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Совет национальной безопасности США
Совет национальной безопасности (англ. National Security Council, сокращённо СНБ) — консультативный орган при президенте США для решения наиболее важных вопросов национальной безопасности и внешней политики, и координации действий всех основных ведомств, связанных с указанными вопрос ...

Совет национальной безопасности (англ. National Security Council, сокращённо СНБ) — консультативный орган при президенте США для решения наиболее важных вопросов национальной безопасности и внешней политики, и координации действий всех основных ведомств, связанных с указанными вопросами.

Совет национальной безопасности был создан в 1947 году законом о национальной безопасности. Его созданию послужила убеждённость влиятельных американских политиков в том, что дипломатия Государственного департамента США больше не была способна сдерживать СССР при напряжённых отношениях между СССР и США[1]. Конечной целью его создания было обеспечение согласованности действий между военно-морскими силами, Корпусом морской пехоты, сухопутными войсками и военно-воздушными силами США.

2009 г.:

Заседание СНБ: президент Барак Обама, Госсекретарь Хиллари Клинтон, Министр обороны — Роберт Гейтс, Заместитель начальника ОКНШ — ген. Кэртрайт, директор разведки Деннис Блэр, советник президента Грег Крейг, директор ЦРУ Леон Панетта, заместитель начальника Совета внутренней безопасности Том Донилон, советник президента по национальной безопасности ген. Джеймс «Джим» Джонс и глава президентской администрации Рэм Эмануел

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25 июля, 03:31

Trump shames Sessions amid shake-up speculation

Advisers said Trump was considering whether to make a change. Sessions, an Eagle Scout, was noticeably absent on a West Virginia stage as Trump spoke to a Boy Scout jamboree.

24 июля, 12:16

Laurel Miller: The Full Transcript

Susan Glasser: I’m Susan Glasser, and welcome back to The Global POLITICO. Our guest again this week is Laurel Miller who has just completed her service as the acting special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s a big mouthful of a title, as the State Department is wont to create, the SRAP as it’s known. And I imagine we’ll refer to that in this conversation. But I’m really glad to be speaking with her this week. It’s a very timely conversation about just what is America’s policy towards Afghanistan these days. The Trump administration has been undertaking a review of it. There are reports any day now we’ll see an increase of new troops being sent to the region. It’s almost an eerie echo of the very beginning of the Barack Obama administration. Laurel Miller, yesterday Donald Trump said—and it was almost one of those unintentionally revealing comments—“I want to find out why we’ve been there for 17 years.” So what’s the answer? Why have we been in Afghanistan for 17 years?Laurel Miller: Thank you, Susan. I’m very happy to be here. You know, that’s a harder question to answer than you think it might be. And it’s a fair question to ask. It’s not unusual for any new administration to want to and need to pause and reflect on why we’re doing what we’re doing in an area of the world where we’ve been devoting so many resources -- financial resources, human resources -- as we have in Afghanistan. And, as I said, it’s not as easy a question to answer as you might think.Why we went into Afghanistan at the end of 2001 is clear and is well known. Since that time, you have the accretion of one decision after another that takes you down a path, a path that’s led us today to a point where we still have one of our largest overseas commitments in the world of troops, of financial resources, of diplomats, of development personnel, and yet it’s a place that clearly the new administration is not keen to be actively engaged in. It has not been a topic of public conversation during the campaign and really since then, from the highest levels of our government. I think one of the reasons we’re still in Afghanistan relates to why we went in in the first place, which is our concerns about terrorist groups that thrive in a region that does not have strong government control and our concern about the risk of groups that have transnational ambitions. It is not clear that the kinds of threats that emanate from Afghanistan or, perhaps better said, the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, are of the same caliber and degree of risk as they were to us in the past given the very significant degradation of Al Qaeda in that region and other associated terrorist groups.Glasser: And yet here we are all these years later talking about more troops once again.Miller: And yet here we are. Glasser: You yourself said recently—and, you know, it seems like it’s almost not a controversial statement—that “the status quo is clearly not working.”Miller: Yes.Glasser: But Donald Trump clearly—I don’t think I had ever heard him use the word “Afghanistan” actually until these comments, at least in public the other day. You’re right that he never mentioned it on the campaign trail. He had a lot of opinions about Iraq; he had a lot of opinions about the broader Middle East in the course of the campaign. But one of the things he’s been very clear on is a wariness of increased military activity. And yet behind the scenes you must have seen he had brought in a bunch of very experienced, savvy generals to run this policy review. He’s got Jim Mattis at the Pentagon. He’s got General McMaster at the National Security Council. So tell us a little bit about the conversations that you observed and that you had with folks inside this new Trump administration. They’re very focused on not walking away from a fight, and yet you have the president who is very wary of committing more. Miller: So I think one of the reasons why the policy review has gone on longer than originally planned, longer than expected, is because there aren’t very good options. To withdraw abruptly from Afghanistan would certainly risk the collapse of a government that is very deeply dependent on the American military backing and on American financial resources. The U.S. and other allies around the world pay more than 90 percent of the cost of Afghan security forces and more than 60 percent of the total Afghan budget. If the United States withdrew from its financial commitments and its military engagement, it is highly likely that the government would suffer a very severe political crisis and be unable to sustain the fight that they are currently engaged in against Taliban insurgents. And so the concern about an abrupt military withdrawal is that you would create, once again, ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan that would enable terrorist groups that might threaten us to reemerge. On the other hand, the Obama administration tried to turn the corner on the war in Afghanistan by surging military troops into the country. We had, at the peak, over 100,000 American troops plus about 40,000 NATO troops in the country. That didn’t work. It suppressed the insurgency, but it didn’t end the insurgency and win the war. I don’t think there is any serious analyst of the situation in Afghanistan who believes that the war is winnable. It’s possible to prevent the defeat of the Afghan government and prevent military victory by the Taliban, but this is not a war that’s going to be won, certainly not in any time horizon that’s relevant to political decision-making in Washington.And so what does that leave you with? A sort of middle ground of do a bit more in order to buy some time, again, continuing to prevent the defeat of the Afghan government, prevent military victory by the insurgents, but not really get you anywhere. And that is a very unappealing set of choices. As brilliant and capable as some of the American military leaders may be, they don’t have any fancy new tricks up their sleeve that haven’t been tried in one fashion or another in Afghanistan. Glasser: Right. So this policy review, what they’re sitting around discussing is not something that they’re going to unveil with some big bells and whistles and say, “Aha! Here is the key to unlocking this conflict”?Miller: It’s always possible to rhetorically add some bells and whistles to whatever statement you make about what you’re going to do, but, as I said, there aren’t any fancy new tricks; there aren’t any new tools to be used to suddenly turn around the conflict in Afghanistan. And, many people would acknowledge that, that what is proposed by those who are advocating the additional investment of military resources is that we have to be there for the long haul, that we have to support the Afghan government for the long haul and essentially continue in the same vein that we’ve been in.Not a particularly appealing option for a new president who has been publicly indicating that he is more interested in withdrawing from these kinds of long-term commitments around the world than committing to them, than owning it. And so to say to this new president—not so new anymore, but this policy review has been going on for several months—to say that your only option is that now you need to be third president in a row to own this war, that’s a very politically difficult thing to do.Glasser: So you weren’t surprised to hear him say, “I want to find out why we’ve been there for 17 years,” because, in fact, behind the scenes that’s clearly already been evident in the push and pull of this policy review?Miller: Yes, and I think it makes it evident that he has not been persuaded by what has been said to him about the security risks for the United States that come from that region as compared to risks elsewhere around the world, I mean, very evident risks elsewhere around the world. Glasser: It really is hard to see him wanting to expend any political capital. A, how much does he really have, anyways, of political capital at this point? But, B, hard to imagine that he wants to expend it on a place, a country whose name he has never even uttered in public. What does that do? What is the emerging dynamic between the State Department and the Pentagon in those conversations? We’re all trying to understand how foreign policy, how national security policy is made in the Trump administration? Publicly, they’ve said that Jim Mattis and H. R. McMaster are leading this review. What does that mean in a practical sense? Miller: In the practical, technical sense, the way a policy review like this works is that the National Security Council staff organizes a series of meetings at different levels of government to work through identifying what U.S. interests are, identifying what the options are for how to address those interests. And then all the relevant agencies of the government—the State Department, Defense Department, intelligence agencies, Treasury Department, USAID—gather and give their input and try to come to some consensus. I think it’s been publicly reported and actually reflects the reality that the Defense Department has a fairly outsized role in this process at this particular time, given that one of the main questions on the table is whether to apply more military resources to the problem. There has been an effort to try to get away from the Obama administration’s tendency to decide—to sort of boil down the whole question of strategy in Afghanistan to how many troops do we have in the country and to stop micromanaging the number of troops in the country. But it’s pretty hard to get away from that fundamental question. It’s the one thing that the American public and Afghans and others can use to objectively measure the level of commitment. You can always just say, “We’re committed.” Diplomats can talk about commitment, but it’s hard to see that in concrete terms until you’re really talking about what are you putting on the table in terms of money and troops. Glasser: A lot of folks have worried in a bigger picture sense that we’ve seen the long-term militarization of our foreign policy and that this current Afghanistan situation might be another reflection of that, but that it’s become particularly acute in the Trump administration because he has turned to so many career military officers in key positions, including positions they wouldn’t normally have, civilian positions. And then, of course, there’s the question of the State Department and what on earth is going on there. A lot of people are wondering when are they going to fill these jobs. Is your job even going to exist after you? There was a spurt of reports when you left to return to RAND that they were shutting down the office. What can you tell us about that? Miller: First of all, on the issue of militarization of foreign policy, I can say that with respect to Afghanistan, it’s been militarized for quite some time. Despite the differences in personnel at the leadership level, I would not say that the policy in Afghanistan is more militarized now than it was during the Obama administration. And it’s certainly less militarized now than it was at the peak of U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan. When you’ve got 100,000 American troops in the country and you weigh that against an embassy, it’s pretty clear where the balance of power lies in decision-making. In the State Department my particular appointment expired at the end of June, the kind of appointment that I had. And my last remaining deputy had a long-planned exit from the State Department at the end of June. And so the State Department leadership took that opportunity to—if you want to call it an opportunity—took that moment, shall I say, to fold what was the SRAP office back into a more regularized bureaucratic structure and to put that responsibility back into one of the regular regional bureaus of the State Department.Glasser: None of which, we should point out, actually have any appointed leaders at this point.Miller: No, there is only an acting head of that bureau. It’s the South and Central Asia Bureau. Now, I mean, there is a certain logic to doing this, and it’s something that had been under discussion at the end of the Obama administration as well. And the particular logic is that it would be healthier for American foreign policy to have responsibility not just for Afghanistan and Pakistan but India as well all under the same person because the issues related to these three countries are related. Glasser: I’m smiling because I remember when the office was created, and there was a huge turmoil. Miller: Yes, and Richard Holbrooke wanted India too. Glasser: Richard Holbrooke wanted India. We had a report in Foreign Policy Magazine, which I edited then, that he was lobbying to get India in it, and the Indians went crazy about that report. Miller: Well, not just that. I mean, it would have been nothing left of that. Glasser: Of the South Asia bureau, yes. Miller: You know, you don’t have a bureau of just Central Asia and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Glasser: But so there’s bureaucratic politics, but clearly there is bureaucratic politics and then there is Trump-administration politics. Miller: Well, I think even though there is, as I said, a logic to this, it’s also certainly a reflection of policy priorities. I mean, this administration and the current Secretary of State has, as he has said publicly, been very intent on shrinking the State Department and as part of that eliminating as many of the special envoy offices as they can. Some of them are—Glasser: Just this week it was reported they were going to get rid of the war crimes office. Miller: The war crimes office, which I previously worked in, you know, earlier in the State Department Glasser: They’re targeting you.Miller: I won’t take it personally. Glasser: You think that one should stay separate.Miller: The war crimes office?Glasser: Yes.Miller: Again, there are always ways to attend to the policy issues if you are concerned about them, but I do think it’s certainly the case that these decisions are a reflection of policy priorities. I mean, every new administration comes in wanting to get rid of all the special offices created by the previous administration. Now, the war crimes office was 20 years old, and it survived through the whole Bush administration, so that one had a little more institutional longevity than others. But every administration also adds new offices too. I mean, despite the very firm interest of the State Department in getting rid of special envoys, it was reported out of the meeting that President Trump had with President Putin at the G-20 that they were creating a new special envoy for Ukraine. So what that shows is that when there is a policy issue that for whatever reason is a priority for the new administration, the new Secretary of State, or some constituency in Congress—that’s sometimes how it occurs—you add a special envoy. So I would anticipate that Ukraine won’t be the last special envoy that we see during the Trump administration. So, again, I think it’s unquestionable that the current administration prefers not to prioritize Afghanistan. It’s not been a subject of public discussion. The SRAP office was closed down. The Secretary of State has not yet traveled to the region. There has been no indication of the president going to the region, and that’s a choice that can be made. I think you then have to consider that that’s also a judgment about where are the risks for America around the world, where are security interests, where are the threats that we most have to attend to. Even though it’s not publicly stated, de facto this is a judgment about where the greater risks and interests lie around the world. Glasser: Laurel, tell me about Rex Tillerson. Did you ever get the chance to talk with him about Afghanistan? What do you think his point of view is on this? Miller: I did meet and speak with him on a few occasions. You know, I don’t think it would be right for me to characterize what his views are on Afghanistan per se. And, again, I mean, this wasn’t an area that he was closely focused on, and I think we can observe that from his lack of public attention to the issue. As the policy review unfolded it became clear that there was an interest from the State Department but not just from the State Department in ensuring that this was a review that considered issues in a more regional context, in a broader context that was not just about the fight in Afghanistan, but looked at all the relationships between the key countries in the region and looked at a longer-term time horizon of U.S. interests. And I think it’s fair to say that Secretary Tillerson shared that perspective of wanting to have a broader aperture for the review. Glasser: Right. How does it fit into Russia, Iran, Pakistan—Miller: India.Glasser: —India, exactly. So we can get to that, because I do want to. But first I’ve got to just ask, on this policy review before we move on, what is up with this report that they are even considering or that the White House was trying to get as part of the review a hearing for those like Erik Prince who were lobbying for basically the creation of an outsourced, private, mercenary army that would somehow take over the U.S. representation there? Like, one, it seems like a pretty kooky idea, but, two, how is it possible that that was getting a hearing and that Jim Mattis was told to listen to these guys?Miller: My interpretation is that that is a reflection of what I said earlier about the lack of good options.Glasser: People looking out of the box.Miller: When the menu doesn’t appeal to you, you want to order something off menu and ask the chef if he can cook something up special. And I think it’s also a reflection of probably some frustration in the White House that there weren’t a sufficient range of options being fully developed and presented to the president. Now, those particular ideas are completely implausible. I mean, it’s just not practicable that you could do this, for a whole host of reasons. And the specific idea that there should be some kind of colonial-style viceroy for Afghanistan is practically implausible because the Afghans, of course, would get a vote on this. It’s also a little surprising that for those who have had an antipathy towards the idea of nation-building that you would want to think about the idea of an occupation-style viceroy, which is nation-building on steroids. So I don’t myself think that there is any likelihood of those particular ideas taking root. But I think you should take seriously what it reflects about frustration with lack of options. Glasser: Well, are there any other ideas like that floating around?Miller: I have not heard any other outlier ideas like that.Glasser: That’s a very polite, a very diplomatic way of putting it. So this office was created by Richard Holbrooke, a legendary figure, one you know well from your time in the Balkans as well. He saw it as a platform, and his goal was to launch peace negotiations. Well, here we are two full presidential terms and into the start of a next one later; there are no peace talks, at least no meaningful peace talks to speak of. And it’s not been a platform for that. So what was the job? You know, were you looking for ways to start peace negotiations? It seems like one of the most important roles was actually the peace negotiations inside the very dysfunctional Afghan government, where there is a president, Ashraf Ghani, and then a chief executive, the only one in the world, Abdullah Abdullah, the former head of the Northern Alliance. Miller: So the peace negotiations -- or the effort to try to launch peace negotiations -- was definitely part of the job and an important part of the job. The other elements included, as you said, constantly trying to shore up Afghan political stability. And in late 2014 that was a particularly absorbing part of the job because of a crisis they had over flawed elections and the need to form a coalition government to get through that political crisis.The SRAP office also had responsibility for policy related to our foreign assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan as well, also had responsibility for managing our embassies in the countries. Kabul is still our largest embassy in the entire world. And when you count the total number of people at the embassy—Glasser: So even though our physical plant is bigger in Iraq where Baghdad became famous as—Miller: The total number of people in Afghanistan, including contractors and others, is more than Iraq.Glasser: It’s amazing.Miller: It is amazing, yes. Glasser: When you think about the level of attention paid to this. Miller: Yes. Now, a lot of them are security personnel, contractors, others, but still. I mean, the resources that the United States government spends, devotes to Afghanistan is still extraordinary and probably well beyond what most people, even maybe some people in government, fully appreciate. Glasser: Yeah, I noticed that Chris Kolenda, in that very interesting conversation you had at the U.S. Institute of Peace recently, said that he put the number at $25 billion a year approximately. Miller: It’s probably more than that all in when you count not just the military resources, the assistance resources, the operational cost of our embassy. It’s sometimes harder to exactly count these things than you would imagine, but it’s probably more than that.Glasser: It’s an astonishing sum, yes. Okay, so peace talks.Miller: So peace talks.Glasser: We, in effect, created this government. Secretary John Kerry basically helped to negotiate this deal that has survived between Ghani and Abdullah.Miller: Well, yes. The idea for how to form, how to shape this coalition government was actually an Afghan idea. But he did help to broker the agreement and the details of the agreement. But on peace negotiations, look, I mean, even though that was an area that Holbrooke was focused on, I would say the United States has never really put the kind of political muscle and diplomatic muscle behind the effort in a consistent way that would be necessary to launch peace talks. The effort just to try to get to the point of the start of peace talks has gone off the rails at multiple points in time. The vigor of the effort has been in fits and starts. There were, in the past, internal debates in the U.S. government about how much focus to put on the effort to launch peace talks. And so while it’s been an element of U.S. policy, it’s not one that has been attended to with the kind of constancy that’s needed if you’re going to make it succeed.Now, there are lots of obstacles other than U.S. bureaucratics and political intentions to actually launching peace talks, but even among the things that the U.S. government can unilaterally control it hasn’t been as dominant an area of focus as I and others think it should be. Glasser: Was there any moment in your tenure in that office when it seemed like, “Well, maybe we could do something”? Like, when was the last good chance to get something started?Miller: You know, there have been moments of—I mean, you should never use the world optimism in the same sentence with Afghan peace process, but there have been moments when there was more progress in the behind-the-scenes effort than at other moments. And there have been some openings in terms of discussions with various partners in the region and others that we did, in fact, try to capitalize on. So I don’t want to give the impression that we were sitting on our hands and not focused on this. I mean, I devoted a pretty considerable amount of my time and effort to this, as did my predecessor. Before that there was a considerable hiatus on this effort. But there is a difference between having a small group of diplomats who are toiling away in the State Department occasionally traveling around working on this with a small number of people in other countries and having a full-out diplomatic effort that clearly has the broad backing of all the U.S. government and at the highest levels.Glasser: When we stared the conversation you described what basically amounts to a pretty precarious state of the current Afghan government, not just riven by internal discord and dysfunction, although that seems to be spiking once again. Not only is President Ghani besieged by lots of different rival groups; he’s not on speaking terms with his vice president and just refused to allow the vice president, General Dostum, to even land back inside the country amid allegations of abuses committed by Dostum and his forces. So how precarious is the situation of the government? I mean, could it fall even in the absence of the U.S. making a new military commitment?Miller: It’s chronically precarious. There are moments of acute crisis that require very concerted American effort, in particular, to help them through. But even when it’s not in the headlines and you don’t see these acute crises, there is chronic weakness. Now, some of it is for reasons that simply can’t be controlled by the particular individuals who are currently in power. Afghanistan is still one of the poorest countries in the world; it’s a nascent democracy; it has weak institutions; it has limited human capital, limited financial resources. And, on top of that, it’s fighting an insurgency. And so long as the conflict is ongoing any government in Afghanistan is going to have a very hard time addressing those other structural, institutional weaknesses. It’s also the case that President Ghani, who is a close ally of the United States and who has many positive attributes, is not known for his deft political skills. And so there is a certain amount of the instability that you see in Afghanistan that is a function of the political decisions of the current leadership and political choices that have exacerbated tensions among the individuals.And President Karzai, for all of his issues with the United States and our relationship with him, was much more adept at that kind of political consensus building than President Ghani has been. Glasser: So the security situation seems pretty dire at this moment. There was just this enormous attack that killed many, many civilians in Kabul.Miller: Yes, on May 31st. Glasser: It’s led to the increased militarization of the capital itself. There is fighting with the Taliban. There is also Islamic State presence. Tell us about the security situation right now. I mean, how much of a crisis is it, or is it sort of the rhythm of the summer fighting season kicking into gear?Miller: It’s not just the rhythm of the summer fighting season. And, in fact, over the last year especially and to some extend the year before, that fighting season calendar became less relevant as there was considerable fighting during the winter last year. The surge of American and NATO troops in the country suppressed the insurgency. It didn’t dismantle the insurgency; it didn’t eliminate it. And so as the number of troops drew down towards the end of the Obama administration and that pressure on the insurgency was relieved there was a resurgence because they weren’t eliminated.And what we have seen over the last couple of years is we’ve seen that resurgence that was predicted and anticipated actually materialize. I think the erosion of the security situation has been somewhat faster even than was expected. Now, that doesn’t mean that the Taliban is about to march into Kabul. Their gains have been largely in rural areas, and they haven’t been able to take and hold provincial capitals, much less get—despite these sort of one-off attacks in Kabul, they haven’t been able to threaten Kabul in a sense of taking over Kabul. So they’re not on the verge of victory, but the security situation has been deteriorating. And I would expect that even if there is a modest increase in American troops, it will probably continue to deteriorate. Glasser: People have long talked about the role of Pakistan in supporting the insurgency and various groups that the United States has labeled as terrorist groups. A, are they still doing that? And, B, what about Russia? I’ve heard increasing reports that they have been involved in some way in communicating with the Taliban and possibly giving them information. Miller: On Russia, you know, the Russians themselves have acknowledged publicly contacts with the Taliban. They claim that those contacts are related to the issue of the Islamic State presence in Afghanistan. They’ve publicly denied that they have provided material support to the Taliban. It’s hard to say. I think there was observably over the last year, year and a half, an increase in Russian activism in Afghanistan and an observable increase in Russia trying to enhance the perception of its influence in Afghanistan, the perception of it having a stake in Afghanistan and being a relevant player that the United States and others needed to factor in. But whether they’ve actually been increasing material support to the Taliban is much harder to put your finger on, and I don’t think there’s any definitive evidence of that. Glasser: But as the chief U.S. envoy you were seeing—the Russians were saying, “We’re here, and we want a seat at the table,” in a way that was more forceful than previously?Miller: Yes, definitely. And of a piece with Russian foreign policy more broadly, not just in Afghanistan, but, you know, a way of saying, “You can’t ignore us. We’re relevant. We need to be part of whatever international discussions and decisions are happening related to Afghanistan.”Glasser: So Islamic State does not get as much attention, of course, here in Afghanistan and its presence there as compared with in other parts of the world, but how much should we be paying attention to it? How significant are their forces there relative to the Taliban? I saw one of those little items that catches your eye recently that they had just fought and taken over the Tora Bora complex from Al Qaeda in eastern Afghanistan where, of course, Osama bin Laden had made his headquarters. So it seemed like one of those symbolic moments.Miller: Yes. They’re much smaller than the Taliban. And they are in opposition to the Taliban, and the Taliban is in opposition to them. so you have to draw a clear distinction between the Taliban and the Islamic State presence in Afghanistan. Glasser: So who are the Islamic State then if they are not drawing from the same group of sort of Pashtun jihadists that the Taliban are? Miller: They are mostly drawing from former Pakistani Taliban, which is different than the Afghan Taliban, and some other terrorist groups in the region. There might be some disaffected Afghan Taliban individuals in the Islamic State too, but there’s no relationship between—and certainly no collaboration. I mean, there is outright opposition and fighting between the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic State. You know, it’s not a presence at the moment that is existentially threatening to the Afghan government or to the United States, but it’s a worry. It is an official branch of the Islamic State. And it’s certainly something that the United States government has taken very seriously and been devoting considerable attention to trying to eliminate altogether. To actually completely eliminate them will be tough given—and you reference Tora Bora. I mean, given the particular geography of where they are, it’s very difficult terrain, a lot of caves, a lot of—it’s a rough area, and it will be hard to eliminate them entirely. But that is the objective of the current U.S. effort.It’s also an area where there is a shared interest between the U.S. and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Pakistan, given that all three are opposed to the Islamic State. And there has actually been some cooperation with Pakistan on this. And I think that highlights the complexity of the Pakistan element of this whole mosaic. There are areas where the U.S. and Pakistan have cooperated very closely on counterterrorism. I think it’s fair to say the U.S. would not have been able to decimate Al Qaeda in the region without cooperation with Pakistan. But, on the other hand, Pakistan does still provide safe haven for the leadership of the Afghan Taliban and is not in alignment with U.S. policy in the region. Glasser: It’s like Groundhog Day. It’s a conversation that we could have been having, and you could have been giving almost that verbatim quote any time in the last 17 years.Miller: Yes. Look, the Pakistanis see their interests in the region over the long term in a different way than the U.S. believes they should see their interests. And I don’t think the U.S. would succeed in compelling Pakistan to change its perception of its own interests in the region over the long term, given that it doubts the longevity of the current Afghan government, it doubts the stability of Afghanistan, it doubts the ability of the United States and the Afghan government to defeat the Taliban. And so it’s hedging. The best way, in my view, to try to attract Pakistan to an American policy that they could more likely get behind is to put the effort to launch a peace process more at the center of American policy because that is a way that they, the Pakistanis, might be able to have their own interests satisfied. I mean, it’s a sort of oddity of Afghanistan that the strange bedfellows group of countries that includes Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, and the United States all have basically the same objective in Afghanistan of wanting a more stable Afghanistan and seeing ultimately a political solution as the only way to achieve that. Now, it’s all for different reasons, and there would be different views on what acceptable terms of a final settlement in Afghanistan would be, but there is a sort of bizarre consensus on the basic premise of that group of countries’ interests being served more by stability than instability in Afghanistan and the necessity of a political solution.Glasser: Yes, but dot, dot, dot, right? And the but dot, dot, dot is neither one of us can imagine President Donald Trump or even President Barack Obama, for that matter, taking the lead on something like that. It’s not something that Russia or China might agree to at this point in time, but—Miller: It’s possible. I mean, look, that is the same group of countries that the United States collaborated with at the end of 2001, beginning of 2002, in setting up the transitional Afghan government, the interim government after the American invasion.Glasser: In the aftermath of an extraordinarily shocking geopolitical even.Miller: True. True. But, you know, it was also a testament to skillful diplomacy. And this is a group of countries that the United States, that U.S. diplomats talks to about Afghanistan in various formats and forums. Ultimately all these countries surrounding Afghanistan would prefer not to have U.S. bases in Afghanistan. But there is enough convergence of interests that there is a basis for diplomatic activity. Glasser: No, but it’s hard to imagine at this point in the Trump administration them taking the course that you’re outlining, even though those conditions might be there. Do you agree with that?Miller: Well, it depends on what they want. If the president does decide—and I don’t know whether he will or not—that he doesn’t want to just stay the course in Afghanistan for the next four years but wants to find some way to a more durable solution, then really committing to trying to launch a peace process and empowering people to do the necessary diplomacy is the way to do it. It doesn’t mean that he personally needs to be involved in that, certainly, at an early stage. But to come out strongly and clearly saying that that’s your intention would send an important signal that would be very clearly heard. Glasser: Absolutely. We’ll see what happens, but I would still be shocked if that’s the message we hear coming out of the White House any time soon. Laurel, you have had a fascinating experience over the last couple of years. I want to finish our conversation by sort of pulling back. For you, you took on one of the hardest problems in American government, in American foreign policy. Obviously this has been going on for 17 years. What did you come out of realizing? What did you think you might be able to do? What have you learned about the tools that America has available to exercise its strategic imperatives in this complicated day and age?Miller: I’ll say a couple things that I learned. One is that you really do have to regularly revisit why you are doing what you are doing and what your interests are, because it’s so easy to fall into kind of inertial status quo. I very distinctly remember when I first was working in the SRAP office in the middle of 2013, and there was another policy review going on, because they have been constant, you know, this sort of annual policy reviews. And it was my first interagency meeting on whatever was then the policy review that was going on. And the other people at the table had all been at this for a while. And the discussion started with, “What exactly are our vital national interests in Afghanistan?” And I thought to myself, as someone coming in from outside, from a think tank, “I’d assumed they knew that by 2013.” I was shocked. I thought, “How can these people be sitting around the table asking what are our vital national interests in Afghanistan? It’s 2013.” Here we are in 2017, and we’re asking that question again. You do have to keep asking that question, and it’s very hard for bureaucratic institutions to ask it in the serious, blank-slate kind of way that it should be asked. And even though that question has come on the table once again, there is still a tendency to address it in a very routinized kind of way that doesn’t really step back and look at the whole picture. So that’s one thing I’ve learned and will take with me.The other thing I would say is that my own views about the situation in Afghanistan and the path forward have changed quite a bit. When I started the job I was more skeptical of the idea of launching peace talks in Afghanistan than I am now, more skeptical of the plausibility, and, at that time, more skeptical that that was really the way forward. And I would also say, when I started the job, I bought into the often-repeated idea that the problem with the—that we undermined our own military surge in Afghanistan by announcing deadlines for withdrawal at the same time as we announced the surge. I no longer believe that that was such a consequential decision.Glasser: How interesting. People see that as a big mistake of Obama’s.Miller: People see it as the sort of single point of failure. People currently in the U.S. government still see that as the single point of failure. And the reason why I don’t believe that any longer is—first of all, I mean, let’s set aside what the logic of it was at the time, which it wasn’t just that Obama wanted to get out of there. The logic was you’re going to put pressure on the Afghan government to get its act together and to know it doesn’t have an American gravy train forever. But setting that aside, first of all it’s a fallacy that the Taliban were just waiting us out. They didn’t wait us out. They fought us the whole time. So clearly they didn’t believe we were about to leave Afghanistan on any particular timetable. Secondly, it was never going to be plausible that we were going to keep 100,000 troops in Afghanistan forever. Afghans are going to be in Afghanistan forever; Americans are not going to be in Afghanistan forever. And that’s patently obvious to Afghans, to include the Taliban. And, in addition, the Taliban were always going to be more motivated than we were because the idea of foreign troops on Afghan soil is anathema to them. Glasser: See Vietnam. Miller: Right. It’s relevant to the point about peace process because if you look at those factors, it’s pretty hard to see a military solution to the problem in Afghanistan, no matter how much we pour into improving the technical capabilities of the Afghan government security forces, and the logic of seeking a negotiated solution to the conflict becomes more apparent. And it’s usually the case in foreign policy, I would say, as in a lot of things, that the closer you are to a problem, the more you see all the complexities and the obstacles. It’s an interesting aspect of the effort to try to launch peace talks in Afghanistan that the small number of people who have been closest to it have become the greatest believers in the possibility of it, in part because there is a lot that goes on behind the scenes that you can’t really explore and explain publicly. But I do believe that it’s not easy and it will take a long time but it is possible and it’s, to my mind, clearly in American national security interests to put that at the forefront of our policy. Glasser: Laurel, as you said, it’s a hard thing to say the word optimist and the Afghan peace process in the same sentence, but you’ve come close. And I appreciate that as well as your time. We’re talking about America’s longest war, Afghanistan, and I think if you had told both you and I back in 2001 that we would be there 17 years later, longer, by the way, than the Soviet Union was in Afghanistan, it would have shocked us and everyone else in the United States. I want to thank you again for joining me on The Global POLITICO this week. And thanks to all our listeners, of course. You can listen to us on iTunes or whatever is your favorite podcast platform. And of course you can always email me at any time at [email protected] Give me feedback or ideas for more guests. And, of course, thank Laurel Miller along with me for joining us this week. Thank you, Laurel.Miller: Thank you so much.

24 июля, 12:14

The Trump White House’s War Within

His national security team wants a stepped-up fight in Afghanistan. There's just one problem: A president who doesn't want to be there.

24 июля, 08:00

Ahead of October elections, Security Council urges Liberia to plan for safe, credible polls

With Liberian officials responsible for security in the country, the United Nations Security Council today encouraged the Government to put in place an election security plan for the October polls.

24 июля, 05:00

The Man McMaster Couldn't Fire

Thirty-one-year-old Ezra Cohen-Watnick holds the intelligence portfolio on the National Security Council—but almost everything about him is a mystery.

23 июля, 00:15

If Trump Undermines the Iran Deal

A report suggests the president is looking for ways to get out of the accord. It says a lot about how he views the world.

22 июля, 18:29

What Should We Be Ready to Do After the Next Nuclear Fire?...

I was never able to get anybody interested in publishing this when I wrote it and shopped it around ten years ago. I do wonder why: it is, I think, rather important... After the Next Nuclear Fire... : In the early 1980s the U.S. NSA--or perhaps it was the Defense Department--loved to play games with Russian air defense. They would send probe planes in from the Pacific to fly over Siberia. And they would watch and listen: Where were the gaps in Russian sensor coverage? How far could U.S. planes penetrate before being spotted? What were Russian command-and-control procedures to intercept intruders? And so on, and so forth. Then, one night, September 1, 1983, the pilot of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 to Seoul mispunched his destination coordinates into his autopilot, and sent his plane west of its proper course, over Siberia, where Russian fighters--confident that they had finally caught one of the American spyplane intruders napping--blew it and its hundreds of civilian passengers out of the sky. With some glee the Reagan administration claimed that the Russians had deliberately shot down a civilian airliner because they were barbarians and terrorists and wanted the world to know that they were...

21 июля, 12:09

Steve Bannon’s disappearing act

Once dubbed 'The Great Manipulator,' Trump’s senior adviser steps back in bid to save his job.

21 июля, 02:20

New Scapegoat Emerges In Unmasking Scandal: Meet Obama's Former U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power

For months now, many have speculated that Obama's former National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, was the controversial figure behind all the unmaskings of Trump associates in the waning days of Obama's final term in the White House.  That said, new details seem to suggest that Rice's successor as U.N. Ambassador, Samantha Power, may emerge as the administration's convenient scapegoat is this particular scandal. As the Washington Free Beacon points out today (via some anonymous sources so take it with a grain of salt), Power appears to be central to efforts by top Obama administration officials to identify individuals named in classified intelligence community reports related to Trump and his presidential transition team.  If true, Power's role in the unmasking efforts would be particularly questionable since it's nearly inconceivable that her position as the U.N. ambassador  would require such sensitive unmasking activities. "Unmasking is not a regular occurrence—absolutely not a weekly habit. It is rare, even at the National Security Council, and ought to be rarer still for a U.N. ambassador," according to one former senior U.S. official who spoke to the Washington Free Beacon.   "It might be defended when the communication in question relates directly to U.N. business, for example an important Security Council vote," explained the former official, who would only discuss the matter on background. "Sometimes it might be done out of other motives than national security, such as sheer curiosity or to defend a bureaucratic position. Or just plain politics."   The Intelligence Committee's focus of Power and other key Obama officials is a prime example of the Obama administration's efforts to spy on those close to Trump, according to sources familiar with the ongoing investigation.   "The subpoena for Power suggests just how pervasive the Obama administration's spying on Americans actually was," said one veteran GOP political operative who has been briefed on the matter by senior Congressional intelligence officials. "The U.N. ambassador has absolutely no business calling for the quantity and quality of the intelligence that Power seems to have been asking for."   "That's just not the sort of thing that she should have been concerned about, unless she was playing the role of political operative with the help of the intelligence community," the source said. "It gives away what was actually going on: the Obama administration was operating in a pervasive culture of impunity and using the intelligence community against their political opponents." The House Intelligence Committee, which is spearheading the investigation into these efforts, has issued subpoenas for Power and other top Obama administration figures, including former national security adviser Susan Rice, as part of congressional efforts to determine the source of these leaks. Rice was scheduled to speak to House Intelligence Committee this week, but the meeting was reportedly postponed. Some sources speculated this could be a delaying tactic by Rice aimed at pushing the testimony back until after Congress's summer recess. Of course, Power's unmasking efforts would hardly be the first time the Obama administration used it's U.N. Ambassador to do it's dirty work.  Who can forget that time that Susan Rice went on her infamous apology tour to blame the Benghazi attacks, which claimed the lives of multiple U.S. citizens,  on an obscure youtube video that basically no one had ever heard of? Here's a reminder for those who 'do not recall.'   And while most of the country was outraged that Susan Rice went on every major talk show to lie to the American public, her efforts were apparently appreciated by Obama who granted her a promotion to National Security Advisor shortly after the scandal. Of course, getting the "opposition research" from our intelligence community unmasked is only half the effort...the other half is leaking it to friendly reporters at the New York Times and Washington Post.  And that, according to Representative Ron DeSantis, is where Ben Rhodes came in. Rep. Ron DeSantis (R., Fla.), a member of the House Oversight Committee and chair of its National Security Subcommittee, told the Free Beacon last week that these leaks appear to have come from former senior officials, potentially including Ben Rhodes, the Obama national security adviser responsible for creating what he described as an in-house "echo chamber" meant to mislead the public and Congress about the landmark Iran nuclear deal.   "I think Congress and some members on the Intelligence Committee can call Ben Rhodes to testify," DeSantis said. "He may be able to invoke executive privilege from when Obama was president, but he definitely can't do that in any interactions he's had since then."   DeSantis identified Rhodes and other senior Obama administration officials as being "involved with feeding journalists some of these [leaks]. I believe he's in touch with people on the National Security Council. It would be absolutely legitimate as part of leak investigation to bring him in and put him under oath, and I would absolutely support doing that." Call us cynical but it seems hardly coincidental that Power's role in unmasking Trump associates was revealed just before Susan Rice was set to appear before the House Intelligence Committee.  Well played, as always, Ms. Rice.

20 июля, 22:39

Egypt says it is 'shameful' that Qatar not held accountable at United Nations

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - Egypt accused Qatar on Thursday of adopting a "pro-terrorist" policy that violated United Nations Security Council resolutions and described it as "shameful" that the 15-member body had not held Qatar accountable.

20 июля, 09:01

Вашингтон свернет поддержку сирийской оппозиции

Программа была центральным элементом политики прежнего президента США Барака Обамы, который с 2013 года поддерживал давление на сирийское руководство с целью смещения неугодного Западу президента САР Башара Асада

20 июля, 07:43

Russia, U.S. duel at U.N. over whether North Korea fired long-range missile

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - The United States and Russia are waging rival campaigns at the United Nations Security Council over the type of ballistic missile fired by North Korea earlier this month as the U.S. pushes to impose stronger sanctions on Pyongyang over the test.

20 июля, 02:25

President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate Personnel to Key Administration Posts

President Donald J. Trump today announced his intent to nominate the following individuals to key positions in his Administration: Joseph Balash of Alaska to be an Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Land and Mineral Management. Mr. Balash currently serves as the Chief of Staff to Senator Dan Sullivan. He is the former Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, which has management responsibility for one of the largest single portfolios of land and water resources in the world. Previously he served as the Deputy Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources from 2010 to 2013. From 2006 to 2010, he advised two governors on natural resource policy, permitting, and energy. Prior to that, from 1998 to 2006, he served in a variety of legislative staff positions, including Chief of Staff to the President of the Alaskan Senate. He graduated from Ben Eielson Jr.-Sr. High School in 1993. He is married with two children. Samuel H. Clovis Jr. of Iowa to be Under Secretary of Agriculture for Research, Education, and Economics. Mr. Clovis is the Senior White House Advisor to the United States Department of Agriculture. Most recently, he served as the chief policy advisor and national co-chair of the Trump-Pence campaign. He came to the campaign from Morningside College where he was a professor of economics. Mr. Clovis holds a B.S. in political science from the U.S. Air Force Academy, an M.B.A. from Golden Gate University and a Doctorate in public administration from the University of Alabama. He is also a graduate of both the Army and Air Force War Colleges. After graduating from the Academy, Mr. Clovis spent 25 years serving in the Air Force. He retired as the Inspector General of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the United States Space Command and was a command pilot. Mr. Clovis is married to the former Charlotte Chase of Piketon, OH. He is originally from rural central Kansas. Daniel Alan Craig of Maryland to be Deputy Administrator, of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Craig was most recently a senior Vice President at the disaster preparedness and recovery consulting firm, Adjusters International, Inc. In this capacity, he oversaw firm sales, business development, marketing, and relationships with clients. Before this position, Mr. Craig was the CEO and President of Tidal Basin Holdings, a company he founded in the emergency management industry. Mr. Craig previously served as the Director of Recovery for FEMA. He managed the Agency’s recovery services and funds given to individual victims and the public sector for damages from more than 120 Presidentially-declared disasters, emergencies, and fires, including September 11th, the Space Shuttle Columbia explosion, the Cerro Grande Fire in Los Alamos, and the Florida Hurricanes of 2004. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Purdue University as well as an M.B.A. from both Purdue University and Central European University. J. Steven Dowd of Florida to be United States Director of the African Development Bank for a term of five years. Mr. Dowd has decades of executive experience in trade, logistics, and finance, with a significant focus on Africa. Mr. Dowd co-founded Ag Source, LLC, a global agriculture logistics, transportation, and finance company. His prior experience includes overseeing food aid operations and leading port infrastructure projects in Africa. Mr. Dowd also served as CEO of Marcona Ocean Industries, an international shipping and mining company. Mr. Dowd holds a B.S. in History from Manhattan College, and earned a M.A. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, where he was designated as a Georgetown Fellow in Foreign Service. Mark T. Esper of Virginia to be Secretary of the Army. Mr. Esper is an Army, Pentagon, and Capitol Hill veteran who previously served as a Vice President for government relations at the Raytheon Company. Mr. Esper began his career as an Infantry Officer in the 101st Airborne Division, serving with distinction in the first Gulf War. He later served on active duty in Europe and on the Army Staff in Washington, DC, before transitioning to the National Guard and retiring after 21 years of service. He was an airborne ranger and recipient of the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and Meritorious Service Medals, among other awards and qualifications. Mr. Esper worked national security issues on Capitol Hill for Senators Chuck Hagel, Fred Thompson, and Majority Leader Bill Frist. He was also a professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations and House Armed Services Committees, and later a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Mr. Esper’s private sector experience includes service as an Executive Vice President at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Policy Director for Fred Thompson for President during the 2008 campaign, and EVP of the Aerospace Industries Association of America. Mr. Esper is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, and George Washington University. Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick of the District of Columbia to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Ms. Fitzpatrick, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, class of Minister-Counselor, has served as an American diplomat since 1983. She is currently the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. Ms. Fitzpatrick earned a M.S. from the U.S. National War College, a M.A. from Georgetown University and a B.A. from the University of Dayton. Her languages include Spanish, French, Russian, Dutch and some Arabic. Daniel J. Kaniewski of Minnesota to be Deputy Administrator for National Preparedness, of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Kaniewski was most recently Vice President for Global Resilience at AIR Worldwide, a catastrophe risk modeling and consulting services firm, and a Senior Fellow at George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security. Previously, Dr. Kaniewski served as the Mission Area Director for Resilience and Emergency Preparedness/Response at the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute. He was also an adjunct assistant professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, where he taught graduate courses in the Security Studies Program. Before these positions, Dr. Kaniewski served on the White House staff, first as Director of Response and Recovery Policy and later as Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Senior Director for Response Policy. Dr. Kaniewski began his career in homeland security as a firefighter and paramedic. He holds a B.S. in Emergency Medical Services from George Washington University, a Master of Arts degree in National Security Studies from the Georgetown University, and a Ph.D. in Public Policy and Administration from George Washington University. Anthony Kurta of Montana to be a Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. Mr. Kurta was most recently fulfilling the duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, where he was responsible for health affairs, readiness, civilian and military personnel policy for Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian members of the Department of Defense. Mr. Kurta previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy and the Director of Navy Flag Officer Management and Development. In addition, Mr. Kurta served 32 years on Active Duty as a Navy Surface Warfare Officer, during which time he commanded the USS Sentry (MCM 3), USS Guardian (MCM 5), USS Warrior (MCM 10), USS Carney (DDG 64), Destroyer Squadron Two Four and Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). He is a recipient of Defense Superior Service Medals, Legions of Merit, Meritorious Service Medals, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award. Mr. Kurta is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Georgetown University, Air Command and Staff College, and was a National Security Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He retired from the Navy as a Rear Admiral. Ted McKinney of Indiana to be Under Secretary of Agriculture for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs. Mr. McKinney is director of the Indiana State Department of Agriculture, serving from 2014 to present under then Governor Mike Pence, and now Governor Eric Holcomb. Mr. McKinney grew up on a family grain and livestock farm in Tipton, Indiana. He also worked for 19 years with Dow AgroSciences, and 14 years with Elanco, a subsidiary of Eli Lilly and Company, where he was Director of Global Corporate Affairs. His industry and civic involvements include the National FFA Conventions Local Organizing Committee, Indiana State Fair Commission, International Food Information Council (IFIC), the U.S. Meat Export Federation, International Federation of Animal Health (IFAH), and the Purdue Dean of Agriculture Advisory Committee. Mr. McKinney was a 10-year 4-H member, an Indiana State FFA Officer, and a graduate of Purdue University where he received a B.S. in Agricultural Economics in 1981. While at Purdue, he received the G.A. Ross Award as the outstanding senior male graduate. In 2002, he was named a Purdue Agriculture Distinguished Alumnus, and in 2004, received an honorary American FFA Degree. Mr. McKinney and his wife Julie have three children and four grandchildren. A. Wess Mitchell of Virginia to be an Assistant Secretary of State, European and Eurasian Affairs. Mr. Mitchell is an expert on NATO and transatlantic relations. In 2005 he co-founded the Center for European Policy Analysis and has served as its President and CEO since 2009. He serves on numerous policy boards in the United States and Europe. Mr. Mitchell earned a B.A. from Texas Tech University, a M.A. from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and recently completed his Ph.D. at Freie Universität, in Berlin, Germany. He speaks German and has studied Dutch and Czech. Robert L. Wilkie of North Carolina to be Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Mr. Wilkie currently serves as Senior Advisor to Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina. He most recently served in the Presidential Transition Office, where he was a member of both the Defense Policy Team and Cabinet Affairs Teams. Previously, Mr. Wilkie served as Vice President for Strategic Initiatives for CH2M HILL, one of the world’s largest engineering and program management firms. He also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs as well as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the National Security Council during the George W. Bush Administration. On Capitol Hill, Mr. Wilkie served as Counsel and Advisor on International Security Affairs for the Majority Leader of the United States Senate, the Honorable Trent Lott. Mr. Wilkie currently serves in the United States Air Force Reserve, and previously in the United States Navy Reserve. He is a graduate of Wake Forest University, Loyola University College of Law (New Orleans), Georgetown University Law Center, and the United States Army War College. He is also a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff, the Joint Forces Staff College and the Air Command and Staff College.  

19 июля, 21:39

Pentagon Furious After Turkey Leaks U.S. Base Locations In Syria: "Hard Not To See This As A F-You"

So much for NATO-alliance members working for the common good. In a move that has angered the U.S. for obvious reason, Turkey’s state-run news agency Anadolu Agency has leaked the precise locations of U.S. bases in northern Syria. The move - which exposes the exact locations of American soldiers on the front lines in the war-torn nation - has sent the ongoing feud between the two NATO allies to new lows. As Bloomberg details, in reports published in both Turkish and English on Tuesday, Anadolu provided detailed information about 10 U.S. bases in northern Syria, including troop counts and a map of the U.S. force presence in the Turkish version. #AA'n?n 'PKK/PYD'ye ABD deste?i' haberi uluslararas? bas?nda yank? uyand?rd? https://t.co/8IJbm9w16D pic.twitter.com/svt4u9v5CD — ANADOLU AJANSI (@anadoluajansi) July 19, 2017 Without citing specific sources, the state-run news agency unveiled the ten US outposts located in areas controlled by “terrorist” Kurdish militias in the provinces of Aleppo, Hasakah and Raqqa. The reports said that the military outposts are “usually hidden for security reasons, making it hard to be detected.” It said they were located “in the terrorist PKK/PYD-held Syrian territories,” a reference to Kurdish groups that Turkey’s government considers terrorist organizations. While locations of two of the bases, in Rmeilan district (in Hasakah province) and Harab Isk village (near Kobani, in Aleppo province), had already been widely publicized, the others had been mentioned only in outside reports, or were completely unknown. Anadolu’s story also provided systematic and detailed information about troop numbers, equipment, and US operational procedures at the outposts. Needless to say, the Pentagon was furious. According to the Daily Beast, Washington was so incensed that it even tried to prevent US media from reprinting the story, after it had already appeared in the Turkish media. “The discussion of specific troop numbers and locations would provide sensitive tactical information to the enemy which could endanger Coalition and partner forces,” Colonel Joe Scrocca, director of public affairs for Operation Inherent Resolve, reportedly wrote to the New York-based Daily Beast, which was the only major US outlet to pick up the story by Wednesday morning. “Publishing this type of information would be professionally irresponsible and we respectively request that you refrain from disseminating any information that would put Coalition lives in jeopardy,” Scrocca added. It is no secret that over the past few years Turkey and the U.S. have been at odds over the U.S. backing of Kurdish fighters in Syria who are affiliated with separatist movements inside Turkey. The Turkish government probably leaked U.S. troop locations to Anadolu as retaliation, according to Aaron Stein, a fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington. “The U.S. takes force protection seriously, obviously,” Stein said by email on Wednesday. “The Turkish government knows this, and still decided to leak the locations of U.S. bases in Syria. Hard not to see this as a F-you.” Indeed, on Monday, Turkey’s National Security Council proclaimed that the Syrian-based YPD is the “same organization” as the separatist PKK that operates inside the country, and which Turkey has branded as terrorist. Turkish officials said that weapons freely flow between the two groups, and last month accused Washington of arming “terrorists,” saying that “some allies” apply “double standards.” Meanwhile, the Pentagon said it had conveyed its concern to the Turkish government. “While we cannot independently verify the sources that contributed to this story, we would be very concerned if officials from a NATO ally would purposefully endanger our forces by releasing sensitive information,” Major Adrian J.T. Rankine-Galloway, a Defense Department spokesman, said in an emailed statement. “The release of sensitive military information exposes Coalition forces to unnecessary risk and has the potential to disrupt ongoing operations to defeat ISIS.” According to Bloomberg, Levent Tok, an Anadolu Agency reporter on the story, said the information about U.S. troop positions wasn’t leaked. "The story was based on field work by Anadolu’s Syria reporters and some of the information on bases had been broadcast on social media by Kurdish fighters", he told Bloomberg on Wednesday. “The U.S. should have thought about this before it cooperated with a terrorist organization,” he said. The Anadolu report claims that the US operates several types of facilities in the Kurdish-controlled territories. Some are “field-type military points” which are “usually hidden for security reasons, making it hard to be detected.” The most prominent of these is Rmeilan, established in the Al-Hasakah province in October 2015. It has an airfield through which cargo planes deliver weapons to the fighters – one of the two major arms routes into the country, along with a land route from Iraq, according to the news agency. Another is Harab Isk, a helicopter base set up near Kobani in March 2016. Apart from the more traditional facilities, the US-led coalition “uses some other places which are hard to be detected like residential areas, PKK/YPD camps, easily transformed factories.” Eight of the facilities are staffed with officers responsible “for airstrikes and artillery shelling, military consultants, training officers, [and] operational planning officers.” “The equipment in the military points includes artillery batteries with high maneuverability, multi-barrel rocket launchers, various mobile equipment for intelligence and armored vehicles such as ‘Stryker’ for general patrols and security,” the report adds. * * * The incident was the latest to strain relations between Turkey and a major NATO ally. Last week, a senior Turkish official told Bloomberg that Turkey had agreed to purchase a missile defense system from Russia, a move that could jeopardize Turkey’s relations with the Western security bloc. Germany is in the process of withdrawing from Turkey’s most important NATO base, Incirlik, after Turkey repeatedly refused to allow German lawmakers to visit troops there.

19 июля, 12:00

Президент, сталинист и шпион. Самые знаменитые послы США в России

  Президент. Джон Куинси Адамс  Имя шестого президента США Джона Куинси Адамса у нас знают в основном историки — его изображения нет на долларовых банкнотах. Но, до того как он в 1825 году стал хозяином Белого дома, Адамс был первым американским министром — посланником США в России в 1809–1814 годах. Адамс родился в 1767 году. Отец его был вторым президентом США, а до этого — одним из крупнейших американских дипломатов, поэтому неудивительно, что Джона с ранних лет воспитывали как политика. В возрасте 13 лет его вместе с дипломатом Фрэнсисом Дейной направляют в Россию, где Джон Адамс даже стал студентом Санкт-Петербургского университета. Позже он уехал путешествовать во Францию и в Британию, где и встретил свою будущую жену Луизу Джонсон. О своём назначении на пост представителя он узнал из газет. Уже через неделю его принял российский император Александр I, видевший в США некий противовес для Британской империи. Вскоре был заключён договор между США и императором о вечном мире, дружбе и взаимопонимании. Миссия Адамса была успешной: ему удалось установить тесные контакты между Россией и США. Кроме того, он передал в библиотеки США ряд научных трудов, которые были им приобретены в Санкт-Петербурге. В Вашингтоне Джон Адамс стал госсекретарём США при президенте Монро, а в феврале 1825 года палата представителей избрала Адамса шестым президентом США. В историю он вошёл как один из авторов доктрины Монро — основополагающего документа, в котором прямо говорится, что у Америки есть интересы поодаль от её собственных границ. По собственному признанию Джона Адамса, его  всегда тянуло вернуться в Санкт-Петербург, где он провёл лучшие годы своей жизни и где осталась могила его маленькой дочери Луизы Кэтрин Адамс. Генерал-русофил. Кассиус Клей Кассиус Марцеллус Клей, сын богатого плантатора из штата Кентукки и выпускник Йельского университета, снискал известность как самый горячий сторонник освобождения рабов в США. Он сам освободил своих рабов и был редактором газеты "Истинный американец", выступавшей против рабства. Неслучайно, что боксёр Мухаммед Али, также родившийся в штате Кентукки, получил при рождении имя Кассиус Марцеллус Клей — в честь посла Клея. В Россию Клея в 1861 году отправил сам президент Авраам Линкольн. В Санкт-Петербурге он оказался как дома: южная аристократия воспитывала детей в традициях европейских высших классов, и выросший в семье богатого плантатора Клей по духу был намного ближе к русской аристократии, чем к американцам-северянам. Сам Клей позже вспоминал, что с первых дней пребывания в России он купался в лучах внимания высшего света: "При дворе одежда имеет великое значение. Я одевался в униформу генерал-майора, что разрешил мне акт конгресса и которая везде выглядит как красивая и сшитая со вкусом одежда; и это было хорошо воспринято. Также я носил элегантный меч, подаренный мне жителями Кентукки, сделанный Тиффани и красиво отделанный драгоценными камнями". В России Клей нашёл свою жену — знаменитую балерину Марию Суровщикову, которую он отбил у самого Мариуса Петипа. Мария родила посланнику сына Леонида, которого Кассиус Клей позже увёз с собой в США. Была успешной и дипломатическая миссия Клея — так, в 1863 году император Александр II направил военно-морскую флотилию в Сан-Франциско и Нью-Йорк, демонстрируя российскую поддержку США. При деятельном участии Кассиуса Клея в 1867 году состоялась и покупка Соединёнными Штатами Аляски. Несмотря на то что часть американских политиков выступала против этой сделки, полагая, что американская армия сможет и так захватить Аляску, Клей настоял на сохранении союзных отношений с Россией. Также он выступал против русофобии, источником которой он называл Британию: "Мы получаем все наши идеи о России и русских из английских источников, всегда окрашенных непримиримым соперничеством... Хотя и трудно предположить симпатию самодержавия к народному правительству, такому как в Соединённых Штатах, всё-таки в качестве союзника против общего врага — Англии — было вполне естественно, что Россия желала сохранения Американского союза". Маклер-незнайка. Дэвид Фрэнсис В своих мемуарах Дэвид Роуленд Фрэнсис писал, что пост посла в России был для него первым на поприще дипломатии, когда он — в прошлом торговец хлебом и биржевой деятель — решил продолжить карьеру в политике. В Петроград он приехал в 1916 году, толком ничего не зная о Российской империи. "С гривой серебряных волос, в старомодном крахмальном воротничке и визитке он являл собою странную фигуру в обстановке потрясённого войной революционного Петрограда", — так описывал его один из британских дипломатов, заметив, что "Фрэнсису не отличить эсера от картошки". Действительно, посол плохо разбирался в политической жизни России, но зато он, как и всякий член Демократической партии США, выступал против монархии и за народную революцию. Поэтому, наверное, и неудивительно, что посол Дэвид Фрэнсис первым из дипломатов мировых держав и союзников России поддержал военный переворот в феврале 1917 года, когда высокопоставленные генералы, фактически захватив семью государя в заложники, выбили у Николая II отречение от престола. США первой из стран признали и Временное правительство. Позже, в своей книге воспоминаний "Россия: взгляд из Посольства США (апрель 1916 — ноябрь 1918)", Фрэнсис попытался оправдать своё сотрудничество с революционерами тем, что на него произвели впечатления не расстрелы полицейских и погромы магазинов, но малая кровь, которой далась победа Февральской революции: "Это, несомненно, революция, но это лучшая из всех совершённых революций для своего масштаба". Также Фрэнсис прославился тем, что в дни Октябрьского переворота именно он распорядился предоставить дипломатическую машину Посольства США, чтобы вывезти Керенского из Петрограда. В тот же вечер он телеграфировал государственному секретарю Лансингу: "Крайний социалист или анархист по фамилии Ленин произносит опасные речи и тем укрепляет правительство; говорят, что Петроградский совет рабочих и солдат создал кабинет, в котором Ленин — премьер. Думаю, ему умышленно дают волю, ведь чем нелепее ситуация, тем быстрее можно её изменить". Кто именно умышленно давал волю Ленину, Фрэнсис так и не сообщил. Следом за Керенским бежали из Петрограда и американские дипломаты — сначала в Вологду, где американское посольство работало четыре месяца, затем — в Архангельск, под защиту британских интервентов. В сентябре 1919 года дипломатические отношения США с правительством большевиков были прерваны. Богемный тусовщик. Уильям Буллит 42-летний журналист, писатель и дипломат Уильям Буллит был совершенно неслучайно назначен первым послом США в СССР после его официального признания Соединёнными Штатами в 1933 году. Друг писателя-коммуниста Джона Рида, он ещё во времена Первой мировой войны побывал в Петрограде — как репортёр The New York Times. В 1919 году он прибыл и в Москву и, как личный посланник госсекретаря США Роберта Лансинга, провёл секретные переговоры с Лениным. По окончании переговоров получил на руки документы, содержание которых было во многом сенсационным: в обмен на прекращение экономической блокады большевики обещали признать все новые антикоммунистические правительства на территории бывшей Российской империи — в Финляндии, Эстонии, Латвии, Литве, Польше, Западной Белоруссии, более чем на половине Украины, в Крыму, на Кавказе, в Грузии, Армении, Азербайджане, на Урале и в Сибири. А также демобилизовать армию — под международным присмотром, амнистировать политических заключённых, выплатить часть долгов царской России. Однако в Госдепе были уверены, что большевики — явление временное, и не хотели, подписывая с ними договор, признавать новую власть. Разочаровавшись во внешней политике, Буллит ушёл в отставку и занялся литературой; в 1926 году он издал свой первый и единственный роман "Это не сделано" — о богемной жизни блистательной эпохи 20-х годов, когда мир хотел всеми силами забыть о пережитых ужасах войны. Однако в истории литературы Уильям Буллит остался не благодаря собственному роману, а благодаря тому, что стал прототипом главных героев сразу двух знаковых романов ХХ века.   Во-первых, это американец Дик Дайвер из романа "Ночь нежна", который написал его приятель Фрэнсис Скотт Фицджеральд. Во-вторых, это Воланд из романа "Мастер и Маргарита" Михаила Булгакова. Вновь оказавшись в 1933 году в Москве по личной просьбе своего старого приятеля по Госдепу Франклина Делано Рузвельта, ставшего президентом США, Буллит первым делом был принят в Кремле, где в его честь был организован шикарный банкет. В меню — традиционные закуски: чёрная икра, раки. Ну и конечно, водка и коньяк. Буллит вдруг убедился , что пора сумрачных фанатиков и революционеров-аскетов прошла, перед ними — обычные бизнесмены, желающие наслаждаться маленькими радостями жизни. И, желая поддерживать более близкие контакты с советской элитой, Буллит устраивал в своей резиденции в Спасо-хаусе шикарные балы и вечеринки на сотни приглашённых. На одной из этих вечеринок в апреле 1935 года и побывал писатель Михаил Булгаков. "Были у американского посла, — писала в своём дневнике жена писателя Елена Сергеевна. — М.А. в чёрном костюме. Поехали к двенадцати часам. Все во фраках, было только несколько смокингов и пиджаков. В зале с колоннами танцуют, с хор — прожектора разноцветные. За сеткой — птицы — масса — порхают... Стиль рюсс. Масса тюльпанов, роз — из Голландии. В верхнем этаже — шашлычная. Красные розы, красное французское вино. Внизу — всюду шампанское, сигареты". Увиденное настолько потрясло воображение Булгакова, что тот вставил описание этого бала в свой роман о визите дьявола в Москву, причём и сам дьявол приобрёл черты американского посла.   Через два года большая часть гостей, присутствовавших на балу Буллита, будет арестована и казнена в подвалах Лубянки. Но Буллит за "открытыми процессами" против своих вчерашних гостей наблюдал уже издалека — в 1936 году он отправился послом во Францию, где помог спасти от нацистов своего венского приятеля Зигмунда Фрейда. После поражения Франции Уильям Буллит возвратился в США, где начал агитировать за скорейшее вступление США в войну против Гитлера. Их отношения с Рузвельтом разладились, и тогда Буллит отправляется добровольцем к де Голлю. По прибытии в Европу он был назначен майором инфантерии, участвовал во взятии Тулона, Марселя и других городов. Безоговорочную капитуляцию Германии Уильям встретил уже подполковником французской армии. Он умер в Париже в 1967 году. Миллионер-сталинист. Джозеф Дэвис Место убывшего в 1936 году из Москвы Буллита занял другой старинный друг Рузвельта — Джозеф Дэвис, который, казалось, был человеком, совершенно не подходящим на эту роль. Джозеф Дэвис, как и Буллит, не был карьерным дипломатом — напротив, он был банкиром-инвестором, то есть, по выражению Генри Киссинджера, в глазах коммунистов он был "архикапиталистом". Более того, Дэвис был женат на Марджори Пост — самой богатой женщине Америки, владелице процветающего концерна "Дженерал фуд". Пост дипломата Дэвис получил после того, как вложил в предвыборную кампанию Рузвельта 100 тысяч долларов — сумасшедшие деньги по тем временам. Впрочем, он не был и новичком в международной политике: Дэвис в своё время работал советником президента Вудро Вильсона и избегал чёрно-белого взгляда на мир. На страницах своей книги "Миссия в Москву" Дэвис подробно описывает, что президент Рузвельт поставил перед Дэвисом две задачи: развивать торговые отношения с СССР и наладить дружеские контакты с Кремлём, по возможности с самим Сталиным. С обеими он блестяще справился. Весной 1937 года Дэвис дал Рузвельту отчёт о десятидневной поездке по стране. Он был в Киеве, Харькове, Запорожье, Днепропетровске. ДнепроГЭС ошеломила его. Дэвис писал: "Всё, что эти люди сделали за последние семь лет в тяжёлой промышленности, уникально. Они пишут на холстах в десять лье "хвостом кометы". В Вашингтоне Дэвиса назвали "трубадуром Кремля" и осудили за то, что он "дал себя использовать". Упрекали, что он не замечал недостатков и преследований политических оппонентов. Но Дэвиса это нисколько не смущало. "Это не наше дело — вмешиваться в то, как русские ведут свои домашние дела, — пишет Дэвис, — главное, что нас должно волновать, будут ли они надёжными соседями на тот случай, если вспыхнет пожар". В мае 1943 года, вскоре после Сталинградской битвы, президент США доверил Джозефу Дэвису, который к тому времени уже не был послом (он уехал из Москвы в 1939 году) ответственную миссию — передать Сталину конфиденциальное письмо, только что законченный фильм и посетить Сталинград. Так "Миссия в Москву" стала первым голливудским военным фильмом, показанным в Советском Союзе. В мае 1945 года Президиум Верховного Совета СССР наградил Джозефа Эдварда Дэвиса орденом Ленина — он стал единственным западным дипломатом, получившим самую высокую советскую награду. В годы холодной войны Комиссия сенатора Маккарти по расследованию антиамериканской деятельности занесла в чёрный список и книгу "Миссия в Москву", и кинофильм. Сам Дэвис попал в опалу: ему не простили его "сервильности" и наивности, обвинив в том, что свою коллекцию произведений Фаберже и других художественных сокровищ, приобретённых в комиссионных магазинах Советского Союза, он будто бы получил в качестве платы от коммунистического правительства "за проявленную лояльность". Олигарх-прагматик. Аверелл Гарриман Если Джозеф Дэвис был просто миллионером, то Аверелл Гарриман был представителем экономической и политической элиты, голубых кровей Восточного побережья Америки. Его отец Эдвард Генри Гарриман был хозяином нескольких железных дорог в США, сам Аверелл учился в Гротонской школе вместе с братом Элеоноры Рузвельт. С 18 лет он вёл собственный бизнес — так, во времена нэпа он получил на Кавказе концессию в районе Чиатурского марганцевого месторождения, неоднократно бывал в Москве и на Кавказе, успешно "решая вопросы" со многими советскими руководителями. Словом, нет ничего удивительного в том, что именно его Рузвельт попросил стать послом после очевидных провалов американской дипломатии в 1941 году. В 1939 году новым послом стал Лоуренс Штейнгардт — профессиональный дипломат, служивший посланником в Швеции и в Перу. Нападение Германии на Советский Союз повергло его в панику: в первые недели войны он приказал эвакуировать посольство сначала в Вологду, потом в город Куйбышев, чем совершенно парализовал работу дипломатической службы. Когда в 1942 году немцы были отброшены от Москвы, президент Рузвельт вернул посла Штейнгардта домой, назначив вместо него адмирала Уильяма Стэндли, бывшего начальника штаба Военно-морских сил США. Адмирал Стэндли был уверен в поражении СССР в войне, поэтому отправлял в Вашингтон панические депеши, советуя Рузвельту отказаться от поддержки Сталина и заключить союз с Гитлером. В итоге в Москву на переговоры был отправлен Гарриман, который к тому времени уже привлекался администрацией к выполнению отдельных политических миссий. Так, в марте 1941 года он был назначен специальным представителем президента в Англии по осуществлению закона о ленд-лизе, а в конце сентября того же года возглавлял делегацию США на Московской конференции трёх держав по вопросам взаимных военных поставок. И у прагматика Гарримана сложились довольно хорошие отношения с прагматиком Сталиным. В августе 1945 года, когда в СССР приезжал генерал Дуайт Эйзенхауэр, Сталин лично пригласил гостя в сопровождении посла Гарримана на трибуну Мавзолея во время парада на Красной площади. Гарриман и Эйзенхауэр стали единственными гражданами США, когда-либо принимавшими парад в Москве.   Ковбой. Льюэллин Томпсон Льюэллин Томпсон был типичным ковбоем: он родился в семье владельца ранчо в штате Колорадо. На службе Госдепартамента Томпсон стал одним из самых прославленных кадровых дипломатов Америки: он проработал в Москве в общей сложности семь лет при трёх президентах — Эйзенхауэре, Кеннеди и Джонсоне. Мало кому из послов выпало на долю столько критических ситуаций: инцидент с американским самолётом-разведчиком У-2, который был сбит над Свердловском; конфронтация между США и СССР по поводу Берлина и строительство Берлинской стены; сложные встречи между Хрущёвым и президентами Эйзенхауэром и Кеннеди; ввод войск в Чехословакию в августе 1968 года и напряжённость в связи с войной во Вьетнаме. В октябре 1962 года, во время Карибского кризиса, Томпсон в качестве посла по особым поручениям в Вашингтоне входил в Административную комиссию президента и консультировал Джона Кеннеди. В то же время Томпсон был последовательным сторонником улучшения американо-советских отношений. Именно по предложению Томпсона Никита Хрущёв в 1959 году посетил США — это был первый визит руководителя СССР в Соединённые Штаты. Также Томпсон содействовал и подписанию советско-американского договора о культурном сотрудничестве, согласно которому в Сокольниках прошла первая в истории американская выставка. Выставка произвела на советских граждан шокирующий эффект. В парке был сооружён настоящий супермаркет, в котором были представлены самые обычные бытовые товары — от мужских костюмов до эмалированных кастрюль. Ещё больше советских рабочих шокировала информация о том, что для покупки холодильника американскому рабочему надо работать две с половиной недели. После этого миф о том, что Советский Союз сможет когда-либо "догнать и перегнать Америку", был окончательно развеян. Герой детектива. Джек Мэтлок Кадровый дипломат и специалист по России Джек Фауст Мэтлок, наверное, был последним профессиональным советологом на службе Госдепа. Ещё с университета Мэтлок профессионально занимался изучением русской культуры, русской истории и русского языка. Ещё в 1961 году он впервые посетил Москву и завёл дружбу с многими поэтами и писателями — например, он дружил с Андреем Вознесенским. Позже он стал послом в Чехословакии, возглавлял отдел России в Госдепартаменте, был специальным помощником президента Рейгана по СССР, консультируя президента перед переговорами с Михаилом Горбачёвым. В 1987 году Мэтлок стал послом и работал в самый бурный период перестройки. Американский посол первым ещё в июне 1991 года предупредил Горбачёва об угрозе военного переворота. Дипломат позже вспоминал: "В июне 1991 года я пригласил мэра Москвы Гавриила Попова на деловой обед. И он рассказал, что против Горбачева готовится переворот и что он очень хотел бы, чтобы Ельцин, который в те дни находился в Вашингтоне, вернулся в Москву. Всё это происходило в формате обмена записками, мы боялись прослушки. Я написал: "Я доложу, но кто всё это затеял?" Попов вывел ручкой четыре фамилии — Крючков, Павлов, Язов, Лукьянов". Я отправил совершенно секретную телеграмму в Вашингтон. Президент США довел её содержание до сведения Ельцина и спросил его: "Что будем делать?" Ельцин ответил: "Вы должны предупредить Горбачёва". Но как это сделать? Госсекретарь США Джеймс Бейкер находился в тот момент в Берлине. Там же был и глава МИД СССР Александр Бессмертных. Бейкер настоял на встрече, которая прошла в нашем посольстве, и рассказал всё министру. Бессмертных был поражён: "Мне сложно в это поверить, но это как раз тот случай, когда я не могу предупредить Горбачёва". Все — и Бессмертных, и Буш, и Бейкер — позвонить Горбачёву не могли, понимая, что разговор будет зафиксирован КГБ. Из Вашингтона мне сообщили, что президент Буш настаивает на том, чтобы именно я каким-то образом довёл информацию до сведения Горбачёва. Через Черняева, помощника Горбачёва, наша встреча состоялась, информация была передана, но, как мне кажется, генсек не придал ей должного значения. Горбачёв передал сообщение Черняеву и произнёс короткую речь о наивных американцах. — Вы сделали то, что должны были сделать, — сказал он. — Спасибо, что пришли. Президент Буш доказал, что он наш друг. Не беспокойтесь. А днём позже Горбачёву позвонил Буш. Между делом он спросил, состоялась ли встреча с американским послом. Горбачев сказал "да", но заявил: — Всё сказанное послом на тысячу процентов неправда. Уже после неудачной попытки ГКЧП сместить Горбачёва Попов констатировал: — В конце концов всё это сыграло на руку: из телефонного разговора Горбачёва с Бушем Крючков понял, что есть утечка информации, и приостановил подготовку путча. Возможно, именно поэтому переворот провалился. Джек Мэтлок до сих пор является сторонником развития отношений между Россией и США. Не так давно настоящий скандал вызвали его слова о Крыме: "По сравнению с проблемами холодной войны нынешняя — довольно мелкая. У неё много отличительных признаков семейной ссоры. И когда чужаки влезают в семейную ссору, обычно от них особой пользы нет… Украине будет лучше без Крыма, если взглянуть на это дело беспристрастно". Шпион-революционер. Майкл Энтони Макфол Когда в конце 80-х Майкл Макфол изучал международные отношения в Оксфорде, он подал заявление на получение стипендии фонда Сесиля Родса, чтобы защитить диссертацию на тему "Южноафриканское движение за освобождение и вмешательство великих держав: к вопросу о теории революции в международном контексте". Удивлённый чиновник спросил: — Как вы, будучи противником режима апартеида в ЮАР, решились просить стипендию Родса — человека, которого называют столпом превосходства белой расы и "архитектором апартеида"? Макфол, ничуть не смутившись, ответил, что воспользуется стипендией, чтобы "свергнуть режим". В этом ответе — весь Макфол, профессиональный революционер, считающий, что благородство цели оправдывает любые средства, включая и самые низменные. Однако бороться с режимом апартеида Макфолу так и не пришлось — ещё до того, как его диссертация была готова, к власти в ЮАР пришёл чёрный Африканский национальный конгресс, представители которого вот уже три десятка лет рулят страной. Счастья, правда, от этого не прибавилось, но речь не об этом. В итоге Майкл Макфол решил бороться за светлое будущее России.   В 1993–1995 годах он работал в Московском центре Карнеги. Потом стал консультировать Госдеп США на президентских выборах 1996 года в России. Преподавал в Стэнфорде. В 2006 году его пригласили в команду кандидата в президенты США Барака Обамы — консультировать по вопросам политики на постсоветском пространстве. Вскоре он стал директором отдела России и Евразии при Совете национальной безопасности США. Именно Макфол был автором идеи подарить министру иностранных дел Сергею Лаврову большую красную кнопку с надписью "Перезагрузка". Но недостаток специалистов по русскому языку привёл к ошибке по Фрейду — написали: "Перегрузка". В 2012 году Макфол был назначен послом США и сразу же заявил о себе как о кураторе "продемократического протестного движения" — да так, что МИД РФ пришлось протестовать против "недипломатических" слов и выражений, которыми сыпал новоиспечённый посол на встречах с оппозицией. Интересно, что именно при Макфоле возросла шпионская активность посольских работников — ещё ни один посол США не знал столько шпионских скандалов. Например, в 2012 году был задержан третий секретарь политического отдела Посольства США в Москве Чед Вагнер, в связи с чем ФСБ направила американской стороне предупреждение, что такой деятельностью заниматься в России не следует. В январе 2013 года был задержан уже новый третий секретарь экономического отдела Посольства США в Москве — Бенджамин Диллон, который пытался завербовать сотрудника российской контрразведки, занимавшегося борьбой с терроризмом. Следом ФСБ поймала сотрудника ЦРУ Райана Кристофера Фогла, который занимал должность третьего секретаря политического отдела Посольства США. Отправляясь на встречи с агентами, он, явно насмотревшись старинных детективов, надевал парики и накладные усы, чем порой доводил сотрудников контрразведки до истерического хохота. Ещё большим мастером переодевания оказался агент ЦРУ Тимоти Финнеган, который частенько переодевался в женщин. В женщин переодевался и работник ЦРУ Джон Гранос, который выходил на встречи со связными в образе мамаши с куклой-грудничком. Но больше всего сотрудников контрразведки удивил третий секретарь политического отдела Посольства США Дэниэл ван Дайкен, который устроил драку с охранником посольства прямо под объективами телекамер. Возвращаясь с очередного "задания", ван Дайкен прямо на такси подъехал к чёрному входу посольства и, выскочив из автомобиля, бегом бросился к дверям. Наперерез ему выскочил сотрудник полиции, охраняющий посольство, который, очевидно, был не в курсе "странностей" в поведении третьего секретаря. Но американец, не предъявляя никаких документов и ничего не объясняя, вступил в потасовку. И полицейский, и неизвестный оказались на земле, где борьба продолжилась. В итоге ван Дайкен буквально вполз в двери диппредставительства, лишив таким образом полицейского права на дальнейшие действия. Закономерный итог такой "дипломатии" — в 2016 году уже сам Майкл Макфол, сложивший с себя обязанности посла, был включён в закрытый санкционный список России с запретом въезда в страну.  

18 июля, 15:22

Donald Trump and the Danger of 'Adhocracy'

The president has opted for a chaotic style of governing that reinforces his weaknesses and increases the chances of major blunders.

18 июля, 15:22

Donald Trump and the Danger of 'Adhocracy'

The president has opted for a chaotic style of governing that reinforces his weaknesses and increases the chances of major blunders.

18 июля, 08:00

Not the time for 'blame game,' urges UN Special Advisor on Cyprus

Speaking to the media following his briefing to the United Nations Security Council, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide, urged all sides to work collectively and to build on the achievements thus far.

17 июля, 16:24

3 years on, families honor loved ones lost on downed MH17

RELATIVES and friends of people killed three years ago when a surface-to-air missile blew a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet out of the sky over Ukraine gathered Monday to mark the anniversary at a new

16 июля, 18:04

Fate of Kushner’s security clearance could ultimately lie with Trump

The president’s son-in-law and adviser has come under fire for initially failing to disclose meetings with Russian officials.