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24 марта, 18:12

Новая "охота на ведьм" в США ведет к войне

Нынешняя антироссийская истерия в СМИ чревата настоящим ядерным конфликтом, так как сводит на нет десятилетия кропотливой работы над российско-американских договорами в области вооружений

24 марта, 18:10

Procrastinating on March 24, 2017

**Over at [Equitable Growth](http://EquitableGrowth.org): Must- and Should-Reads:** * **Dionna Cheatham & Gabriel Matthews**: _[Does Supplemental Security Income inhibit success? | Equitable Growth][]_ * **Nick Bunker**: _[How life experiences affect the views of U.S. monetary policymakers | Equitable Growth][]_ * **Kavya Vaghul**: _[Is an even larger pass-through business tax loophole destined...

24 марта, 11:29

Paul Krugman: The Scammers, the Scammed and America’s Fate

"The destructive effects of false symmetry in reporting": The Scammers, the Scammed and America’s Fate, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: ...Mr. Ryan’s proposed Obamacare replacement ... is one of the worst bills ever presented to Congress. It would deprive tens...

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24 марта, 00:00

The Scammers, the Scammed and America's Fate

Paul Krugman, New York TimesMany people are horrified, and rightly so, by what passes for leadership in today’s Washington. And it’s important to keep the horror of our political situation up front, to keep highlighting the lies, the cruelty, the bad judgment. We must never normalize the state we’re in.

23 марта, 03:11

Sequel of the Return of Rise of the Robots Again

Our age--meaning 2000-2020, and longer, but how far into the further future I do not know--is not an age of the Rise of the Robots. It does not, primarily, see the replacement of human workers by information technology on a large scale, and the consequent generation of technological unemployment. What...

22 марта, 21:21

Do Wars Help or HURT the Economy?

Does Defense Spending Stimulate the Economy and Create Jobs … Or Is It BAD for the Economy? Preface: Trump wants to drastically increase military spending.  At the same time, France, China, Japan and other countries are ramping up their military spending. An understanding of the effect on the economy is therefore timely. A number of influential mainstream economists, think tanks and media personalities –  including Ben Bernanke,  Martin Feldstein, the Rand Corporation, David Broder and Wolf Blitzer – argue that defense spending and war are good for the economy. On the other hand, About.com writes: One of the more enduring myths in Western society is that wars are somehow good for the economy. And former banker, and risk management and derivatives consultant Satyajit Das wrote in 2016: The high cost of war is damaging the global economy. Economic stability demands that we find peace   ***   The post-1989 economy reaped the benefits of a ‘peace dividend’.   *** Scientific and mathematical resources previously employed in the defence-industrial infrastructure were re-deployed, helping accelerate the growth of other parts of the economy, especially technology industries.   ***   [On the other hand,] actual conflict increases the cost dramatically. There is the direct cost of dealing with the issue of conflict. There is also the indirect cost, by way of disruptions, restrictions on normal commercial and personal life, and the loss of confidence which impinges on economic activity. Even minor conflicts can disrupt critical resource supplies, such as oil or crucial minerals, and trade routes. Conflict can displace large numbers of people resulting in large numbers of refugees. The Syrian civil war illustrates the high humanitarian cost and the economic expense of dealing with the crisis. Combating and controlling failed states, resulting from conflict, such as those in the Middle East, Africa and central Asia, requires commitment of vast resources, by way of manpower and treasure. Asymmetric warfare, cyber-attacks or isolated terrorist attacks, impose high cost on economies. Increased security measures designed to prevent or minimise the effects of such attacks are expensive.   The large and rising homeland security costs in the US and elsewhere is a large and unproductive expense. The reversal of the ‘peace dividend’ now weighs heavily on the prospects of the global economy. Who’s right? Top Economists Say War Is Bad for the Economy After idiotically saying for years that war is good for the economy, Nobel prize winning economist Paul Krugman finally admits: If you’re a modern, wealthy nation, however, war — even easy, victorious war — doesn’t pay. And this has been true for a long time. In his famous 1910 book “The Great Illusion,” the British journalist Norman Angell argued that “military power is socially and economically futile.” As he pointed out, in an interdependent world (which already existed in the age of steamships, railroads, and the telegraph), war would necessarily inflict severe economic harm even on the victor. Furthermore, it’s very hard to extract golden eggs from sophisticated economies without killing the goose in the process.   We might add that modern war is very, very expensive. For example, by any estimate the eventual costs (including things like veterans’ care) of the Iraq war will end up being well over $1 trillion, that is, many times Iraq’s entire G.D.P.   So the thesis of “The Great Illusion” was right: Modern nations can’t enrich themselves by waging war. Nobel-prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz agrees that war is bad for the economy: Stiglitz wrote in 2003: War is widely thought to be linked to economic good times. The second world war is often said to have brought the world out of depression, and war has since enhanced its reputation as a spur to economic growth. Some even suggest that capitalism needs wars, that without them, recession would always lurk on the horizon. Today, we know that this is nonsense. The 1990s boom showed that peace is economically far better than war. The Gulf war of 1991 demonstrated that wars can actually be bad for an economy. Stiglitz has also said that this decade’s Iraq war has been very bad for the economy. Seethis, this and this. Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan also said in that war is bad for the economy. In 1991, Greenspan said that a prolonged conflict in the Middle East would hurt the economy. And he made this point again in 1999: Societies need to buy as much military insurance as they need, but to spend more than that is to squander money that could go toward improving the productivity of the economy as a whole: with more efficient transportation systems, a better educated citizenry, and so on. This is the point that retiring Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) learned back in 1999 in a House Banking Committee hearing with then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. Frank asked what factors were producing our then-strong economic performance. On Greenspan’s list: “The freeing up of resources previously employed to produce military products that was brought about by the end of the Cold War.” Are you saying, Frank asked, “that dollar for dollar, military products are there as insurance … and to the extent you could put those dollars into other areas, maybe education and job trainings, maybe into transportation … that is going to have a good economic effect?” Greenspan agreed. Economist Dean Baker notes: It is often believed that wars and military spending increases are good for the economy. In fact, most economic models show that military spending diverts resources from productive uses, such as consumption and investment, and ultimately slows economic growth and reduces employment. Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the American University Joshua Goldstein notes: Recurring war has drained wealth, disrupted markets, and depressed economic growth.   ***   War generally impedes economic development and undermines prosperity. And David R. Henderson – associate professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and previously a senior economist with President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers – writes: Is military conflict really good for the economy of the country that engages in it? Basic economics answers a resounding “no.” The Proof Is In the Pudding Mike Lofgren notes: Military spending may at one time have been a genuine job creator when weapons were compatible with converted civilian production lines, but the days of Rosie the Riveter are long gone. [Indeed, WWII was different from current wars in many ways, and so its economic effects are not comparable to those of today’s wars.] Most weapons projects now require relatively little touch labor. Instead, a disproportionate share is siphoned into high-cost R&D (from which the civilian economy benefits little), exorbitant management expenditures, high overhead, and out-and-out padding, including money that flows back into political campaigns. A dollar appropriated for highway construction, health care, or education will likely create more jobs than a dollar for Pentagon weapons procurement.   ***   During the decade of the 2000s, DOD budgets, including funds spent on the war, doubled in our nation’s longest sustained post-World War II defense increase. Yet during the same decade, jobs were created at the slowest rate since the Hoover administration. If defense helped the economy, it is not evident. And just the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan added over $1.4 trillion to deficits, according to the Congressional Research Service. Whether the wars were “worth it” or merely stirred up a hornet’s nest abroad is a policy discussion for another time; what is clear is that whether you are a Keynesian or a deficit hawk, war and associated military spending are no economic panacea. The Washington Post noted in 2008: A recent paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research concludes that countries with high military expenditures during World War II showed strong economic growth following the war, but says this growth can be credited more to population growththan war spending. The paper finds that war spending had only minimal effects on per-capita economic activity.   ***   A historical survey of the U.S. economy from the U.S. State Department reports the Vietnam War had a mixed economic impact. The first Gulf War typically meets criticism for having pushed the United States toward a 1991 recession. The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) shows that any boost from war is temporary at best. For example, while WWII provided a temporary bump in GDP, GDP then fell back to the baseline trend. After the Korean War, GDP fell below the baseline trend: IEP notes: By examining the state of the economy at each of the major conflict periods since World War II, it can be seen that the positive effects of increased military spending were outweighed by longer term unintended negative macroeconomic consequences. While the stimulatory effect of military outlays is evidently associated with boosts in economic growth, adverse effects show up either immediately or soon after, through higher inflation, budget deficits, high taxes and reductions in consumption or investment. Rectifying these effects has required subsequent painful adjustments which are neither efficient nor desirable. When an economy has excess capacity and unemployment, it is possible that increasing military spending can provide an important stimulus. However, if there are budget constraints, as there are in the U.S. currently, then excessive military spending can displace more productive non-military outlays in other areas such as investments in high-tech industries, education, or infrastructure. The crowding-out effects of disproportionate government spending on military functions can affect service delivery or infrastructure development, ultimately affecting long-term growth rates.   ***   Analysis of the macroeconomic components of GDP during World War II and in subsequent conflicts show heightened military spending had several adverse macroeconomic effects. These occurred as a direct consequence of the funding requirements of increased military spending. The U.S. has paid for its wars either through debt (World War II, Cold War, Afghanistan/Iraq), taxation (Korean War) or inflation (Vietnam). In each case, taxpayers have been burdened, and private sector consumption and investment have been constrained as a result. Other negative effects include larger budget deficits, higher taxes, and growth above trend leading to inflation pressure. These effects can run concurrent with major conflict or via lagging effects into the future. Regardless of the way a war is financed, the overall macroeconomic effect on the economy tends to be negative. For each of the periods after World War II, we need to ask, what would have happened in economic terms if these wars did not happen? On the specific evidence provided, it can be reasonably said, it is likely taxes would have been lower, inflation would have been lower, there would have been higher consumption and investment and certainly lower budget deficits. Some wars are necessary to fight and the negative effects of not fighting these wars can far outweigh the costs of fighting. However if there are other options, then it is prudent to exhaust them first as once wars do start, the outcome, duration and economic consequences are difficult to predict. We noted in 2011: This is a no-brainer, if you think about it. We’ve been in Afghanistan for almost twice as long as World War II. We’ve been in Iraq for years longer than WWII. We’ve been involved in 7 or 8 wars in the last decade. And yet [the economy is still unstable]. If wars really helped the economy, don’t you think things would have improved by now? Indeed,the Iraq war alone could end up costing more than World War II. And given the other wars we’ve been involved in this decade, I believe that the total price tag for the so-called “War on Terror” will definitely support that of the “Greatest War”. Let’s look at the adverse effects of war in more detail … War Spending Diverts Stimulus Away from the Real Civilian Economy IEP notes that – even though the government spending soared – consumption and investment were flatduring the Vietnam war: The New Republic noted in 2009: Conservative Harvard economist Robert Barro has argued that increased military spending during WWII actually depressed other parts of the economy. (New Republic also points out that conservative economist Robert Higgs and liberal economists Larry Summers and Brad Delong have all shown that any stimulation to the economy from World War II has been greatly exaggerated.) How could war actually hurt the economy, when so many say that it stimulates the economy? Because of what economists call the “broken window fallacy”. Specifically, if a window in a store is broken, it means that the window-maker gets paid to make a new window, and he, in turn, has money to pay others. However, economists long ago showed that – if the window hadn’t been broken – the shop-owner would have spent that money on other things, such as food, clothing, health care, consumer electronics or recreation, which would have helped the economy as much or more. If the shop-owner hadn’t had to replace his window, he might have taken his family out to dinner, which would have circulated more money to the restaurant, and from there to other sectors of the economy. Similarly, the money spent on the war effort is money that cannot be spent on other sectors of the economy. Indeed, all of the military spending has just created military jobs, at the expense of the civilian economy. Professor Henderson writes: Money not spent on the military could be spent elsewhere.This also applies to human resources. The more than 200,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan could be doing something valuable at home.   Why is this hard to understand? The first reason is a point 19th-century French economic journalist Frederic Bastiat made in his essay, “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” Everyone can see that soldiers are employed. But we cannot see the jobs and the other creative pursuits they could be engaged in were they not in the military.   The second reason is that when economic times are tough and unemployment is high, it’s easy to assume that other jobs could not exist. But they can. This gets to an argument Bastiat made in discussing demobilization of French soldiers after Napoleon’s downfall. He pointed out that when government cuts the size of the military, it frees up not only manpower but also money. The money that would have gone to pay soldiers can instead be used to hire them as civilian workers. That can happen in three ways, either individually or in combination: (1) a tax cut; (2) a reduction in the deficit; or (3) an increase in other government spending.   ***   Most people still believe that World War II ended the Great Depression …. But look deeper.   ***   The government-spending component of GNP went for guns, trucks, airplanes, tanks, gasoline, ships, uniforms, parachutes, and labor. What do these things have in common? Almost all of them were destroyed. Not just these goods but also the military’s billions of labor hours were used up without creating value to consumers. Much of the capital and labor used to make the hundreds of thousands of trucks and jeeps and the tens of thousands of tanks and airplanes would otherwise have been producing cars and trucks for the domestic economy. The assembly lines in Detroit, which had churned out 3.6 million cars in 1941, were retooled to produce the vehicles of war. From late 1942 to 1945, production of civilian cars was essentially shut down.   And that’s just one example. Women went without nylon stockings so that factories could produce parachutes. Civilians faced tight rationing of gasoline so that U.S. bombers could fly over Germany. People went without meat so that U.S. soldiers could be fed. And so on.   These resources helped win the war—no small issue. But the war was not a stimulus program, either in its intentions or in its effects, and it was not necessary for pulling the U.S. out of the Great Depression. Had World War II never taken place, millions of cars would have been produced; people would have been able to travel much more widely; and there would have been no rationing. In short, by the standard measures, Americans would have been much more prosperous.   Today, the vast majority of us are richer than even the most affluent people back then. But despite this prosperity, one thing has not changed: war is bad for our economy. The $150 billion that the government spends annually on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (and, increasingly, Pakistan) could instead be used to cut taxes or cut the deficit. By ending its ongoing wars … the U.S. government … would be developing a more prosperous economy. Austrian economist Ludwig Von Mises points out: That is the essence of so-called war prosperity; it enriches some by what it takes from others. It is not rising wealth but a shifting of wealth and income. We noted in 2010: You know about America’s unemployment problem. You may have even heard that the U.S. may very well have suffered a permanent destruction of jobs.   But did you know that the defense employment sector is booming? [P]ublic sector spending – and mainly defense spending – has accounted for virtually all of the new job creation in the past 10 years: The U.S. has largely been financing job creation for ten years. Specifically, as the chief economist for BusinessWeek, Michael Mandel, points out, public spending has accounted for virtually all new job creation in the past 1o years: Private sector job growth was almost non-existent over the past ten years. Take a look at this horrifying chart:     Between May 1999 and May 2009, employment in the private sector only rose by 1.1%, by far the lowest 10-year increase in the post-depression period.   It’s impossible to overstate how bad this is. Basically speaking, the private sector job machine has almost completely stalled over the past ten years. Take a look at this chart:     Over the past 10 years, the private sector has generated roughly 1.1 million additional jobs, or about 100K per year. The public sector created about 2.4 million jobs.   But even that gives the private sector too much credit. Remember that the private sector includes health care, social assistance, and education, all areas which receive a lot of government support.   ***   Most of the industries which had positive job growth over the past ten years were in the HealthEdGov sector. In fact, financial job growth was nearly nonexistent once we take out the health insurers.   Let me finish with a final chart.     Without a decade of growing government support from rising health and education spending and soaring budget deficits, the labor market would have been flat on its back. [120] *** So most of the job creation has been by the public sector. But because the job creation has been financed with loans from China and private banks, trillions in unnecessary interest charges have been incurred by the U.S. And this shows military versus non-military durable goods shipments: [Click here to view full image.] So we’re running up our debt (which will eventually decrease economic growth), but the only jobs we’re creating are military and other public sector jobs.   Economist Dean Baker points out that America’s massive military spending on unnecessary and unpopular wars lowers economic growth and increases unemployment: Defense spending means that the government is pulling away resources from the uses determined by the market and instead using them to buy weapons and supplies and to pay for soldiers and other military personnel. In standard economic models, defense spending is a direct drain on the economy, reducing efficiency, slowing growth and costing jobs. A few years ago, the Center for Economic and Policy Research commissioned Global Insight, one of the leading economic modeling firms, to project the impact of a sustained increase in defense spending equal to 1.0 percentage point of GDP. This was roughly equal to the cost of the Iraq War.   Global Insight’s model projected that after 20 years the economy would be about 0.6 percentage points smaller as a result of the additional defense spending. Slower growth would imply a loss of almost 700,000 jobs compared to a situation in which defense spending had not been increased. Construction and manufacturing were especially big job losers in the projections, losing 210,000 and 90,000 jobs, respectively.   The scenario we asked Global Insight [recognized as the most consistentlyaccurate forecasting company in the world] to model turned out to have vastly underestimated the increase in defense spending associated with current policy. In the most recent quarter, defense spending was equal to 5.6 percent of GDP. By comparison, before the September 11th attacks, the Congressional Budget Office projected that defense spending in 2009 would be equal to just 2.4 percent of GDP. Our post-September 11th build-up was equal to 3.2 percentage points of GDP compared to the pre-attack baseline. This means that the Global Insight projections of job loss are far too low…   The projected job loss from this increase in defense spending would be close to 2 million. In other words, the standard economic models that project job loss from efforts to stem global warming also project that the increase in defense spending since 2000 will cost the economy close to 2 million jobs in the long run. The Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst has also shown that non-military spending creates more jobs than military spending. High Military Spending Drains Innovation, Investment and Manufacturing Strength from the Civilian Economy Chalmers Johnson notes that high military spending diverts innovation and manufacturing capacity from the economy: By the 1960s it was becoming apparent that turning over the nation’s largest manufacturing enterprises to the Department of Defense and producing goods without any investment or consumption value was starting to crowd out civilian economic activities. The historian Thomas E Woods Jr observes that, during the 1950s and 1960s, between one-third and two-thirds of all US research talent was siphoned off into the military sector. It is, of course, impossible to know what innovations never appeared as a result of this diversion of resources and brainpower into the service of the military, but it was during the 1960s that we first began to notice Japan was outpacing us in the design and quality of a range of consumer goods, including household electronics and automobiles.   ***   Woods writes: “According to the US Department of Defense, during the four decades from 1947 through 1987 it used (in 1982 dollars) $7.62 trillion in capital resources. In 1985, the Department of Commerce estimated the value of the nation’s plant and equipment, and infrastructure, at just over $7.29 trillion… The amount spent over that period could have doubled the American capital stock or modernized and replaced its existing stock”.   The fact that we did not modernise or replace our capital assets is one of the main reasons why, by the turn of the 21st century, our manufacturing base had all but evaporated. Machine tools, an industry on which Melman was an authority, are a particularly important symptom. In November 1968, a five-year inventory disclosed “that 64% of the metalworking machine tools used in US industry were 10 years old or older. The age of this industrial equipment (drills, lathes, etc.) marks the United States’ machine tool stock as the oldest among all major industrial nations, and it marks the continuation of a deterioration process that began with the end of the second world war. This deterioration at the base of the industrial system certifies to the continuous debilitating and depleting effect that the military use of capital and research and development talent has had on American industry.” Economist Robert Higgs makes the same point about World War II: Yes, officially measured GDP soared during the war. Examination of that increased output shows, however, that it consisted entirely of military goods and services. Real civilian consumption and private investment both fell after 1941, and they did not recover fully until 1946. The privately owned capital stock actually shrank during the war. Some prosperity. (My article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Economic History, March 1992, presents many of the relevant details.)   It is high time that we come to appreciate the distinction between the government spending, especially the war spending, that bulks up official GDP figures and the kinds of production that create genuine economic prosperity. As Ludwig von Mises wrote in the aftermath of World War I, “war prosperity is like the prosperity that an earthquake or a plague brings.” War Causes Austerity Economic historian Julian Adorney argues: Hitler’s rearmament program was military Keynesianism on a vast scale. Hermann Goering, Hitler’s economic administrator, poured every available resource into making planes, tanks, and guns. In 1933 German military spending was 750 million Reichsmarks. By 1938 it had risen to 17 billion with 21 percent of GDP was taken up by military spending. Government spending all told was 35 percent of Germany’s GDP.   ***   No-one could say that Hitler’s rearmament program was too small. Economists expected it to create a multiplier effect and jump-start a flagging economy. Instead, it produced military wealth while private citizens starved.   ***   The people routinely suffered shortages. Civilian wood and iron were rationed. Small businesses, from artisans to carpenters to cobblers, went under. Citizens could barely buy pork, and buying fat to make a luxury like a cake was impossible. Rationing and long lines at the central supply depots the Nazis installed became the norm.   Nazi Germany proves that curing unemployment should not be an end in itself. War Causes Inflation … Which Keynes and Bernanke Admit Taxes Consumers As we noted in 2010, war causes inflation … which hurts consumers: Liberal economist James Galbraith wrote in 2004: Inflation applies the law of the jungle to war finance. Prices and profits rise, wages and their purchasing power fall. Thugs, profiteers and the well connected get rich. Working people and the poor make out as they can. Savings erode, through the unseen mechanism of the “inflation tax” — meaning that the government runs a big deficit in nominal terms, but a smaller one when inflation is factored in.   ***   There is profiteering. Firms with monopoly power usually keep some in reserve. In wartime, if the climate is permissive, they bring it out and use it. Gas prices can go up when refining capacity becomes short — due partly to too many mergers. More generally, when sales to consumers are slow, businesses ought to cut prices — but many of them don’t. Instead, they raise prices to meet their income targets and hope that the market won’t collapse. Ron Paul agreed in 2007: Congress and the Federal Reserve Bank have a cozy, unspoken arrangement that makes war easier to finance. Congress has an insatiable appetite for new spending, but raising taxes is politically unpopular. The Federal Reserve, however, is happy to accommodate deficit spending by creating new money through the Treasury Department. In exchange, Congress leaves the Fed alone to operate free of pesky oversight and free of political scrutiny. Monetary policy is utterly ignored in Washington, even though the Federal Reserve system is a creation of Congress.   The result of this arrangement is inflation. And inflation finances war. Blanchard Economic Research pointed out in 2001: War has a profound effect on the economy, our government and its fiscal and monetary policies. These effects have consistently led to high inflation.   ***   David Hackett Fischer is a Professor of History and Economic History at Brandeis. [H]is book, The Great Wave, Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History … finds that … periods of high inflation are caused by, and cause, a breakdown in order and a loss of faith in political institutions. He also finds that war is a triggering influence on inflation, political disorder, social conflict and economic disruption.   ***   Other economists agree with Professor Fischer’s link between inflation and war.   James Grant, the respected editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, supplies us with the most timely perspective on the effect of war on inflation in the September 14 issue of his newsletter: “War is inflationary. It is always wasteful no matter how just the cause. It is cost without income, destruction financed (more often than not) by credit creation. It is the essence of inflation.” Libertarian economics writer Lew Rockwell noted in 2008: You can line up 100 professional war historians and political scientists to talk about the 20th century, and not one is likely to mention the role of the Fed in funding US militarism. And yet it is true: the Fed is the institution that has created the money to fund the wars. In this role, it has solved a major problem that the state has confronted for all of human history. A state without money or a state that must tax its citizens to raise money for its wars is necessarily limited in its imperial ambitions. Keep in mind that this is only a problem for the state. It is not a problem for the people. The inability of the state to fund its unlimited ambitions is worth more for the people than every kind of legal check and balance. It is more valuable than all the constitutions every devised.   ***   Reflecting on the calamity of this war, Ludwig von Mises wrote in 1919 One can say without exaggeration that inflation is an indispensable means of militarism. Without it, the repercussions of war on welfare become obvious much more quickly and penetratingly; war weariness would set in much earlier.*** In the entire run-up to war, George Bush just assumed as a matter of policy that it was his decision alone whether to invade Iraq. The objections by Ron Paul and some other members of Congress and vast numbers of the American population were reduced to little more than white noise in the background. Imagine if he had to raise the money for the war through taxes. It never would have happened. But he didn’t have to. He knew the money would be there. So despite a $200 billion deficit, a $9 trillion debt, $5 trillion in outstanding debt instruments held by the public, a federal budget of $3 trillion, and falling tax receipts in 2001, Bush contemplated a war that has cost $525 billion dollars — or $4,681 per household. Imagine if he had gone to the American people to request that. What would have happened? I think we know the answer to that question. And those are government figures; the actual cost of this war will be far higher — perhaps $20,000 per household.   ***   If the state has the power and is asked to choose between doing good and waging war, what will it choose? Certainly in the American context, the choice has always been for war. And progressive economics writer Chris Martenson explains as part of his “Crash Course” on economics: If we look at the entire sweep of history, we can make an utterly obvious claim: All wars are inflationary. Period. No exceptions.   ***   So if anybody tries to tell you that you haven’t sacrificed for the war, let them know you sacrificed a large portion of your savings and your paycheck to the effort, thank you very much. The bottom line is that war always causes inflation, at least when it is funded through money-printing instead of a pay-as-you-go system of taxes and/or bonds. It might be great for a handful of defense contractors, but war is bad for Main Street, stealing wealth from people by making their dollars worth less. Given that John Maynard Keynes and former Federal Reserve chair Ben Bernanke both say that inflation is a tax on the American people, war-induced inflation is a theft of our wealth. IEP gives a graphic example – the Vietnam war helping to push inflation through the roof: War Causes Runaway Debt We noted in 2010: All of the spending on unnecessary wars adds up.   The U.S. is adding trillions to its debt burden to finance its multiple wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, etc. Indeed, IEP – commenting on the war in Afghanistan and Iraq – notes: This was also the first time in U.S. history where taxes were cut during a war which then resulted in both wars completely financed by deficit spending. A loose monetary policy was also implemented while interest rates were kept low and banking regulations were relaxed to stimulate the economy. All of these factors have contributed to the U.S. having severe unsustainable structural imbalances in its government finances. We also pointed out in 2010: It is ironic that America’s huge military spending is what made us an empire … but our huge military is what is bankrupting us … thus destroying our status as an empire. Economist Michel Chossudovsky told Washington’s Blog: War always causes recession. Well, if it is a very short war, then it may stimulate the economy in the short-run. But if there is not a quick victory and it drags on, then wars always put the nation waging war into a recession and hurt its economy. (and remember Greenspan’s comment.) It’s not just civilians saying this … The former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – Admiral Mullen – agrees: The Pentagon needs to cut back on spending.   “We’re going to have to do that if it’s going to survive at all,” Mullen said, “and do it in a way that is predictable.” Indeed, Mullen said: For industry and adequate defense funding to survive … the two must work together. Otherwise, he added, “this wave of debt” will carry over from year to year, and eventually, the defense budget will be cut just to facilitate the debt. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agrees as well. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post in 2010: After a decade of war and financial crisis, America has run up debts that pose a national security problem, not just an economic one.   ***   One of the strongest voices arguing for fiscal responsibility as a national security issue has been Defense Secretary Bob Gates. He gave a landmark speech in Kansas on May 8, invoking President Dwight Eisenhower’s warnings about the dangers of an imbalanced military-industrial state.   “Eisenhower was wary of seeing his beloved republic turn into a muscle-bound, garrison state — militarily strong, but economically stagnant and strategically insolvent,” Gates said. He warned that America was in a “parlous fiscal condition” and that the “gusher” of military spending that followed Sept. 11, 2001, must be capped. “We can’t have a strong military if we have a weak economy,” Gates told reporters who covered the Kansas speech.   On Thursday the defense secretary reiterated his pitch that Congress must stop shoveling money at the military, telling Pentagon reporters: “The defense budget process should no longer be characterized by ‘business as usual’ within this building — or outside of it.” And the Founding Fathers and father of modern economics AGREED that debt-financed wars ruin the economy. While war might make a handful in the military-industrial complex and big banks rich, America’s top military leaders and economists say that would be a very bad idea for the American people. Indeed, military strategists have known for 2,500 years that prolonged wars are disastrous for the nation. War Increases Inequality … And Inequality Hurts the Economy Mainstream economists now admit that runaway inequality destroys the economy. War is great for the super-rich, but horrible for everyone else. Defense contractors, Congress membersand bankers love war, because they make huge profits from financing war. Pulitzer prize winning New York Times reporter James Risen notes that the so-called war on terror has caused “one of the largest transfers of wealth from public to private hands in American history,” and created a new class of war profiteers which Risen calls “the oligarchs of 9/11.” War Increases Terrorism … And Terrorism Hurts the Economy Security experts – conservative hawks and liberal doves alike – agree that waging war in the Middle Eastweakens national security and increases terrorism. See this, this, this, this, this, this and this. Terrorism – in turn – terrorism is bad for the economy. Specifically, a study by Harvard and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) points out: From an economic standpoint, terrorism has been described to have four main effects (see, e.g., US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 2002). First, the capital stock (human and physical) of a country is reduced as a result of terrorist attacks. Second, the terrorist threat induces higher levels of uncertainty. Third, terrorism promotes increases in counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing resources from productive sectors for use in security. Fourth, terrorism is known to affect negatively specific industries such as tourism. The Harvard/NBER concludes: In accordance with the predictions of the model, higher levels of terrorist risks are associated with lower levels of net foreign direct investment positions, even after controlling for other types of country risks. On average, a standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk is associated with a fall in the net foreign direct investment position of about 5 percent of GDP. So the more unnecessary wars American launches and the more innocent civilians we kill, the less foreign investment in America, the more destruction to our capital stock, the higher the level of uncertainty, the more counter-terrorism expenditures and the less expenditures in more productive sectors, and the greater the hit to tourism and some other industries. Moreover: Terrorism has contributed to a decline in the global economy (for example, European Commission, 2001). So military adventurism increases terrorism which hurts the world economy. And see this. Attacking a country which controls the flow of oil also has special impacts on the economy. For example, well-known economist Nouriel Roubini says that attacking Iran would lead to global recession. The IMF says that Iran cutting off oil supplies could raise crude prices 30%. War Destroys Freedom … Which, In Turn, Destroys the Economy A permanent war economy destroys our freedoms.  In turn, loss of liberty is bad for the economy. For example, mass surveillance – under the guise of stopping terrorism – is causing huge economic damage to America’s tech sector. And Mary Theroux pointed out in 2011 – in an article entitled War On Terror Bad for Economy – that the tourism industry is one of the largest employers in the U.S., but tourists are being discouraged from visiting the U.S. due to its intimidating treatment of tourists due to the never-ending wars. War Causes Us to Lose Friends … And Influence While World War II – the last “good war” – may have gained us friends, launching military aggression is now losing America friends, influence and prosperity. For example, the U.S. has launched Cold War 2.0 – casting Russia and China as evil empires – and threatening them in numerous way. For example, the U.S. broke its promise not to encircle Russia, and isusing Ukraine to threaten Russia; and the U.S. is backing Japan in a hot dispute over remote islands, and backing Vietnam in its confrontations with China. And U.S. statements that any country that challenge U.S. military – or even economic – hegemony will be attacked are extremely provocative. This is causing Russia to launch a policy of “de-dollarization”, which China is joining in. This could lead to the collapse of the petrodollar.  

21 марта, 09:19

Robots and Inequality: A Skeptic's Take

Douglas Campbell: Robots and Inequality: A Skeptic's Take: Paul Krugman presents "Robot Geometry" based on Ryan Avent's "Productivity Paradox". It's more-or-less the skill-biased technological change hypothesis, repackaged. Technology makes workers more productive, which reduces demand for workers, as their effective...

21 марта, 07:42

Links for 03-21-17

Robot Geometry (Very Wonkish) - Paul Krugman Market Power Probably Contributes to Inequality - ProMarket 1965: The Year the Fed and LBJ Clashed - FRBRichmond Is the Internet Causing Political Polarization? - NBER The Mechanical Turn in Economics and Its...

20 марта, 20:52

Why Krugman and Stiglitz are no real alternatives to mainstream economics

from Lars Syll Little in the discipline has changed in the wake of the crisis. Mirowski thinks that this is at least in part a result of the impotence of the loyal opposition — those economists such as Joseph Stiglitz or Paul Krugman who attempt to oppose the more viciously neoliberal articulations of economic theory […]

20 марта, 20:26

Paul Krugman: America’s Epidemic of Infallibility

"...inability to engage in reflection and self-criticism is the mark of a tiny, shriveled soul...": America’s Epidemic of Infallibility, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: ...American politics — at least on one side of the aisle — is suffering from an...

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20 марта, 15:27

SELF-AWARENESS FAIL: Paul Krugman says America has a problem admitting when it’s wrong. Hey, did…

SELF-AWARENESS FAIL: Paul Krugman says America has a problem admitting when it’s wrong. Hey, did I miss a Krugman apology for his egregious election-night market prediction?

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20 марта, 00:00

America's Epidemic of Infallibility

Paul Krugman, New York TimesTwo weeks after President Trump claimed, bizarrely, that the Obama administration had wiretapped his campaign, his press secretary suggested that GCHQ — Britain’s counterpart to the National Security Agency — had done the imaginary bugging. British officials were outraged. And soon the British press was reporting that the Trump administration had apologized.

18 марта, 18:23

Факты.Неизвестные стороны экономистов.

Интересные факты про известных экономистов: — Адам Смит постоянно разговаривал сам с собой — Адам Смит дважды убегал с собственной свадьбы и жил с мамой всю жизнь — Давид Рикардо в 13 лет начал торговать на бирже в Голландии, так как, он был евреем, то по законам того времени, работал в углу и не имел права мешать другим. — Давид Рикардо считается единственным в мире буржуазным экономистом, труды и постулаты которого не смог опровергнуть даже Карл Маркс. — Карл Маркс однажды влюбился в богатую девочку. Ее отец был против их брака, потому что, она была протестанткой, а Маркс — сын раввина. Карл об этом узнал, похитил эту девочку, зачал ей ребенка и больше никогда не общался. — Карл Маркс, вождь работающего класса, не работал нигде. Ему отказывали в должностях из-за его членства в сомнительных кружках. Он жил на средства, которые его жена получала, отдавая драгоценности своих родителей в ломбард. — Карл Маркс имел 7 детей. 4 умерло от холеры и голода. Некоторых хоронили без гробов, так как, не было на это денег. Но современники говорят, что Маркс очень любил своих детей. — Карл Маркс имел любовницу — 11-летнюю служанку родителей своей жены. Когда она забеременела от Маркса, Энгельс, чтобы выручить друга, соврал, что ребенок от него. — Джон Кейнс был гомосексуалистом. — Джон Кейнс — самый богатый из великих экономистов. — Джон Кейнс родился в том же году, когда умер Карл Маркс. — Джон Кейнс решил забросить свои однополые утехи, когда влюбился в русскую танцовщицу Лидию Лопухову, позже — они поженились. — Джон Кейнс сочинял музыку для балета и она пользовалась популярностью. — Джон Кейнс выпивал в день по несколько бутылок шампанского, последней его фразой перед смертью было что-то неразборчивое, но очевидцы четко услышали слово «шампанское». — Джон Кейнс учился в Кембридже, 4 его одногруппника получили Нобелевские премии. — Йозеф Шумпетер был уволен из Черновицкого университета в Украине за то, что не соблюдал учебный план. — Йозеф Шумпетер работал в Америке, Англии, Австрии, Германии, Украине, Чехии, Египте, Польше, Франции. — Йозеф Шумпетер считал, что предприниматели — это люди, которым должны служить все остальные, сравнивал бизнесменов с монархами по рангу. — Фридрих Хайек — единственный из великих экономистов, который дожил до момента, когда его пророчества в плане экономического развития мира сбылись. — Фридрих Хайек и Джон Кейнс — это ярые враги в своих теориях о формировании цен и развитии производства. Дело дошло до того, что сформировались целые команды поклонников этих экономистов. Вопрос открыт и сегодня. — Фридрих Хайек — первым в мире экономистом доказал, что время — это один из ключевых факторов развития экономики. — Фридрих Хайек, когда получал премию памяти Нобеля, во время своего выступления заявил, что все экономисты очень далеки от настоящей экономики и он их всех за это ненавидит. — Джон Кеннет Гэлбрейт — аналитик, которого назвали великим экономистом. — Джон Кеннет Гэлбрейт первый в мире из экономистов заявил о том, что не было никакой «пятичленки» (первобытный строй, рабовладение, феодализм, капитализм, социализм). Он утверждал, что все признаки любого из периодов «пятичленки» есть всегда. — Пол Кругман получил Нобелевскую премию случайно. Он 8 лет писал небольшую колонку в одной из американских газет, где постоянно критиковал Буша и прогнозировал финансовый кризис из-за такой политики. Когда кризис случился, его статьи проанализировали и признали его экономическим пророком.  — Пол Кругман считается самым известным экономистом наших дней. (думаю не раз был на смарт-лабе пост.повторю)

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17 марта, 21:00

Why Economists, Financial Types and the Media FAIL to Get the Trump Phenomenon

The following is an attempt to explain the Trump phenomenon. It is NOT a pro-Trump article; it is simply an explanation for how Trump accomplished what he did, and why so few predicted his success and the impact of his economic policies. There’s a simple reason so few people in the media and in finance understand the economic impacts of a Trump Presidency. That reason is summated in this chart: The percentage of people who are business owners relative to the overall employed population, is at an all time low. The Fast Company, Shark Tank echo chamber would have you believe that entrepreneurialism is in a bubble. It’s not. Unprofitable, tech-centric gimmicks that are fueled by loosed monetary policies from the Fed are in a bubble. Legitimate businesses that produce cash flow and grow the middle class are not being created much, if at all. Because the US has been waging war on the self-employed since the 1950’s, we not only have very few self-employed people in the workforce, we also have multiple generations of journalists who have ZERO experience engaging with those who run an actual business. This is why NO ONE in the media gets Trump or the impact of his policies. None of them have ever had to make payroll or create something from nothing. They’ve spent the last eight years literally kowtowing to a man who openly told the self-employed, “you didn’t build that.” The same can be said for economists. Time and again, you will see academics like Paul Krugman write op-eds suggesting that Trump is going to collapse the economy. Krugman has never once had to actually run a business. His entire career has been one of writing the equivalent of glorified book reports for other people who write glorified book reports to read. If you ran a McDonalds or plumbing business implementing anything Krugman claims, you’d be broke within six months. The man lives in a world of excel spreadsheets and faculty meetings, not the world of revenues and payroll. So what is Trump doing? First off, Trump is getting rid of regulations. Economists don’t understand the impact of this because none of their models include regulations. According to an economist, you simply “start a business.” These people have no concept of the business costs of licenses and the like. Business owners care far more about regulations than taxes. Get ride of stifling regulations and you can start growing your business more aggressively. I can tell you, business owners would happily pay more in taxes if they were doing 50% more in revenues. No business owner feels successful paying less in taxes on a business with zero growth. Regarding taxes themselves, Trump understands them better than anyone in politics in the last 30 years. Why? Because as a business owner, Trump has been paying more taxes than the media or politicians can believe. This is why the obsession with Trump’s personal taxes is beyond moronic. As a business owner, Trump has been paying taxes on property, payroll tax, taxes on some products, excise taxes, and a slew of others than journalists and economists don’t even know exist. These people think taxes are something you pay on income. For a business owner taxes are present in every single step of operations. And if you’re profitable, you then have to pay taxes on the money you’ve made. Finally, Trump is attempting to reform what is clearly a disastrous economic system. The reality is that quality of life has been falling in the US since the ‘70s. This reality stares everyone in the face, but the chattering classes ignore it to tout “advances” like iPads and the like. In the 1950s, one parent worked and people got along just fine. Today, two parents work and most people struggle to get by. There is no way to spin this as indicating quality of life has improved in the US. The fact that the economic policies since 1971 have increased the number of billionaires doesn’t mean they (the policies) have been good for the US as a whole. All these policies have done is dramatically increase the concentration of wealth, which in turn has allowed a small circle of people to exert an absurd influence on the US political and economic spheres (note that the media is now largely owned and managed by a group of billionaires). All of the above contributed to Trump’s winning the US Presidency, taking out two political dynasties (the Bushes and Clintons), despite the efforts of a media that was literally colluding with Trump’s opponent. That is reality whether you like it or not. The fact that many continue to see Trump through the lens of identity politics only shows how disconnected the media has become from reality. People want jobs and want to make a decent living. Once that is achieved, THEN they care about other items No one in history has ever said, “well, I can’t get a job, there is zero upwards mobility for my future, and my kids are worse off than I am… but at least I know that [insert random identity politics cause] went well.” Trump, whose entire career has been one gigantic effort to make himself wealthy gets this. People who have started and their own businesses get this. But it seems almost no one else does. Best Regards Graham Summers Chief Market Strategist Phoenix Capital Research      

17 марта, 11:44

Paul Krugman: Conservative Fantasies, Colliding With Reality

Talk is cheap: Conservative Fantasies, Colliding With Reality, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: This week the Trump administration put out a budget blueprint — or more accurately, a “budget” blueprint. After all, real budgets detail where the money comes from...

15 марта, 18:49

The Appealing Logic That Underlies Trump’s Economic Ideas

His policies may fail to deliver, but his rhetoric answers a question millions of Americans are asking about a globalized economy: What about me?

14 марта, 21:34

Populism and the Politics of Health

Paul Krugman: Populism and the Politics of Health: What’s next on health care? Truly, I have no idea. The AHCA is a real stinker... But ... starting off the Trump legislative era with the crashing and burning of Obamacare repeal...

14 марта, 09:04

Links for 03-14-17

Trumpcare vs. Obamacare: Apocalypse Foretold - Paul Krugman Wages Are Up? Not For Ordinary Workers, They Aren't - Kevin Drum The Trump administration dons a tinfoil hat - The Washington Post On the Cost of Holding Reserves. Sometimes It Is...

14 марта, 03:17

The Banking Secret that Neither Economists Nor Laypeople Know … Which Is Destroying the Real Economy (While Making a Few King)

Private Banks - Not the Government or Central Banks - Create 97 Percent of All Money Who creates money? Most people assume that money is created by governments ... or perhaps central banks. In reality - as noted by the Bank of England, Britain's central bank - 97% of all money in circulation is created by private banks. Bank Loans = Creating Money Out of Thin Air But how do private banks create money? We've all been taught that banks first take in deposits, and then they loan out those deposits to folks who want to borrow. But this is a myth ... The Bank of England the German central bank have explained that loans are extended before deposits exist ... and that the loans create deposits: The above is from an official video released by the Bank of England. The Bank of England explains: Whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money. The reality of how money is created today differs from the description found in some economics textbooks: Rather than banks receiving deposits when households save and then lending them out, bank lending creates deposits. *** One common misconception is that banks act simply as intermediaries, lending out the deposits that savers place with them. In this view deposits are typically ‘created’ by the saving decisions of households, and banks then ‘lend out’ those existing deposits to borrowers, for example to companies looking to finance investment or individuals wanting to purchase houses. *** In reality in the modern economy, commercial banks are the creators of deposit money .... Rather than banks lending out deposits that are placed with them, the act of lending creates deposits — the reverse of the sequence typically described in textbooks. *** Commercial banks create money, in the form of bank deposits, by making new loans. When a bank makes a loan, for example to someone taking out a mortgage to buy a house, it does not typically do so by giving them thousands of pounds worth of banknotes. Instead, it credits their bank account with a bank deposit of the size of the mortgage. At that moment, new money is created. For this reason, some economists have referred to bank deposits as ‘fountain pen money’, created at the stroke of bankers’ pens when they approve loans. *** This description of money creation contrasts with the notion that banks can only lend out pre-existing money, outlined in the previous section. Bank deposits are simply a record of how much the bank itself owes its customers. So they are a liability of the bank, not an asset that could be lent out. Similarly, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago published a booklet called “Modern Money Mechanics” in the 1960s stating: [Banks] do not really pay out loans from the money they receive as deposits. If they did this, no additional money would be created. What they do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the borrowers’ transaction accounts. Monetary expert and economics professor Randall Wray explained to Washington's Blog that: Bank deposits are bank IOUs. Economics professor Richard Werner - who obtained his PhD in economics from Oxford, was the first Shimomura Fellow at the Research Institute for Capital Formation at the Development Bank of Japan, Visiting Researcher at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies at the Bank of Japan, Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Monetary and Fiscal Studies at the Ministry of Finance, and chief economist of Jardine Fleming - was granted access to study a bank's books, and confirmed that private banks create money when they simply create fictitious deposits into a borrower's account. Werner explains: What banks do is to simply reclassify their accounts payable items arising from the act of lending as ‘customer deposits’, and the general public, when receiving payment in the form of a transfer of bank deposits, believes that a form of money had been paid into the bank. *** No balance is drawn down to make a payment to the borrower. *** The bank does not actually make any money available to the borrower: No transfer of funds from anywhere to the customer or indeed the customer’s account takes place. There is no equal reduction in the balance of another account to defray the borrower. Instead, the bank simply re-classified its liabilities, changing the ‘accounts payable’ obligation arising from the bank loan contract to another liability category called ‘customer deposits’. While the borrower is given the impression that the bank had transferred money from its capital, reserves or other accounts to the borrower’s account (as indeed major theories of banking, the financial intermediation and fractional reserve theories, erroneously claim), in reality this is not the case. Neither the bank nor the customer deposited any money, nor were any funds from anywhere outside the bank utilised to make the deposit in the borrower’s account. Indeed, there was no depositing of any funds. *** The bank’s liability is simply re-named a ‘bank deposit’. *** Banks create money when they grant a loan: they invent a fictitious customer deposit, which the central bank and all users of our monetary system, consider to be ‘money’, indistinguishable from ‘real’ deposits not newly invented by the banks. Thus banks do not just grant credit, they create credit, and simultaneously they create money. *** Instead of discharging their liability to pay out loans, the banks merely reclassify their liabilities originating from loan contracts from what should be an ‘accounts payable’ item to ‘customer deposit’ .... How Can Banks DO This? Professor Werner explains the reason that banks - but no one else - can create money out of thin air is that they are the only institution exempted from normal accounting rules. Specifically, every other company would be busted for fraudulent accounting if they conjured new money out of thin air by reclassifying a liability (i.e. an accounts payable) as an asset (i.e. a deposit). But the banks have pushed through exemptions so that they don't have to follow normal accounting rules: What enables banks to create credit and hence money is their exemption from the Client Money Rules. Thanks to this exemption they are allowed to keep customer deposits on their own balance sheet. This means that depositors who deposit their money with a bank are no longer the legal owners of this money. Instead, they are just one of the general creditors of the bank whom it owes money to. It also means that the bank is able to access the records of the customer deposits held with it and invent a new ‘customer deposit’ that had not actually been paid in, but instead is a re-classified accounts payable liability of the bank arising from a loan contract. *** What makes banks unique and explains the combination of lending and deposit-taking under one roof is the more fundamental fact that they do not have to segregate client accounts, and thus are able to engage in an exercise of ‘re-labelling’ and mixing different liabilities, specifically by re-assigning their accounts payable liabilities incurred when entering into loan agreements, to another category of liability called ‘customer deposits’. What distinguishes banks from non-banks is their ability to create credit and money through lending, which is accomplished by booking what actually are accounts payable liabilities as imaginary customer deposits, and this is in turn made possible by a particular regulation that renders banks unique: their exemption from the Client Money Rules. [Werner gives a concrete example on British law for banking and non-banking institutions.] Sound fraudulent? Professor Werner thinks so, also: But he also makes some more important points ... What Does It All Mean? The Implications of Money Creation By Private Banks Mainstream economists believe that private debt doesn’t even “exist“ as a force that acts on the economy. For example, Ben Bernanke and Paul Krugman assume that huge levels of household debt don’t hurt the economy because more debt among households just means that savers have loaned them money … i.e. that it is a net wash to the economy. To make this assumption, they rely on the myth debunked above ... that banks can only loan as much money out as they have in deposits. In reality, 143 years of history shows that excessive private debt – in and of itself – can cause depressions. Moreover, Professor Werner points out that attempts to shore up the banking system with capital requirements (such as the Basel accords) are doomed to failure, since they don't recognize that banks create money at will: Basel rules were doomed to failure, since they consider banks as financial intermediaries, when in actual fact they are the creators of the money supply. Since banks invent money as fictitious deposits, it can be readily shown that capital adequacy based bank regulation does not have to restrict bank activity: banks can create money and hence can arrange for money to be made available to purchase newly issued shares that increase their bank capital. In other words, banks could simply invent the money that is then used to increase their capital. This is what Barclays Bank did in 2008, in order to avoid the use of tax money to shore up the bank’s capital: Barclays ‘raised’ £5.8 bn in new equity from Gulf sovereign wealth investors — by, it has transpired, lending them the money! As is explained in Werner (2014a), Barclays implemented a standard loan operation, thus inventing the £5.8 bn deposit ‘lent’ to the investor. This deposit was then used to ‘purchase’ the newly issued Barclays shares. Thus in this case the bank liability originating from the bank loan to the Gulf investor transmuted from (1) an accounts payable liability to (2) a customer deposit liability, to finally end up as (3) equity — another category on the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet. Effectively, Barclays invented its own capital. This certainly was cheaper for the UK tax payer than using tax money. As publicly listed companies in general are not allowed to lend money to firms for the purpose of buying their stocks, it was not in conformity with the Companies Act 2006 (Section 678, Prohibition of assistance for acquisition of shares in public company). But regulators were willing to overlook this. As Werner (2014b) argues, using central bank or bank credit creation is in principle the most cost-effective way to clean up the banking system and ensure that bank credit growth recovers quickly. The Barclays case is however evidence that stricter capital requirements do not necessary prevent banks from expanding credit and money creation, since their creation of deposits generates more purchasing power with which increased bank capital can also be funded. Moreover, Werner points out that banks create the boom-bust cycle by lending too much for speculative, non-productive purposes: By failing to take into account the fact that banks create money, economists and governments are sowing the seeds for future crashes. But the economics field is very resistant to change ... Economics professor Steve Keen notes in Forbes: In any genuine science, empirical data like this would have forced the orthodoxy to rethink its position. But in economics, the profession has sailed on, blithely unaware of how their model of “banks as intermediaries between savers and investors” is seriously wrong, and now blinds them to the remedy for the crisis as it previously blinded them to the possibility of a crisis occurring. A wit once defined an economist as someone who, when shown that something works in practice, replies “Ah! But does it work in theory?” And a 2016 IMF paper notes: Around [the 1960s] banks began to completely disappear from most macroeconomic models of how the economy works.­ This helps explain why, when faced with the Great Recession in 2008, macroeconomics was initially unprepared to contribute much to the analysis of the interaction of banks with the macro economy. Today there is a sizable body of research on this topic, but the literature still has many difficulties.­ *** Virtually all recent mainstream neoclassical economic research is based on the highly misleading “intermediation of loanable funds” description of banking ... *** In modern neoclassical intermediation of loanable funds theories, banks are seen as intermediating real savings. Lending, in this narrative, starts with banks collecting deposits of previously saved real resources (perishable consumer goods, consumer durables, machines and equipment, etc.) from savers and ends with the lending of those same real resources to borrowers. But such institutions simply do not exist in the real world. There are no loanable funds of real resources that bankers can collect and then lend out. Banks do of course collect checks or similar financial instruments, but because such instruments—to have any value—must be drawn on funds from elsewhere in the financial system, they cannot be deposits of new funds from outside the financial system. New funds are produced only with new bank loans (or when banks purchase additional financial or real assets), through book entries made by keystrokes on the banker’s keyboard at the time of disbursement. This means that the funds do not exist before the loan and that they are in the form of electronic entries—or, historically, paper ledger entries—rather than real resources.­ *** This “financing through money creation” function of banks has been repeatedly described in publications of the world’s leading central banks—see McLeay, Radia, and Thomas (2014a, 2014b) for excellent summaries. What has been much more challenging, however, is the incorporation of these insights into macroeconomic models [how true]. What's the Solution? We've seen the problems created by failing to take into account the fact that private banks create money. But there are solutions ... Initially, Professor Werner notes that preventing banks from creating new money to loan for speculation and mere personal consumption would prevent booms and busts: Werner says that the "Asian Miracle" happened for exactly this reason: Additionally, allowing small community banks to grow would cause the real economy to flourish ... since small banks loan to small businesses (which create most of the jobs), while big banks only loan to giant companies and speculators: Indeed, big banks are virtually out of the business of traditional lending ... and small banks are the only ones funding Main Street. Werner says this is the secret of Germany's economic success: Postscript: Due to their unique money-printing powers, banks now literally own the world … including the entire political system. There's a war raging in connection with banking. Remember that the giant banks tried to kill off community banking through the Trans Pacific Partnership. And as Professor Werner points out, the European Central Bank is currently in a war to destroy community banks: One of key battles for prosperity and democracy today is decentralization of the banking system.

14 марта, 01:20

Procrastinating on March 13, 2017

**Over at [Equitable Growth](http://EquitableGrowth.org): Must- and Should-Reads:** * _[Clearing the Way: How Can Government Promote Shared Prosperity? | Equitable Growth][]_ * **Kavya Vaghul**: _[College may not be the great equalizer across race and ethnicity | Equitable Growth][]_ * **Elizabeth Jacobs**: _[Does targeted or universal pre-Kindergarten better serve low-income kids? |...

02 февраля, 14:18

7 самых успешных управляющих хедж-фондов

Лондонский фонд LCH Investments, подразделение Edmond de Rothschild Capital Holdings Limited, опубликовал свой ежегодный рейтинг 20 самых успешных фондовых управляющих 2016 г.

31 мая 2015, 21:21

новая норма от Лиссабона до Владивостока

Прочитав статью о плачевном состоянии экономики Финляндии, Пол Кругман предложил посмотреть в странах еврозоны на изменение ВВП на душу с 2007 года. Латвия, которую Кругман продолжает ошибочно ругать за якобы неправильную антикризисную политику, на фоне остальных стран с фиксированным курсом выглядит совсем не плохо. Но в целом картинка окончательной победы Европейского союза довольно депрессивная. Полная деградация стран победившего евро-капитализма, губят людей европейские институты...Не удивительно, что кризис еврозоны все еще продолжается, сохраняется недовольство Грецией, растет нелюбовь к трудовым и прочим мигрантам. Это экономика, а не российская пропаганда, виновата в росте противоречий и популярности евроскептиков. Многие сейчас ругаются и переживают из-за замедления экономического роста в России после 2008. На всякий случай глянул на регион от Лиссабона до Владивостока :) За базу выбрал не 2007, а 2008. Картинка игнорирует докризисные темпы роста, которые, например, у прибалтов, России и Беларуси были очень высокими, намного лучше, чем в Польше. За такой длинный срок правильнее было бы сравнивать ВВП на душу, как у Кругмана, но есть некоторые сомнения в точности данных по населению. Если считать на душу, то рост Турции, Узбекистана и Таджикистана, естественно, был бы поменьше. Украина выглядела бы получше, но все равно была бы последней в списке. Беларусь и Польша так и остались бы рядом, как близнецы. В общем и целом сокращение разрыва между доходами богатых и бедных продолжалось.

10 декабря 2013, 22:28

Почему должны расти зарплаты

Наступила пора развлечений – или, во всяком случае, пора провести время в торговых центрах. Также, по традиции, это время подумать о положении тех, кому повезло меньше – например, о человеке по другую сторону кассы. оследние несколько десятилетий были трудными для многих американских рабочих, но особенно тяжело пришлось людям, занятым в розничной торговле – это категория, включающая продавцов Walmart и сотрудников McDonald’s. Несмотря на остаточное действие финансового кризиса, Америка сейчас гораздо богаче, чем 40 лет назад. Однако зарплата неруководящего персонала в розничной торговле, скорректированная с учетом инфляции сократилась почти на 30% с 1973 г. Так можно ли как-то помочь этим рабочим, многим из которых, чтобы накормить семью, нужны продуктовые карточки (при условии, что они смогут их получить), и многие из которых зависят от программы Medicaid (опять же при условии доступа к ней) для получения необходимого медицинского обслуживания? Да. Мы можем сохранить и расширить продуктовые карточки, а не сокращать программу, как этого хотят Республиканцы. Мы можем обеспечить успешное проведение реформ в сфере здравоохранения, несмотря на попытки правых подорвать процесс реализации программы. И мы можем повысить минимальную зарплату. Для начала - несколько фактов. Несмотря на увеличение минимальной, национальной, зарплаты несколько лет назад, она все же остается очень низкой по историческим меркам, значительно отставая от инфляции и средних уровней зарплаты. Кто же получает этот небольшой минимум? По большому счету, это мужчины или женщины, работающие на кассе: почти 60% американских рабочих, получающих минимальную зарплату, занимаются продажей продуктов питания или оказанием сопутствующих услуг. Между прочим, это значит, что один из аргументов, часто выдвигаемых против повышения зарплат - угроза конкуренции со стороны иностранных компаний – в данном случае не убедителен: американцы не поедут в Китай за гамбургерами и картошкой фри. Тем не менее, даже если международная конкуренция – не проблема, можем ли на самом деле помочь рабочим, просто законодательно установив более высокую зарплату? Не нарушает ли это закон спроса и предложения? Не поразят ли нас боги рынка невидимой рукой? Но есть множество свидетельств того, что происходит при повышении минимальной зарплаты. И результат является положительным: повышение минимальной зарплаты мало влияет, или совсем не влияет, на занятость, при этом значительно увеличивает доходы рабочих. Важно понять, насколько можно доверять таким доказательствам. Обычно экономическому анализу препятствует отсутствие контролируемых экспериментов. Например, мы можем увидеть, что случилось с американской экономикой после внедрения стимулов, предложенных Обамой, но мы не можем оценить состояние альтернативной вселенной, в которой не было стимулов, и не можем сравнить результаты. Однако существуют примеры, когда один штат поднимал минимальную зарплату, а другой нет. Если бы что-то подтверждало значительное негативное влияние повышения минимальной зарплаты на сферу занятости, подобный результат был бы очевиден при сравнении штатов. Но этого не произошло. Так что повышение минимальной зарплаты помогло бы низкооплачиваемым рабочим, без особых негативных последствий. И мы говорим о большом числе людей. В начале этого года Институт экономической политики подсчитал, что повышение минимальной национальной зарплаты с 7,25 доллара до 10,10 доллара принесло бы пользу 30 миллионам рабочих. Большинство получило бы непосредственную выгоду, поскольку сейчас они зарабатывают менее 10,10 доллара в час; а остальные получили бы косвенную выгоду, так как их оплата на самом деле привязана к минимуму – например, управляющие магазинов быстрого питания, получающие немного (но только немного) больше, работников, которыми они руководят. Сейчас многие экономисты испытывают неприязнь ко всему, что связано с установлением цен, даже при наличии положительных последствий. Некоторые из этих скептиков выступают против всего, что помогло бы низкооплачиваемым рабочим. Другие утверждают, что мы должны обеспечить субсидии и расширить программу E.I.T.C. (налоговый зачет за заработанный доход), которая, в сущности, оказывает значительную помощь малообеспеченным семьям. Между прочим, я полностью за расширение программы E.I.T.C. Но, оказывается, существуют веские причины рассматривать минимальную зарплату и E.I.T.C. как дополнение друг к другу, а не замену. Следует увеличить и то, и другое. К сожалению, учитывая политическую реальность, нет никаких шансов, что Конгресс примет закон об увеличении помощи работающему бедному населению. С другой стороны, минимальная зарплата может быть повышена благодаря огромной государственной поддержке. Эта поддержка исходит не только от Демократов или даже самовыдвиженцев; за повышение выступает подавляющее большинство Республиканцев (57%) и консерваторы (59%). Словом, повышение минимальной зарплаты помогло бы многим американцам, и, соответственно, американской экономике. Пол Кругман Подготовлено Forexpf.ru по материалам New York Times

12 ноября 2013, 19:58

Бернанке, не Кругман

Пол Кругман предложил вниманию читателей свою лекцию (с двумя моделями ) о роли политики обменного курса и наличия собственной валюты во время кризиса. Он настаивает на том, что спекулятивный кризис доверия практически не возможен в развитых странах с плавающим валютным курсом. Эту ситуацию он противопоставляет "греческим" кризисам в странах еврозоны, повторяя свои обобщения о природе кризиса в странах валютного союза. На доброжелательных ирландцев повторение пройденного большого впечатления не произвело.  Одним из важных элементов в рассказе Кругмана является хорошо знакомая роль правительственных и частных займов в собственной валюте, а не иностранной. Ничего нового для знакомых с "первородным грехом" в экономике и тех, кто слыхал о работах Кармен Рейхарт с коллегами про "боязнь плавания" и "неожиданные астановки"... В дополнение к лекции, за последние недели Кругман разместил в своем блоге серию записей с атаками на Германию, защитой Франции и критикой ЕЦБ с евробюрократами. Большинство из этих нападок повторяют тезисы 2-3-4-х летней давности. Как будто бы за это время мы не узнали ничего нового. Версию о том, что кризис в еврозоне был вызван потерей конкурентоспособности стран периферии в пользу Германии, мы обсуждали в начале 2010 здесь, и потом часто (начиная с немцы против немцев). С тех пор ко многим экономистам пришло понимание природы кризиса в Латвии, затем в Ирландии, затем в Италии и Испании.  Как здесь уже записано, огромным, хотя и запоздалым, ударом по позициям Кругмана была недавняя статья Бланшара о кризисе в Латвии. Благодаря внимательному изучению опыта этих стран, понимание кризиса в еврозоне стало намного более глубоким. На версию о потере конкурентоспособности теперь приходится, быть может, процентов 10-20 его объяснения :), и она теперь годится разве что для лекции в сельском клубе... Лекция Бернанке (там же, интересно) о кризисе как классическом набеге на финансовый сектор и панике на финансовых рынках, важна для понимания уроков кризиса в США, в еврозоне и Великобритании.  В еврозоне эти моменты были особенно важны, потому что банки там были слабее, и механизмы защиты от паники были институцуионально не проработанными. Рассмотрение еврозоны Кругманом как одной страны граничит с профанацией анализа.  Ожидать от правительства Германии действий не в интересах экономики своей страны, а в интересах экономики Греции или Испании, мне кажется верхом наивности. Конечно, валютный союз накладывает дополнительные обязательства на правительства еврозоны, и за время кризиса они обсуждались, менялись, кодифицировались. Но национальные правительства там пока никто не отменял, и избирают партию Меркель граждане Германии, а не кругманы. Критика Кругманом денежно-кредитной политики ЕЦБ, как мне кажется, тоже несправедлива, но об этом лучше черкнуть отдельно. Большинству, наверное, давно не интересно разбираться в уже разобранном, но Кармен Рейнхарт не поленилась указать нобелевскому лауреату на его ошибочные комментарии к картинке про Великобританию. А о том, что "греческий кризис" был только в Греции, что еврозона не страна, похожая на США, и что банковский кризис в еврозоне многим отличался от механики кризисов в других странах, никто уже блогеру не жаждет рассказывать... Офтопик: Своими грубыми нападками, часто выходящими далеко за рамки приличий, Кругман удобен тем, кому выгодно атаковать ЕЦБ, Европейскую комиссию и антикризисную политику в Европе.  С одной стороны, Кругмана нельзя игнорировать, потому что блогер-экономист пользуется популярностью и авторитетом среди читателей и многих коллег. С другой стороны, отвечать ему грубостями не каждый захочет и не каждый может себе это позволить. Поэтому европейцы пытаются отвечать взвешенными заметками, как Бути и Падоан здесь и, в ответ Кругману, здесь.  Или как только что тужился сделать один из бывших лидеров ЕЦБ Смаги в заметке "Аскетизм и тупость" :) Народная мудрость: "Против лома нет приема, если нет другого лома".  Для ответа Кругману, наверное, нужен евро-Ильвес с большой командой неглупых экономистов :) Рогофф и Рейнхарт, как мне кажется, лучше других защищались от гадких наездов Кругмана. По крайней мере в среде профессионалов им удалось поставить Кругмана на место. Но в популярном сознании Рогофф и Рейнхарт все равно подозреваются в тяжких грехах.  Утешение атакуемых Кругманом в том, что люди, принимающие решения по антикризисной политике, слушают не Кругмана, а его оппонентов. И народ, который свои правительства избирает, этих людей поддерживает.

26 апреля 2013, 12:44

Странглия, Мервин Кинг и Сергей Игнатьев

На графике ВВП Великобритании (картинка из свежайшей речи одного из лидеров Банка Англии, там другие есть). Красным показан докризисный тренд, а синим жизнь. Вчера все с напряжением ждали, объявят ли народу об уже ТРЕТЬЕЙ по счету рецессии, но бог миловал и объявили о небольшом росте в первом квартале. Почему нет роста в любимом россиянами Лондонграде и его окрестностях?Кругман, ДеЛонг и другие уверяют своих читателей, что это из-за бюджетной консолидации бюджетного аскетизма, как в России.  Они видят на этой картинке ошибку в статье Рейнхарт-Рогофф 2010 года, и письмо о бюджетной дисциплине, которое в феврале 2010 года подписал Кеннет Рогофф вместе с другими экономистами. Статья и письмо подтолкнули правительство Камерона на ужасную экономическую политику и лишили британцев благосостояния, измеряемого разницей между красной революционной линией и синей, преступной. Чтобы убедиться, что красная линия является для Кругмана и ДеЛонга критерием успеха, желающие могут почитать свежую заметку ДеЛонга про США или поискать его и Кругмана многочисленные атаки на Великобританию, а про Латвию с Эстонией я лучше промолчу.Вопрос на засыпку про бюджетный аскетизм упирается в Великобританию по ряду причин.  У страны своя валюта, которая, как постоянно повторяет Кругман и Ко. необходима для успеха.  С начала кризиса фунт стерлингов подешевел процентов на 20-25, что, по мнению Кругмана, должно было привести с скачку экспорта.  Инфляция была намного выше 2%, к чему тоже призывали Кругман и другие экономисты.  Много чего было в Великобритании в кризисные годы. А роста не было и пока нет.  Поэтому для Кругмана, ДеЛонга и их единомышленников  главным виновником преступления должен быть бюджетный аскетизм.  В Великобритании, по их мнению, нужен был значительный бюджетный стимул, достаточный для быстрого возвращения к красной черте.  На всякий случай напомню сразу, что дефицит бюджета в Странглии на автомате сразу скакнул к 10-11% ВВП (картинка).  Этого, по мнению борцов с бюджетным аскетизмом, было мало, надо было гораздо больше. По мнению Кругмана, инвесторы бы этого совсем не испугались, потому что никакой "Волшебницы доверие" нет (добавим от себя следствие: нет и "Волшебницы Недоверие").  Вот свежая заметка ДеЛонга, где он обвиняет Камерона и "правых" экономистов в попытке реализовать в Великобритании "стимилирующее сокращение" дефицита бюджета а ля Алесина.Как и в случае российских дебатов о замедлении роста, за более объективным мнением я обратился к уходящему руководителю центрального банка - Банка Англии - Мервину Кингу, коллеге Сергея Игнатьева. В своей январской речи Кинг подробно рассказывал о диагнозе, лечении и будущем экономики Великобритании.  Речь советую почитать. В отличие от Банка России, британцы публикуют речи своих руководителей, чтобы каждый желающий не гадал, какие у них мысли, а мог прочитать речь и поглазеть на иллюстрации к ней и даже почитать указанную дополнительную литературу.Кинг сразу же напомнил слушателям об избыточном докризисном энтузиазме:Much of this reflects the inevitable correction of exuberance on the part of borrowers and lenders, the conditions for which were created by the failure to tackle the global imbalances that left most major countries with unsustainable exchange rates, unsustainable paths of consumption, saving and borrowing, and unsustainably low long-term real interest rates.Затем отметил три фактора, сдерживающих рост, некоторые из них внутренние, некоторые внешние. Не буду пересказывать, но среди них упомянуты цены на еду и энергию.  Системный финансовый кризис привел к нарушениям в банковском секторе, толкнул банки к осторожности и затруднил доступ к кредиту, особенно для мелких и средних предприятий. Но среди причин анемичного роста у Кинга нет даже намека на излишний бюджетный аскетизм.  Единственное упоминание о бюджетной политике во всей речи сводится к ограничениям в ее использовании из-за большого госдолга:In many countries, including the UK, fiscal policy is constrained by the size of government indebtedness, and monetary policy has come to be seen as the only game in town.Нет бюджетного стимулирования и среди нескольких рецептов лечения (помимо денежно-кредитной политики КуЕ). Рецепта три, включая укрепление банков, увеличение экономического потенциала за счет структурных реформ и (все еще надежда на)  восстановление еврозоны и слабый фунт стерлингов/экспорт:What are those other policies? They come under three headings: restoring confidence in our banks, reforms to raise the future potential supply of our economy, and changes in the world economy and exchange rates.Этот диагноз, рецепты лечения и прогноз мы услышали от одного из сотен британских экономистов, которые в свое время в открытом письме возмутились преступным бюджетным аскетизмом Маргарет Тэтчер :). Кто-нибудь наверняка скажет мне, что старик Кинг кривит душой, что не хочет осложнять жизнь правительству Камерона. Но ведь он пожилой уже человек, ему нечего терять, кроме своего доброго имени. Не боится же он требовать значительного дополнительного увеличения акционерного капитала у всесильных банков, которые могли бы его подкармливать в старости. Неужели Кинг промолчал бы, если бы действительно верил во вред бюджетной дисциплины?Что такое ужасное делает правительство Великобритании, какой такой особый аскетизм в Лондонграде?  Смотрим еще раз на сокращение дефицита, ожидаемое в разных странах за три года 2011-2013, и видим, что у британцев сокращение дефицита очень похоже на небольшое сокращение в других странах, как у Франции или Бельгии, и меньше, чем в США, не говоря уже о больных еврозоны Испании, Ирландии и Ко., которым Кругман, кстати, тоже раньше регулярно предлагал активнее стимулировать экономику дополнительными бюджетными расходами (?!).Можно допустить, что сейчас, когда инвесторы успокоились после испуга 2008-2011 гг., британцы могли бы сокращать дефицит чуть медленнее, как это может себе теперь легко позволить Эстония или Латвия. Сейчас, а не в 2010, когда инвесторы, включая Билла Гросса, буквально тряслись от страха. И американцы могли бы сейчас дать слабину. Но надо же быть реалистами. К красной линии они бы все равно долго не вернулись. И Кругман с ДеЛонгом все равно будут ругать всех и вся во всю силу своих легких.  Никакого чрезмерного аскетизма в Великобритании нет, просто не нашли там вовремя сланцевый газ, банковский сектор там побольше и еврозона поближе. Разница между Великобританией и США еще и в том, что в Америке нет никаких бюджетных планов, а есть секвестр, знакомый нам по предкризисным 1990м. Там правит политический паралич. Планы же британцев известны заранее, и за выполнением планов уже давно следят специально обученные независимые люди в Офисе бюджетной ответственности, как и учил реалист Кеннет Рогофф.ДОП: Пока я кропал и выдергивал из интернета чужие мысли и картинки, появился пользительный пост zhu_s...Как я уже заметил в тексте, мы не можем ознакомиться с речью Сергея Игнатьева о причинах замедления роста российской экономики и посмотреть на познавательные картинки-иллюстрации к его увлекательному рассказу.  Но у нас есть zhu_s, который думает и пишет на эту важную для экономической политики тему.

28 февраля 2013, 20:13

Стимулирование или спад? МАКРОЭКОНОМИКА РЕЦЕССИИ

ДЕЛОНГ: Период между 1985 и 2007 – период «Великого Спокойствия» - Фед Резерв и Правительство США с одной стороны на Западе, а центральные банки и финансовые институты Евросоюза на востоке Атлантического океана обеспечили устойчивое макроэкономическое окружение в рамках которого частный бизнес сектор, рабочие и инвесторы могли реализовывать свои экономические устремления. В США в годовом выражении прирост номинального ВВП опускался ниже 4% только 3 раза в эти годы и превышал 7% только 2 раза в течение 22 лет, уровень потребительской инфляции был выше 5% 3 раза и падал ниже 2%  только 2 раза в течение этих 22 лет, а уровень занятости взрослого населения (отношение числа занятых к общей численности взрослого населения) колебался в границах 60-64%. Западная Европа переживала примерно такой же период «Великого Спокойствия» с низкой инфляцией, плавным ростом и снижающейся безработицей. Как говорил Роберт Лукас в эти спокойные годы: «проблема предотвращения депрессии была решена». Далее в 2008-2009-м гг. уровень прироста номинального ВВП в США рухнул к -3% - неожиданное значительное снижение для любого, кто ожидает «Великого Спокойствия» с прежним уровнем роста расходов, потребительская инфляция ушла в отрицательную зону (-2%), а занятость населения упала с 63% до 58-59%. В Западной Европе изначально рецессия была слабее, но последующая ситуация на рынке труда оказалась более разочаровывающей, так что в настоящий момент чистое снижение к тренду производства и занятости в Западной Европе превышает аналогичные показатели в США. Проблема предотвращения депрессии и её излечения не была решена. В этом контексте мы собрались обсудить следующие четыре вопроса: Может ли политика ФРС, ЕЦБ, государственных органов адоптироваться так, чтобы в короткие сроки вернуть уровень занятости к значениям которые мы в течение 1985-2007 считали «нормальными», а темпы роста занятости к уровням Рейгановского бума 1982-1989 гг.? Если может, какой должна быть эта политика? Если может, является ли эта политика приемлемой? Как ваше мнение на вопросы 1-3 отличается от мнения 6 лет назад?  Карло Коттарелли из Международного валютного фонда.