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15 сентября, 05:15

Keynes: A Master Of Confused And Confusing Prose

Authored by Hunter Lewis via The Mises Institute, [This article is a selection from Where Keynes Went Wrong] Paul Samuelson, professor of economics at MIT after World War II and author of a best-selling economics textbook, was one of Keynes’s most ardent American disciples. Here is what he has to say about the latter's General Theory: It is a badly written book, poorly organized. . . . It is ar­rogant, bad-tempered, polemical, and not overly gener­ous in its acknowledgements. It abounds in mare’s nests and confusion....  In reading this, one recalls Keynes’s infatuation with paradox. Samuelson, the ardent disciple, is telling us that the master’s book is good because it is bad. We do not, however, have to take Samuelson’s word about the bad writing, poor organization, and general confusion of The General Theory. Following publication in 1936, many lead­ing economists pointed to the same problems, although some of them hesitated to criticize or quarrel with Keynes and thus chose their words carefully. Frank H. Knight, a leading American econ­omist, complained that it was “inordinately difficult to tell what the author means. . . . The direct contention of the work [also] seems to me quite unsubstantiated.”   Joseph Schumpeter noted Keynes’s “technique of skirting problems by artificial definitions which, tied up with highly specialized assumptions, produce paradoxical-looking tau­tologies. . . .”    British economist Hubert Henderson privately stated that: “I have allowed myself to be inhibited for many years . . . by a desire not to quarrel in public with Maynard . . . . But. . . I regard Maynard’s books as a farrago of confused sophis­tication.”   French economist Etienne Mantoux added that the whole thing simply appeared to be “rationalization of a policy ... long known to be . . . dear to him." In The General Theory itself, Keynes has a good word to say about clarity, consistency, and logic.He is quick to pounce on what he considers the errors of others. But he then leads us down a rabbit hole of convolution, needless and misleading jar­gon, mis-statement, confusion, contradiction, unfactuality, and general illogic. It is not that Keynes is entirely opaque. It is quite feasible to make out what he seems to be saying, but it is worth taking a moment to focus on the particular rhetorical devices and obfuscations that Keynes employed. Device One: Obscurity A typical sentence from The General Theory: We have full employment when output has risen to a level at which the marginal return from a representa­tive unit of the factors of production has fallen to the minimum figure at which a quantity of the factors suf­ficient to produce this output is available. This means, in essence, that we have not reached full employ­ment until all factors of production are fully employed. We will recall that, per Keynes, only at this point do we have to worry about inflation. Keynes took exception when other economists wrote in this convoluted way. For example, in a 1931 letter to the editor of The New Statesman and Nation, he charged Lionel Robbins with the same sin, even though Robbins was, on the whole, a very clear writer: Professor Robbins wants “increased elasticity of local wage costs” . . . which means in plain English, I sup­pose, a reduction of average wages. Given this stab at Robbins, can we at least assume that Keynes will avoid the term “elasticity” in The General Theory? No, not at all, he uses (and misuses) it repeatedly. Device Two: Misuse of Technical Language In the example above, Lionel Robbins was at least using standard economist’s jargon. Keynes liked to make up his own jargon, or worse, use standard jargon in a non standard way. This led to a scolding by economist Frank H. Knight in the review of The Gen­eral Theory that we have already cited: “Familiar terms and modes of expression seem to be shunned on principle.” The only legitimate reason to use technical language is to make a sentence clearer, if not to the average reader, at least to the pro­fessional reader. Keynes habitually uses technical language to confuse, and as we shall shortly see, this may have been a deliber­ate strategy. Device Three: Shifting Definitions Keynes tells us in The General Theory that economists have not clearly defined the jargonish term “marginal efficiency of capi­tal” (which roughly means return on capital). He then proceeds throughout the book to use the term in many different ways, at least seven by Henry Hazlitt’s count. Another slippery word in The General Theory is wages, which can mean an hourly rate or total employee pay or something else. Keynes does not seem to notice the difference, which leads him into serious logical errors. Once again, Keynes criticized the same lapse in others. In a book review early in his career, he took an author to task for us[ing] the [same] expression some thirty times in some apparently eight different senses. Device Four: Misuse of Common Terms In some cases, Keynes stretches the meaning of a commonly used word beyond recognition without explicitly redefining it. For example, he tells us that for every commodity there is an implicit rate of interest, a wheat rate of interest, a copper rate of interest, a steel plant rate of interest, and so on. This confuses commodity options and futures pricing with interest rates, a clear case of mix­ing apples and bananas. We have already seen that Keynes uses the word equilibrium to describe what is actually disequilibrium. Device Five: Reversing Cause and Effect Keynes says that entrepreneurs calculate how much revenue they will earn from x employees. But they do not. They calculate how many employees they can afford from x revenue. Keynes says that prices are low if production is low. In actuality, it is the reverse: production is low if prices are low. Keynes seems to like these reversals, perhaps because they dress up the ordinary with a gloss of novelty, even of profundity. But it is really no more than a parlor trick, and just piles error on error. Device Six: False Determinism Keynesian economist Alvin H. Hansen, whose book A Guide to Keynes attempted to de-mystify the master, tells us that “Keynes’s most notable contribution was his consumption function.” The so-called marginal propen­sity to consume (consumption function) tells us that people tend to save more as their income rises. Stated as such, it is a common­place, certainly nothing new. But Keynes calls it a “fundamen­tal psychological law,” which it certainly is not. We can nei­ther predict with certainty that people will always save more as their income rises, nor can we work out a forecastable schedule of increased saving, as Keynes assumed. In the Keynesian model, the marginal propensity to consume is also treated as an independent variable. (It is supposed to deter­mine other variables, not be determined by them.) This is clearly false. As Benjamin Anderson, economist and early Keynes critic, pointed out, “The so-called independent Keynesian variables (1. The marginal propensity to consume, 2. The schedule of the mar­ginal efficiency of capital, and, 3. The rate of interest) are all influ­enced by each other. They are interdependent, not independent. Keynes even forgets himself and admits at one point that #2 is influenced by #1.”  Device Seven: Slipping Back and Forth between Mutually Inconsistent Categories Keynes uses the word “wages” to mean either a wage rate or total wages. He is also prone to move back and forth between physical commodities and services and money prices for commodities and services, another case of mixing up apples and bananas. Device Eight: Unsupported Assertion In the entirety of The General Theory, there are only two refer­ences to statistical studies, one of which Keynes partly dismisses as improbable: Mr. Kuznet’s method must surely lead to too low an estimate. Even when he discusses a subject that especially lends itself to statistical analysis, such as a suggested relationship between agri­cultural harvests and the business cycle, he simply takes a posi­tion without bothering to search for relevant data. Device Nine: Misstatement Keynes mischaracterizes the purpose of corporate sinking funds. How could he make such an elementary error? Probably because he had said the same thing many times when speaking on his feet, and, being busy, did not take sufficient time to check his written work. Sometimes Keynes seems too busy even to think. He says that if a lender lends money to a business owner, this doubles the risk of a business owner using his own money, which doubled risk is reflected in the interest rate. This makes no sense, as Henry Hazlitt noted. Risk is not doubled when a lender enters the pic­ture. The lender and the business owner share what is still the same risk of failure. Device Ten: Macro or Aggregative Economics Keynes is usually credited with “inventing” macroeconomics, which looks at economy-wide flows rather than the micro-eco­nomics of specific firms or industries. This is not entirely accu­rate. Other economists adopted an economy-wide perspective, although they often extrapolated from the firm or industry to the economy as a whole, which Keynes wrongly criticized. Ironi­cally, Keynes attacked Say’s Law which is, itself, an example of macroeconomics. It is certainly fair to say that Keynes developed his own type of macroeconomics, which his followers developed into the macroeconomics of today. It is also true that a macroeconomic viewpoint makes it easier for a skilled casuist to mislead and confuse, and that Keynes fully exploited this opening. Device Eleven: Misuse of Math Keynes refers to sales in one of his equations, but it is expected sales, not actual sales. Expectations by definition are not verifiable and thus do not belong in an equation. As Henry Hazlitt has pointed out, A mathematical statement, to be scientifically useful, must, like a verbal statement, at least be verifiable, even when it is not verified. If I say, for example (and am not merely joking), that John’s love of Alice varies in an exact and determinable relationship with Mary’s love of John, I ought to be able to prove that this is so. I do not prove my statement—in fact, I do not make it a whit more plausible or “scientific”—if I write, solemnly, let X equal Mary’s love of John, and Y equal John’s love of Alice, then Y = f (X) —and go on triumphantly from there. Yet this is the kind of assertion constantly being made by mathemat­ical economists, and especially by Keynes. Given the Alice in Wonderland quality of The General Theory, it should not surprise us that Keynes interrupts his own misuse of math to tell us that he (apparently) agrees with Hazlitt: To say that Queen Victoria was a better queen but not a happier woman than Queen Elizabeth [is] a propo­sition not without meaning and not without interest, but unsuitable as material for the differential calculus. Our precision will be a mock precision if we try to use such partly vague and nonquantitative concepts as the basis of a quantitative analysis.28 He also warns of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods . . . of eco­nomic analysis. After some of his own algebra he adds that: I do not myself attach much value to manipulations of this kind. It is quite typical of Keynes now to attack, now to disarm, now to shout, now to whisper, now to qualify his mathematical claims, now to ignore, even blatantly ignore, the same qualifications. On occasion, Keynes was even capable of a crude bluff. Writing a pri­vate letter to Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of Eng­land, he said that his theories (the same theories that would later appear in The General Theory) were a mathematical certainty, [not] open to dispute. Keynes certainly knew better. Some of his disciples did not. Economist Wilhelm Röpke noted in 1952 that The [Keynesian] revolutionaries [take a stance of] . . . vehement self-assertion and barely veiled contempt, such as are habitual to the “enlightened” in dealing with those who remain in the dark. They seem to re­gard themselves as all the more superior in that they can point with obvious pride to the difficulty of their literature and to the use of mathematics, which lifts the “new economics” almost to the lofty heights of physics. One could go on, almost indefinitely, citing Keynes’s obscuri­ties, convolutions, inconsistencies, factual or logical lapses,and so on, but it is time to ask the obvious question: why did he write The General Theory this way? Keynes could be orderly, orga­nized, consistent, relevant, clear, complete, and factual, in addi­tion to being playful and witty, when he wanted to be. This is apparent from the earlier books and many of the shorter pieces. There are some snippets from The General Theory that also reflect these characteristics. So why is most of The General Theory so different? There are many possible answers. Historian Paul Johnson has said, unrelated to Keynes, that “In financial matters, the object of complexity is all too often to conceal the truth, to deceive.” The French economist Étienne Mantoux, reviewing The General Theory shortly after publication, quoted an earlier English econo­mist, Samuel Bailey, from 1825: “An author’s reputation for the profundity of his ideas often gains by a small admixture of the unintelligible.” This may be part of the explanation, that Keynes intended to deceive or impress. But we must bear in mind that Keynes was a salesman. He was trying to sell a particular type of economic policy, and he was prepared to utilize any rhetorical device, from crystal clarity and wit all the way to complete unintelligibility, in order to make the sale. Why would unintelligibility help to make the sale? Not just because it can be used to impress. Equally important, it can be used to intimidate. Keynes liked to make people feel, as his very intelligent friend Bob Brand said, like “the bottom boy in the class.” Keynes probably developed obscurity as one of his speaking styles. He obscured, confused, and scrambled the mental “chessboard,” because he felt confident that he could always keep the position of the “chess pieces” in mind, and combine them as he saw fit for an attack in any direction, whereas his opponents could not. This is a very impressive skill indeed, especially when one is speaking extemporaneously. No wonder that Sir Josiah Stamp, a very respected economist who often partnered with Keynes on BBC broadcasts, said on the air that “I can never answer you when you are [verbally] theorizing.” Whether this was a deliberate style on Keynes’s part, or just a habit, we cannot know. But it was natural for him to fall into the same scrambling, intimidating style when writing The Gen­eral Theory. The problem is that it does not work as well in print as in conversation or debate. When confined to print, it can be examined, and all the myriad flaws, the errors of fact or reasoning, the rhetorical tricks, the pseudo originality, may be revealed. A few prominent economists, notably Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Wilhelm Röpke, Jacques Rueff, and Henry Hazlitt, among others, saw through it completely. Others per­ceived that something was wrong, but hesitated to say so out of fear of Keynes’s position and powers of retaliation. Regrettably, no major economist published an immediate book-length ref­utation, so that the influence of The General Theory spread and spread, notwithstanding its all too apparent flaws. Today many people - economists, financiers, investors, busi­ness owners, and managers - say that Keynes is their intellectual hero. Have they actually read The General Theory? Have they read more than the few clear and witty passages so widely quoted?  

14 сентября, 17:54

Free exchange: Stanley Fischer and the twilight of technocracy

Print section Print Rubric:  Stanley Fischer and the twilight of the technocrat Print Headline:  Remote control Print Fly Title:  Free exchange UK Only Article:  standard article Issue:  Closing in on cancer Fly Title:  Free exchange Main image:  20170916_FND000_0.jpg IN 2004 Stanley Fischer described the wonder he felt as an economics student in the 1960s. “You had a set of equations”, he said, “that meant you could control the economy.” Technocracy—the dream of scientific government by a caste of wise men—arose in the 20th century, as rapid change rendered the world unfathomably complex; in economics, it came of age in the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s. On September 6th, after a remarkably distinguished career in public service, Mr Fischer, an intellectual heir to Keynes, announced his imminent retirement as the vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve. It is ...

14 сентября, 17:54

Free exchange: Stanley Fischer and the twilight of technocracy

Print section Print Rubric:  Stanley Fischer and the twilight of the technocrat Print Headline:  Remote control Print Fly Title:  Free exchange UK Only Article:  standard article Issue:  Closing in on cancer Fly Title:  Free exchange Main image:  20170916_FND000_0.jpg IN 2004 Stanley Fischer described the wonder he felt as an economics student in the 1960s. “You had a set of equations”, he said, “that meant you could control the economy.” Technocracy—the dream of scientific government by a caste of wise men—arose in the 20th century, as rapid change rendered the world unfathomably complex; in economics, it came of age in the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s. On September 6th, after a remarkably distinguished career in public service, Mr Fischer, an intellectual heir to Keynes, announced his imminent retirement as the vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve. It is ...

11 сентября, 19:45

Behavioural New-Keynesian Macroeconomics

Roger Farmer: Behavioural New-Keynesian Macroeconomics: This is my penultimate post featuring research presented at the conference on Applications of Behavioural Economics and Multiple Equilibrium Models to Macroeconomics Policy Conference held at the Bank of England on July 3rd and 4th...

29 июня, 23:12

My views on monetary economics, by Scott Sumner

In this post, I'll use "(e)" to denote a (market) expected value. 1. NGDP(e) is the single most important variable in macro; it should be the centerpiece of modern macro. Unfortunately, it often doesn't even appear in models. 2. NGDP(e) should be used as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy. Instead the highly misleading fed funds rate is often used. Some economists cite the difference between the actual and natural rate of interest, but the natural rate is unobservable, and hence not useful. 3. Interest rates and the price level should be dropped from macro models for "never reason from a price change" reasons. Changes in interest rates and changes in inflation don't tell us anything useful about the economy, at least nothing that cannot be better demonstrated with alternative variables. Regarding the price level, Keynes agreed with me, ustilizing a nice analogy in the General Theory: But the proper place for such things as net real output and the general level of prices lies within the field of historical and statistical description, and their purpose should be to satisfy historical or social curiosity, a purpose for which perfect precision -- such as our causal analysis requires, whether or not our knowledge of the actual values of the relevant quantities is complete or exact -- is neither usual nor necessary. To say that net output to-day is greater, but the price-level lower, than ten years ago or one year ago, is a proposition of a similar character to the statement that Queen Victoria was a better queen but not a happier woman than Queen Elizabeth -- a proposition not without meaning and not without interest, but unsuitable as material for the differential calculus. Our precision will be a mock precision if we try to use such partly vague and non-quantitative concepts as the basis of a quantitative analysis. 4. There are welfare effects of changes in trend NGDP growth and also the volatility of NGDP. There are welfare effects from instability in hours worked. The "divine coincidence" that some economists believe applies to inflation and output, actually better applies to NGDP growth and hours worked. Low and stable NGDP growth minimizes the welfare costs of "inflation", and also leads to approximately optimal hours worked. Not exactly, but more closely than for inflation and output. 5. NGDP fluctuations are monetary shocks, they are not financial or real shocks. But they do have financial and real effects. 6. The lesson of the Great Recession is that macroeconomists need to spend less attention on the financial system. Bernanke attempted to integrate the financial system into macro in his famous 1983 AER article, which argued that banking problems directly depressed output during the early 1930s. That led Bernanke and others to wrongly conclude that fixing the banking problem was the way to stabilize the economy in late 2008. In fact, the Fed needed to use monetary policy to try to prevent a steep fall in NGDP. It did not even attempt to do so. Indeed the (contractionary) monetary policy of interest on reserves (adopted in October 2008) was aimed at depressing the economy, while the Fed worked to rescue the banking system. 7. The New Keynesian/NeoFisherian debate is focused on the wrong set of issues. It's not a question of who's right---they are both wrong to focus on interest rates---it's about how to determine which shocks have NK effects and which shocks have NF effects. a. Sometimes monetary shocks have NK effects. This occurs when an easy money policy leads to lower interest rates, a weaker currency, and an increase in the expected rate of appreciation in the domestic currency (due to lower interest rates and interest parity). An example was the QE announcement of March 18, 2009. b. Sometimes monetary shocks have NF effects. This occurs when a tight money policy leads to lower interest rates, a stronger currency, and an increase in the expected rate of appreciation in the domestic currency (due to lower interest rates and interest parity). An example was the Swiss currency appreciation of January 2015. 8. Most business cycles in large complex economies occur when NGDP moves unexpectedly in the presence of sticky nominal hourly wages. These monetary shocks cause a fluctuation in the ratio of NGDP to hourly wages, and this leads to a similar fluctuation in total hours worked---the essence of a business cycle: 9. There may be a zero lower bound of interest rates (or perhaps a slightly negative lower bound), but this is not a problem. There may be a problem of a zero lower bound of eligible assets not yet purchased by the central bank. But if so, it is a self-imposed problem. Make more assets eligible, or raise the trend rate of NGDP growth. Socialism or inflation. PS. Ramesh Ponnuru and David Beckworth have an excellent piece in National Review, which discusses both the logic of a higher inflation target, and why a NGDP level target is the superior option. Highly recommended. (19 COMMENTS)

27 июня, 09:23

Текст: Секрет экономического чуда США: Гамильтон против Адама Смита ( Толкователь )

Первый министр финансов США Александр Гамильтон был отцом американского протекционизма. Он шёл вопреки и мнению Томаса Джефферсона, и английского экономиста Адама Смита, считавших, что лучшая судьба США — оставаться сырьевой страной. Гамильтон резко поднял импортные тарифы на импорт промышленной продукции. Он же был основателем полугосударственного Банка Америки. Если бы не реформы Гамильтона, Америка никогда не смогла бы стать экономической, а затем политической сверхдержавой. Корейско-английский экономист Ха-Джун Чхан — редкий сегодня представитель школы кейнсианства. Он противник неограниченного глобализма, неолиберализма (в Англии он близок к Лейбористской партии). Заниматься неортодоксальной экономикой он начал под руководством одного из известнейших бр...

25 июня, 19:14

W. Arthur Lewis and the Tradeoffs of Economics and Economists

From Vox EU: W. Arthur Lewis and the tradeoffs of economics and economists, by Ravi Kanbur, VoxEU: There is nothing new under the sun. The passionate political economy discourses of today consume us entirely. But they are in fact perennials,...

19 июня, 17:39

Hoisted from the Archives: How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down...

**Hoisted from the Archives**: How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down... : Bruce Bartlett's piece on supply-side economics: >How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down - New York Times: AS one who was present at the creation of “supply-side economics” back in the 1970s, I think it is long past time that the phrase be put to rest. It did its job, creating a new consensus among economists on how to look at the national economy. But today it has become a frequently misleading and meaningless buzzword that gets in the way of good economic policy... sparked an interesting and useful debate at Mark Thoma's _Economist's View_ (which I previously noted). After thinking about it, I want to weigh in again--on the side of Bruce Bartlett as opposed to Paul Krugman. It's not that Paul says anything wrong about what he and his MIT colleagues thought at the end of the 1970s, but IMHO he underestimates the intellectual gulf between Cambridge and Washington. There are two issues here--stabilization policy and growth policy. (1) On stabilization policy: Bartlett says that the Keynesians around 1980 believed that full employment should be produced via fiscal policy--spending increases and tax cuts, preferably spending increases, to boost aggregate demand--and...

19 июня, 16:12

A Generalized Approach to Indeterminacy in Linear Rational Expectations Models -- by Francesco Bianchi, Giovanni Nicolo

We propose a novel approach to deal with the problem of indeterminacy in Linear Rational Expectations models. The method consists of augmenting the original model with a set of auxiliary exogenous equations that are used to provide the adequate number of explosive roots in presence of indeterminacy. The solution in this expanded state space, if it exists, is always determinate, and is identical to the indeterminate solution of the original model. The proposed approach accommodates determinacy and any degree of indeterminacy, and it can be implemented even when the boundaries of the determinacy region are unknown. As a result, the researcher can estimate the model by using standard packages without restricting the estimates to a certain area of the parameter space. We apply our method to simulated and actual data from a prototypical New-Keynesian model for both regions of the parameter space. We show that our method successfully recovers the true parameter values independent of the initial values.

18 июня, 22:40


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.Товарищ возбудился по поводу моего замечания о "глубокой мысли" Путина, что, мол, коммунизм был квазирелигией нет другого пути, как заместить его религией (например культом Вуду, как я понимаю). ПесТня. Верущие - это как бы не круглые, а кубические идиоты.Евгений Юркевич 17 июн, 2017 23:30 (местное)Ватикан и Бердяев - тоже полные идиоты?"Только полные идиоты, не способные к элементарной логике считают марксизм - "квазирелигией"." (Мое, кровное -СЛ) Надеюсь вы не считате таковым Н.Бердяева? Книга "Истоки и смысл русского коммунизма" вышла на немецком языке в 1938. Интересно для кого Бердяев ее издавал? :)Цитата: "Koммyнизм, нe кaк coциaльнaя cиcтeмa, a кaк peлигия, фaнaтичecки вpaждeбeн вcякoй peлигии и бoлee вceгo xpиcтиaнcкoй. Oн caм xoчeт быть peлигиeй, идyщeй нa cмeнy xpиcтанcтвy, oн пpeтeндyeт oтвeтить нa peлигиoзныe зaпpocы чeлoвeчecкoй дyши, дaть cмыcл жизни. Koммyнизм цeлocтeн, oн oxвaтывaeт вcю жизнь, oн нe oтнocитcя к кaкoй-либo coциaльнoй oблacти. Пoэтoмy eгo cтoлкнoвeниe c дpyгими peлигиoзными вepoвaниями неизбежно. Heтepпимocть, фaнaтизм вceгдa имeют peлигиoзный иcтoчник. Hикaкaя нayчнaя, чистo интeллeктyaльнaя тeopия нe мoжeт быть cтoль нeтepпимa и фaнатична. Kaк peлигиoзнoe вepoвaниe, кoммyнизм эксклюзивен."Ватикан боролся с коммунизмом именно как с конкурирующей религией. Ватикан - тоже полные идиоты?sl_lopatnikov18 июн, 2017 00:00 (местное)Re: Ватикан и Бердяев - тоже полные идиоты?И не надейтесь. Я считаю Бердяева хуже чем идиотом: я его считаю болтливой бестолочью, пустым гремящим барабаном. Ну а Ватикан, как как всякая религиозная организация - есть организованная преступная группировка мошенников не доверии.Марксизм не является религией ни разу. Не больше, чем какое-нибудь Кейнсианство или просто термодинамика. Это - наука. Просто не по мозгам Бердяева Маркса читать.По поводу заявлений типа бердяевского, замечательно сказал Ф.Энгельс: "Ели сапожную щетку отнести к разряду млекопитающих, молочные железы у нее от этого не вырастут."Есть идиоты, вполне в духе Бердяева , которые к религии относят всё, что угодно, включая атеизм, теорию относительности, квантовую механику, дарвинизм, и так далее... Пустые дураки, не понимающие сути вещей ни разу.Кстати, то, что Бердяев дурак и болтун я писал не раз. Как и, о господи, пресловутый Розанов, и просто умалишенный "преп" (не подумайте, что преподаватель) Флоренский, единственный "значимый математический труд" которого - "доказательство" ГЕОЦЕТРИЧНОСТИ Солнечной системы.Вообще, вся российская православная "мысль" - это продукт пуканья пауков в головах говорящих идиотов.Меня всегда изумляла способность придурков носиться с этими идиотами как с писаной торбой. Причем известно, почему - из-за их близкой идиотам дичайшей дремучести и пошлости мысли, ну и непременной примеси близкого быдлу русского шовинизма ( здесь русский дух, здесь Русью пахнет - так мыться надо было чаще, чем под Пасху) и, разумеется, антисемитизма (что немаловажно в качестве диагностического признака идиотов).PS. Пояснение по поводу Ватикана. Мало того, что это организованная преступная группировка, Ватикан боролся с коммунизмом НЕ КАК КОНКУРИРУЮЩЕЙ РЕЛИГИЕЙ. Ватикан ИСПОЛНЯЛ распоряжение ЗАКАЗЧИКА - крупного капитала, которому церковь всегда исправно служила.

15 июня, 02:42

Larry White on Monetary Economists and the Gold Standard, by David Henderson

Why isn't the gold standard more popular with current-day economists? Milton Friedman once hypothesized that monetary economists are loath to criticize central banks because central banks are by far their largest employer. Providing some evidence for the hypothesis, I have elsewhere suggested that career incentives give monetary economists a status-quo bias. Most understandably focus their expertise on serving the current regime and disregard alternative regimes that would dispense with their services. They face negative payoffs to considering whether the current regime is the best monetary regime. Here I want to propose an alternative hypothesis, which complements rather than replaces the employment-incentive hypothesis. I propose that many mainstream economists today instinctively oppose the idea of the self-regulating gold standard because they have been trained as social engineers. They consider the aim of scientific economics, as of engineering, to be prediction and control of phenomena (not just explanation). They are experts, and an automatically self-governing gold standard does not make use of their expertise. They prefer a regime that values them. They avert their eyes from the possibility that they are trying to optimize a Ptolemaic system, and so prefer not to study its alternatives. This is from "Experts and the Gold Standard," an excellent piece at Alt-M by George Mason University economist Lawrence H. White. I recommend the whole thing. Make sure you look at his evidence on the performance of the classical gold standard alongside the evidence on the performance of central banking. Larry quotes an astounding statement by Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer: Emphasis on a single rule as the basis for monetary policy implies that the truth has been found, despite the record over time of major shifts in monetary policy -- from the gold standard, to the Bretton Woods fixed but changeable exchange rate rule, to Keynesian approaches, to monetary targeting, to the modern frameworks of inflation targeting and the dual mandate of the Fed, and more. We should not make our monetary policy decisions based on that assumption. Rather, we need our policymakers to be continually on the lookout for structural changes in the economy and for disturbances to the economy that come from hitherto unexpected sources. Read Larry's great critique of this statement. One excerpt from that critique: Contrary to Fischer, there is no good reason to presume that expert-guided monetary regimes get progressively better over time, because there is no filter for replacing mistaken experts with better experts. We have no test of the successful exercise of expertise in monetary policy (meaning, superiority at correctly diagnosing and treating exogenous monetary disturbances, while avoiding the introduction of money-supply disturbances) apart from ex post evaluation of performance. The Fed's performance does not show continuous improvement. As previously noted, it doesn't even show improvement over the pre-Fed regime in the US. (17 COMMENTS)

11 июня, 16:04

I Am Heartened by the Improvement in the Prime-Age Employment Rate. Now Let Us Let It Continue Rather than Stopping It...

Here in the United States, there were always three arrows to "hysteresis"—to the argument that the failure to adopt policies that properly fought the downturn of 2008-2009 in an aggressive manner to restore full employment rapidly did not just temporary but permanent damage to the economy's productive potential. A long period of very slack demand: 1. slowed experimentation with business models, organizations, and technologies and so reduced total factor productivity growth by a poorly known but perhaps very substantial amount. 2. diminished investment and reduced our productive capital stock relative to a rapid-recovery counterfactual baseline by a well understood and large amount. 3. caused workers to exit from the labor force with little hope of getting them back—too much time out of the workforce had destroyed their social networks they needed in order to effectively search for jobs. (1) and (2) dealt mighty and powerful permanent blows to American economic growth. Barring some currently-unanticipated large positive shock, we are never getting back to our pre-2007 growth trend: But there has, over the past couple of years, been good news about (3). The prime-age employment-to-population ratio is no longer lower than it has been since the 1980s, before the full coming...

10 июня, 11:00

Проблемы экономических идеологий

В последнее время как ни возьмешь статью, посвященную проблемам развития российской экономики, так едва ли ни в каждой наткнешься на рассуждения относительно необходимости отказаться от либеральных (неолиберальных) мифов при разработке экономической политики. Вот и на заседании либеральной платформы партии «Единая Россия» либеральный подход к экономике подвергся суровому осуждению. Выглядит, конечно, абсурдно, но это едва ли […]

08 июня, 08:28

General election 2017 live: polls show Tory lead as final hours of voting get under way

All the news as the snap election gets under way, with last-minute polls still putting Theresa May’s Tories ahead of Jeremy Corbyn’s LabourElection night: hour-by-hour guide plus live results from 10pmGet live results updates on Android devicesShare your photos and stories of polling day 8.55pm BST If you thought the offer of a free Banksy print - subsequently withdrawn as it was was warned it could invalidate the results - was good, with just over an hour until the polls end, the actor and comedian David Schneider has offered some (tongue in cheek I should add in case the Electoral Commission is reading) incentives to get out and vote:Young people. I’ve hidden some things in polling stations around the UK. If you haven’t voted, go there now, see what you can find. And vote pic.twitter.com/K7PaU3jHfG 8.45pm BST Liz, a Lib Dem supporter in the south London marginal of Kingston and Surbiton – where Ed Davey is trying to take his old seat back from Tory politician James Berry – has been pounding the street this evening offering lifts to the polling station. Apparently Cleggmania lives on, if this picture she sent from the Lib Dem HQ toilets is anything to go by:Cleggmania lives on! A Lib Demmer campaigning in the Kingston and Surbiton marginal has sent me this from the toilet of the local HQ pic.twitter.com/mTsOpe26EJA steady stream of volunteers is flowing in and out of the K&S LD HQ as we are collecting the names of any potential voters who we think might not have voted yet. It has been a long day – some were out at 6am dropping election day leaflets and are still going, fuelled by orange squash, biscuits and bananas. And if that’s not enough to keep us going, the lifesize Clegg in the ladies’ loo should do it.We’re hopeful, but not overconfident – Ed Davey is very popular with the locals, but there’s a sense that national politics is going back to a two -party system and this is impacting how people vote locally. Continue reading...

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07 июня, 19:34

Причины кризисов -- кейнсианство

Кейнс «мудро» заметил, что при постоянном обесценивании денег народ пытается от них избавится как можно скорей, а не накопить Соответственно, по-его мнению, для ускорения экономики можно использовать этот эффект. Он был прав в этом, только он упустил из вида качество такого ускорения. Если предложение денег преобладает над спросом, то деньги берут только те, кто тем или иным образом хотят их либо вообще не отдать, либо отдать только частично, то есть мошенники. Рядовому потребителю держать обесценивающиеся деньги незачем, он может их только реинвестировать. Честным производителям товаров лишние деньги тоже не нужны, потому что все что им нужно для поддержания производства ограничено уровнем спроса на данную продукцию. Например, производители хлеба не могут произвести хлеба больше, чем его могут съесть. Экспорт в такой ситуации, однако возможен, но только при условии того, что инфляция в импортирующей стране меньше. Дабы не усложнять, мы не будем рассматривать данную ситуацию, потому что это выходит за рамки исследования(а в целом, это для народного хозяйства тоже деструктивный фактор). Будем рассматривать замкнутую систему. Итак, после того, как порог насыщения промышленности в инвестициях пройден, деньги становятся не нужны никому, кроме авантюристов и мошенников. Естественным финалом данного процесса является начало дефолтов. В первые моменты со стороны государства будут предприниматься попытки заткнуть эти дыры с помощью печатного станка, но когда предел такой поддержки будет пройден, наступит коллапс. Вот это кейнсианская модель в действии.

04 июня, 17:11

Ten Years Ago in Grasping Reality: June 4, 2007

Three pieces worth highlighting: * My monthly contribution to Project Syndicate: **What Can China Do with Its Foreign Exchange Reserves?** * Back when I was much more optimistic about internet technologies and the public sphere: **Neil Henry vs. Jay Rosen Future-of-Journalism Smackdown!** * Guenter Grass's con game: trying to hide his membership in the criminal organization that was the Waffen-SS while denouncing the western alliance for refusing to face the unmasterable past: **Guenter Grass Surfaces in the Pages of the New Yorker** Three pieces that, if this were a novel, I would wince at as overly-clumsy foreshadowing: * Paul Krugman accurately gets Barack Obama in an aside: **Paul Krugman on Barack Obama's Health Plan** : "On the whole, the Obama plan is better than I feared.... It doesn’t quell my worries that Mr. Obama’s dislike of 'bitter and partisan' politics makes him too cautious..." * And Atul Gawande nails 2009-2017: **Atul Gawande Sees a Near-Consensus on Health Care Reform** : "[A]ttacks are certain to label this as tax-and-spend liberalism and government-controlled health care. But these are not what will sabotage success. Instead, the crucial matter is our reaction as a country when the attacks come. If we as consumers, health...

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02 июня, 19:43

Economic View: A Tax Cut Might Be Nice. But Remember the Deficit.

Combining the logic of supply-side economics and of Keynesian stimulus makes sense when the economy is weak, but not right now.

02 июня, 19:17

On Keynesian Economicses and the Economicses of Keynes: Hoisted from June 2, 2007

**Hoisted from June 2, 2007: On Keynesian Economicses and the Economicses of Keynes** : With respect to ... I think that there are two ways to understand the divergence of perspectives here... The first is to note that Jamie Galbraith sees Keynes's _General Theory_ as part of something bigger: combine it with John Kenneth Galbraith's _New Industrial State_, with Hyman Minsky's approach to financial crises, and perhaps with Piero Sraffa's _Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities_, and you do have an alternative theoretical framework for economics that owes very, very little to the Marshallian or even the Smithian tradition—and that owes nothing at all to the Walrasian tradition. Call this "East Anglian Keynesianism." My macroeconomics teachers—Kindleberger, Eichengreen, Dornbusch, Fischer, Abel, Blanchard, Sargent—by contrast, see Keynes's macroeonomics (not just the single book that is the _General Theory_, but also _How to Pay for the War_, _The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill_, the Tract on Monetary Reform, and so forth) as part of a different bigger thing. They see Keynes, Wicksell, and even Milton Friedman (though he would rarely admit it) as all groping toward an understanding of the macroeconomy that ends in the belief that limited, strategic, focused, yet powerful...

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02 июня, 19:07

Fed paper warns on helicopter money risks

Tool appears much less powerful when less realistic elements of the New Keynesian framework are removed; other options could work better, authors say

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02 июня, 18:42

Ten Years Ago on Grasping Reality: June 2, 2007...

* **Two links for 2007-06-03** : "Scott Horton: Did... Rumsfeld... Wolfowitz, Feith, Cambone and DiRita–with backing from John Bolton... actually attempt to provoke a war with China?..." And: "Anatole France: La majestueuse égalité des lois interdit..." * **Shopping on Saturday Afternoon, with Cellphones** : "I'm going to have to reconsider my attitude toward Costco now that I know you can get a cubic foot of pre-washed organic spring mix for under $4..." * Two ways to understand Keynesian heresy wars: as East Anglian vs. MIT Keynesianism; and as root-and-branch opposition to versus peaceful coexistence with right-wing Friedmanite and Hayekian perspectives: **On Keynesian Economicses and the Economicses of Keynes** . Worth hoisting and highlighting...

03 сентября 2016, 06:00

Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя

2016 год ознаменовал восьмидесятилетнюю годовщину публикации одной из самых влиятельных книг по теме экономики когда-либо увидевших свет. Эта книга – “Общая теория занятости, процента и денег” Джона Мейнарда Кейнса – нанесла непоправимый экономический и политический ущерб Западному миру и другим… читать далее → Запись Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя впервые появилась .