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09 декабря, 00:15

Без заголовка

**Live from Tea Party Headquarters: Jonathan Chait**: _[Donald Trump Has Proven Liberals Right About the Tea Party][]_: "Conservatives insisted that what spurred protesters... were the timeless principles of conservative movement thought... [Donald Trump Has Proven Liberals Right About the Tea Party]: http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/12/donald-trump-has-proven-liberals-right-about-the-tea-party.html >...advocacy of balanced budgets, adherence to a strict...

08 декабря, 23:22

Fake News, Criminalized

Via The Daily Bell  MI6 Chief Says Fake News And Online Propaganda Are A Threat To Democracy … The chief of MI6 has said he is deeply concerned by the threat posed by rival countries attempting to undermine democracy through propaganda and cyberattacks. -Buzzfeed The next step in attacking the alternative media is to criminalize it. Right now the alternative media is under attack in Europe for “hate speech” and (potentially) terrorism. In the US, the alternative media is being accused of presenting Russian propaganda. Earlier today, this approach was taken up by British intel (see above). In the US, there are Congressional attempts underway to provide funds for law enforcement to investigate alternative news sites as supporters of Russian propaganda. But so far there have been no major statements from US federal law enforcement officials. Now, however, we have one from Britain - as the head of MI6 has spoken up. Since Western alternative media is simply an outgrowth – an expression – of discontent with the current system, those producing it cannot ultimately be seen as tools of Russian propaganda. However, alternative media is proving deeply disconcerting to the larger Western power structure. For this reason, suspicions of Russian propaganda merely provide a justification for investigation. One an investigation has been pursued, it may not stop until something – anything – is found that can be construed as criminal or at least problematic. In this way alternative media can be first criminalized and then hounded. Or so the plan goes … More: Alex Younger, aka “C”, used a rare public speech to say he was deeply concerned about the risks posed by hybrid warfare, where countries take advantage of the internet to “further their aims deniably” through “means as varied as cyberattacks, propaganda, or subversion of democratic process”. Although he did not name Russia directly, the comments come following accusations that the Kremlin has attempted to influence elections in the US and Europe using underhand tactics ranging from undeclared direct funding, to hacking emails, to spreading fake news. “Our job is to give the government the information advantage; to shine a light on these activities and to help our country and allies, in particular across Europe, build the resilience they need to protect themselves,” Younger said. “The risks at stake are profound and represent a fundamental threat to our sovereignty; they should be a concern to all those who share democratic values.” In fact, what is being planned is not going to work. It will likely make life miserable for certain reporters and others associated with the alternative media. But it is far too early for the powers-that-be to stamp out alternative journalism (and the thinking behind it) no matter how much they wish to. For one thing, alternative journalism is now representative of a larger mindset among tens and even hundreds of millions of people, especially in the West. Thus it will take at least a full generation to wipe out new perspectives and rediscovered information. Second, because the news is representative of people’s points of view (rather than vice-versa) alternative media insights and information will continue to be presented in various ways – on the  Internet as well, only not so obviously. Finally, the growing war against the alternative media will only reinforce its relevance and credibility, thus causing more people to become informed (or deepen their perceptions) about the issues presented in the so-called alternative media. There is a whole alternative culture that is offered by modern alternative media. Some of it may be leftist but the initial approach – for those who have tracked its emergence on the ‘Net – was basically libertarian and freedom-oriented. Even today this specific cultural approach informs a lot of alternative reporting. The fundamental ideas is that the market itself should make determinations regarding human interactions rather than government run by groups of people with greater or lesser competence. This approach is rooted in free-market – Austrian – economic theory which is actually accepted throughout mainstream economics. It begins with marginal utility, the idea that credible prices can only be generated by marketplace competition. But its insights are much broader. If everyone in formal academic economics including Keynesians accept the reality of marginal utility (as they do) then how can such massive governments exists, passing thousands of laws, rules and regulations – all of which are essentially price fixes? Shouldn’t human behavior be moderated by competition instead whenever possible? The same goes for central banking. It contravenes fundamental economic logic. Ask almost anyone in banking of economics (on the left or right) if they believe in marginal utility and the answer will be “yes.” Ask anyone if they believe price-fixing is effective or productive and they will answer “no.” And yet central banking is a form of price fixing and so is government. Western society exists in a bubble of cognitive dissonance. What is accepted academically is not applied in reality. And thus freedom – and libertarianism – cannot be attacked logically. Instead, false arguments will be created to damp down the alternative media. But as pointed out above, it is not going to be simple or easy to remove fundamental truths from the body politic. The last time we witnessed this kind of paradigm was after the invention of the Gutenberg press that blew open societies throughout the West and helped create the New World and then the republic of “these United States.” It took about 500 years for control of society to be re-established from the top down by certain historical groups ... and yet here we are again. The same sort of technological undermining has taken place and it won’t be easily repressed. It may not take another 450 years but it certainly won’t happen in 10 or 20. And by the time it does take place it is certainly possible that another information revolution will have come to pass. Time and history are working against authoritarianism and not with it. Depriving people of knowledge and history is a signature of repression. But in the current technological era it becomes more and more difficult. What is pending is period of chaos and difficulty. But over the next century we may see an efflorescence of the sort that took place after the Gutenberg press with the expansion of the Renaissance and the advent of the Enlightenment and the rediscovery of scientific thinking. Conclusion: Things may indeed change. But not necessarily in the way controllers imagine. Editor's Note: The Daily Bell is giving away a silver coin and a silver "white paper" to subscribers. If you enjoy DB's articles and want to stay up-to-date for free, please subscribe here.  More from The Daily Bell:  Will Rand Paul Fight Fake News With a Filibuster? ‘Populism Vs. Globalism’ – a Meme That Doesn’t Exist in Reality Elites Plot to Replace Austrian Free-Market Economics?

08 декабря, 19:02

Will the U.S. Economy Boom Over the Next Four Years?

The very sharp Ken Rogoff predicts a boom over the next four years: "The biggest missing piece... is business investment, and if it starts kicking in... output and productivity could begin to rise very sharply.... You don’t have to be a nice guy to get the economy going.... It is...

07 декабря, 19:34

Donald Trump Just Contradicted Everything Republicans Have Said About The Economy For 8 Years

In an interview with Time magazine for its Person Of The Year issue, President-elect Donald Trump said something... true? “Well sometimes you have to prime the pump,” Trump told the Time editors. “So sometimes in order to get the jobs going and the country going, because look, we’re at 1% growth.” “I was taking to the head of a major country, because most of them have called me and I’ve talked to all of them,” he went on. “[They said,] ‘Yes, we are doing not well, not well. Our GDP is only 4.5%.’ I said wow, if our GDP was 4.5% we’d be the happy ― I mean our GDP is probably less than 1% if you think about it. And going in the wrong direction.” OK, well, that last part is wrong. The United States’ real GDP grew 3.2 percent in the third quarter of this year, which was better than the 1.4 percent growth the country experienced in the second quarter. But whatever. The point is that with his talk of “priming the pump,” Trump appears to be embracing the version of Keynesian economic theory that has dominated American policymaking since World War II. The idea is pretty simple: When the economy gets into a rut, the government can get it out by spending money. Hiring workers to fix bridges and paint schoolhouses puts money in their pockets, which they can, in turn, go out and spend on other goods. Retailers can thus afford to employ workers to sell those goods, who in turn can spend their pay on other things, and off we go. The economy grows. Republicans have made a show of rejecting this idea since President Barack Obama took office in 2009. House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and others have insisted that government spending is economic poison, and that a responsible government can somehow cut its way to growth. This is what much of Europe has been trying to do since the financial crisis, with lousy economic (and political) results.  Trump has talked like a Keynesian before. During the campaign, he vowed to implement a $550 billion infrastructure project, and basically said he would borrow money to pay for it. That’s what Obama did with his 2009 stimulus package, but Republicans voted against it, denounced it and insisted the country was headed for a “debt crisis” that never actually materialized.  Conservatives condemn big budget deficits and government spending when Democrats are in power, but they tend to govern as militarist Keynesians, slashing taxes and spending big on defense. “Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter,” Vice President Dick Cheney once said, while pursuing exactly those policies, which Ryan voted for. Maybe conservatives actually believe their rhetoric this time and we’ll have a government of Republicans divided against themselves that can’t pass legislation. Or maybe not. Things are crazy right now. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

07 декабря, 19:34

Donald Trump Just Contradicted Everything Republicans Have Said About The Economy For 8 Years

In an interview with Time magazine for its Person Of The Year issue, President-elect Donald Trump said something... true? “Well sometimes you have to prime the pump,” Trump told the Time editors. “So sometimes in order to get the jobs going and the country going, because look, we’re at 1% growth.” “I was taking to the head of a major country, because most of them have called me and I’ve talked to all of them,” he went on. “[They said,] ‘Yes, we are doing not well, not well. Our GDP is only 4.5%.’ I said wow, if our GDP was 4.5% we’d be the happy ― I mean our GDP is probably less than 1% if you think about it. And going in the wrong direction.” OK, well, that last part is wrong. The United States’ real GDP grew 3.2 percent in the third quarter of this year, which was better than the 1.4 percent growth the country experienced in the second quarter. But whatever. The point is that with his talk of “priming the pump,” Trump appears to be embracing the version of Keynesian economic theory that has dominated American policymaking since World War II. The idea is pretty simple: When the economy gets into a rut, the government can get it out by spending money. Hiring workers to fix bridges and paint schoolhouses puts money in their pockets, which they can, in turn, go out and spend on other goods. Retailers can thus afford to employ workers to sell those goods, who in turn can spend their pay on other things, and off we go. The economy grows. Republicans have made a show of rejecting this idea since President Barack Obama took office in 2009. House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and others have insisted that government spending is economic poison, and that a responsible government can somehow cut its way to growth. This is what much of Europe has been trying to do since the financial crisis, with lousy economic (and political) results.  Trump has talked like a Keynesian before. During the campaign, he vowed to implement a $550 billion infrastructure project, and basically said he would borrow money to pay for it. That’s what Obama did with his 2009 stimulus package, but Republicans voted against it, denounced it and insisted the country was headed for a “debt crisis” that never actually materialized.  Conservatives condemn big budget deficits and government spending when Democrats are in power, but they tend to govern as militarist Keynesians, slashing taxes and spending big on defense. “Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter,” Vice President Dick Cheney once said, while pursuing exactly those policies, which Ryan voted for. Maybe conservatives actually believe their rhetoric this time and we’ll have a government of Republicans divided against themselves that can’t pass legislation. Or maybe not. Things are crazy right now. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

07 декабря, 19:09

Automation destroyed 20 million manufacturing jobs, by Scott Sumner

I am becoming increasingly frustrated by all the articles I'm reading about how trade is supposedly decimating jobs in US manufacturing. I went to the FRED data set, and they have manufacturing output (real) going back to the first quarter of 1987. So let's start there. Their series shows total manufacturing output rising from 69.789 in 1987 to 129.129 in the most recent quarter. That's an 85% gain. At the same time, manufacturing employment has fallen, from 17.499 million to 12.275 million. This represents a decline from 17.3% of total employment to only 8.5% of total employment. That's the figure that has people so upset. But the cause is not trade; it's automation. What people forget is that an increase in imports tend to cause an increase in exports. It's true that imports may currently exceed exports, but that gap is not caused by trade, it reflects saving/investment imbalances. But let's say I'm wrong. Let's say trade does cause the current account deficit. In that case, how many jobs have been lost to trade since 1987? Zero. Not because the CA deficit is zero; it's 2.26% of GDP in the most recent quarter. However in the first quarter of 1987 it was 3.19% of GDP. So the trade deficit has shrunk over that period. If you really believed that trade deficits caused unemployment (I don't) you'd be forced to conclude that, in net terms, trade has added jobs to US manufacturing since 1987. After all, the deficit has gotten smaller. When people say they are upset about trade, I think that what really bothers them is that automation is allowing us to produce 85% more manufactured goods with far fewer workers. That transition has been painful for many workers, but it's not about trade---except in one respect. Trade allows the US to concentrate in industries where we have a comparative advantage (aircraft, chemicals, agricultural products, high tech goods, movies, pharmaceuticals, coal, etc.) We then import cars, toys, sneakers, TVs, clothing, furniture and lots of other goods. It's likely that our productivity is higher in the industries where we export as compared to the industries where we import. So in that sense, trade may be speeding up the pace by which automation costs jobs. But probably only slightly; in previous posts I've shown that even within a given industry, such as steel, the job loss is overwhelmingly about automation, not trade. Why do so may people blame trade? Cognitive illusions. It seems like imports would reduce aggregate demand, and that this would reduce employment. Those effects are highly visible. It's human nature to demonize foreigners. But even Paul Krugman rejects that argument, at least when we are not at the zero bound. The Fed would simply offset any reduction to AD due to trade. Even if you thought it was depressing output during the recent recession, the effect would have gone away once we exited the zero bound. But the jobs are still not there in manufacturing. The bottom line is that to the extent trade is a problem, it has nothing to do with aggregate demand. The real problem is frictional unemployment, the difficulty of transitioning from dying industries to growing industries. Business Insider has an excellent article discussing a recent interview with Carrier (United Technologies) CEO Greg Hayes, by Jim Cramer: The result of keeping the plant in Indiana open is a $16 million investment to drive down the cost of production, so as to reduce the cost gap with operating in Mexico. What does that mean? Automation. What does that mean? Fewer jobs, Hayes acknowledged. From the transcript (emphasis added): GREG HAYES: Right. Well, and again, if you think about what we talked about last week, we're going to make a $16 million investment in that factory in Indianapolis to automate to drive the cost down so that we can continue to be competitive. Now is it as cheap as moving to Mexico with lower cost of labor? No. But we will make that plant competitive just because we'll make the capital investments there. JIM CRAMER: Right. GREG HAYES: But what that ultimately means is there will be fewer jobs. The general theme here is something we've been writing about a lot at Business Insider. Yes, low-skilled jobs are being lost to other countries, but they're also being lost to technology. Everyone from liberal, Nobel-winning economist Paul Krugman to Republican Sen. Ben Sasse has noted that technological developments are a bigger threat to American workers than trade. Viktor Shvets, a strategist at Macquarie, has called it the "third industrial revolution." One by one we are repeating all the mistakes of the Great Depression. We are falling prey to fallacies that were adopted in the 1930s, but rejected by the 1990s. Now they are all coming back: 1. The belief that financial crisis caused the Great Depression (rather than vice versa). 2. The view that the Fed was out of ammo. 3. The view that interest rates measure the stance of monetary policy. 4. The view that exchange rate depreciation is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. 5. The view that fiscal stimulus is needed in recessions. 6. The view that a higher minimum wage could boost the economy. 7. The view that mercantilist policies are justified. I spent much of my life studying the intellectual climate during the 1930s, including reading all of the New York Times from 1929-38. I can't tell you how depressing it is to see today's intellectual climate reverting back to the vulgar Keynesianism of the 1930s. To see us making all of the same mistakes. But opposition to free trade might be the worst of all, as it's based on pure innumeracy. That's why even Keynesians like Krugman don't buy the argument. Unfortunately, the innumerates are probably in the majority. PS. About the title of the post. The US did not even have 20 million manufacturing jobs in 1987. So how could we lose that many? I derived this figure by first assuming that our current manufacturing output was produced with the same level of productivity as in 1987---in which case employment would have risen by 85%. That would have required an extra 15 million workers. Then I noted that actual manufacturing employment has fallen by 5 million. The gap is 20 million. Is that a ridiculous comparison? Of course it is. But so are all the estimates of jobs lost from trade. So what's all this really about? Perhaps the "feminization" of America. When farm work was wiped out by automation, uneducated farmers generally found factory jobs in the city. Now factory workers are being asked to transition to service sector jobs that have been traditionally seen as "women's work". Even worse, the culture is pushing back against a lot of traditionally masculine character traits (especially on campuses). The alt-right is overtly anti-feminist, and Trump ran a consciously macho themed campaign. This all may seem to be about trade, but it's actually about automation and low-skilled men who feel emasculated. (22 COMMENTS)

01 декабря, 08:45

What are the sources of demand-side secular stagnation?

In 2015, US output per capita was 12.5% below its 1950–2007 trend. This paper uses an estimated New Keynesian model to decompose the sources of this gap. The model features demographic trends, real and monetary shocks, and the occasionally binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. I calibrate demographic trends to observed mortality and […] The post What are the sources of demand-side secular stagnation? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

30 ноября, 01:19

Robert Reich Previews A New Era Of Savage Inequality Under Donald Trump

This story originally appeared in Capital & Main. Sign up for email alerts from Capital & Main. Last fall, Robert Reich published Saving Capitalism, in which he called for a sweeping realignment of political power to counter the excesses of contemporary capitalism. A realignment has followed, but not the kind Reich had in mind. While most observers don’t expect Donald Trump’s stunning election to lead to greater shared prosperity, there’s little question that rampant economic inequality was critical to his success. It’s hard to imagine Trump’s ascent without the dramatic hollowing out of the American middle class over the past several decades. Capital & Main spoke by phone with the former labor secretary about how the Trump years will affect inequality and the working class voters who were so instrumental in the business mogul’s rise to political power. About This Series Capital & Main: What will happen to economic inequality under Donald Trump? Robert Reich: It will worsen for a number of reasons. First, Trump and the Republican Congress will pass a huge tax cut for the very wealthy, larger than the Reagan or George W. Bush tax cuts. That would mean large deficits. Those deficits will require, at some point, cuts in public spending. Second, Trump and [House Speaker] Paul Ryan are already talking about privatizing Medicare and rolling back or eliminating the Affordable Care Act. Trump says he wants to maintain the portion of the Affordable Care Act that requires insurers to provide insurance to people with preexisting conditions, but there’s no requirement that insurers charge an affordable rate to people with preexisting conditions. My fear is that they won’t. On paper, they will be complying with the letter of the law in terms of what Trump says he wants, but, in reality, people with preexisting conditions will pay enormous premiums, giant copayments and deductibles. Third, I have every reason to believe that the person Donald Trump names to the Supreme Court will be a right-wing conservative who has no interest in reversing Citizens United — in fact, if anything will probably eviscerate what remains of campaign finance limits and may do terrible damage to low-income and poor people through a variety of decisions. What was the most decisive factor that explains why millions of Americans voted against their own economic self-interest — again? The resentment [against] the ruling class has been building for 30 years, and that resentment is based on two related things. First, the majority of Americans have been on a downward escalator for 30 years. Second, Republicans have for years stoked the fires of racism, and they did it long before the middle class began to shrink and the working class began losing good jobs, but the crisis of the American working class added to the potency of Republican race-baiting. Obviously, that applies not just to African Americans but to Muslims and Latinos. It was that poisonous combination of economic stress and appeals to racism, all wrapped up in a kind of right-wing populist garb, that won it for the Republicans. Hillary Clinton did not provide a convincing message of what she was going to do to turn the economy around for most people, and she seemed to be the embodiment of the ruling class. Will the white working-class voters who were crucial to Trump’s victory see any real economic benefits from his administration? No. They may see some initial Keynesian benefit from a big infrastructure project if that’s, in fact, what Trump manages to do, combined with an increase in military spending and a tax cut. That all will stimulate the economy much the same way Ronald Reagan’s military Keynesianism stimulated the economy in the 1980s, but it will be short term. It won’t change, fundamentally, anything and the white working class, along with the poor and the lower middle class — white, black and Latino — will continue to be on the downward escalator they have been on, but it will be worse. What do you think a clearly weakened American labor movement can do at this moment to oppose a conservative free-market economic agenda? I still think it’s a great time for the labor movement, particularly with regard to the large retail chains, hospitals, restaurant chains, hotel chains. A very substantial group of low-paid, mostly women, and significantly black and Latino workers, need a voice. They don’t have to compete with foreign low-wage workers and could really gain ground if they united. This is exactly the right time. I think organized labor might be moved to put some pressure on Congress to make sure that the infrastructure plan that Trump has advised is large enough, respects labor laws, such as Davis-Bacon, really does have the multiplier effect on jobs that it should have. Finally, I think that labor has some new ground to stand on in terms of such things as trade policy where there’s lot of room to shape new consensus around trade that’s not just protectionist but enables working people who lose their jobs for whatever reason to move to a new job that pays as much as the job they lost. Would you counsel progressives, liberals, Democrats to join with Trump in trying to repeal or alter trade agreements or to pass a major infrastructure spending bill, both of which have been major progressive priorities? Look, I wouldn’t urge anybody to team up with Trump. I think he’s unreliable and rather awful in every way. But mainstream Republicans are not going to want to do a huge infrastructure spending program. They’re not going to want to modify or reduce the effects of free trade on average working people. If Trump provides an opening, then I’d say let’s use that opening. It doesn’t mean necessarily siding with him, because I honestly don’t believe that Trump stands for anything. I don’t think he is going to take on the Republicans in Congress. I think when all is said and done, he’s going to do exactly what they want, because he wants to score victory. He doesn’t care about what kind of victories, he just wants to be able to show that he has a lot of wins. How important is California to the advancement of progressive ideas in this time? Enormously important. It has huge influence, even if Washington weren’t becoming an occupied city. California really is the largest and most important progressive beacon left in the United States. Washington and Oregon are close, physically and figuratively. My daydreams are the three states getting together and coordinating environmental policy, a minimum wage, labor policy, even perhaps a single-payer healthcare plan. I think that people are going to look to California for leadership in all these areas. What are the one or two most important things that those concerned with economic inequality, racial inequality and climate change can do right now? I think it’s more of an attitude than specific actions, because we don’t know what Trump is going to do first, how the Republican Congress is going to behave. But I think the attitude has got to be engaged in a much more active way than most progressives have been up till now. Many people are quite generous with their money, in terms of progressive causes. Some provide some time, but I don’t think there’s any choice any longer. I think people have to be willing to participate actively in a manner they haven’t been called upon before. I use the phrase “peaceful army of resistance,” and I do think it’s partly that at every level. I think that turning our cities into sanctuary cities and uniting against the kind of brutality we might end up seeing in the coming years with regard to undocumented workers is an important step. Keeping progressive ideas boiling at least at the state and local level. Getting rid of the electoral college. Eliminating the kind of voter suppression we’ve seen. Being a force for democracy, in a very practical sense. There’s much to be done. It’s hard to find any silver linings in this dark storm cloud, but if there is one, it has to do with us being awakened to the emergency we face. Not normalizing what we’re about to experience. Not telling ourselves, “Oh, this is just another president, another administration, maybe more right-wing than before, but we’ve gotten through these kinds of things.” I don’t think that’s the right attitude. I think that there’s nothing normal about what we’re about to experience. We’ve got to be peaceful warriors. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

30 ноября, 01:19

Robert Reich Previews A New Era Of Savage Inequality Under Donald Trump

This story originally appeared in Capital & Main. Sign up for email alerts from Capital & Main. Last fall, Robert Reich published Saving Capitalism, in which he called for a sweeping realignment of political power to counter the excesses of contemporary capitalism. A realignment has followed, but not the kind Reich had in mind. While most observers don’t expect Donald Trump’s stunning election to lead to greater shared prosperity, there’s little question that rampant economic inequality was critical to his success. It’s hard to imagine Trump’s ascent without the dramatic hollowing out of the American middle class over the past several decades. Capital & Main spoke by phone with the former labor secretary about how the Trump years will affect inequality and the working class voters who were so instrumental in the business mogul’s rise to political power. About This Series Capital & Main: What will happen to economic inequality under Donald Trump? Robert Reich: It will worsen for a number of reasons. First, Trump and the Republican Congress will pass a huge tax cut for the very wealthy, larger than the Reagan or George W. Bush tax cuts. That would mean large deficits. Those deficits will require, at some point, cuts in public spending. Second, Trump and [House Speaker] Paul Ryan are already talking about privatizing Medicare and rolling back or eliminating the Affordable Care Act. Trump says he wants to maintain the portion of the Affordable Care Act that requires insurers to provide insurance to people with preexisting conditions, but there’s no requirement that insurers charge an affordable rate to people with preexisting conditions. My fear is that they won’t. On paper, they will be complying with the letter of the law in terms of what Trump says he wants, but, in reality, people with preexisting conditions will pay enormous premiums, giant copayments and deductibles. Third, I have every reason to believe that the person Donald Trump names to the Supreme Court will be a right-wing conservative who has no interest in reversing Citizens United — in fact, if anything will probably eviscerate what remains of campaign finance limits and may do terrible damage to low-income and poor people through a variety of decisions. What was the most decisive factor that explains why millions of Americans voted against their own economic self-interest — again? The resentment [against] the ruling class has been building for 30 years, and that resentment is based on two related things. First, the majority of Americans have been on a downward escalator for 30 years. Second, Republicans have for years stoked the fires of racism, and they did it long before the middle class began to shrink and the working class began losing good jobs, but the crisis of the American working class added to the potency of Republican race-baiting. Obviously, that applies not just to African Americans but to Muslims and Latinos. It was that poisonous combination of economic stress and appeals to racism, all wrapped up in a kind of right-wing populist garb, that won it for the Republicans. Hillary Clinton did not provide a convincing message of what she was going to do to turn the economy around for most people, and she seemed to be the embodiment of the ruling class. Will the white working-class voters who were crucial to Trump’s victory see any real economic benefits from his administration? No. They may see some initial Keynesian benefit from a big infrastructure project if that’s, in fact, what Trump manages to do, combined with an increase in military spending and a tax cut. That all will stimulate the economy much the same way Ronald Reagan’s military Keynesianism stimulated the economy in the 1980s, but it will be short term. It won’t change, fundamentally, anything and the white working class, along with the poor and the lower middle class — white, black and Latino — will continue to be on the downward escalator they have been on, but it will be worse. What do you think a clearly weakened American labor movement can do at this moment to oppose a conservative free-market economic agenda? I still think it’s a great time for the labor movement, particularly with regard to the large retail chains, hospitals, restaurant chains, hotel chains. A very substantial group of low-paid, mostly women, and significantly black and Latino workers, need a voice. They don’t have to compete with foreign low-wage workers and could really gain ground if they united. This is exactly the right time. I think organized labor might be moved to put some pressure on Congress to make sure that the infrastructure plan that Trump has advised is large enough, respects labor laws, such as Davis-Bacon, really does have the multiplier effect on jobs that it should have. Finally, I think that labor has some new ground to stand on in terms of such things as trade policy where there’s lot of room to shape new consensus around trade that’s not just protectionist but enables working people who lose their jobs for whatever reason to move to a new job that pays as much as the job they lost. Would you counsel progressives, liberals, Democrats to join with Trump in trying to repeal or alter trade agreements or to pass a major infrastructure spending bill, both of which have been major progressive priorities? Look, I wouldn’t urge anybody to team up with Trump. I think he’s unreliable and rather awful in every way. But mainstream Republicans are not going to want to do a huge infrastructure spending program. They’re not going to want to modify or reduce the effects of free trade on average working people. If Trump provides an opening, then I’d say let’s use that opening. It doesn’t mean necessarily siding with him, because I honestly don’t believe that Trump stands for anything. I don’t think he is going to take on the Republicans in Congress. I think when all is said and done, he’s going to do exactly what they want, because he wants to score victory. He doesn’t care about what kind of victories, he just wants to be able to show that he has a lot of wins. How important is California to the advancement of progressive ideas in this time? Enormously important. It has huge influence, even if Washington weren’t becoming an occupied city. California really is the largest and most important progressive beacon left in the United States. Washington and Oregon are close, physically and figuratively. My daydreams are the three states getting together and coordinating environmental policy, a minimum wage, labor policy, even perhaps a single-payer healthcare plan. I think that people are going to look to California for leadership in all these areas. What are the one or two most important things that those concerned with economic inequality, racial inequality and climate change can do right now? I think it’s more of an attitude than specific actions, because we don’t know what Trump is going to do first, how the Republican Congress is going to behave. But I think the attitude has got to be engaged in a much more active way than most progressives have been up till now. Many people are quite generous with their money, in terms of progressive causes. Some provide some time, but I don’t think there’s any choice any longer. I think people have to be willing to participate actively in a manner they haven’t been called upon before. I use the phrase “peaceful army of resistance,” and I do think it’s partly that at every level. I think that turning our cities into sanctuary cities and uniting against the kind of brutality we might end up seeing in the coming years with regard to undocumented workers is an important step. Keeping progressive ideas boiling at least at the state and local level. Getting rid of the electoral college. Eliminating the kind of voter suppression we’ve seen. Being a force for democracy, in a very practical sense. There’s much to be done. It’s hard to find any silver linings in this dark storm cloud, but if there is one, it has to do with us being awakened to the emergency we face. Not normalizing what we’re about to experience. Not telling ourselves, “Oh, this is just another president, another administration, maybe more right-wing than before, but we’ve gotten through these kinds of things.” I don’t think that’s the right attitude. I think that there’s nothing normal about what we’re about to experience. We’ve got to be peaceful warriors. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

29 ноября, 11:06

Links for 11-29-16

Federal Reserve economic projections: What are they good for? - Ben Bernanke Missing the Economic Big Picture - J. Bradford DeLong Ending Too Big to Fail - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz China’s Dual Equilibria - Brad Setser The Benefits of Mandatory...

28 ноября, 17:14

A Shadow Rate New Keynesian Model -- by Jing Cynthia Wu, Ji Zhang

We propose a New Keynesian model with the shadow rate, which is the federal funds rate during normal times. At the zero lower bound, we establish empirically the negative shadow rate summarizes unconventional monetary policy with its resemblance to private interest rates, the Fed's balance sheet, and Taylor rule. Theoretically, we formalize our shadow rate New Keynesian model with QE and lending facilities. Our model generates data-consistent results: a negative supply shock is always contractionary. It also salvages the New Keynesian model from the zero lower bound induced structural break.

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27 ноября, 19:47

P3: Impact of Keynes

from Asad Zaman This 1000 word article is the third in a series of posts on Re-Reading Keynes. It traces the impact of Keynesian theories on the 20th century, as necessary background knowledge for a contextual and historically situated study of Keynes. It was published in Express Tribune on 4 Nov 2016. The Global Financial […]

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25 ноября, 14:51

P3: Impact of Keynes

from Asad Zaman This 1000 word article is the third in a series of posts on Re-Reading Keynes. It traces the impact of Keynesian theories on the 20th century, as necessary background knowledge for a contextual and historically situated study of Keynes. It was published in Express Tribune on 4 Nov 2016. The Global Financial […]

22 ноября, 14:09

Some Links

(Don Boudreaux) TweetHere’s some useful myth-busting about health-care from John Graham.  A slice: As I’ve previously written, I agree utterly with the Commonwealth Fund scholars that health care in the United States is delivered inefficiently and over bureaucratized. Nevertheless, the suggestion that U.S. health care is the worst overall is not consistent with the data. Adam Ozimek […]

22 ноября, 00:50

Trump’s Misguided Flirtation with Keynesianism

We liberals would love big infrastructure investments—and they’re badly needed—but he’s going about it the wrong way.

21 ноября, 22:58

Brexit and Trump in the Age of Democratic Rage

By Gael Sirello and Olivier Sirello, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris "The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born; now is the time of monsters" (Antonio Gramsci) The year 2016 comes as a major historical turning point since the end of the Cold War. After a short-lived period of liberal optimism reaching its peak with the spread of democracy in many post-communist countries, it has taken less than twenty-five years to see how this dream was going to disappear. On the one hand, global terrorism shed light on the porosity of national borders and the effectiveness of states to protect their citizens. On the other hand, the financial crisis in 2008 showed that the global neoliberal economy comes at the expenses of social welfare and, as such, may pave the way for popular unrest. Today, we can clearly see how far these events have contributed to spread the seeds of disorder and discontent in many Western societies. These are the seeds of anxiety, injustice and inequality that are today fueling many populist movements and opening the doors of a new age, that of globalization of rage, as Pankaj Mishra has put it. Brexit and, more recently, the election of Trump seem to open indeed the doors of this new age. Brexit and Trump are not independent and uncorrelated events. They are the product of the same ideological matrix; they emerge from the same sentiment of rage that is propagating quickly all over the Western world. As such, Brexit and Trump are not anomalies in the political landscape, nor are outliers that nobody could and would expect. Quite the opposite, they constitute the surface of some social and economic dynamics that scholars have been trying to disentangle for the last decades. Two bubbles of unrealism: "globalized" elites v. "backward-looking" populists In our view, both elections express a profound popular discontent against a world supposedly governed by elites whose policies are mainly perceived to be too far from reality. As Latour notes, two separate and independent "bubbles of unrealism" are emerging out of these electoral results. On the one hand, there are those who strongly believe in globalization and are getting the most out of it. The "globalized" (globalisés in French), as Latour calls them, belong to upper-middle classes and have strong educational backgrounds. On the other hand, there is a wide majority of people - usually with lower academic achievements - that associates globalization with lower wages and more competition in the labor market. This second bubble, which Latour labels "backward-looking" (trans. passéistés), is populated essentially by the supporters of both Trump and Brexit. These are those who feel themselves excluded from the promises of globalization and they seek a radical change in the system by resetting the machine back to a mythic "golden time" of economic prosperity. What is most striking in Latour's analysis, though, is that these two bubbles constitute two separate but parallel universes, expressing radical - if not opposite - visions of the society, the former defending the status-quo, and the latter advocating a radical change. Unavoidably, this situation gives rise to some kinds of "social frustrations" that reverberate in the electoral results under the guises of a massive support for populist movements to reject the establishment. Rising inequalities, the fuel of populisms and extremism As relevant as the rejection of the establishment, Brexit and Trump are the pure political consequences of the dramatic rise of inequalities. The day after Brexit, Harris considered in The Guardian that the vote "In" and "Out" was explained by economic factors: "if you've got money, you vote in [...] if you haven't got, you vote out". Although simplistically, the same reasoning may apply for the Trump vote as well. In this regard, Piketty points out that "the victory of Trump must be explained because of the explosion of social and geographic inequalities in the United States, as well as the incapacity of the governments to tackle them". In this sense, both votes express the willingness to halt a deafening status quo and to pursue deep social policies instead. As such, they are the expression of the latent dissatisfaction with liberalization and deregulation, which are perceived as bringing more benefits to the "privileged few" than to those who are worse-offs. Democracy at stake, the concept of the "lesser evil" voting challenged Last but not least, these two electoral results seem to be the product of what we may call "the democratic rage". Extensive academic research builds on the medium voter theorem to investigate the trends and the outcomes of elections. To put it simply, median preferences are expected to get more votes than extreme choices. Following this logic, in the case of elections where voters have to choose between extreme and median proposals, they will be likely to drop the former and favor the latter. However, Brexit and Trump seem to bring fresh challenges to this way of rationalizing electoral contests. In these two cases, voters have preferred the outcomes that lie the further off from the median alternative, precisely because they lied at the extreme poles. In other words, people rejected the idea to vote for the lesser evil alternative, in the hope of bringing drastic and radical change. This may challenge the current idea that we have of democracy for at least two main reasons: challenging "the lesser evil" argument not only may lead to a political race to the bottom but, as History shows, it also may constitute a fertile ground for planting the seeds of anti-democratic regimes. However, we should not overestimate this trend. The latest polls on the French center-right convention seem to suggest on the contrary that voters are willing to vote "the lesser evil" candidate in an attempt to block a potential victory of the National Front in 2017. According to these estimations, an increasing proportion of French left voters would be willing to back the most moderate candidates of the main center-right party (Les Républicains), precisely because they think that she or he will be able to counter the rise of the extreme right party. What's next? Challenges and perspectives ahead In this context, we Europeans should learn some lessons on these three sides, before new Brexits and Trumps take place in our immediate political future. Countering social inequalities will require a profound change in the way economic policies are oriented, both at the domestic and European levels. As Meyer et al. underline "the EU today is no longer synonymous with growing prosperity, rising incomes and greater security [...]: planning for the future has become [more difficult for] more and more Europeans". Increasingly, people are not safe from the most common social risks, social security having been sacrificed on the altar of an excessive and arguably ideological austerity. Also because of factors that fall outside European politics, rich are becoming richer, and poor poorer. An increasing percentage of Europeans cannot even sustain housing costs. Fueling the most dangerous populisms, the European leaders' inertia against these dramatic circumstances is unsurprisingly leading to the disruption of the very European ideal. A deep change would require the adoption of new social policies that address the core of the issue, and not merely some of its manifestations. At the domestic level, it will require profound reforms of the tax systems - that should be revisited in light of globalization -, an enhanced regulation of financial activities and transactions, and a move towards efficient public spending. Particularly, in a period of zero lower bound, fiscal responsibility must be combined with a more Keynesian view of public finances. At the European level, the commitment for the creation of a common unemployment insurance, common minimum wage and labor mobility schemes must be unquestionable and irreproachable. From this stance, a new European plan for social expenditure can become a very powerful antidote to the political and social crisis. Finally, we should acknowledge that a normative overhaul of politics is required to revive the very concept of democracy in Europe, at the domestic and supranational levels. By taking the erosion of democratic faith in an increasing number of European countries seriously, we would realize how crucial the consolidation of trust between the citizens and their elites is, as well as the need to adapt the notion of democracy to new forms of participation and civic involvement. In our view, this can be achieved only in the longue durée and through policies that, among others, aim at handling properly the major issues we underlined above. But even more crucially, politics, which is reflected and exerted in democracy, shall be taking clear and forward-looking normative stances. This will require to overcome the common view of politics as guided by mere short-term electoral purposes and, specifically to the European supranational level, a new institutional design allowing more room for participative and inclusive actions. For instance, European democracy may be improved by creating new direct accountability systems between the Commission and EU citizens. A direct election of the Commission might be one step in that direction, although it may be not enough. Deep changes are needed crucially to counter the so-called globalization of rage, which Brexit and the election of Donald J. Trump exemplify brilliantly. In this context, weakened by rising populisms and poisoned by uncontrollable nationalistic interests, the future of the European Union is, for sure, at a cross-road. We argue here that addressing rampant inequalities and redefining Politics as a forward-looking normative exercise will be required for securing its very short-term survival. -- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

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21 ноября, 15:47

10 Monday AM Reads

Back to a short week with our gluten-free morning train reads: • Inside a Moneymaking Machine Like No Other: Medallion quant fund at Renaissance Technologies is the blackest box in all of finance (Bloomberg) • How to Get Better Prices on Amazon Automatically (Medium) • Sustainable Sources of Competitive Advantage (Collaborative Fund) • Even Trump Is a Keynesian (Bloomberg… Read More The post 10 Monday AM Reads appeared first on The Big Picture.

20 ноября, 17:20

Без заголовка

**Should-Read:** There is, as of yet, no Trump fiscal policy plan. There is only a plan to have a plan to have a plan. On the tax side, getting good policy looks hopeless: another big tax cut for the super-rich and the rich, sold to outsiders as something that will...

18 ноября, 17:55

Janet Yellen confirms much of what I've been saying about fiscal stimulus, by Scott Sumner

I've been frequently arguing that fiscal stimulus makes no sense, especially at a time when the unemployment rate is 4.9% and the Fed is raising interest rates. Any impact on aggregate demand will be offset by tighter monetary policy. In contrast, prior to 2007, no one (AFAIK) was suggesting that infrastructure spending is a sensible countercyclical tool when unemployment is 4.9%. And if someone did recommend it, they almost certainly recommended LOWER than usual spending at 4.9% unemployment. Now Janet Yellen is saying much the same thing; now's not the time for fiscal stimulus: President-elect Donald Trump has pledged a $1 trillion infrastructure spending program to help jump-start an economy that he said during the campaign was in terrible shape. Speaking on Capitol Hill Thursday, Federal Reserve Board Chair Janet Yellen warned lawmakers that as they consider such spending, they should keep an eye on the national debt. Yellen also said that while the economy needed a big boost with fiscal stimulus after the financial crisis, that's not the case now. "The economy is operating relatively close to full employment at this point," she said, "so in contrast to where the economy was after the financial crisis when a large demand boost was needed to lower unemployment, we're no longer in that state." In my recent Lake Wobegon post I pointed out that fiscal policy can't always be above average. Thus if you do fiscal stimulus when unemployment is relatively low, then in the next recession fiscal policy will have to be tighter than otherwise: The key point to understand about fiscal stimulus is that more fiscal stimulus today implies less fiscal stimulus during the next recession. That's because the expansionary impact of fiscal stimulus (in the Keynesian model) occurs because the full employment budget deficit gets larger than before, not because it is large in absolute value. For the moment, let's assume that the full employment deficit during the next recession is $X. In that case, the larger the fiscal stimulus between now and the onset of the next recession, the smaller the increase in the deficit during the next recession, and thus the smaller the fiscal stimulus during the next recession. And now Janet Yellen is saying the same thing: Yellen cautioned lawmakers that if they spend a lot on infrastructure and run up the debt, and then down the road the economy gets into trouble, "there is not a lot of fiscal space should a shock to the economy occur, an adverse shock, that should require fiscal stimulus." In other words, lawmakers should consider keeping their powder dry so they have more options whenever the next economic downturn comes along. For weeks and months we've been bombarded with nonstop commentary from media "pundits" about how monetary policy is out of ammo, and fiscal stimulus is the shiny new thing that everyone favors. I've been standing in the middle of the road yelling, "stop". My opponents claimed that the Fed does not agree with me. So how does it feel to achieve a dramatic come from behind fourth quarter victory? Pretty darn good! (16 COMMENTS)

17 ноября, 17:30

Trump, Krugman and the long run, by Alberto Mingardi

From what we are reading in the papers, it would appear Donald Trump is relying mainly on seasoned Republican apparatchiks: people that may be liked or disliked, but not considered amateurish newcomers to the Washington scene. Some people, however, are arguing that the Trump's election will have resonance no matter what the new President actually does - just because he won. I think there is more than a grain of truth in there. Though the Trump platform isn't necessarily on par with, say, Marine Le Pen's in France, and though Brexit may well be considered more of a "British" thing than another popular insurgencies against the establishment, all these things have been boxed together by mainstream media as "populism." Therefore, in this narrative, "populists" have won the biggest prize of them all, the White House. Paul Krugman wrote a piece claiming that Trump is not going to do much damage to the U.S. economy in the short term, but is likely to have very problematic consequences for the American society in the long run. The piece is a masterful exercise in the sort of rhetoric a successful populariser of ideas ought to command. Krugman writes not so much to send a message to a wider and politically neutral readership--that perhaps doesn't even exist--but to reassure his crowd in the wake of the Trump shock. He manages to tell his readers that (a) the world won't blow up because Donald Trump became President, and he has now told you so and (b) well, if Trumponomics works, it will be because it aims to "stimulate" the economy (even though, of course, stimulus for the rich, of the Trumpian sort, is inferior to the Keynesian/Krugmanian sort). So, if the danger isn't imminent, where, according to Krugman, is it lurking? In the long term, the Nobel laureate predicts "a major degradation in both the quality and the independence of public servants," which should imply "the dismantling of financial reform" and a new financial crisis that will hurt the American working class.  In short, kleptocracy will lead to disaster. The missing link, perhaps, is that the policies Krugman likes (infrastructural stimulus, for example) are the lever to buy the consensus needed to accomplish those actions he fears (the occupation of government and the civil service by an uncouth bunch of barbarians). Trump's election has brought Krugman to write a piece that emphasises how people in government are self-interested too, something that many tend to forget selectively, depending on the party in government. Krugman's emphasis on the fact "in the longer run Trumpism will be a very bad thing for the economy," no matter how well the stock market performs in the next few months, made me recall this 2015 piece in which Krugman chastised the "narrow-minded, irresponsible obsession with long-run problems." Of course, there Krugman was denouncing those who don't take sides against austerity, basically because he thinks it imposed such dreadful economic evils in the short run that they offset any vague long-term benefit.  "In today's economic and political environment, long-termism is a cop-out, a dodge, a way to avoid sticking your neck out."  Well, I suppose a Trump presidency may have also positive, unintended consequences. I bet a fair number of Trump protesters have campaigned against free trade in the past: will the victory of Trump perhaps let them understand how much the dream of a cosmopolitan, tolerant, open society is intertwined with free trade? It's good that in this instance Paul Krugman is shedding light on the possible, long-term consequences of public policies. The obvious next step is start considering the long-term consequences of policies he likes, and not only those of people he dislikes. (6 COMMENTS)

03 сентября, 06:00

Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя

2016 год ознаменовал восьмидесятилетнюю годовщину публикации одной из самых влиятельных книг по теме экономики когда-либо увидевших свет. Эта книга – “Общая теория занятости, процента и денег” Джона Мейнарда Кейнса – нанесла непоправимый экономический и политический ущерб Западному миру и другим… читать далее → Запись Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя впервые появилась .

28 ноября 2014, 11:37

Владимир Мау, Алексей Улюкаев: Глобальный кризис и тенденции экономического развития

Глобальный кризис формирует экономико-политическую повестку. Она требует переосмысления многих выводов экономической теории и практики, которые до сих пор считались общепринятыми. В статье ректор Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президента РФ и Владимир Мау и Министр экономического развития РФ Алексей Улюкаев, опубликованной в журнале "Вопросы экономики" (11/2014) анализируют ключевые вопросы экономического развития на среднесрочную перспективу. В числе важных для формирования новой модели экономического поста проблем рассматриваются: темпы роста и вероятность долгосрочной стагнации, новые вызовы макроэкономической политики в связи с широким распространением ее нерадиационных инструментов, неравенство и экономический рост, контуры нового социального государства, перспективы глобализации,а также реиндустриализация в развитых странах. В. Мау , А. Улюкаев[1] Глобальный кризис и тенденции экономического развития* Аннотация на русском, ключевые слова, коды JEL Глобальные кризисы – общее и особенное Экономическое развитие ведущих стран определяется прежде всего предпосылками и характером глобального кризиса, который начался в 2008 г. и продолжается по настоящее время. Это кризис особого рода: он не описывается одним-двумя параметрами (например, спадом производства и ростом безработицы), а является многоаспектным, охватывая разные сферы социально-экономической жизни, и, как правило, имеет серьезные социально-политические последствия. Это системный кризис, и в этом отношении он аналогичен кризисам 1930-х и 1970-х годов (Мау, 2009). Разумеется, здесь не может быть прямых аналогий. Структурные кризисы уникальны, то есть опыт, накопленный в ходе преодоления каждого из них, практически нельзя использовать в новых условиях. Тем не менее есть ряд качественных характеристик, которые позволяют относить их к одному классу, то есть эти кризисы можно сравнивать, учитывать их особенности, но не прилагать рецепты антикризисной политики, эффективные в одном случае, к другому. Можно выделить следующие черты системных кризисов. Первое. Такой кризис одновременно и циклический и структурный. Он связан с серьезными институциональными и технологическими изменениями, со сменой технологической базы (некоторые экономисты используют термин «технологические уклады»). Эти изменения выводят экономику на качественно новый уровень эффективности и производительности труда. Системное обновление технологической базы на основе новейших достижений науки и техники – важнейшее условие успешного выхода из кризиса[2]. Второе. Существенным элементом системного кризиса выступает финансовый кризис. Именно наложение последнего на собственно экономический кризис (спад производства и падение занятости) затрудняет выход из него, обусловливает необходимость проведения комплекса структурных и институциональных реформ для выхода на траекторию устойчивого роста. Третье. Неизбежным результатом кризиса выступает формирование новой модели экономического роста: она предполагает структурную модернизацию как развитых, так и развивающихся стран, что связано с созданием новых технологических драйверов. Возникновение новых отраслей и секторов реального производства, их географическое перемещение по миру определяют новую глобальную экономическую реальность и одновременно создают предпосылки для появления новых вызовов и инструментов экономической политики. Эту тенденцию хорошо отражает появившийся в 2009 г. термин «новая нормальность» – newnormal (Улюкаев, 2009). Четвертое. Отметим серьезные геополитические и геоэкономические сдвиги, формирование новых балансов сил (отдельных стран и регионов) в мировой политике. В начале кризиса можно было предположить, что он приведет к закреплению двухполярной модели, на сей раз основанной на противостоянии США и Китая, которых иногда обозначают как G2 – «большую двойку» (Brzezinski, 2009), а Н. Фергюсон назвал «Кимерикой» (Chimerica = China + America; см.: Ferguson, 2008). Однако постепенно все отчетливее проступают контуры многополярного мира, который хотя и не отрицает наличия двух-трех ключевых экономических центров, на практике означает возврат к хорошо известной по XIX в. модели «концерта стран», балансирующих интересы друг друга. С поправкой на нынешние реалии речь может идти, скорее, о балансе интересов ключевых региональных группировок. Пятое. В ходе системного кризиса происходит смена модели регулирования социально-экономических процессов. В 1930-е годы завершился переход к индустриальной стадии развития и закрепились идеология и практика «большого государства», сопровождаемого ростом налогов, бюджетных расходов, государственной собственности и планирования, а в некоторых случаях – и государственного ценообразования. Напротив, кризис 1970-х годов привел к масштабной либерализации и дерегулированию, к снижению налогов и приватизации – словом, к тому, чего требовал переход к постиндустриальной технологической фазе. В начале последнего кризиса создавалось впечатление, что мир вновь вернется к модели, основанной на доминирующей роли государства в экономике (появился даже термин «примитивное кейнсианство» – Crass-Keynesianism). Практика, впрочем, пока не подтверждает такую тенденцию. Роль государственного регулирования действительно возрастает, однако это относится преимущественно к сфере регулирования финансовых рынков на национальном и глобальном уровнях. Действительно, в настоящее время важнейшим противоречием выступает конфликт между глобальным характером финансов и национальными рамками их регулирования. Важно выработать механизм регулирования глобальных финансов в отсутствие глобального правительства. Шестое. Системный кризис ставит на повестку дня вопрос о новой мировой финансовой архитектуре. В результате кризиса 1930-х годов сформировался мир с одной резервной валютой – долларом. После 1970-х годов сложилась бивалютная система (доллар и евро). Направление эволюции валютных систем после новейшего кризиса пока не определилось. Можно предположить усиление роли юаня, а также региональных резервных валют, если значение региональных группировок в мировом балансе сил возрастет. Множественность резервных валют могла бы поддержать тенденцию к многополярности мира и способствовать росту ответственности денежных властей соответствующих стран (поскольку резервные валюты будут конкурировать между собой). Седьмое. Начнет формироваться новая экономическая доктрина, новый мейнстрим в науке (по аналогии с кейнсианством и неолиберализмом в ХХ в.). Из всего сказанного вытекают важные выводы относительно перспектив преодоления системного кризиса и соответствующих механизмов. Во-первых, системный кризис связан с масштабным интеллектуальным вызовом, требующим глубокого переосмысления его причин, механизмов развертывания и путей преодоления. Как генералы всегда готовятся к войнам прошлого,  так и политики и экономисты готовятся к прошлым кризисам. До поры до времени это срабатывает, пока приходится иметь дело с экономическим циклом, то есть с повторяющимися проблемами экономической динамики. Поэтому сначала для борьбы с системным кризисом пытаются применить методы, известные из прошлого опыта. Применительно к 1930-м годам – это стремление правительства Г. Гувера (прежде всего его министра финансов Э. Меллона) не вмешиваться в естественный ход событий, жестко балансировать бюджет и укреплять денежную систему, основанную на золотом стандарте. Как свидетельствовал опыт предшествующих 100 лет, кризисы обычно рассасывались примерно за год и никакой специальной политики для этого не требовалось. Аналогично в 1970-е годы с началом кризиса попытались задействовать традиционные для того момента методы кейнсианского регулирования (бюджетное стимулирование в условиях замедления темпов роста и даже государственный контроль за ценами в исполнении республиканской администрации Р. Никсона), но это обернулось скачком инфляции и началом стагфляционных процессов. К системным кризисам плохо применимы подходы экономической политики, выработанные в предыдущие десятилетия. Возникает слишком много новых проблем, изначально не ясны механизмы развертывания кризиса и выхода из него, его масштабы и продолжительность. В ХХ в. на преодоление системных кризисов требовалось порядка десяти лет. Именно на это обстоятельство указывал П. Волкер, когда в июле 1979 г., в разгар предыдущего системного кризиса, вступил в должность руководителя ФРС: «Мы столкнулись с трудностями, которые до сих пор еще не встречались в нашей практике. У нас больше нет эйфории…, когда мы возомнили, что знаем ответы на все вопросы, касающиеся управления экономикой». Во-вторых, системный кризис не сводится к рецессии, росту безработицы или панике вкладчиков банков. Он состоит из ряда эпизодов и волн, охватывающих отдельные секторы экономики, страны и регионы. Это предопределяет его продолжительность – примерно десятилетие, которое можно назвать турбулентным. Более того, статистические данные могут неточно или даже неадекватно отражать происходящие в экономике процессы. Сам факт технологического обновления может искажать (причем существенно) динамику производства, поскольку новые секторы сначала плохо учитываются традиционной статистикой. Проблемы создает и статистика занятости. Если в ходе циклического кризиса одним из важных показателей его преодоления выступает рост занятости, то при системном кризисе этот критерий действует лишь в конечном счете. Технологическое обновление предполагает качественно новые требования к трудовым ресурсам, то есть серьезные структурные изменения на рынке труда. Поэтому для выхода из системного кризиса характерно запаздывающее восстановление занятости, когда высокая безработица сохраняется на фоне экономического роста. Возникает своеобразный конфликт между новой экономикой и старой статистикой, и для его разрешения требуется определенное время. В-третьих, нельзя преодолеть системный кризис лишь мерами макроэкономической политики, макроэкономического регулирования при всей важности бюджетных и денежно-