and use these mistakes to prove to their supporters why they are the right choice." He said, "I was behind their walls; therefore, I understand the mentality. If you really want to finish ISIS, you need to address people's concerns, let the religious leaders talk to youths and stop making big mistakes. ISIS is surviving as the result of the dire mistakes committed by governments of the region." Defeating ISIS should not be impossible if the above is addressed and serious military and economic steps are taken to prevent the group from expanding both financially and geographically. This means doing battle on the war fronts and imposing sanctions on countries and individuals financing the group or allowing money to flow to it or buying goods, mainly oil, from territories under its control. Long-term strategic steps must be taken or IS will be here to stay and expand. ​ This article was first published on Al-Monitor.com. Also on HuffPost: (function(){var src_url="https://spshared.5min.com/Scripts/PlayerSeed.js?sid=577&width=571&height=350&playList=518300871&responsive=false&pgType=console&pgTypeId=editVideo-overviewTab-copyCodeBtn&onVideoDataLoaded=HPTrack.Vid.DL&onTimeUpdate=HPTrack.Vid.TC";if (typeof(commercial_video) == "object") {src_url += "&siteSection="+commercial_video.site_and_category;if (commercial_video.package) {src_url += "&sponsorship="+commercial_video.package;}}var script = document.createElement("script");script.src = src_url;script.async = true;var placeholder = document.querySelector(".js-fivemin-script");placeholder.parentElement.replaceChild(script, placeholder);})(); -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

30 ноября 2015, 14:53

Эмир или What is Al-Bagdadi

После смерти Абу Омара, глава военного совета ИГ Хаджи Бакр получил возможность повлиять на выбор нового главы ИГ путем интриг и манипуляция. Бывший офицер Саддамовской армии, отбывавший срок в Кэмп Букка уже после освобождения Аль Багдади, Бакр не являлся страстным религиозным фанатиком и потому не мог претендовать на пост главы ИГ, но он предпринял все усилия, чтобы стать серым кардиналом.Проигнорировав инструкции Бен Ладена, Хаджи Бакр решил опросить мнение всех членов консультативного совета, кто по их мнению заслуживает стать главой. Но перед этим, Хаджи Бакр позаботился о том, чтобы каждый член совета получил письмо с сообщением, что остальные 10 членов совета желали бы видеть на этом посту Багдади. Идя на такую интригу коварный полковник предполагал, что Багдади, в силу своего молодого возраста, будет сговорчивее остальных претендентов, или что он будет не так лоялен руководителям из Аль-Каиды, которым очень не нравились кровавые расправы командиров ИГ при завоевании территорий. Обосновывая необходимость назначения Аль-Багдади, Хаджи Бакр будет ссылаться на его родословную, которая ведется от Пророка, богословское образование и организационные навыки.Консультативный совет выбрал нового Эмира Исламского государства проголосовав 9/2. Именно тогда Абу Бакр Аль-Багдади, в возрасте 39 лет, и взял свой знаменитый псевдоним, который выражал собой одновременно приверженность вере и своей родной земле.если обратиться к истории, Абу Бакр был тестем Муххамеда, и, после смерти Пророка, стал первым халифом.Багдад был столицей громадного халивата на заре Ислама, при династии Аббасидов. Династия Аббасидов пришла к власти в восьмом веке на волне массовых недовольств правлением династии Омейядов которые находились в тот момент в Дамаске. У Аббасидов была подпольная сеть, деятельность которой была направлена на смещение Омейядов. Главным лозунгом их противодействия был лозунг «следовать Корану и сунне Пророка». Также Аббасиды вели свою родословную от Пророка, что тоже давало им определенное преимущество.Аль-Багдади попытался использовать эту же самую тактику.С благословения новоиспеченного эмира, Хаджи Бакр приступил к очищению рядов Исламского государства всех тех, которые могли поколебать авторитет Багдади.Приверженцы ИГ прозвали Хаджи Бакра «князем теней» и «личным министром эмира».Сильная политическая позиция позволила Бакру сводить счеты с врагами и устранять соперников, прибегая к угрозам и убийствам. Он делал все то, в чем когда-то обвиняли Саддама.В итоге власть в ИГ сосредоточилась в руках иракских групп, которые смогли подвинуть иностранных джихадистов.Когда американские или иракские силы захватывали или убивали одно из джихадистких командиров, им на смену приходили бывшие заключенные из Кэмп Букка, как это было в случе с Аль-Багдади и Хаджи Бакром. Многие из этих заключенных были бывшими офицерами Саддамовской армии либо разведки. Подобного рода люди могли оказаться полезными в новом авторитарном государстве.Закрепившись на троне Багдади и его «личный министр» приступили к восстановлению позиций Исламского государства.Еще в 2008 году военные неудачи вытеснили джихадистов в подполье, а последующие атаки наподобие атак на Абу Омара и Масри привели к тому, что исламисты несли командные потери в своем командном составе. Поэтому Багдади и Бакр были полны решимости вновь развернуть борьбу открыто, чтобы завладеть территориями, необходимыми для построения халифата.Растущие недовольства в Сирии в 2011 году сыграли им на руку, представив возможность внести в мирный протест элемент хаоса и насилия. Для этого Багдади поручил одному своему сирийскому подручному организовать ячейку исламского государства на территории Сирии.Первоначально, эта ячейка, позже известная как Фронт ан-Нусра играла по тем правилам, которые им определяло Исламское государство: организовывала террор в отношении мирных граждан и сеяла хаос. У ИГ появилась надежда, что они смогут капитализировать эту ситуацию, укрепить свои позиции, и захватить новые земли.Сирийский президент Башар Асад не разбираясь в нюансах объявил мирно протестующих в терроризме. Но так как Нусра стала повстанческой группой, она стала избирательнее в своих терактах, проявляя осторожность в отношении суннитов, при этом налаживая связи с другими суннитскими группами, недовольными правлением Асада, надеясь таким образом добиться его свержения. Подобные трансофрмации аль-Нусры приветствовались руководством аль-Каиды, Айманом аз-Завахири , который возглавил аль-Каиду после смерти Бен Ладена. Завахири полагал, что будет лучше, если повстанческие группы сначала объединяться, получат популярность у населения и только потом поднимут вопрос о создании Исламского государства.Багдади хотя и присягнул на верность аль-Завахири, придерживался иной точки зрения. В фантазиях Багдади Исламское государство уже существовало, а захват Сирии делал эти фантазии реальностью. Действия аль-Нусры срывали планы Багдади.Весной 2013 года, Багдади приказал подчиненным из Нусры проводить стратегию ИГ, но те отказались. Взбешённый Багдади публично объявил, что Нусра часть исламского государства. Нусра отреклась от ИГ и присягнула на верность Завахири. Завахири принял обет Нусры и предложил Багдади сосредоточить свои усилия на территории Ирака. Багдади отказался. Ему нужны была и Сирия. Под руководством Багдади ИГ стало захватывать восточные территории Сирии, вытесняя другие повстанческие суннитские группировки, включая Нусру. У Завахири не осталось иного выбора как исключить ИГ из Аль-Каиды, что он и сделал в феврале 2014 года. В последующей схватке между ИГ и Нусрой, победителем вышла ИГ. Они смогли консолидировать повстанцев на территории восточной Сирии и вывести большую часть Нусровского иностранного контингента, который был заинтересован в установлении своего собственного государства после смещения Асада.Позже появилась информации что ИГ управляет новыми землями.Если изначально Багдади применял наказания к неповиновавшимся по Шариату, потому что группировка ИГ еще не имела достаточного контроля над территорией. То теперь, в качестве правителя, который господствовал на территории восточной Сирии он мог навязывать волю сотням тысяч, особенно на территории города Ракка.Багдади брал с христиан плату за «крышевание», те кто не мог платить осуждались на смерть. Ворам отрубали руки, обвиненные в прелюбодеянии забивались до смерти камнями или плетью.Несмотря на то, что эти наказания предписаны шариатом, большинство исламских стран относились к этим мерам наказания как устаревшим. Даже лидеры аль-Каиды рекомендовали своим сторонникам применять более мягкие меры.Но для Багдади подобные меры были способом легитимации нового государства, а также способом держать людей в повиновении и страхе. Как и Садам, он понимал политическую целесообразность жестокости во имя религии.Непокорных мусульман Багдади объявлял вероотступниками. Непокорные сунниты, его земляки, а также солдаты правительства подвергались казням и были погребены в братских могилах, являясь таким образом устрашающим примером для каждого, кто собирался бросить ему вызов.продолжение следует ...источник

25 ноября 2015, 22:00

Рождение ISIS. 18+

В этой американской тюрьме в Ираке между пытками, насилием, кровью и ненавистью, иракскими партийными, военными и религиозными активистами был выношен и позднее воплощён в жизнь проект "социально-справедливого исламского государства" ISIS. Понимая как происходило рождение ISIS, наивно ждать от него пацифизма, либерализма и всепрощенияНе очень понятно наше сегодняшнее стремление стать главными врагами ISIS, заменив собой американцев, убивших ранее миллионы иракцев, ливийцев и сирийцев и своим безграничным насилием породивших государство ISIS, построенное на идеологии противостояния Западу.

24 ноября 2015, 10:57

Осмысление терактов в Париже

  Изложу некоторые свои мысли о смысле чудовищных событий, потрясших Европу на прошлых выходных.  Коротко о самом событии.  Поздно вечером 13-го ноября Париж сотрясла серия терактов. Шесть атак были совершены в самом центре Парижа, три взрыва прогремели  возле стадиона «Stade de France», на котором в это время проходил футбольный матч «Франция: Германия». Важно, что на трибуне находились высокопоставленные гости: президент Франции Франсуа Оланд и министр иностранных дел ФРГ Франк-Вальтер Штанмайер. Нападения в центре Парижа были  настоящей бойней: террористы расстреливали людей прямо в кафе и ресторанах, переполненных в пятничный вечер. Самая ужасная трагедия разыгралась в концертном зале «Bataclan», в котором было убито около 80 человек.  В настоящее время известно о 129 погибших и около 352 пострадавших.  Полиция сообщила о 8 террористах, 7 из них подорвали себя взрывчаткой, 1 был убит правоохранителями. Уже утром 14-го ноября в СМИ и от официальных лиц Франции прозвучали заявления о том, что ответственность за теракт на себя взяло «Исламское государство».  Изложенная мной картина построена на сообщениях о происходящем мировых СМИ. Ход событий во многих источниках практически идентичен. Но вот обсуждение смысла произошедшего, начавшись сразу после терактов, не прекращается до сих пор, и утихнет еще не скоро. Не претендую на роль аналитика, но определёнными своими мыслями хотелось бы поделиться.  Для понимания сути любого события, тем более такого значительного, как теракты во Франции, важно рассмотреть: контекст произошедшего, субъект действия, механизм, с помощью которого оно было совершено, реакцию на событие.  Контекст.  1. Характер долговременного политического процесса в ЕС: провал многолетней политики мультикультурализма: наличие с одной стороны коллосальных мусульманских анклавов, никак не интегрированных в европейскую культуру, а с другой стороны уничтожение собственно европейской христианской культуры. Дрейф политических предпочтений европейцев в сторону евроскептиков и «новых правых». (Во Франции это прежде всего "Национальный фронт" Мари Ле Пен)  2. Нестабильность в «подвале» Европы: на Ближнем Востоке и в Северной Африке, начавшаяся с «Арабской весны» 2011 года и с тех пор только набирающая обороты.  3. Вызванные все той же нестабильностью массовые потоки беженцев из «горящих» стран Северной Африки и Ближнего Востока, прежде всего из Ливии, Сирии и Ирака.  4. Упорное возращение в европейскую политику ультраправых сил: неофашистских и неонацистских. Самым показательным «маркером» этого является центральная роль украинских неонацистов в государственном перевороте в Киеве в феврале 2014 года и реакция на это ЕС (практически нулевая, если не положительная).  5.  Резонансный теракт в редакции журнала «Шарли – Эбдо» и еще более резонансный ответ европейского сообщества (миллионная демонстрация с участием первых лиц под лозунгом «Я – Шарли!»).  7. Мощное военное присутствие России в Сирии с 30 сентября 2015 года. Серьезное изменение расклада сил в ведущейся со времени «Арабской весны» войне на Ближнем Востоке (фактически между суннитским радикальным исламом и Западом с одной стороны и шиитским исламом и светскими ближневосточными режимами с другой).  Субъект.  Международная террористическая группировка «Исламское государство»,  заявившая о себе как о лидере исламистского радикального движения в последние 2 года. По мнению многих аналитиков идеологическое и организационное ядро ИГ было создано  американскими спецслужбами в лагере «Кэмп-Букка» во время второго вторжения западной коалиции в Ирак.  Условия для набора существующих сейчас сил у ИГ появились благодаря затяжной нестабильности на Ближнем Востоке, вызванной сначала вторжением западной коалиции в Ирак (2004г.), а затем «Арабской весной» (2011г.). Отдельно стоит отметить новый медиа-имидж ИГ, сформированный профессионально снятыми сценами расправ над «неверными». Такого «ноу хау» не было прежде ни у одной исламистской радикальной группировки.  Фактом является также помощь США «Исламскому государству» оружием, техникой и боеприпасами. Это и странным образом «потерянные» изделия,  и регулярная помощь Сирийской Свободной Армии, которая то ли существует как нечто единое, то ли нет, но люди из которой активно переходят в ИГ. Таким образом, США оказывали военную помощь ИГ, напрямую или опосредованно, через предельно размытую ССА.  Ведущаяся же в течении последнего года «странная война» западной коалиции во главе с США против ИГ,  ужасно напоминает войну Англии и Франции с Гитлером в 1939 - 1940-ых годах, и не приводит ни к каким-либо ощутимым результатам. Видимо потому, что целью этой операции является не подавление и уничтожение, а корректировка действий исламистов.  Учитывая историю появления и становления «Исламского государства», высоко вероятным является сотрудничество западных спецслужб и подпольных структур ИГ и за пределами зоны боевых действий, в том числе и в Европе.  Механизм.  После произошедших терактов многие издания заговорили о уже подзабытой подпольной террористической сети «Гладио». Эти разговоры представляются обоснованными.  В 90-ых годах Европу сотрясал скандал, связанный с появлением информации о наличии в Европе абсолютно автономной от национальных государственных структур подпольной армии НАТО – сети «Гладио». Эта тайная структура включала в себя как бывшую нацистскую агентуру, унаследованную ЦРУ, так и новые ультраправые боевые формирования. Сеть имела в распоряжении секретные базы, склады с оружием и боеприпасами. Изначально предназначенная для противостояния гипотетической советской оккупации, по факту «Гладио» использовалась для организации терактов, приписываемых левым радикальным группам (например, «Красным бригадам» в Италии). Так во второй половине 20-го века Европу поворачивали от левого движения, которое в то время стремительно набирало популярность. Самым важным здесь является то, что, несмотря на скандалы в прессе, сеть «Гладио» никуда не делась. Французские теракты в редакции «Шарли-Эбдо» и произошедшие в прошлую пятницу очень напоминают подчерк именно «Гладио», но только с исламистскими, а не ультраправыми исполнителями. Возможно, мы наблюдали именно совместную операцию «Гладио» и исламистского подполья Европы.  В любом случае, фактом является наличие давнего работающего механизма организации терактов в Европе под прикрытием НАТО. Это высокое прикрытие может объяснить саму возможность (очень малую!) скрытой организации и реализации такого масштабного теракта в самом центре европейской столицы.  Реакция.Приведу несколько важных, с моей точки зрения, публичных заявлений по поводу произошедших атак.  НЬЮ-ЙОРК, 15 ноября. /Корр. ТАСС Иван Пильщиков/. Вашингтон и его союзники могут из-за серии терактов в Париже начать более активно вести боевые действия против боевиков группировки "Исламское государство" (ИГ, запрещена в РФ). Об этом говорится в статье, опубликованной в субботу на сайте американской газеты The New York Times."Теракты почти наверняка вынудят президента (Барака) Обаму и союзников США провести переоценку имеющейся угрозы, возможно, из-за них также потребуется более агрессивная стратегия в борьбе против ИГ", - отмечает издание.http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2438070  ВАШИНГТОН, 15 ноября. /Корр. ТАСС Антон Чудаков/. США усилят авиаудары по позициям боевиков из террористической группировки "Исламское государство" (ИГ, запрещена в РФ - прим.ТАСС) после парижских терактов. Об этом в интервью телеканалу ABC сообщил ключевой внешнеполитический советник президента Барака Обамы в аппарате Белого дома Бен Родс.http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2438997  Мы видим, что первым и уже массово афишируемым последствием терактов может быть значительное усиление военного присутствия Запада на Ближнем Востоке.ПАРИЖ, 16 ноября. /Корр. ТАСС Иван Батырев/. Теракты в Париже неуместно связывать с наплывом беженцев из Сирии и Ирака в Европу, ведь эти люди вынуждены спасаться бегством из своих стран, преследуемые тем же ужасом терроризма, который несет с собой террористическая группировка "Исламское государство" (запрещенная в РФ группировка). С таким предостережением выступил 16 ноября председатель Европейского парламента Мартин Шульц.http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2442079БРЮССЕЛЬ, 18 ноября. /Корр. ТАСС Денис Дубровин/. ЕС не будет пересматривать свою миграционную концепцию, включая квоты на прием мигрантов, после терактов в Париже. Об этом заявил в среду еврокомиссар по миграции, внутренним делам и гражданству Димитрис Аврамопулос.http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2450025  Власти ЕС пытаются развести темы беженцев и терактов, понимая чем грозит их соединение. По той же причине политические противники европейских властей начинают эти темы тут же соединять:  ПАРИЖ, 16 ноября. /Корр. ТАСС Иван Батырев/. Правительство Франции должно незамедлительно запретить въезд в страну мигрантам в связи с парижскими терактами, совершенными в минувшую пятницу. С таким заявлением выступила лидер партии "Национальный фронт" Марин Ле Пен.http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2442166  Ещё одной важной реакцией является начало разговоров о "патриотическом пакте" во французском, а возможно и общеевропейском варианте (напомню, так называемый «патриотический пакт» имел место в США после атаки 11сентября). То есть речь идет об ограничении гражданских прав и свобод во имя безопасности, и, что гораздо более важно, расширении полномочий спецслужб и полиции:ПАРИЖ, 17 ноября. /Корр. ТАСС Иван Батырев/. Общественные свободы во Франции могут быть в определенной мере ограничены ради борьбы с терроризмом. Такую возможность допустил премьер-министр республики Манюэль Вальс.http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2444582  Смысл.Все подобные крупные действия имеют тактические и стратегические цели.  Сначала о тактических целях.  Сейчас заголовки пестрят воинственными заявлениями западных лидеров о начале «настоящей войны с терроризмом», усилении ударов по ИГ и кооперации в этом с Россией. Учитывая предшествовавшую началу российской военной операции западную игру в поддавки с ИГ, можно привести одну аналогию - с открытием второго фронта во время Второй мировой войны. Тогда тоже шла «странная война» на протяжении трёх лет, и, только когда стало очевидно, что СССР способен победить и в одиночку, открылся второй фронт - в первую очередь не как война с Гитлером, а как «спасение» европейских государств от будущего влияния СССР.  То есть Запад спешит занять ближневосточное пространство, пока это не сделала Россия, и именно поэтому в заявлениях прежде всего фигурирует не просто Ближний Восток, а конкретно Сирия.  Стратегические цели.  Террористические акты всегда являются средством воздействия на массовое сознание. Обычно его сводят к примитивному запугиванию, но оно может иметь и более сложный характер. Я не зря привел важные элементы общей картины, в которую теперь вписаны атаки в Париже. Массовое разочарование в центристской политике ЕС, нагнетаемая напряженность в связи с наплывом беженцев, растабуирование нацизма и фашизма, а теперь и кровавые атаки за авторством ИГ (скорее всего, не последние) – создают серьезные предпосылки для резкого поправения Европы и именно в радикальном варианте. Только у неонацистов есть конкретный и брутальный ответ на теракты. Его нам продемонстрировал во всей полноте Андреус Брейвик в 2012-ом году. То есть даже нацистский «пророк» уже имеется. Европу снова активно двигают, но теперь не слева в центр, а от центра вправо.  Что дальше? Неужели все эти действия нужны для того, чтобы сформировать «новую правую Европу», Четвертый рейх? Мне кажется, это не так. В интересах организаторов этого процесса (а это, безусловно, США) не усиление Европы, а ее ослабление, распространение зоны хаоса с уже охваченного им Ближнего Востока и Африки дальше – на европейский континент. Для этого формируются две антагонистические радикальные силы, которые в своей схватке погрузят страны в глубокий кризис. Сегодняшняя Европа – это не Европа 20-ых и 30-ых, родившая стального монстра нацизма, это нечто совсем другое. Процент мусульманского населения уже так высок, а коренные европейцы настолько погрязли в гедонизме, что зачистки по примеру еврейских погромов 30-ых уже вряд ли даже физически возможны. А вот тлеющая гражданская война на улицах Парижа, Берлина и Амстердама – вполне реальный сценарий.  Возможно, это и есть настоящая цель: толкнуть Европу в неонацизм и глубокий гражданский кризис одновременно. Ренацификация и «конфликт цивилизаций» не останутся в границах ЕС – они обязательно, сознательно и стихийно, будут переноситься и на российскую почву. Следовательно, нашему обществу и государству нужно иметь иммунитет сразу от двух вирусов: и от конфликтов на национальной и конфессиональной почве, и от постепенной реабилитации идеи фундаментального разделения людей: будь то по тем же национальным и религиозным, или социальным и экономическим признакам. Проверенный историей ответ на оба вызова содержится в комунистическом наследии: принципах «дружбы народов» и «социальной справедливости и равенства», реализованных в советском обществе.  Успеем ли мы вновь выработать этот мировоззренческий иммунитет в ближайшем будущем, зависит только от нас.

23 ноября 2015, 00:06

The Road To The Paris Attacks Runs Through The Iraq War

WASHINGTON -- One Middle East catastrophe apparently wasn't enough for some supporters of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. So they've continued to try to shape policy relating to the region, offering punditry in the wake of each fresh crisis. It wasn't a surprise, then, that they seized on last week's tragic attacks in Paris to argue that the Islamic State group could only be eliminated by their preferred mode of U.S. intervention: large-scale troop deployment. "If it takes 50,000 troops going in there and cleaning out Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State, do it," Bill Kristol said on ABC two days after the attack. We've heard this before. Kristol, the editor of The Weekly Standard, told the Senate in 2002 that he endorsed U.S. military action against Saddam Hussein -- despite the absence of credible links between Hussein and the Sept. 11 attacks that launched the Bush administration's War on Terror. Other cheerleaders for the war said the absence of such proof didn't matter because the strike would be an essential pre-emptive step. "One of the things the American people learned on September 11 is that there are implacable enemies seeking to destroy us. Everybody knows that. And if those enemies are not identified and disarmed and/or destroyed, 'they will come for us,' to quote the president of the United States," former Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) said during the same hearing at which Kristol testified. These advocates believed the end result of a foray into Iraq would be, in Kristol's own words, "a friendly, free and oil-producing Iraq." The pesky skeptics warning about the risks of launching two concurrent U.S. invasions in the Middle East -- one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan -- were ignoring the potential rewards, Kristol argued.  What really happened? The Bush administration invaded Iraq and made policy calls that are central to how the Islamic State group became the force the world is so worried about today. (Though there are, of course, many other reasons for the group's rise.) Just in case anyone needs a reminder of why we should treat recommendations from folks like Kristol with caution, here's a rundown of the many ways the Iraq War helped a small extremist group formed in Jordan in 1999 become the focus of the world's fears today. Disenfranchised Iraqis became well-armed recruits for the extremists.  The Bush administration decided, less than a month after it toppled the Saddam Hussein regime, that it would disband Hussein's army. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who had previously been among the most privileged in their desperate country were suddenly unemployed, though they retained all the ingenuity and discipline they had gained working for the dictator. Veteran New Yorker correspondent Dexter Filkins called the move "probably the single most catastrophic decision of the American venture in Iraq." Multiple Iraqi soldiers were willing to work with the Americans, and some U.S. military commanders wanted to keep the institution alive, but those messages went ignored, Filkins wrote earlier this year. After the Bush decision, many of these disenfranchised soldiers -- who were doubly alienated because they were largely Sunni, like Hussein, in a country now being run by the other major sect of Islam, the Shiites -- joined the insurgency against the U.S. presence. Deep investigations into ISIS's workings show that the group has benefited from having well-trained Sunni army lieutenants from the Saddam era in its leadership. Mismanaged Iraqi prisons ended up fostering radicals.  Camp Bucca, a U.S.-run facility that held tens of thousands of Iraqi prisoners during its tenure, was once home to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (captured by American forces in 2005) and many of the extremists who are now his top aides. Military veteran Andrew Thompson and University of Texas at Austin professor Jeremy Suri referred to the prison and other detention centers as "virtual terrorist universities" in The New York Times last October, saying they gave radicals captive audiences and hubs they could use to grow. Those extremists were able to exert influence over former members of Hussein's Baath Party and regular small-time criminals, pressuring them to join the insurgency and accept their twisted version of Islam if they wanted to avoid retribution. Though the U.S. military instituted programs to counter radicalization, it wasn't clear whether those efforts had any impact. After Bush transferred thousands of potentially enraged detainees to Iraqi custody under a 2008 agreement, hundreds of them were released -- fresh with bomb-making expertise and other dangerous skills. Iraq became a lightning rod for regional players.  Bush's adventure had a ripple effect throughout the Middle East that empowered violent radicals. Just a year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, extremist groups were already gaining recruits thanks to the propaganda value of an unpopular, visibly ineffective occupation. "Al-Qaeda has added Iraq to its list of grievances. With Osama Bin Laden's public encouragement, up to 1,000 foreign jihadists may have infiltrated Iraq," the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported in October 2004.  U.S. officials testified before Congress about the trend the following year. At the same time, more established anti-American forces in the Middle East -- notably, the regimes in Syria and Iran -- saw the massive U.S. presence in Iraq as a juicy target and began ramping up their support to extremists who would later attack U.S. soldiers, undermine stability in Iraq and, you guessed it, help ISIS grow. Dictatorial Syrian President Bashar Assad allowed thousands of extremists to move through Syria to Iraq (even as he aided the CIA's torture program), and Iran's top intelligence agency supported al Qaeda in Iraq as recently as 2012,  according to the U.S. Treasury Department. The group eventually became the Islamic State group's predecessor. Iraq was left with a divided, uneven political system.  The Bush administration decided that power in Iraq should be split three ways: between Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs and Kurds. That simplistic approach -- still encouraged in some corners in Washington -- ignored other important dynamics of class or religion. (Most Kurds, for instance, are Muslims with some sectarian identity, and many secular Iraqis like prominent politician and one-time presidential candidate Ayad Allawi do not see their loyalties as sectarian -- Allawi has worked closely with Sunnis.) Any distribution of power on this basis should have accounted for factors like Sunnis' worries about disenfranchisement, given their previous dominance under Saddam, and many Shiite politicians' links to Iran, which has little interest in keeping Iraq united or seeing power devolved to the Sunnis. That failure to guarantee Sunni Arab buy-in for the central Iraqi government helped the anti-American insurgency -- and its most worrying component, al Qaeda in Iraq. Though U.S. engagement with Sunni tribes during the 2007 surge and "Sunni Awakening" helped undercut those radicals, Sunnis' relationships with the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad remained precarious. The Islamic State group, then known as the Islamic State in Iraq, exploited those worries to target top Sunnis loyal to the Baghdad government as it become clear that the Americans would be leaving and might take fragile sectarian unity away with them. There are scores of other reasons for ISIS's growth. President Barack Obama's approach to Iraq did not help. The Republican complaint about ISIS being a product of Obama's troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 is largely baseless, given that U.S. troops could not have remained in the country without an agreement that the Iraqi government was not willing to sign. But the Obama administration did support controversial Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki for years after it became clear that he was not serious about working with Sunnis in Iraq, and did not attempt to increase aid to Iraq or take steps that might give Washington leverage over him. The White House didn't pressure the prime minister to step down until after Maliki's shocking treatment of Sunnis -- including the persecution of top Sunni politicians -- led Sunni Iraqis to welcome ISIS with open arms in the summer of 2014. Though his successor, Haider al Abadi, has attempted reform, his hands seem tied by the Iranian influence that Maliki allowed to grow for years under Obama's nose. Syria's Assad is another factor. He violently reacted to a largely peaceful Sunni opposition movement in 2011, sparking a civil war that gave ISIS a new power vacuum to move into. In what many see as an attempt to let the radical group look like the only alternative to his rule, Assad has helped ISIS by releasing extremists from his jails and largely ignoring its advances through his country. An Associated Press report earlier this week revealed that Assad continues to enable the extremists: last month, his regime released a militant chemical weapons expert who may end up helping ISIS. Some of the blame also goes to Turkey, for border policies ISIS has exploited; to private donors in U.S.-friendly Gulf states; and to Arab rulers who continue to suppress their populations with U.S. backing and guarantee future radicalization.   Still, the consequences of the Iraq War are important for any talk of how to defeat ISIS. And they make it clear that that war's proponents are not exactly the best experts to consult in these conversations. Also on HuffPost: -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

20 ноября 2015, 22:14

Dealing With ISIS

Four years ago, U.S. Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden; many Americans believed Al Qaeda had been broken and the terrorist threat eliminated. The November 13 Paris massacre demonstrated that terrorism has a new face: ISIL -- the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Where should the U.S. do? There are several acronyms used for the same group of jihadi terrorists: ISIL, ISIS -- the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria -- and DAESH -- an acronym based upon the group's full Arabic name. The U.S. government uses ISIL most of the time. While a tiny minority within Islam, ISIL is an ultra-conservative Muslim sect. ISIL's roots go back to 2010 when the group, then known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, was decimated by American forces. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi then became ISIL's leader. Al-Baghdadi is an Iraqi-born ultra-conservative (Salafi) Sunni Muslim cleric who fought against the U.S. troops. At the end of 2011, U.S. forces left Iraq, as a consequence of the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. (Jeb Bush has implied that President Obama had the option to keep 10,000 troops in Iraq but Politifact has ruled this assertion "mostly false.") Shortly thereafter, Iraq began to come apart. The New York Times observed that after U.S. troops left: ... tensions began rising between the Sunnis and the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki... Salaries and jobs promised to cooperating [Sunni] tribes were not paid. There seemed little room for Sunnis in the new Iraq. The old Sunni insurgents began to look appealing again. The New York Times noted that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was briefly imprisoned. In US Camp Bucca he met Sunni military officers (Baathists) who had served Saddam Hussein. Beginning in 2011, Al-Baghdadi recruited them to serve in ISIL. In the spring of 2011, civil war began in Syria. ISIL saw this as an opportunity and moved in from the east. In 2013 it claimed Raqqa, a Syrian city of 200,000, as its capital. In June of 2014, ISIL seized the northern Iraq city of Mosul and mountains of weapons left behind by fleeing Iraqi troops. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared at Mosul's Nuri Mosque announcing the formation of the Levant caliphate and his role as caliph. Atlantic writer Graeme Wood observed that al-Baghdadi was in a unique position to become caliph because he was a Sunni Muslim, (Salafi cleric), and Quraysh, a descendant of the tribe of the prophet Mohammed. Pew Research estimates there are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world. 87-90 percent are Sunni Muslims, 1.4 billion. The remaining 10-13 percent are Shias who are concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and India. Many Middle-East countries contain Sunnis and Shias (for example, Shias are two-thirds of the population of Iraq and roughly one-quarter of the population of Turkey.) There are significant differences between the Sunni and Shiite practices. Pew Research observed, Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa tend to be most keenly aware of the distinction between the two main branches of Islam, Sunni and Shia. In most countries surveyed in the region, at least 40% of Sunnis do not accept Shias as fellow Muslims. Among the most intolerant Sunni sects are al-Baghdadi's Salafi, which constitutes less than one percent of the 1.4 billion, roughly 8 million. ISIL's forces are composed of Salafis from Iraq and Syria, and foreign recruits who are attracted to the notion of a modern caliphate. Several things are clear about ISIL/ISIS/DAESH. 1. Unlike Al Qaida, ISIL occupies substantial physical territory; it is in effect a state. We can declare war on them. (President Obama has been trying to get Congress to do this but so far they have punted.) 2. It's a theocracy, like Iran. The leaders of ISIL teach a fundamentalist version of Sunni Islam that advocates slavery or death for apostates (among whom are other Muslims). Graeme Wood observed that to understand ISIL Americans have to imagine that a splinter group of Christians took over a US State and preached a form of Christianity based upon the book of Leviticus: a "dystopian alternate reality in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million." 3. ISIL is Islamic but not representative of all Islam. Its adherents are less than one-half of one percent of the total. 4. ISIL seeks a holy war in the Middle East. Graeme Wood believes their theology prophesizes that, before the end times, there will be a final battle in northern Iraq between "the armies of Islam" and "the armies of Rome" (Christians, the west.). The United States needs to form a multi-nation coalition to destroy ISIL. This must include Sunni Muslims as a major component; after all, alienating Sunnis was one of the factors that led to the formation of ISIL. The US needs to find a way to obliterate ISIL while making allies of Muslims, in general. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

06 декабря 2015, 09:33

Как и почему появилось Исламское государство

Интересные видео-ролики на тему генезиса Халифата.Достаточно сжато изложены основные вехи "большого пути", которые привели к тому, что мы видим сейчас на политической карте мира.Как и почему появилось Исламское государствоКак формировалось руководство ИГИЛ

08 июля 2015, 11:23

Рамзан Кадыров заявил, что главарь ИГИЛ аль-Багдади был завербован американским генералом Петрэусом в Ираке

Накануне в Грозном прошла встреча главы Чеченской Республики с руководителями силовых ведомств, представителями местных администраций и духовенством. В ходе встречи Рамзан Кадыров отметил, что сегодня одной из главных угроз для мира является распространение так называемого «Исламского государства». По словам главы Чечни, с боевиками ИГИЛ работают зарубежные институты, которые явно или опосредованно финансируют террористическую группировку.

01 июля 2015, 10:45

Scofield: У истоков создания ИГ

С декабря 2014 г. в ведущих западных изданиях появилось несколько лонгридов о создании ИГ. В них было раскрыта роль Самира абд Мухаммада аль-Хлифауи (Хаджи Бакра), полковника разведки ПВО армии С. Хусейна, который, находясь в Кэмп Букка и опираясь на других находящихся там офицеров иракской разведки, наладил сеть контактов среди исламистов. После массового освобождения в 2009 г. эти люди создали ИГ. Немецкий Spiegel, в силу определённых причин, отметил, что опыт работы Хаджи Бакра в системе «вездесущего аппарата безопасности» (omnipresent security apparatus) С. Хусейна позволил ему построить разведку ИГ (Islamic Intelligence State) по образцу Штази...