Using US Census data for 1990-2000, we estimate effects of NAFTA on US wages, focusing on differences by gender. We find that NAFTA tariff reductions are associated with substantially reduced wage growth for married blue-collar women, much larger than the effect for other demographic groups. We investigate several possible explanations for this finding. It is not explained by differential sensitivity of female-dominated occupations to trade shocks, or by household bargaining that makes married women workers less able to change their industry of employment than other workers. We find some support for an explanation based on an equilibrium theory of selective non-participation in the labor market, whereby some of the higher-wage married women workers in their industry drop out of the labor market in response to their industry's loss of tariff. However, this does not fully explain the findings so we are left with a puzzle.
Торговые пошлины на ввоз в США стали и алюминия вступили в силу. В последний момент Дональд Трамп внял предупреждениям и отсрочил введение заградительных мер для стран-союзниц. И теперь окончательно ясно, что главной целью для него был Китай. Пекин принимает ответные меры — обнародован список из 128...
Whatever one thinks of Trump, love him, loathe him, mock him or respect him, he's managed to do one thing - in the one year that he's been president, his ad hoc, haphazard, chaotic, irrational and unpredictable style of governance may have thrown the country, its institutions, its "establishment", and certainly the press for loop, but it has also achieved one other thing: it has made the "globalists" conclude that the "liberal world order" which they created - which has resulted in the greatest accumulation of wealth by the fewest number of people; in the greatest political, social, ethnic, economic and financial polarization in recent history; in a global debt load that has put the world on the verge of financial catastrophe (only offset by constant central bank "confidence" injections); and which the "Trump vote" was a protest against - is almost over. And nobody says it better than Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in the following essay: Liberal World Order, R.I.P. After a run of nearly one thousand years, quipped the French philosopher and writer Voltaire, the fading Holy Roman Empire was neither holy nor Roman nor an empire. Today, some two and a half centuries later, the problem, to paraphrase Voltaire, is that the fading liberal world order is neither liberal nor worldwide nor orderly. The United States, working closely with the United Kingdom and others, established the liberal world order in the wake of World War II. The goal was to ensure that the conditions that had led to two world wars in 30 years would never again arise. To that end, the democratic countries set out to create an international system that was liberal in the sense that it was to be based on the rule of law and respect for countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Human rights were to be protected. All this was to be applied to the entire planet; at the same time, participation was open to all and voluntary. Institutions were built to promote peace (the United Nations), economic development (the World Bank) and trade and investment (the International Monetary Fund and what years later became the World Trade Organization). All this and more was backed by the economic and military might of the US, a network of alliances across Europe and Asia, and nuclear weapons, which served to deter aggression. The liberal world order was thus based not just on ideals embraced by democracies, but also on hard power. None of this was lost on the decidedly illiberal Soviet Union, which had a fundamentally different notion of what constituted order in Europe and around the world. The liberal world order appeared to be more robust than ever with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But today, a quarter-century later, its future is in doubt. Indeed, its three components – liberalism, universality, and the preservation of order itself – are being challenged as never before in its 70-year history. Liberalism is in retreat. Democracies are feeling the effects of growing populism. Parties of the political extremes have gained ground in Europe. The vote in the United Kingdom in favor of leaving the EU attested to the loss of elite influence. Even the US is experiencing unprecedented attacks from its own president on the country’s media, courts, and law-enforcement institutions. Authoritarian systems, including China, Russia, and Turkey, have become even more top-heavy. Countries such as Hungary and Poland seem uninterested in the fate of their young democracies. It is increasingly difficult to speak of the world as if it were whole. We are seeing the emergence of regional orders – or, most pronounced in the Middle East, disorders – each with its own characteristics. Attempts to build global frameworks are failing. Protectionism is on the rise; the latest round of global trade talks never came to fruition. There are few rules governing the use of cyberspace. At the same time, great power rivalry is returning. Russia violated the most basic norm of international relations when it used armed force to change borders in Europe, and it violated US sovereignty through its efforts to influence the 2016 election. North Korea has flouted the strong international consensus against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The world has stood by as humanitarian nightmares play out in Syria and Yemen, doing little at the UN or elsewhere in response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons. Venezuela is a failing state. One in every hundred people in the world today is either a refugee or internally displaced. There are several reasons why all this is happening, and why now. The rise of populism is in part a response to stagnating incomes and job loss, owing mostly to new technologies but widely attributed to imports and immigrants. Nationalism is a tool increasingly used by leaders to bolster their authority, especially amid difficult economic and political conditions. And global institutions have failed to adapt to new power balances and technologies. But the weakening of the liberal world order is due, more than anything else, to the changed attitude of the US. Under President Donald Trump, the US decided against joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement. It has threatened to leave the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal. It has unilaterally introduced steel and aluminum tariffs, relying on a justification (national security) that others could use, in the process placing the world at risk of a trade war. It has raised questions about its commitment to NATO and other alliance relationships. And it rarely speaks about democracy or human rights. “America First” and the liberal world order seem incompatible. My point is not to single out the US for criticism. Today’s other major powers, including the EU, Russia, China, India, and Japan, could be criticized for what they are doing, not doing, or both. But the US is not just another country. It was the principal architect of the liberal world order and its principal backer. It was also a principal beneficiary. America’s decision to abandon the role it has played for more than seven decades thus marks a turning point. The liberal world order cannot survive on its own, because others lack either the interest or the means to sustain it. The result will be a world that is less free, less prosperous, and less peaceful, for Americans and others alike. [email protected] is now set for war on 3 fronts: political vs Bob Mueller, economic vs China/others on trade, and actual vs. Iran and/or North Korea. This is the most perilous moment in modern American history-and it has been largely brought about by ourselves, not by events. — Richard N. Haass (@RichardHaass) March 23, 2018
Samuel Rines economy, Americas In the end, it is certain the United States will place tariffs on Chinese goods, and there will be retaliation. Should anyone really care about the China tariffs “announced” yesterday. Yes and no. Nothing was actually announced yesterday, and there remains a tremendous amount of uncertainty surrounding the whole affair. But there will be consequences for the U.S. economy and the investment landscape. What did we learn on March 22? Relatively little. There were few details, and the process of getting from announcement to implementation is arduous. It will be fifteen days before there is enough detail to make a projection about the potential consequences. Then there will be haggling and lobbying for thirty days, and those efforts are certain to change at least some of the outcomes. In the end, it is certain the United States will place tariffs on Chinese goods, and there will be retaliation. That is all that is known at this point. For background, Section 301 is a trade rule that allows a president to take significant unilateral action against countries deemed to “unjustifiable or unreasonable tariff” or other trade restrictions. The critical aspect of a Section 301 investigation is that the available remedies are wide-ranging. After all, the language reads, “the President... may impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of such foreign country or instrumentality, and may impose fees or restrictions on the services of such foreign country or instrumentality, for such time as he deems appropriate.” There is no need for the president to consult Congress, but there is the requirement that the president allow for offenders to seek a remedy. There are issues that the United States and China can find common ground on in trade including steel. And there are numerous other areas as well. For instance, last summer following a meeting between President Xi and President Trump, China offered to be more open to U.S. beef exports. There remains the possibility this is the starting point for a “threaten-to-negotiate” style of trade tariff, similar to the recent steel and aluminum tariffs that appear to be targeted at gaining an upper hand in NAFTA negotiations. But these are on a much larger scale, and China will retaliate—they have said as much. Read full article
«Китай мне друг, но истина дороже», – нечто в этом роде произнес вчера президент США Дональд Трамп, подписывая в прямом эфире из Белого дома документ о введении пошлин на импорт китайских товаров. Речь идет о поставках в объеме $60 млрд., что меньше 10% импорта США из Китая. Санкции не решают проблему торгового дефицита США в товарообмене с Китаем, который за прошлый год составил $375 млрд. Но говорят о том, что Трамп упорно идет курсом «Купуй американське!».
The Trump administration's gradually softening tariff stance is bad news for domestic steel makers.
Следственным управлением СКР по РТ возбуждено уголовное дело по статье «Мошенничество в сфере кредитования». Фигурантами стали супруги из Нижнекамска — Лейсан и Марат Хайруллины, которые обманули банковскую систему на сумму около 100 млн рублей, сообщает НТР.
Управляющая компания «Евро Пауер» (торговая марка «БРСМ-Нафта») заявляет о рейдерском захвате автозаправочных станций «БРСМ-Нафта» беглым экс-министром энергетики и угольной промышленности Эдуардом Ставицким и нанятыми им «титушками».
Вашингтон решил сделать исключение для ряда стран.
Uber crash hits the self-driving car industry hard, which is witnessing billions of dollars of investment and has the potential of being a game changer in transportation.
(Don Boudreaux) TweetHere’s part of a March 5th tweet from America’s tweeter-in-chief: We have large trade deficits with Mexico and Canada. NAFTA, which is under renegotiation right now, has been a bad deal for U.S.A. Massive relocation of companies & jobs. Forget the live question of whether or not we Americans have a trade deficit with Canada. […]
The high-stakes scandal relating to an investigation into Facebook’s improper use of personal data grabbed the headlines and prompted investors to sell off the stock. Facebook and tech equities both trended this week, coming in first and third on the list. Optimism about a potential NAFTA agreement propelled Canada to second place, while lithium demand is expected to spur a wave of deals in the sector. High yield bonds close the list. Check our previous trends edition at Trending: Trump’s Tariff Orders on Metal Imports Leave Door Open to Exemptions
American, Canadian and Mexican officials are signaling they have cleared a road block on auto-industry issues that have been some of the thorniest in talks to overhaul the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Голландский инвестиционный фонд FreezeOil заявил о рейдерской атаке на сеть автозаправочных станций «БРСМ-Нафта» со стороны совладельца сети АЗС Андрея Бибы, который после взрыва Васильковской нефтебазы летом 2015 года бежал с Украины и сейчас скрывается в Италии от ответственности за смерти людей.
Премьер Канады Джастин Трюдо признал возможным перезаключить Соглашение о североамериканской зоне свободной торговли (НАФТА) между Канадой, США и Мексикой на взаимовыгодных условиях. Об этом он заявил в среду, 21 марта.
Джастин Трюдо отметил, что в хорошем договоре заинтересованы все стороны
Preserving NAFTA in some form is important because millions of auto-related jobs depend on exports from the U.S. to its southern and northern neighbors. U.S. trades more with Canada and Mexico than with Japan, South Korea, China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa combined.
Today, according to Politico, the White House will unveil its plan to hit China with tariffs and other trade restrictions, one day ahead of schedule as President Trump is slated to outline the results of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer's investigation into allegations that China violates U.S. intellectual property rights by forcing American companies to transfer valuable technology to Beijing. Lighthizer’s office has determined that the US loses at least $30BN a year to China’s alleged forced technology transfers, and the administration is weighing a package of tariffs equivalent to that amount of Chinese imports; according to Reuters it could be as high as $60Bn. While it is still unclear what Chinese imports might be targeted, Goldman notes that unlike the steel and aluminum tariffs, which were 25% and 10%, respectively, the affected categories of imports from China are likely to face a much higher level of tariffs, potentially approaching 100%. In advance of Trump's announcement, China hinted that its countertariffs will be aimed at Trump’s support base, including levies targeting U.S. agricultural exports from farmbelt states in retaliation to the mounting trade offensive from Washington. This confirms what has been widely suggested, namely that Chinese retaliation is virtually assured, with Goldman adding that in some recent cases China has announced its own protective actions within days of a US action but usually covering a fraction of the value of products targeted by the US. With China-focused investment and visa restrictions still on the horizon, it is possible that the announcement of those measures several weeks from now could prompt a further counter-response from China. The launch of trade war with China does have a silver lining: it suggests that trade policy risks might soon reach a near-term peak. According to Goldman, while NAFTA renegotiation remains a risk and adverse headlines are a clear possibility, a US withdrawal from NAFTA looks unlikely. There are additional trade remedy cases in the pipeline in the US, but these cover only a few billion in imports in total and are in line with similar cases considered by other administrations. And now the bad news: Goldman also notes that with the economy humming along, once things start deteriorating, it is likely that only then will Trump's trade war start to escalate aggressively: We also note that the economic cycle, not the political cycle, has tended to drive trade restrictions in the US. Taking the solar panel, steel, aluminum, and forthcoming China-focused announcements together, the Administration will likely have announced tariffs covering at least $100bn in goods at a time that the jobless rate is at 4.1%. Either the Trump Administration is acting differently from prior administrations—clearly a possibility—or we should expect even more substantial trade restrictions when the unemployment rate eventually begins to rise. * * * Below, we present the full Q&A with Goldman's chief political economist Alec Phillips on what "the Next Shots in the Trade War" will be. Q: When will tariffs on imports from China be announced and when will they take effect? A:Tariffs look likely to be announced by Friday, March 23, but the broader Section 301 process is likely to take several weeks longer. As we noted last week, the US Trade Representative (USTR) is likely to release its Section 301 report on China’s practices regarding intellectual property and technology transfer in the near term along with, we believe, a recommendation to impose tariffs on a variety of goods imported from China. Various media reports suggest the announcement will be made Thursday, March 22, or Friday, March 23. This fits with the timing of two other events this week: (1) the testimony of Trump Administration trade officials (USTR Lighthizer testifies in the House Ways and Means Committee on March 21 and in the Senate Finance Committee on March 22, and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross testifies in the Ways and Means Committee on March 22) and (2) the House is likely to vote on spending legislation by March 22, which needs to pass Congress by the end of March 23 to avoid a government shutdown. The White House might seek to delay the announcement until the end of the week to avoid some of these events. We also expect the tariffs to take effect with a greater delay than the recently announced steel and aluminum tariffs, which are scheduled to take effect March 23, roughly two weeks after the President formally approved them. The tariffs appear likely to cover a much wider range of products than the steel and aluminum tariffs announced two weeks ago and therefore could be subject to a public comment period—typically at least 30 days—before they take effect. In addition, we expect that the White House will seek to use the proposed tariffs to enter consultations with Chinese officials over policy changes, which would be difficult to accomplish quickly. Q: How might these tariffs compare to the recently announced steel and aluminum tariffs? A:Tariffs on imports from China are likely to be applied at a much higher tariff rate and cover a greater amount of imports. The products initially targeted in the steel and aluminum case totaled around $46 billion in imports in 2017, but only $38 billion once Canada and Mexico are excluded. At tariff rates of 25% and 10% respectively, this would amount to roughly $7 billion in tariffs if imports remained at current levels. By contrast, we expect tariffs on Chinese-manufactured products to cover a somewhat greater amount of imports (in dollars) and be applied at a much higher rate. Media reports suggest that tariffs could reach $60 billion annually. While there has been some confusion as to whether this applies to the value of goods covered by the tariffs, or to the amount that the tariffs would in theory raise in revenue, the simple answer might be that it applies to both. The USTR might be considering the tariffs under its Section 301 recommendation to be similar to the retaliatory tariffs that other administrations have levied on imports as a result of trade disputes. These are often set at 100% for a specific reason. When a country is trying to offset the economic damage caused by another trading partner’s policies, it is aiming for a specific dollar amount. Rather than estimate the elasticity of demand at lower tariff rates, countries often set the rate at a prohibitively high level, which essentially blocks imports of covered products from covered countries. It seems likely that the tariff rates could be set at high levels— substantially higher than the 10% or 25% on steel and aluminum and potentially approaching 100%—which would effectively block trade in the affected categories. If so, reports of $60bn in tariffs and $60bn in goods covered could very well both be correct. However, we would note that if implemented, the actual tariff revenue collected as a result of the actions would be insignificant since few imports would actually come in under such a high tariff. Q: What goods are likely to be targeted? A:We think a focus on consumer products and goods available from multiple sources is likely, but it is unclear what categories will be targeted. In a recent US Daily we outlined a framework that the White House might use to consider where to apply tariffs. This includes targeting categories where most imports go toward final consumption rather than intermediate inputs, where there is a large tariff differential, where there is a bilateral trade deficit, and where supply could be diverted from other countries (including domestically) without substantially impacting consumers. If this were the strategy followed, categories affected could include power tools, household appliances and certain consumer electronics, furniture, apparel, and jewelry, among several other categories. However, some media reports also suggest that the tariffs could fall heavily on “technology” and “telecommunications” products. This is intuitive, given the large amount of such products that China exports to the US and the importance of intellectual property to those industries. However, we note that the sum of all imports of “technology and telecommunications” related products was nearly $200 billion in 2017, so either the scope of the tariffs would be substantially broader than what media reports suggest, or at most a subset of such products might be targeted. Q: Will the Section 301 recommendations be limited to tariffs? A: No, but that looks likely to be the initial focus. We continue to expect restrictions on inbound investment by Chinese companies (and possibly individuals) to be announced as part of the response to the Section 301 report’s findings. In addition, greater visa restrictions for Chinese travelers have also been mentioned as a potential response in some press reports. However, it is unclear whether either of these will be announced in any detail this week along with the tariff announcement. Instead, it is possible that the investment restrictions, for example, could be announced “in concept” this week, with details to be determined later. It is also possible that this week’s announcement could be limited to tariffs with no explicit mention of other restrictions. Q: Where do the steel and aluminum tariffs stand? A:The tariffs are set to take effect March 23 but the requests for exclusions will continue. The 25% tariff on steel products and 10% tariff on aluminum products are scheduled to take effect Friday, March 23. At this point Canada and Mexico are explicitly exempt from the tariffs according to the presidential order, while Australia is expected to be exempt from the tariffs but this has not been formally announced yet. The EU and several other countries are seeking exemptions as well though the probability of these being granted looks somewhat low in the near-term, we believe. A product-specific exemption process is also underway, but is likely to take several weeks—the Department of Commerce has indicted it hopes to rule on exemptions within 90 days—and is likely to be cumbersome, as exemptions are being considered on a company-specific basis. This could prove quite difficult to administer in practice, as US customs officials are unlikely to be able to easily determine which goods are exempt and which are not. This could simply result in at least a temporary delay of steel and aluminum imports more generally as customs officials try to determine the status of each shipment. Q: How will trading partners respond to the proposed tariffs? A:They are likely to retaliate, and quickly. In the past, when trading partners responded to a sudden change in trade policy (such as imposition of a tariff or cancellation of a prior agreement), a first response of some sort often came within a matter of days. In 2009, China began an investigation into US chicken parts dumping two days after President Obama imposed tariffs on Chinese tires, and last month China announced an investigation into US sorghum exports two weeks after the Administration announced tariffs on Chinese solar panels and washing machines. We note that in both cases, the US exports that China targeted were worth only a fraction of the imports targeted by the US, but focused on politically sensitive agricultural sectors. Other countries have been quick to retaliate against the US as well; in 2009, Mexico announced retaliatory tariffs a week after the US prohibited funding for a cross-border trucking deal. More recently, the EU announced a list of retaliatory tariffs within days of the Trump Administration’s announcement on steel tariffs, which it looks likely to implement assuming the tariffs go into effect on EU exports. That said, some trading partners have in some cases waited for the WTO to rule before imposing retaliatory tariffs. These cases were generally drawn out and often spanned several years. These cases often involve an issue that is less clear cut than an increase in tariffs, such as a regulatory or tax dispute. For example, in July 1999, the WTO ruled in favor of the US in a beef-related case, and the US implemented tariffs about two weeks later. After the WTO ruled against the US and allowed Canada and Mexico to impose $1 billion in tariffs in response to the US country of origin labeling (COOL) rules, Congress repealed the offending rules within two weeks to avoid announced retaliation by Canada and Mexico. By contrast, the EU has responded more slowly in some cases; it postponed imposing retaliatory tariffs on the US following two adverse WTO rulings involving the 2002 steel tariffs and a long-standing tax-related dispute in 2002. Q: What other trade policy risks are on the horizon? A: There are far fewer additional trade restrictions left in the pipeline than have already been announced. Most significant trade actions require a long administrative process involving multiple stages and often multiple government agencies (USTR, Department of Commerce, the US International Trade Commission, etc). For this reason, one can look at the pipeline of upcoming cases to see what sort of tariffs might be imposed. At the moment, there are a number of antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases under review at the Department of Commerce and International Trade Commission. However, together these cases represent about around $3 billion in imports, and they do not represent a meaningful acceleration in AD/CVD activity as far as we can tell. NAFTA negotiations are likely to go on hiatus ahead of the Mexican presidential election in July and the US midterm election in November. This leaves little time to reach an agreement before the window effectively closes on reaching an agreement; most observers expect talks to effectively come to a halt after April. From the US perspective, the timing of congressional consideration of a renegotiated NAFTA agreement is relevant; even if an agreement were reached next month, the President would need to wait 90 days (or possibly 180 days depending on the details of the agreement) to sign it under the timeline required by the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA, or “fast track”) process, another 30 days to submit the text to Congress, and then up to 90 days to for congressional consideration. In theory, if an agreement were reached in the near-term, it could be sent to Congress later this year and passed later this year, possibly after the mid-term election in a “lame duck” session of Congress. However, we expect that the more likely scenario is that the negotiations will fail to conclude over the next month and will pause until later this year. We also note that President Trump has formally requested an extension of TPA to 2021. This extension will take effect automatically unless either chamber of Congress votes by a simple majority to block the extension before July 1, 2018. While this could lead to a debate in Congress over trade policy, it looks unlikely to end the TPA process, which we expect to continue until July 2021. Q: So does this mean that trade-policy related risks have peaked? A:We are probably approaching peak trade risk in the near-term, but note that trade tensions could escalate even further over the remainder of President Trump’s term if the economy slows. It is certainly possible that the Trump Administration could retaliate against the retaliatory measures that other countries might soon implement in response to impending tariffs. However, we think the odds are against this and even if it does happen we would expect that the amount of trade affected would be smaller—for example, it seems unlikely that the Administration would impose tariffs on another $60bn in goods in response to any trade restrictions China imposes as a result of the Section 301 tariffs. However, we note that trade tensions typically respond not to the political cycle but to the economic cycle. For example, in the past AD/CVD and “safeguard” cases have become more frequent when the unemployment rate has risen, but do not vary much by proximity to the next election. With the unemployment rate approaching 4% we would normally expect relatively little action on trade protection. Instead, the actions already taken—the steel and aluminum tariffs as well as the recent safeguard decisions on solar panels and washing machines—represent some of the most substantial trade protections in decades, measured by the amount of imports covered. Tariffs on imports from China would roughly double this amount. Either the Trump Administration is acting differently from prior administrations—clearly a possibility—or we should expect even more substantial trade restrictions when the unemployment rate eventually begins to rise.
Хиллари Клинтон объявила о том, что будет участвовать в президентских выборах, которые пройдут в США в следующем году. Стоит ли России ожидать очередной "перезагрузки" или нового витка обострения отношений, в случае если Клинтон победит на выборах?
Сайт WikiLeaks опубликовал два документа, из которых следует, что переговоры по созданию Тихоокеанского партнёрства близки к тупику. В них участвуют 12 стран: США, Япония, Мексика, Канада, Австралия, Малайзия, Чили, Сингапур, Перу, Вьетнам, Новая Зеландия и Бруней. Вместе они производят более 40% мирового ВВП, сообщает RT На этой неделе представители перечисленных государств собрались в Сингапуре, чтобы обсудить будущее торговое соглашение. После встречи за закрытыми дверями министр торговли Японии Ясутоси Нисимура заявил прессе, что США, по его мнению, должны продемонстрировать «большую гибкость». Документы, обнародованные WikiLeaks, показывают, что стороны не могут договориться по 119 пунктам, в том числе и из-за жёсткой позиции США. Пока остаётся неясным, какая именно страна из двенадцати, участвующих в переговорах, допустила утечку. «США оказывает серьёзное давление, чтобы за эту неделю закрыть вопросы по максимально возможному количеству спорных пунктов», - утверждает один из опубликованных документов. «Одно из государств указывает, что до сих пор не было сделано никаких существенных шагов со стороны США, что и явилось причиной создавшейся ситуации». Администрация Обамы призвала все стороны, участвующие в переговорах, достичь соглашения до конца этого года. Однако споры вокруг ключевых вопросов могут привести в декабре к «частичному прекращению переговоров или даже к их срыву». Создание транстихоокеанского торгового партнерства в Вашингтоне расценивают в качестве приоритета. Подчёркивается, что оно даст импульс экономикам всех стран-участниц. Однако существует мнение, что некоторые пункты соглашения могут привести к подрыву национальных интересов ряда государств этого региона. Среди спорных вопросов, в частности, право транснациональных корпораций оспаривать законодательство отдельных стран в наднациональных трибуналах. Ранее Вашингтон уже одобрил такие полномочия в предыдущих торговых соглашениях, например, в рамках Североамериканской зоны свободной торговли. Однако условия, предлагаемые тихоокеанским партнёрством, могут предоставить транснациональным корпорациям возможность оспаривать более широкий круг законов. 30 августа 2013 года WikiLeaks опубликовал документ, который касается прав интеллектуальной собственности и вызывает сильнейшие опасения у гражданских активистов. Так, организация Electronic Frontier Foundation предупреждает, что меры, перечисленные в договоре, «нанесут огромный вред свободе слова, праву на частную жизнь, а также существенно снизят возможность для создания инноваций». «По сравнению с существующими многосторонними соглашениями, глава соглашения ТРР предлагает выдачу большего числа патентов, создание дополнительных прав собственности на данные, расширение защиты патентов и авторских прав, расширение привилегий правообладателей. Наказания для нарушителей становятся строже, - сказал эксперт Джеймс Лав из международной организации «Экология Знания». – Данный текст существенно урезает существующие исключения в международном законодательстве по авторскому праву. Он обсуждался секретно и мешает распространению знаний, развитию медицины и инновационной деятельности». Данное соглашение, в случае его принятия, может усилить и расширить власть фармацевтических монополий в том, что касается лекарств от рака, ВИЧ, сердечных заболеваний, в особенности – в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе. Монополисты получат беспрецедентные права, не допуская на рынок других производителей. Последующий рост цен на жизненно важные лекарства, возможно, затронет каждого. «Данная глава соглашения о ТРР – это рождественский подарок для крупнейших корпораций, - сообщил газете Sydney Morning Herald доктор Мэтью Риммер, эксперт по законодательству в сфере интеллектуальной собственности. – Голливуд, звукозаписывающие компании, такие IT-гиганты, как Microsoft, фармацевтические компании – все получат свой кусок пирога».
Сергей РоговДиректор Института США и Канады РАН, академик РАН, член РСМД12 февраля президент США Барак Обама выступил в Конгрессе с посланием «О положении страны», в котором изложил приоритеты американской политики на второй срок своего пребывания у власти. На мировой арене Обама намерен поставить США во главе двух гигантских экономических блоков – Трансатлантического и Транстихоокеанского. Это должно обеспечить Вашингтону лидерство в полицентрической системе международных отношений. Такая схема стала одним из ключевых компонентов «доктрины Обамы».Читать статью