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27 марта, 16:23

Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality, and Incomplete Markets -- by Emmanuel Farhi, Ivan Werning

This paper extends the benchmark New-Keynesian model with a representative agent and rational expectations by introducing two key frictions: (1) agent heterogeneity with incomplete markets, uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and occasionally-binding borrowing constraints; and (2) bounded rationality in the form of level-k thinking. Compared to the benchmark model, we show that the interaction of these two frictions leads to a powerful mitigation of the effects of monetary policy, which is much more pronounced at long horizons, and offers a potential rationalization of the "forward guidance puzzle". Each of these frictions, in isolation, would lead to no or much smaller departures from the benchmark model. We conclude that the interaction of bounded rationality and market frictions improves the ability of the model to account for the effects of monetary policy.

26 марта, 17:24

Без заголовка

**Must-Read:** Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff are mainstream economists. The fact is that they had much more influence on economic policy in 2009-2013 than did Simon Wren-Lewis and me. Simon needs to face that fact squarely, rather than to dodge it. The fact is that the "mainstream economists, and most...

25 марта, 23:14

Conservatives better hope that wages and prices are sticky, by Scott Sumner

Macroeconomists are often lousy political philosophers. In previous posts I've discussed how macroeconomic views that are considered "liberal" or "conservative" actually have no obvious relationship to those political stances. For instance there's no obvious reason why "using monetary policy" (as Milton Friedman preferred) is less interventionist that a countercyclical budget deficit (as Keynes preferred.) One of the most amusing examples of this phenomenon is the critical reaction to Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History of the United States. When the book first came out the message was viewed as being "conservative". Thus the Great Depression (in their view) was not caused by the inherent instability of capitalism, but rather by bad monetary policy. All of the statist interventions of FDR were not needed, and indeed were often counterproductive. (That's still my view.) By the 1990s, however, it was liberal economists who defended the book against conservative critics. By the 1990s, many of the right had moved past monetarism to flexible price "equilibrium models' of the business cycle, AKA, real business cycles. Keynesians kept insisting that because of sticky wages and prices, aggregate demand shocks still matter---and pointed to the Monetary History as supporting evidence. If you survey the field of macroeconomics, circa 2017, you see economists on the left almost unanimously acknowledging that wages and prices are sticky and that demand shocks have real effects on output. On the right side of the spectrum, there are people like Greg Mankiw, John Taylor and I who believe that wages and prices are sticky, but also a large group who are skeptical about whether wage and price stickiness is a key issue in the business cycle. In fairness, the stickiness skeptics hold views are often fairly nuanced, with some acknowledging price stickiness as a factor, but doubting its importance. Still, it's clear that on average the skepticism over sticky wage/price models of the business cycle is far more pronounced on the right than on the left. An outsider might naively assume that this political dichotomy occurs because wage and price stickiness is what Al Gore would call an "inconvenient truth" for those on the right. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am mostly on "the right" in my economic philosophy, but that's only because I believe wages and prices are sticky. If someone convinced me that they are actually flexible, I might be inclined to become more of a socialist. I believe that a combination of sticky wages and monetary shocks produce most of America's economic slumps, including the Great Contraction of 1929-33, as well as other big recessions like 1920-21, 1937-38, 1981-82 and 2008-09. I do not believe the capitalist system is "inherently unstable" and that big government is needed to stabilize it, rather I believe that it is naturally stable, as long as bad monetary policy doesn't interact with wage stickiness to produce business cycles. But suppose it were shown that I am wrong, and that wage/price stickiness is not an issue---what then? That would be very bad news for my laissez-faire ideology. Now I'd have to concede that events like the Great Contraction of 1929-33 showed that capitalism is indeed inherently unstable, and that this problem could not be fixed with good monetary policy. Now I'd have to entertain other solutions, such as big government and or comprehensive economic planning. To be fair, the real business cycle view that "technology shocks" cause business cycles is not necessarily identical to the left wing view that capitalism is inherently unstable. What RBC economists call 'technology shocks' could simply be bad economic policies by the government. And in my view they sometimes are bad policies. The NIRA caused the recovery to stall from July 1933 to May 1935, while Nixon's wage price controls led to an artificial boom in1972, and then a deep recession after they were removed and workers sought catch up pay increases. But my reading of economic history is that it not possible to develop a general theory of the American business cycle based on bad government policies. Indeed even where bad policies play a role, such as Hoover's policy of high wages, high tariffs, and high taxes, they don't even come close to explaining the 1929-33 downturn. The same policies during a period of stable NGDP growth would have simply meant a bit of stagflation. And lots of periods of "big government" policies are associated with strong growth, such as the period of LBJ's Great Society (1965-69). So thank God that the right is wrong about wage/price stickiness! It is a major issue, and when combined with bad monetary policy it leads to economic instability. Without wage price stickiness it pretty hard to argue in favor of conservative economic policies. The Great Depression directly led to immense human suffering and indirectly led to WWII, which caused even more suffering. Those things simply cannot be allowed to happen. Without wage price stickiness, the right would not have any persuasive arguments against those who want to use much more interventionist policies to prevent economic Depressions. Without wage/price stickiness, capitalism really would be inherently unstable. (13 COMMENTS)

22 марта, 10:05

Is the US in Another Housing Bubble?

It's approaching 10 years since I wrote Behind the Housing Crash, and certainly beyond 10 since I started writing it.  I've long abandoned the banking industry and frankly have forgotten most of the metrics, statistics, methods, and techniques I used to predict the bubble (amazing how if you don't get paid, you forget).  That being said, I did want to check in on the housing market to see if perma-low interest rates have inflated prices back to their 2007 levels and my findings, truthfully are mixed.First, yes, according to price to rents we are back where we left off in the nose bleed section in 2007.The price to rents ratio has tapered off a bit since its second peak in mid 2016, but based on historical data, prices have outgrown rents across the country significantly since the second great Keynesian expansion under Obama took place. However, enter in historically low and historically long mortgage interest rates.  While any non-Keynesian knows artificially low interest rates create bubbles and malinvestment, two things about this long round of perma-low interest rates is that they're long term (30 year, not some damn resetting ARM or NINJA loan) and have been around for nearly a decade. This has allowed people to not only buy more housing on the same income, but make significant dents into their mortgages if they held onto them.  Couple that with the bad taste the housing crash left in people's mouths, it was only the long term players and home owners that were buying houses.  Not the dipshits and douches in Phoenix, Florida, Vegas, and California playing "Let's Flip This House Dude Bro!"  These variables assuage my concerns about the high price to rents ratio in that the market is not as liquid, a higher percentage of homes are not second, flip or investment properties, and 98% of the housing market is not financed with 947 to 1 ARMS with NINJA quality underwriting.Further assuaging my concerns of a bubble are vacancies.  While rents are relatively low to prices, vacancies are just above half of the double digit vacancies we saw right before the housing bubble. While the overall housing market and rental properties are not the same market, this tightening of the rental market provides somewhat of a floor that rents will unlikely fall through.  Yes, people looking to rent condos in downtown are not looking to rent suburbanite homes, but in case of an emergency, a collapse, etc. etc., spare rooms and bedrooms are commodities in that they have potential rental value. Finally, related to people paying down their mortgages instead of taking on three extras, combined with long and low interest rates, debt servicing to disposable income is also trending low. I know the argument against this is that the asset, the house, only has value based on its rents, but we have to admit a large percentage of the housing stock is to be lived in by its owners and is not purely rental property.  And artificial, disagreeable, and unprincipled you might find abusing monetary policy to pump up housing prices, low interest rates have lessened people's mortgage expense on their personal budgets, meaning they can indeed afford more housing on less income. Does this mean I'm advising people to go out and buy their first home or perhaps look at rental property as a means to retire?No, not at all.  Truth is, I'm still very skeptical and wary of the high price to rents ratios the country as a whole faces.But what I am advising is that people who are interested in property be VERY careful and proceed with caution.  The above figures are nationwide and real estate is a very local game.  You will want to do a thorough and complete analysis of the housing market you're interested in before committing your life's savings and agreeing to a 30 year commitment.  Some markets, even individual houses, are a great buy.  Some property is a good deal.  But given the valuations and the fact that the 30 year mortgage rate may not hang around 4% for the next 10 years, there's a lot of properties and markets out there that just aren't worth it.  Make sure you do your homework._______________________________Aaron Clarey is a former banker and economist.  He now sits on his ass, sleeping in till 1030AM as a micro-internet celebrity.  If you need advice, consider hiring him at his egregiously expensive, but totally worth it consultancy, Asshole Consulting.HHR4HM7ZPMV3

14 марта, 17:18

Federal Courts Say Foreigners, Not US Citizens, Are Entitled To Due Process — Paul Craig Roberts

SUPPORT YOUR WEBSITE WWW.PAULCRAIGROBERTS.ORG Federal Courts Say Foreigners, Not US Citizens, Are Entitled To Due Process Paul Craig Roberts The US Constitution applies to US citizens, and the amendments known as the Bill of Rights guarantee due process as a protection of US citizens’ civil liberties. That’s the theory but not the practice. Trump’s travel… The post Federal Courts Say Foreigners, Not US Citizens, Are Entitled To Due Process — Paul Craig Roberts appeared first on PaulCraigRoberts.org.

13 марта, 22:13

France's NIRA did just as poorly as America's, by Scott Sumner

In July 1933, Roosevelt issued an executive order that effectively forced firms to raise nominal hourly wages by 20% in just two months. In the previous 4 months, industrial production had risen by 57%, three times faster than in any other 4-month period in US history. It looked like we would get a rapid recovery from the Depression due to the stimulative effects of dollar devaluation. Unfortunately, the NIRA wage policy aborted the recovery and industrial production began falling. It would not regain July 1933 levels for another 2 years, after the May 1935 Supreme Court decision ruling the NIRA unconstitutional. Here's the abstract of a new paper by Jérémie Cohen-Setton (Peterson Institute for International Economics), Joshua K. Hausman (University of Michigan), and Johannes F. Wieland (University of California, San Diego): The effects of supply-side policies in depressed economies are controversial. We shed light on this debate using evidence from France in the 1930s. In 1936, France departed from the gold standard and implemented mandatory wage increases and hours restrictions. Deflation ended but output stagnated. We present time-series and cross-sectional evidence that these supply-side policies, in particular the 40-hour law, contributed to French stagflation. These results are inconsistent both with the standard one-sector new Keynesian model and with a medium scale, multi-sector model calibrated to match our cross-sectional estimates. We conclude that the new Keynesian model is a poor guide to the effects of supply-side shocks in depressed economies. In the US, the wage shock was implemented by reducing the work week from 48 hours to 40 hours, without any change in weekly wages. This boosted hourly wages by 20%. The French version was even more extreme, they reduced the work week to 40 hours while increasing weekly wages by 7% to 15%. In their opening paragraph they point out that this study has important policy implications for Europe: The output effects of supply-side policies in depressed economies are controversial. Much of the debate has focused on the U.S. New Deal's supply-side elements, in particular the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).1 Standard new Keynesian models used for policy analysis imply that the NIRA ought to have been expansionary given economic conditions during the Great Depression (Eggertsson, 2012), but many economists have suggested otherwise (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Bordo, Erceg, and Evans, 2000; Cole and Ohanian, 2004). More recently, this debate has resurfaced in the context of whether structural reforms would be helpful or harmful for the Eurozone periphery (e.g., Bundick, 2014; Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo, 2014; Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez, 2014; Lo and Rogoff, 2015). The basic problem with the New Keynesian model is that they use the wrong indicator of nominal (demand) shocks. In the NK model, higher inflation is expansionary. But of course that's reasoning from a price change. It's expansionary when caused by an increase in AD (say due to expansionary monetary policy), but contractionary when caused by a decrease in AS (say due to legal mandates forcing wages higher.) The correct nominal indictor is NGDP growth. An increase in NGDP growth is always consistent with higher AD, and vice versa. If the Keynesians would replace inflation with NGDP growth in their models, they would avoid disastrous policies such as the NIRA, and its French equivalent. This is just one of the reasons why the market monetarist model is superior to the NK model. HT: Kurt Schuler PS. People interested in this subject might want to check out my book on the Great Depression: (7 COMMENTS)

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09 марта, 20:57

Fossil Fuels Are Toast - But Real Assets Are Still The Place To Be

With all the oil-related headlines we're exposed to each day, you might assume that "black gold," along with other fossil fuels like coal and natural gas, matter to humanity's future. You'd be wrong. Like Keynesian economics and ...

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08 марта, 20:31

‘Superstar Firms’ May Have Shrunk Workers’ Share of Income

It was long Keynesian dogma that two-thirds of economic output goes to labor. That truism has come undone, and corporate consolidation may be a cause.

06 марта, 04:21

Weekend Reading: Daniel Davies (2012): New Ideas From Dead Political Systems

**Daniel Davies** (2012): _[New Ideas From Dead Political Systems][]_: >Back in the days before I had realised that a guy who takes five years to deliver a simple book review probably ought to rein in the ambition a bit when it comes to larger-scale projects, I occasionally pitched an idea...

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05 марта, 18:57

Hammond, UK's Chancellor, Intends A £60 Billion Brexit Contingency Fund By 2020

... run these points through standard Keynesian theory and they're all just fine. For this is one of those points where such theory accords with the more conservative idea of balanced budgets. We are in the upturn, the upswing of the business cycle, the deficit should be falling anyway.

05 марта, 18:11

Arizona Challenges the Fed's Money Monopoly

History shows that, if individuals have the freedom to choose what to use as money, they will likely opt for gold or silver. Of course, modern politicians and their Keynesian enablers despise the gold or silver standard.

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04 марта, 10:37

Keynesianism and the Great Recession

Why abandoning Keynesianism in favor of neoliberalism set up the financial crisis and led to inadequate post-crisis responses.

03 марта, 17:17

Procrastinating on February 28, 2017

**Over at [Equitable Growth](http://EquitableGrowth.org): Must- and Should-Reads:** * _[Rethinking Productivity Growth | Equitable Growth][]_ * _[(Late) Monday Smackdown: In Which I Am Annoyed at Being Paired with John Taylor | Equitable Growth][]_: * **Kavya Vaghul**: _[Sustaining preschool gains can help the benefits of early childhood education endure | Equitable Growth][]_...

03 марта, 15:47

Без заголовка

**Should-Read: Richard Lipsey**: _[The Phillips Curve and an Assumed Unique Macroeconomic Equilibrium in Historical Context][]_: "So we seem to have gone full circle from the early Keynesian view... [The Phillips Curve and an Assumed Unique Macroeconomic Equilibrium in Historical Context]: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-history-of-economic-thought/article/div-classtitlethe-phillips-curve-and-an-assumed-unique-macroeconomic-equilibrium-in-historical-contextdiv/66AAB4AB7D8053BF4196C02BAFD842CA >...in which there was no unique level of GDP...

02 марта, 23:19

A Self-Fulfilling Expectations Led Recession?

Simon Wren-Lewis: A self-fulfilling expectations led recession?: The only two lectures on Oxford’s core undergraduate macro course that I still teach, and which I have just taught, are the last two on fiscal policy. I use the privilege of the...

02 марта, 16:29

Rewriting the Monetary-Policy Script

Many central bankers, intoxicated by rigid neo-Keynesian models of the effects of interest rates on demand and inflation, are ignoring a major lesson from decades of experimentation: the impact of monetary policy cannot be predicted with a high degree of certainty or accuracy. To manage risk, flexibility is key.

02 марта, 07:30

The Fed's Dependence On The Consumer Will Backfire

Via C.Jay Engel of The Mises Institute, The story is that it is consumers that are going "to push the economy to grow more than 2 percent this year." That's Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan's recently expressed view. It's the old fallacy of spending — rather than saving — our way into growth. It's remarkable that no one talks about the fact that the economy since 2008 was built on little but cheap debt, and therefore depends on the continued flow of such debt. To raise interest rates in that environment, will lead to the very conditions that the Fed fears the most. Of course, Austrians would praise such a blessed blow to the artificial boom. However, since the Fed, operating through a Keynesian lens, sees no inherent instability in such an economic environment. They don't see how much this would severely undermine the alleged stability they think they've achieved. Kaplan and the rest of them are depending on indebted consumers, exhausted by their credit levels, to push the economy all the way up to 2 percent growth. That it's come down to this speaks volumes about the Fed's alleged success over the years. Aside from the terrible labor participation rate is the fact that we are now supposed to be impressed by a GDP growth print above 2 percent. And even worse, the economy is so bad that in order to hit this 2 percent mark, we have to rely on the consumer.  Beyond this, we just got the 2016 fourth quarter GDP numbers and guess what: it came in at a seriously lousy 1.9 percent. The "expectations" were in the 2.1 percent range. It gets even better: this low number was in spite of a 3 percent increase in consumer spending. This of course means that the spending isn't helping. And without it, where would economic growth be then? If the Fed raises rates, where will the "recovery" go? Or more accurately, where will the facade of a recovery go?

01 марта, 02:32

Links for the Week of March 5, 2017

**Most-Recent Must-Reads:** * **Nick Crafts**: _[W...

24 февраля, 18:42

Procrastinating on February 24, 2017

**Over at [Equitable Growth](http://EquitableGrowth.org): Must- and Should-Reads:** * **Nick Bunker**: _[What’s the problem a U.S. corporate tax cut will solve? | Equitable Growth][]_ * **John Schmitt**: _[The U.S. minimum wage improves access to traditional lines of credit | Equitable Growth][]_ * **Matt Markezich**: _[Why is collective bargaining so difficult in...

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24 февраля, 17:00

As Rio de Janeiro Implodes, Keynesians Have Some Explaining To Do

'Shovel-Ready' government spending authored the opposite of an economic boom in Brazil.

03 сентября 2016, 06:00

Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя

2016 год ознаменовал восьмидесятилетнюю годовщину публикации одной из самых влиятельных книг по теме экономики когда-либо увидевших свет. Эта книга – “Общая теория занятости, процента и денег” Джона Мейнарда Кейнса – нанесла непоправимый экономический и политический ущерб Западному миру и другим… читать далее → Запись Antoniusaquinas.com: Джон Мейнард Кейнс “Общая теория”: Восемьдесят лет спустя впервые появилась .

28 ноября 2014, 11:37

Владимир Мау, Алексей Улюкаев: Глобальный кризис и тенденции экономического развития

Глобальный кризис формирует экономико-политическую повестку. Она требует переосмысления многих выводов экономической теории и практики, которые до сих пор считались общепринятыми. В статье ректор Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президента РФ и Владимир Мау и Министр экономического развития РФ Алексей Улюкаев, опубликованной в журнале "Вопросы экономики" (11/2014) анализируют ключевые вопросы экономического развития на среднесрочную перспективу. В числе важных для формирования новой модели экономического поста проблем рассматриваются: темпы роста и вероятность долгосрочной стагнации, новые вызовы макроэкономической политики в связи с широким распространением ее нерадиационных инструментов, неравенство и экономический рост, контуры нового социального государства, перспективы глобализации,а также реиндустриализация в развитых странах. В. Мау , А. Улюкаев[1] Глобальный кризис и тенденции экономического развития* Аннотация на русском, ключевые слова, коды JEL Глобальные кризисы – общее и особенное Экономическое развитие ведущих стран определяется прежде всего предпосылками и характером глобального кризиса, который начался в 2008 г. и продолжается по настоящее время. Это кризис особого рода: он не описывается одним-двумя параметрами (например, спадом производства и ростом безработицы), а является многоаспектным, охватывая разные сферы социально-экономической жизни, и, как правило, имеет серьезные социально-политические последствия. Это системный кризис, и в этом отношении он аналогичен кризисам 1930-х и 1970-х годов (Мау, 2009). Разумеется, здесь не может быть прямых аналогий. Структурные кризисы уникальны, то есть опыт, накопленный в ходе преодоления каждого из них, практически нельзя использовать в новых условиях. Тем не менее есть ряд качественных характеристик, которые позволяют относить их к одному классу, то есть эти кризисы можно сравнивать, учитывать их особенности, но не прилагать рецепты антикризисной политики, эффективные в одном случае, к другому. Можно выделить следующие черты системных кризисов. Первое. Такой кризис одновременно и циклический и структурный. Он связан с серьезными институциональными и технологическими изменениями, со сменой технологической базы (некоторые экономисты используют термин «технологические уклады»). Эти изменения выводят экономику на качественно новый уровень эффективности и производительности труда. Системное обновление технологической базы на основе новейших достижений науки и техники – важнейшее условие успешного выхода из кризиса[2]. Второе. Существенным элементом системного кризиса выступает финансовый кризис. Именно наложение последнего на собственно экономический кризис (спад производства и падение занятости) затрудняет выход из него, обусловливает необходимость проведения комплекса структурных и институциональных реформ для выхода на траекторию устойчивого роста. Третье. Неизбежным результатом кризиса выступает формирование новой модели экономического роста: она предполагает структурную модернизацию как развитых, так и развивающихся стран, что связано с созданием новых технологических драйверов. Возникновение новых отраслей и секторов реального производства, их географическое перемещение по миру определяют новую глобальную экономическую реальность и одновременно создают предпосылки для появления новых вызовов и инструментов экономической политики. Эту тенденцию хорошо отражает появившийся в 2009 г. термин «новая нормальность» – newnormal (Улюкаев, 2009). Четвертое. Отметим серьезные геополитические и геоэкономические сдвиги, формирование новых балансов сил (отдельных стран и регионов) в мировой политике. В начале кризиса можно было предположить, что он приведет к закреплению двухполярной модели, на сей раз основанной на противостоянии США и Китая, которых иногда обозначают как G2 – «большую двойку» (Brzezinski, 2009), а Н. Фергюсон назвал «Кимерикой» (Chimerica = China + America; см.: Ferguson, 2008). Однако постепенно все отчетливее проступают контуры многополярного мира, который хотя и не отрицает наличия двух-трех ключевых экономических центров, на практике означает возврат к хорошо известной по XIX в. модели «концерта стран», балансирующих интересы друг друга. С поправкой на нынешние реалии речь может идти, скорее, о балансе интересов ключевых региональных группировок. Пятое. В ходе системного кризиса происходит смена модели регулирования социально-экономических процессов. В 1930-е годы завершился переход к индустриальной стадии развития и закрепились идеология и практика «большого государства», сопровождаемого ростом налогов, бюджетных расходов, государственной собственности и планирования, а в некоторых случаях – и государственного ценообразования. Напротив, кризис 1970-х годов привел к масштабной либерализации и дерегулированию, к снижению налогов и приватизации – словом, к тому, чего требовал переход к постиндустриальной технологической фазе. В начале последнего кризиса создавалось впечатление, что мир вновь вернется к модели, основанной на доминирующей роли государства в экономике (появился даже термин «примитивное кейнсианство» – Crass-Keynesianism). Практика, впрочем, пока не подтверждает такую тенденцию. Роль государственного регулирования действительно возрастает, однако это относится преимущественно к сфере регулирования финансовых рынков на национальном и глобальном уровнях. Действительно, в настоящее время важнейшим противоречием выступает конфликт между глобальным характером финансов и национальными рамками их регулирования. Важно выработать механизм регулирования глобальных финансов в отсутствие глобального правительства. Шестое. Системный кризис ставит на повестку дня вопрос о новой мировой финансовой архитектуре. В результате кризиса 1930-х годов сформировался мир с одной резервной валютой – долларом. После 1970-х годов сложилась бивалютная система (доллар и евро). Направление эволюции валютных систем после новейшего кризиса пока не определилось. Можно предположить усиление роли юаня, а также региональных резервных валют, если значение региональных группировок в мировом балансе сил возрастет. Множественность резервных валют могла бы поддержать тенденцию к многополярности мира и способствовать росту ответственности денежных властей соответствующих стран (поскольку резервные валюты будут конкурировать между собой). Седьмое. Начнет формироваться новая экономическая доктрина, новый мейнстрим в науке (по аналогии с кейнсианством и неолиберализмом в ХХ в.). Из всего сказанного вытекают важные выводы относительно перспектив преодоления системного кризиса и соответствующих механизмов. Во-первых, системный кризис связан с масштабным интеллектуальным вызовом, требующим глубокого переосмысления его причин, механизмов развертывания и путей преодоления. Как генералы всегда готовятся к войнам прошлого,  так и политики и экономисты готовятся к прошлым кризисам. До поры до времени это срабатывает, пока приходится иметь дело с экономическим циклом, то есть с повторяющимися проблемами экономической динамики. Поэтому сначала для борьбы с системным кризисом пытаются применить методы, известные из прошлого опыта. Применительно к 1930-м годам – это стремление правительства Г. Гувера (прежде всего его министра финансов Э. Меллона) не вмешиваться в естественный ход событий, жестко балансировать бюджет и укреплять денежную систему, основанную на золотом стандарте. Как свидетельствовал опыт предшествующих 100 лет, кризисы обычно рассасывались примерно за год и никакой специальной политики для этого не требовалось. Аналогично в 1970-е годы с началом кризиса попытались задействовать традиционные для того момента методы кейнсианского регулирования (бюджетное стимулирование в условиях замедления темпов роста и даже государственный контроль за ценами в исполнении республиканской администрации Р. Никсона), но это обернулось скачком инфляции и началом стагфляционных процессов. К системным кризисам плохо применимы подходы экономической политики, выработанные в предыдущие десятилетия. Возникает слишком много новых проблем, изначально не ясны механизмы развертывания кризиса и выхода из него, его масштабы и продолжительность. В ХХ в. на преодоление системных кризисов требовалось порядка десяти лет. Именно на это обстоятельство указывал П. Волкер, когда в июле 1979 г., в разгар предыдущего системного кризиса, вступил в должность руководителя ФРС: «Мы столкнулись с трудностями, которые до сих пор еще не встречались в нашей практике. У нас больше нет эйфории…, когда мы возомнили, что знаем ответы на все вопросы, касающиеся управления экономикой». Во-вторых, системный кризис не сводится к рецессии, росту безработицы или панике вкладчиков банков. Он состоит из ряда эпизодов и волн, охватывающих отдельные секторы экономики, страны и регионы. Это предопределяет его продолжительность – примерно десятилетие, которое можно назвать турбулентным. Более того, статистические данные могут неточно или даже неадекватно отражать происходящие в экономике процессы. Сам факт технологического обновления может искажать (причем существенно) динамику производства, поскольку новые секторы сначала плохо учитываются традиционной статистикой. Проблемы создает и статистика занятости. Если в ходе циклического кризиса одним из важных показателей его преодоления выступает рост занятости, то при системном кризисе этот критерий действует лишь в конечном счете. Технологическое обновление предполагает качественно новые требования к трудовым ресурсам, то есть серьезные структурные изменения на рынке труда. Поэтому для выхода из системного кризиса характерно запаздывающее восстановление занятости, когда высокая безработица сохраняется на фоне экономического роста. Возникает своеобразный конфликт между новой экономикой и старой статистикой, и для его разрешения требуется определенное время. В-третьих, нельзя преодолеть системный кризис лишь мерами макроэкономической политики, макроэкономического регулирования при всей важности бюджетных и денежно-