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24 февраля, 18:42

Procrastinating on February 24, 2017

**Over at [Equitable Growth](http://EquitableGrowth.org): Must- and Should-Reads:** * **Nick Bunker**: _[What’s the problem a U.S. corporate tax cut will solve? | Equitable Growth][]_ * **John Schmitt**: _[The U.S. minimum wage improves access to traditional lines of credit | Equitable Growth][]_ * **Matt Markezich**: _[Why is collective bargaining so difficult in...

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24 февраля, 17:00

As Rio de Janeiro Implodes, Keynesians Have Some Explaining To Do

'Shovel-Ready' government spending authored the opposite of an economic boom in Brazil.

23 февраля, 15:48

Без заголовка

**Should-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis**: _[The academic consensus on austerity solidifies, but policymakers go their own sweet way][]_: "Any fiscal expansion in the US would not be for Keynesian reasons... [The academic consensus on austerity solidifies, but policymakers go their own sweet way]: https://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2017/02/the-academic-consensus-on-austerity.html >...There remains a clear and rather urgent need...

22 февраля, 18:00

The US is the World's Bitch

Since cognizance, my observation of the US has essentially been a slow motion, 35 year nightmare where I saw the US triumphantly rise from the malaise of its 1970's ashes, to the supreme, undisputed superpower in the 80's, to the slow, inexorable decay that we unconsciously realize today.  And while the temperature in the pan has been slowly increased so American sheeple-frogs do not realize it, I and many of my counterparts are not so easily duped as we are fully aware of what has been going on.  Slowly, but surely, people on the left have eroded away the sovereignty of the United States, and have successfully brainwashed and indoctrinated the majority of the population to forfeit this precious and vital thing.If you look at the attitudes among Americans (and western Europeans) their views on sovereignty are perverse and ultimately self-destructive.  They take no pride in their respective countries.  They have an irrational guilt for non-existent historical sins they did not personally commit.  They lack the ability to see the threats foreigners and foreign countries present if you do not maintain the integrity of a nation.  They're against voter ID laws.  They're OK with 58% of legal immigrants parasiting off of them, and they're additionally OK with 71% of illegal immigrants doing the same.  And they give preferential treatment to foreigners who do not like or respect them in our academic, corporate, and government institutions.  It's as if they're seemingly rolling on their backs, splaying and enslaving themselves to foreigners because they lack the basic self-respect for sovereignty, self-determinism, and self-ownership of their futures.We can speculate all we want about why this is.Americans have been successful brainwashed to hate themselves and the country.Americans are cowards, afraid to actually fight in a verbal or hot war to protect their land.Americans are deathly afraid of being called an "ist" and so like Sweden spreads her legs for all the world to rape.Americans are increasingly siding with the more aggressive people because said people tend to win over countries and societies in the long run.But whatever the reason, when we contrast these attitudes, or simply juxtapose them into foreign countries, we see how absurd and dangerous America's cowardly and flippant view towards their sovereignty really is:Imagine going into Mexico and demanding the countrymen not only speak your language, but pay for your everything.Imagine going to India and getting preferential treatment through H1-B visas over Punjab who lived there all his life.Imagine going to Japan and demanding the right to vote and that their ENTIRE population simply breed itself out of existence because "diveristy."And imagine just waltzing into Sweden, living off of the local population, getting the right to vote, raping the locals....oh wait, you don't have to imagine.  You can just visit.Regardless, the point is Americans (self-hating leftists or rightists) can clearly understand why those host countries (bar Sweden) would have every right to arrest us, throw our asses in jail, and deport us.  We understand sovereignty.  We understand it's "their country."  We understand all of this...except when it comes to the United States.This disgusting lack of self-respect makes us the world's bitch.  And the saying "Asia for Asians, Africa for Africans, and America for everyone" epitomizes the world's psychology towards the US.  For while Americans have been deluded this past 60 years with unrivaled economic growth and unrivaled debt spending to think resources are unlimited, the remaining 6.7 billion people on the planet know otherwise.  They know resources are limited.  They know poverty.  And if they can get a free meal out of a bunch of easily-duped, self-loathing pussies, they will.  It's why immigrants today are majority-parasites and why they really don't care about the morality of being parasitic.  Furthermore, if you didn't notice, they are more aggressive than the millennial liberal arts majoring pussies, getting pissed off and angry, daring to protest in a country that isn't theirs because they might be deported and their welfare might be cut off.This presents a problem all Americans must face.  We must deal with the illegal aliens and immigrants in our country that have no respect for the country, no respect for the law, and (get this through your precious liberal-arts majoring heads) no respect for you.  They view you as a meal ticket.  They view you as a host.  And, if you take the time to think about time, money, and labor, they are doing nothing more than simply enslaving you to work for them.Slavery, no matter how obfuscated, is a reason to go to war.  It is a disgusting violation of human rights, we fought a just war over it already, and any self-respecting person will not tolerate it.  However, this doesn't mean we have to go to war to re-establish US sovereignty.  Deportation is certainly called for and is a much more peaceful solution.  Building a wall, no matter what Sheila Lebouf says, is not "literally nazi" or "fascism" but simple self-respect.  And simply enforcing the law is not only well within the rights of the country, but moral as well.  I sincerely hope these peaceful methods, exercised over the same 30 years the left had to destroy this country, will peacefully re-establish US sovereignty, show Americans it's alright to demand their own nation, and remind the world the US is not their communal property.But if it doesn't then it's high time the US act a little more like Russia and remind the world militarily.  I'm sure an army at the border with Mexico, shooting anybody who crosses into the US would get people's attention.  I'm sure building an internal Deportation Army to kick parasitic and criminal aliens out of the country would not only be a Keynesian boost to the economy, but send a clear signal to foreign countries that the US is not their communal time share.  And I'm sure that if we just decided to start taking over bits and pieces of other countries whose illegal populations invaded ours, they mind just reconsider viewing Americans as the doormats they are.But that's just the problem.  Americans are doormats.  They're push overs.  They're weak.  They're self-loathing losers who only enjoy the standards of living they do because of the work of their ancestors and the fact we have the world's reserve currency.  They are so soft and self-loathing they'll gladly take in people who, at minimum, want to parasite off of them and, at worst, kill them because it's politically correct.  They simply do not have the spine, self-respect, or stomach for the violence and sacrifice that would come with a domestic war to reassert sovereignty.  And so, despite the election of Trump, you an expect America in the long run to become like Sweden and bend over for the rest of the world.  It's not only what modern day Americans deserve, but it's another good reason to do some reconnaissance as well as enjoy the decline.______________________________________Check out more of the hate at Aaron's other sites!! PodcastAsshole ConsultingYouTubeTwitterBooksAmazon AffiliateHHR4HM7ZPMV3

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20 февраля, 11:06

Links for 02-20-17

How will President Trump reshape the Fed? - Gavyn Davies Econometrics: Angrist and Pischke are at it Again - No Hesitations Did post-Marxist theories destroy Communist regimes? - Branko Milanovic Globalisation and economic nationalism - VoxEU Views on industrial strategy...

19 февраля, 18:15

Beckworth interviews Eggertsson, by Scott Sumner

David Beckworth has done a very interesting set of interviews with leading figures in monetary economics and related fields. One of my favorite occurred a few weeks ago when David interviewed Gauti Eggertsson. Eggertsson is a prominent monetary theorist, who has also worked at the New York Fed. This gives him an excellent vantage point to evaluate the past decade. Since there is no written transcript, I'll rely on memory. Thus keep in mind these are not exact quotes: 1. Eggertsson expressed surprise that the Fed did not try for the sort of reflationary policies that FDR adopted in 1933. Recall that Bernanke once called on the Bank of Japan to show "Rooseveltian resolve", and specifically suggested ideas such as "level targeting." Both David and Gauti argued that level targeting could have been very helpful at the zero bound. 2. David pointed out that many central bankers were afraid of making the same mistakes as we made in the 1970s, (when, many would argue, we let the inflation genie out of the bottle.) Eggertsson responded (I paraphrase) "instead they made the same mistakes as in the early 1930s." 3. Eggertsson suggested that some central bankers seemed afraid that unconventional monetary stimulus could lead to an increase in risk premia, which would actually be contractionary. Eggertsson didn't seem to think much of that theory, and neither do I. 4. As in almost all conversations these days, talk eventually turned to Trump. Eggertsson suggested that if any idea has recently taken a beating it is the claim that uncertainty is recessionary. I've made that argument about Brexit, but Eggertsson was thinking of the uncertainty created by Trump. I think that's right, even today no one seems to have a good idea as to what sort of trade policy will eventually be adopted, or what will replace Obamacare. And yet stocks are soaring, suggesting that no recession is expected. I'm increasingly inclined toward the view that "uncertainty" is a lazy way of thinking about economic shocks. Economists are better off focusing on specific shocks, such as tight money, tax cuts, or an actual trade war. 5. At one point David brought up the idea of "helicopter drops", which is a metaphor used by economists for combined fiscal/monetary stimulus. Eggertsson asked how that's different from what Japan has been doing over the past 20 years. I've made similar arguments over the past few years. Overall I thought it was one of David's best interviews. I expected to disagree with a good portion of what Eggertsson had to say, as he's certainly more Keynesian than I am. But I ended up agreeing with most of what he said, and also learned something from the way he thought about problems. PS. My only regret is that David didn't ask him about Iceland, where Eggertsson grew up. They had a very severe banking crisis back in 2008, and used currency devaluation to cushion the blow. (6 COMMENTS)

18 февраля, 23:42

Procrastinating on February 18, 2017

**Over at [Equitable Growth](http://EquitableGrowth.org): Must- and Should-Reads:** * **Robert Waldmann**: _[Marking My Beliefs To Market: UK Violent Crime][]_: "The lead causes crime hypothesis... * **Wing Thye Woo**: _[China’s Growth Odyssey][]_: "Former World Bank Chief Economist Justin Yifu Lin is sanguine... * **Colin Camerer**: _[On "Rational Expectations" and John Muth][]_: "Rational...

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18 февраля, 19:03

New Keynesian DSGE models and the ‘representative lemming’

from Lars Syll If all agents are supposed to have rational expectations, it becomes convenient to assume also that they all have the same expectation and thence tempting to jump to the conclusion that the collective of agents behaves as one. The usual objection to representative agent models has been that it fails to take […]

18 февраля, 17:37

Без заголовка

**Should-Read: Robert Waldmann**: _[Buchanan, Smith, and Krugman][]_: "There is no reason why macroeconomists can't work on empirical microeconomics while also using old Keynesian models for forecasting and policy advice... [Buchanan, Smith, and Krugman]: http://rjwaldmann.blogspot.com/2016/12/buchanan-smith-and-krugman.html >...Now one might argue that it would be better not to give advice until we have...

17 февраля, 03:35

Wartime Prosperity?

(Don Boudreaux) TweetHere’s a passage from page 18 of volume 1 of Roger Backhouse’s forthcoming (in May) biography of Paul Samuelson (1915-2009): Founder of Modern Economics: Paul A. Samuelson: His remark that he could see the Keynesian multiplier at work when he was on the farm [that he often visited as a boy] is clearly a later […]

13 февраля, 17:15

Circumventing the Zero Lower Bound with Monetary Policy Rules Based on Money -- by Michael T. Belongia, Peter N. Ireland

Discussions of monetary policy rules after the 2007-2009 recession highlight the potential ineffectiveness of a central bank's actions when the short-term interest rate under its control is limited by the zero lower bound. This perspective assumes, in a manner consistent with the canonical New Keynesian model, that the quantity of money has no role to play in transmitting a central bank's actions to economic activity. This paper examines the validity of this claim and investigates the properties of alternative monetary policy rules based on control of the monetary base or a monetary aggregate in lieu of the capacity to manipulate a short-term interest rate. The results indicate that rules of this type have the potential to guide monetary policy decisions toward the achievement of a long-run nominal goal without being constrained by the zero lower bound on a nominal interest rate. They suggest, in particular, that by exerting its influence over the monetary base or a broader aggregate, the Federal Reserve could more effectively stabilize nominal income around a long-run target path, even in a low or zero interest-rate environment.

13 февраля, 17:15

Tight Money-Tight Credit: Coordination Failure in the Conduct of Monetary and Financial Policies -- by Julio A. Carrillo, Enrique G. Mendoza, Victoria Nuguer, Jessica Roldan-Penya

Quantitative analysis of a New Keynesian model with the Bernanke-Gertler accelerator and risk shocks shows that violations of Tinbergen's Rule and strategic interaction between policymaking authorities undermine significantly the effectiveness of monetary and financial policies. Separate monetary and financial policy rules, with the latter subsidizing lenders to encourage lending when credit spreads rise, produce higher welfare and smoother business cycles than a monetary rule augmented with credit spreads. The latter yields a tight money-tight credit regime in which the interest rate responds too much to inflation and not enough to adverse credit conditions. Reaction curves for the choice of policy-rule elasticity that minimizes each authority's loss function given the other authority's elasticity are nonlinear, reflecting shifts from strategic substitutes to complements in setting policy-rule parameters. The Nash equilibrium is significantly inferior to the Cooperative equilibrium, both are inferior to a first-best outcome that maximizes welfare, and both produce tight money-tight credit regimes.

12 февраля, 00:53

WaPo: Federal agents conduct immigration enforcement raids in at least six states

From the article: Officials said the raids targeted known criminals, but they also netted some immigrants without criminal records, an apparent departure from similar enforcement waves during the Obama administration. Last month, Trump substantially broadened the scope of who the Department of Homeland Security can target to include those with minor offenses or no convictions […]

09 февраля, 00:09

Why do so many economists favor fiscal stimulus in Japan?, by Scott Sumner

It seems like hardly a week goes by without me running into another article suggesting that Japan needs to do fiscal stimulus. Today there's one discussing the recommendations of Nobel Laureate Christopher Sims, using the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level" (FTPL): To revive Abenomics, he [Sims] calls for a co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policy to tackle Japan's deflation problems and urges the Japanese government to declare that it will not raise the consumption tax in the future. Now some may wonder why we need a new theory like the FTPL. Wouldn't it be the same conclusion as an old Keynesian economics? There is a concept called "liquidity trap" where monetary becomes ineffective and fiscal policy would be effective when the interest rate reaches zero. Well, yes and no. The conclusion may look similar, but the FTPL adds at least three new aspects to the old consensus. First, the FTPL incorporates the role of expectations. What matters is not the current budget surplus or deficit, but the future path of budget surplus or deficit. In this regard, the government has to commit itself to run fiscal deficit to generate inflation. Second, the FTPL negates the usual distinction between fiscal and monetary theory. This is a theory for a consolidated governance combining both the government and the central bank of a country. I am perplexed by this, for a number of reasons: 1. Japan did exactly what Sims recommended from 1994 to 2012, and failed as miserably as a policy can possible fail. It combined the largest fiscal stimulus (in peacetime) that the world has ever seen---by far, with the worst performance for aggregate demand that the world has ever seen in a major country---by far. Indeed nominal GDP actually fell. That's right, even in nominal terms aggregate income was lower in 2012 than in 1994. (The population increased over that period). Here is Japan's net debt, blowing past Italy to be the highest for any major economy: The debt ratio soared from 20% of GDP in 1994 to 140% of GDP in 2013. Some people would complain that you can't just look at the actual debt or deficit; you need to look at the cyclically-adjusted figures. But in Japan's case that won't make much difference, except for the period around 2009, as its unemployment rate is only 3%. Japan has a secular growth problem, not a cyclical problem. But it gets even worse, Japan has recently been doing better than before 2012, even though its fiscal policy has become more contractionary: As I have argued, Abenomics has delivered some good results, especially in employment, and inflation rate has been higher than that before the launch of Abenomics. Prime Minister Abe likes to say that deflation is over for Japan, but it is still early to declare that. Unfortunately I don't have net debt data post-2013, but the gross debt ratio data shows that Japan's fiscal policy has indeed become less expansionary under Abe. Debt is still rising, but at a slower rate: This reflects the sales tax increase that Abe implemented. Notice that Japan's gross debt has now reached an astounding 250% of GDP, far higher than even Greece (number two on the chart.) These are levels that economists used to view as being quite dangerous. Admittedly, the debt ratio is not currently a problem for Japan, as interest rates are quite low. But what if they rise in the future? Greece's debt situation looked manageable, until it wasn't. Of course the other difference is that Japan has its own currency, and could inflate its debt away in an emergency. But should we be reassured by that? In the end, my biggest problem with recommendations of fiscal stimulus for Japan is not that it will lead to bankruptcy, but rather that it simply makes no sense. Again: 1. They tried massive fiscal stimulus and it failed miserably. 2. When they cut back on stimulus after 2012 the economy did better. Most economists expect Japan to have about 1% inflation going forward. Prior to Abe they had mild deflation. NGDP has risen 9% since Abe took office. That's not a lot for 3.75 years, but recall that Japan's NGDP fell over the previous 19 years. And also recall that this 9% rise occurred during a period of falling population, whereas the previous decline occurred during a period of rising population. 3. Unemployment is 3% and falling, and Japanese companies complain they can't find workers. Immigrants are being brought in to do menial jobs. Unlike the US, the Japanese economy has a high and rising labor force participation rate. What am I missing here? I understand that Japanese interest rates are zero, but that's been true for many years. Why do western economists expect a policy that failed for several decades, to suddenly start working? What happened to the view that governments should be responsible, and not push the debt/GDP ratio endlessly higher? And what happened to the view that fiscal stimulus was only appropriate, if at all, during a temporary recession? The calls for fiscal stimulus in Japan make no sense on so many levels that I'm almost speechless. The assertion seems not just wrong, but preposterous. It would be like claiming that the press doesn't pay enough attention to terrorism, or the Kardashians. (9 COMMENTS)

07 февраля, 21:57

The Great Recession: A Macroeconomic Earthquake

Larry Christiano on why the Great Recession happened, why it lasted so long, why it wasn't foreseen, and how it’s changing macroeconomic theory (the excerpt below is about the last of these, how it's changing theory): The Great Recession: A...

07 февраля, 09:46

Paying for the Wall/Fence: Tariff Edition

Tax reform (DBCFT) will not pay for the wall. A remittances tax will not yield sufficient revenues, except perhaps over many years. What about a tariff? That’ll do the trick (back-of-the-envelope calculations!). But it won’t necessarily be the Mexicans paying… First consider the canonical analysis, where the US is considered a small country (in the […]

05 февраля, 23:52

How to identify shocks, by Scott Sumner

I'm seeing two common mistakes by commenters trying to analyze the Brexit vote shock: 1. Assuming that monetary offset applies to real shocks 2. Assuming that a cut in the BOE's target interest rate represents an easing of policy. It turns out that these two errors are interrelated. The Bank of England has a dual mandate, which includes 2% inflation in the long run, but macroeconomic stability in the short run. It's probably easiest to view this as keeping NGDP growth steady in the short run, but gradually nudging it up or down in the long run to keep inflation close to 2%. To make things simple, let's define AD as a given level of NGDP. Then the BOE wants stable growth in AD, at roughly 4%/year. Now suppose there is a nominal shock. In that case, the BOE should adjust policy to keep NGDP growth stable. If we use the Equation of Exchange: MV = PY You can think of that as the central bank adjusting M to offset changes in V. If you prefer a Keynesian approach, you can define the Wicksellian equilibrium interest rate as the rate that keeps NGDP growth at about 4%. If the Wicksellian rate falls (as it did after Brexit) the BOE will cut the policy rate, to keep growth in NGDP stable. But monetary offset does not apply to real shocks: When the AS curve shifts left, the BOE will keep monetary policy stable by keeping the AD curve stable (more precisely the growth rate is kept stable.) So real shocks will reduce RGDP, even if monetary policy is fully offsetting shocks that might impact AD. Monetary offset is a useful concept, but can only do so much. I think people tend to overrate the importance of central banks in setting interest rates. The BOE is constrained by its macro targets. Thus 90% of the time when it adjusts interest rates it's not a true policy change, it's just the central bank reflecting a change in the Wicksellian rate caused by some sort of shock. It looks like the central bank is what's causing rates to change, but that's a cognitive illusion. As an analogy, a bus driver will adjust the steering wheel on a twisty road. Superficially it looks like the bus is moving around at the whims of the driver. But a deeper explanation is that the path of the bus reflects the shape of the road, and the driver simply adjusts the steering to keep the bus centered on the road. A true change in "bus driver policy" would be a change in steering that drove the bus off the road. Central banks mostly adjust rates passively to accommodate changes in the economic road ahead. Occasionally they do something wild and crazy, like not adjust the interest rate to changes in the Wicksellian equilibrium rate. How do we know when that happens? The economy goes off the road. NGDP goes wildly up or down. The last good example was in 2008, when rates were cut too slowly. Another example is the 1970s, when rates were raised too slowly. When big mistakes are made, the problem is almost always "rates adjusted too slowly." (12 COMMENTS)

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02 февраля, 07:03

Keynesianism in One Photo

(Don Boudreaux) TweetA picture is worth a million words.  This one reveals, perfectly, the essence of Keynesianism.  (HT John Csekitz)

31 января, 11:06

Links for 01-31-17

Competitiveness Games - Paul Krugman Alarm Over the Fed's $4.45 Trillion Balance Sheet Is Silly - Tim Duy A Model of Secular Stagnation (NBER) - Eggertsson, Mehrotra, Robbins Winter 2017 Journal of Economic Perspectives Available Online - Tim Taylor Post...

30 января, 17:12

Post Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Theory -- by Roger E.A. Farmer

This paper explains the connection between ideas developed in my recent books and papers and those of economists who self-identify as Post Keynesians. My own work is both neoclassical and 'old Keynesian'. Much of my published work assumes that people have rational expectations and that 'animal spirits' should be modeled as a new fundamental. I adopt a general equilibrium framework to model the macroeconomy. But although I write from a neo-classical tradition the themes I explore in my published writing have much in common with heterodox economics. This paper explains the common elements between these seemingly disparate traditions. I make the case for unity between Post-Keynesian and General Equilibrium Theory under the banner of Post-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Theory.

03 сентября 2016, 06:00

Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя

2016 год ознаменовал восьмидесятилетнюю годовщину публикации одной из самых влиятельных книг по теме экономики когда-либо увидевших свет. Эта книга – “Общая теория занятости, процента и денег” Джона Мейнарда Кейнса – нанесла непоправимый экономический и политический ущерб Западному миру и другим… читать далее → Запись Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя впервые появилась .

28 ноября 2014, 11:37

Владимир Мау, Алексей Улюкаев: Глобальный кризис и тенденции экономического развития

Глобальный кризис формирует экономико-политическую повестку. Она требует переосмысления многих выводов экономической теории и практики, которые до сих пор считались общепринятыми. В статье ректор Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президента РФ и Владимир Мау и Министр экономического развития РФ Алексей Улюкаев, опубликованной в журнале "Вопросы экономики" (11/2014) анализируют ключевые вопросы экономического развития на среднесрочную перспективу. В числе важных для формирования новой модели экономического поста проблем рассматриваются: темпы роста и вероятность долгосрочной стагнации, новые вызовы макроэкономической политики в связи с широким распространением ее нерадиационных инструментов, неравенство и экономический рост, контуры нового социального государства, перспективы глобализации,а также реиндустриализация в развитых странах. В. Мау , А. Улюкаев[1] Глобальный кризис и тенденции экономического развития* Аннотация на русском, ключевые слова, коды JEL Глобальные кризисы – общее и особенное Экономическое развитие ведущих стран определяется прежде всего предпосылками и характером глобального кризиса, который начался в 2008 г. и продолжается по настоящее время. Это кризис особого рода: он не описывается одним-двумя параметрами (например, спадом производства и ростом безработицы), а является многоаспектным, охватывая разные сферы социально-экономической жизни, и, как правило, имеет серьезные социально-политические последствия. Это системный кризис, и в этом отношении он аналогичен кризисам 1930-х и 1970-х годов (Мау, 2009). Разумеется, здесь не может быть прямых аналогий. Структурные кризисы уникальны, то есть опыт, накопленный в ходе преодоления каждого из них, практически нельзя использовать в новых условиях. Тем не менее есть ряд качественных характеристик, которые позволяют относить их к одному классу, то есть эти кризисы можно сравнивать, учитывать их особенности, но не прилагать рецепты антикризисной политики, эффективные в одном случае, к другому. Можно выделить следующие черты системных кризисов. Первое. Такой кризис одновременно и циклический и структурный. Он связан с серьезными институциональными и технологическими изменениями, со сменой технологической базы (некоторые экономисты используют термин «технологические уклады»). Эти изменения выводят экономику на качественно новый уровень эффективности и производительности труда. Системное обновление технологической базы на основе новейших достижений науки и техники – важнейшее условие успешного выхода из кризиса[2]. Второе. Существенным элементом системного кризиса выступает финансовый кризис. Именно наложение последнего на собственно экономический кризис (спад производства и падение занятости) затрудняет выход из него, обусловливает необходимость проведения комплекса структурных и институциональных реформ для выхода на траекторию устойчивого роста. Третье. Неизбежным результатом кризиса выступает формирование новой модели экономического роста: она предполагает структурную модернизацию как развитых, так и развивающихся стран, что связано с созданием новых технологических драйверов. Возникновение новых отраслей и секторов реального производства, их географическое перемещение по миру определяют новую глобальную экономическую реальность и одновременно создают предпосылки для появления новых вызовов и инструментов экономической политики. Эту тенденцию хорошо отражает появившийся в 2009 г. термин «новая нормальность» – newnormal (Улюкаев, 2009). Четвертое. Отметим серьезные геополитические и геоэкономические сдвиги, формирование новых балансов сил (отдельных стран и регионов) в мировой политике. В начале кризиса можно было предположить, что он приведет к закреплению двухполярной модели, на сей раз основанной на противостоянии США и Китая, которых иногда обозначают как G2 – «большую двойку» (Brzezinski, 2009), а Н. Фергюсон назвал «Кимерикой» (Chimerica = China + America; см.: Ferguson, 2008). Однако постепенно все отчетливее проступают контуры многополярного мира, который хотя и не отрицает наличия двух-трех ключевых экономических центров, на практике означает возврат к хорошо известной по XIX в. модели «концерта стран», балансирующих интересы друг друга. С поправкой на нынешние реалии речь может идти, скорее, о балансе интересов ключевых региональных группировок. Пятое. В ходе системного кризиса происходит смена модели регулирования социально-экономических процессов. В 1930-е годы завершился переход к индустриальной стадии развития и закрепились идеология и практика «большого государства», сопровождаемого ростом налогов, бюджетных расходов, государственной собственности и планирования, а в некоторых случаях – и государственного ценообразования. Напротив, кризис 1970-х годов привел к масштабной либерализации и дерегулированию, к снижению налогов и приватизации – словом, к тому, чего требовал переход к постиндустриальной технологической фазе. В начале последнего кризиса создавалось впечатление, что мир вновь вернется к модели, основанной на доминирующей роли государства в экономике (появился даже термин «примитивное кейнсианство» – Crass-Keynesianism). Практика, впрочем, пока не подтверждает такую тенденцию. Роль государственного регулирования действительно возрастает, однако это относится преимущественно к сфере регулирования финансовых рынков на национальном и глобальном уровнях. Действительно, в настоящее время важнейшим противоречием выступает конфликт между глобальным характером финансов и национальными рамками их регулирования. Важно выработать механизм регулирования глобальных финансов в отсутствие глобального правительства. Шестое. Системный кризис ставит на повестку дня вопрос о новой мировой финансовой архитектуре. В результате кризиса 1930-х годов сформировался мир с одной резервной валютой – долларом. После 1970-х годов сложилась бивалютная система (доллар и евро). Направление эволюции валютных систем после новейшего кризиса пока не определилось. Можно предположить усиление роли юаня, а также региональных резервных валют, если значение региональных группировок в мировом балансе сил возрастет. Множественность резервных валют могла бы поддержать тенденцию к многополярности мира и способствовать росту ответственности денежных властей соответствующих стран (поскольку резервные валюты будут конкурировать между собой). Седьмое. Начнет формироваться новая экономическая доктрина, новый мейнстрим в науке (по аналогии с кейнсианством и неолиберализмом в ХХ в.). Из всего сказанного вытекают важные выводы относительно перспектив преодоления системного кризиса и соответствующих механизмов. Во-первых, системный кризис связан с масштабным интеллектуальным вызовом, требующим глубокого переосмысления его причин, механизмов развертывания и путей преодоления. Как генералы всегда готовятся к войнам прошлого,  так и политики и экономисты готовятся к прошлым кризисам. До поры до времени это срабатывает, пока приходится иметь дело с экономическим циклом, то есть с повторяющимися проблемами экономической динамики. Поэтому сначала для борьбы с системным кризисом пытаются применить методы, известные из прошлого опыта. Применительно к 1930-м годам – это стремление правительства Г. Гувера (прежде всего его министра финансов Э. Меллона) не вмешиваться в естественный ход событий, жестко балансировать бюджет и укреплять денежную систему, основанную на золотом стандарте. Как свидетельствовал опыт предшествующих 100 лет, кризисы обычно рассасывались примерно за год и никакой специальной политики для этого не требовалось. Аналогично в 1970-е годы с началом кризиса попытались задействовать традиционные для того момента методы кейнсианского регулирования (бюджетное стимулирование в условиях замедления темпов роста и даже государственный контроль за ценами в исполнении республиканской администрации Р. Никсона), но это обернулось скачком инфляции и началом стагфляционных процессов. К системным кризисам плохо применимы подходы экономической политики, выработанные в предыдущие десятилетия. Возникает слишком много новых проблем, изначально не ясны механизмы развертывания кризиса и выхода из него, его масштабы и продолжительность. В ХХ в. на преодоление системных кризисов требовалось порядка десяти лет. Именно на это обстоятельство указывал П. Волкер, когда в июле 1979 г., в разгар предыдущего системного кризиса, вступил в должность руководителя ФРС: «Мы столкнулись с трудностями, которые до сих пор еще не встречались в нашей практике. У нас больше нет эйфории…, когда мы возомнили, что знаем ответы на все вопросы, касающиеся управления экономикой». Во-вторых, системный кризис не сводится к рецессии, росту безработицы или панике вкладчиков банков. Он состоит из ряда эпизодов и волн, охватывающих отдельные секторы экономики, страны и регионы. Это предопределяет его продолжительность – примерно десятилетие, которое можно назвать турбулентным. Более того, статистические данные могут неточно или даже неадекватно отражать происходящие в экономике процессы. Сам факт технологического обновления может искажать (причем существенно) динамику производства, поскольку новые секторы сначала плохо учитываются традиционной статистикой. Проблемы создает и статистика занятости. Если в ходе циклического кризиса одним из важных показателей его преодоления выступает рост занятости, то при системном кризисе этот критерий действует лишь в конечном счете. Технологическое обновление предполагает качественно новые требования к трудовым ресурсам, то есть серьезные структурные изменения на рынке труда. Поэтому для выхода из системного кризиса характерно запаздывающее восстановление занятости, когда высокая безработица сохраняется на фоне экономического роста. Возникает своеобразный конфликт между новой экономикой и старой статистикой, и для его разрешения требуется определенное время. В-третьих, нельзя преодолеть системный кризис лишь мерами макроэкономической политики, макроэкономического регулирования при всей важности бюджетных и денежно-