США Соединённые Штаты Америки (США) (англ. United States of America, USA) &mdash; государство в Северной Америке. Площадь &mdash; 9,8 млн км&sup2; (3-е место в мире, уступая России и Канаде). Население &mdash; 315 млн человек (2013, оценка; 3-е место в мире). Столица &mdash; город Вашингтон.&nbsp;Административно страна делится на 50 штатов и федеральный округ Колумбия, в подчинении США также находится ряд островных территорий. Жителей США называют американцами, а к самим США применяется общее название Америка. В русском языке до середины XX века также было распространено наименование Северо-Американские Соединённые Штаты (САСШ). Соединённые Штаты Америки были образованы в 1776 году при объединении тринадцати британских колоний, объявивших о своей независимости. Война за независимость продолжалась до 1783 года и окончилась победой колонистов. В 1787 году была принята Конституция США, а в 1791 &mdash; Билль о правах, который существенно ограничил полномочия правительства в отношении граждан. В 1860-х годах противоречия между рабовладельческими южными и промышленными северными штатами привели к началу четырёхлетней гражданской войны. Победа северных штатов привела к повсеместному запрету рабства в США и восстановила страну после раскола, возникшего при объединении южных штатов в Конфедерацию и объявление ими независимости от США. О консерватизме по-американски http://so-l.ru/tags/show/ssha Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:38:15 +0300 <![CDATA[Ivanka Trump arrives in South Korea, but Seoul says no meeting with North planned]]> http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_23_ivanka_trump_arrives_in_south_korea_but Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:38:13 +0300 <![CDATA[Europeans look for a way to preserve nuclear deal while punishing Iran and satisfying Trump]]> http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_23_europeans_look_for_a_way_to_preserve_nuc Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:38:13 +0300 <![CDATA[Дональд Трамп борется с судебной системой США]]> http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_01_donald_tramp_boretsya_s_sudebnoy_sistemo Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:37:29 +0300 <![CDATA[Tune in: TFI@10: The Evolution of Treasury's National Security Role]]> On Monday, June 2, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Center for Strategic and International Studies will co-host a symposium entitled “TFI@10: The Evolution of Treasury’s National Security Role,” marking the 10th anniversary of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). Secretary Jacob J. Lew will deliver remarks on the Department’s role in advancing U.S. national security and foreign policy and the event will convene senior Administration officials, former government and Congressional leaders, and other foreign policy experts in academia and the private sector to discuss the future of financial tools, financial transparency, and financial intelligence as a means of advancing our national security. The symposium recognizes TFI's important work to disrupt and dismantle the financial networks of terrorist organizations, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, drug traffickers, and transnational organized criminals as well as to protect the U.S. financial system from abuse.    

Since its establishment in 2004, TFI has marshalled the Department’s intelligence, regulatory, policy and enforcement authorities to combat the most significant threats to U.S. national security and advance key foreign policy objectives. 

Below are additional details on the impressive speakers and panelists that will be participating. The whole event will be broadcasted live on USTREAM here

Monday, June 2, 2014

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC

8:40 a.m. Introductory Remarks

David S. Cohen
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,
U.S. Department of the Treasury

8:45 a.m. Morning Keynote

Jacob J. Lew
Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury


John J. Hamre
President, CEO, and Pritzker Chair, CSIS

9:05 a.m. Panel I: Leveraging Financial Tools to Advance National Security

Tom Donilon
Distinguished Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Former National Security Adviser

Stephen Hadley
Chairman of the Board, U.S. Institute of Peace
Former National Security Adviser

Andrea Mitchell

Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent, NBC News

10:15 a.m. Morning Remarks

Stuart Levey
Chief Legal Officer, HSBC Holdings plc 
Former Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence

10:30 a.m. Panel II: Financial Intelligence: Redefining and Reshaping National Security

Keith Alexander
Former Director of the National Security Agency

Jane Harman
Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center
Former Representative (D-CA)

Michèle Flournoy
CEO, Center for a New American Security
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

David Sanger
Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times

11:30 a.m. Midday Keynote

Denis McDonough
White House Chief of Staff

12:30 p.m. Panel III: Increasing Financial Transparency and Protecting the U.S. Financial System

Neal Wolin
Former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury

Reuben Jeffery III
Senior Adviser, CSIS; CEO, Rockefeller & Co.
Former Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, & Agricultural Affairs


Juan Zarate

Senior Adviser, CSIS
Former Deputy National Security Adviser
Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes

1:30 p.m. Closing Remarks

David S. Cohen
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,
U.S. Department of the Treasury

Anthony Reyes is the New Media Specialist at the United States Department of the Treasury.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_01_tune_in_tfi_10_the_evolution_of_treasu Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:36:25 +0300
<![CDATA[A Comparison between the College Scorecard and Mobility Report Cards]]> Introduction
In 2015, the Department of Education launched the College Scorecard, a vast database of student outcomes at specific colleges and universities developed from a variety of administrative data sources. The Scorecard provides the most comprehensive and accurate information available on the post-enrollment outcomes of students, like whether they get a job, the rate at which they repay their loans, and how much they earn.
While labor-market success is certainly not the end-all-be-all of higher education, the notion that a college education is a ticket to a good job and a pathway to economic opportunity is intrinsic to the tax benefits and financial support provided by federal and state governments, to the willingness of parents and families to shoulder the burden of college’s high costs, and to the dreams of millions of students. More than 86% percent of freshmen say that “to be able to get a better job” is a “very important” reason for going to college.[1]
That is why the College Scorecard is a breakthrough—for the first time, students have access to detailed and reliable information on the economic outcomes of students after leaving college, including the vast majority of colleges that are non-selective or otherwise fall between the cracks of other information providers.
The data show that at every type of post-secondary institution, the differences in post-college earnings across institutions are profound. Some students attend institutions where many students don’t finish, or that don’t lead to good jobs.   
Moreover, the analysis behind the Scorecard suggested not only that there are large differences across institutions in their economic outcomes, but that these differences are relevant to would-be students. For instance, the evidence in the Scorecard showed that when a low-income student goes to a school with a high completion rates and good post-college earnings, she is likely to do as well as anyone else there. While there are large differences between where rich and poor kids are likely to apply and attend, there is little difference in their outcomes after leaving school: the poorest aid recipients earn almost as much as the richest borrowers. This pattern suggests, at least, that low-income students are not mismatched or underqualified for the schools they currently attend. But it is also consistent with powerful evidence from academic studies that show that when marginal students get a shot at a higher-quality institution their graduation rates and post-college earnings converge toward those of their new peers (Zimmerman 2014, Goodman et al. 2015).
Hence, the Scorecard is likely to provide useful information for students, policymakers, and administrators on important measures of post-college success, access to college by disadvantaged students, and economic mobility.  Indeed, the College Scorecard shows that great economic outcomes are not exclusive to Ivy-League students. Many institutions have both good outcomes and diverse origins—institutions whose admissions policies, or lack thereof, take in disproportionate shares of poor kids and lift them up the economic ladder.
Nevertheless, the design of the Scorecard required making methodological choices to produce the data on a regular basis, and making it simple and accessible required choosing among specific measures intended to be representative. Some of these choices were determined by data availability or other considerations.  Some choices have been criticized (e.g. Whitehurst and Chingos 2015). Other valuable indicators could not be reliably produced on a regular basis or in a way that evolved over time as college or student outcomes changed.
In part to address these issues, we supported the research that lead to the creation of Mobility Report Cards, which provide a test of the validity and robustness of the College Scorecard and an expansion of its scope.
Mobility Report Cards (MRCs) attempt to answer the question “which colleges in America contribute the most to helping children climb the income ladder?” and characterize rates of intergeneration income mobility at each college in the United States. The project draws on de-identified administrative data covering over 30 million college students from 1999 to 2013, and focuses on students enrolled between the ages of 18 and 22, for whom both their parents’ income information and their own subsequent labor-market outcomes can be observed.  MRCs provide new information on access to colleges of children from different family backgrounds, the likelihood that low-income students at different colleges move up in the income distribution, and trends in access over time.
Background on College Scorecard
The College Scorecard provides detailed information on the labor-market outcomes of financial-aid recipients post enrollment, including average employment status and measures of earnings for employed graduates; outcomes for specific groups of students, like students from lower-income families, dependent students, and for women and men; and measures of those outcomes early and later in their post-college careers. These outcome measures are specific to the students receiving federal aid, and to the institutions those students attend. And the outcome measures are constructed using technical specifications similar to those used to measure other student outcomes, like the student loan Cohort Default Rate, which allows for a consistent framework for measurement while allowing institution outcomes to evolve from cohort to cohort.
The technical paper accompanying the College Scorecard spelled out the important properties and limitations of the federal data used in the Scorecard, regarding the share of students covered, the institutions covered, the construction of cohorts, the level of aggregation of statistics, and how the earnings measures were used.
These choices were made subject to certain constraints on disclosure, statistical reliability, reproducibility, and operational capacity, and with specific goals of making the data regularly available (updating it on an annual basis), using measurement concepts similar to those used in other education-related areas (like student loan outcomes), and providing measures that could evolve over time as characteristics of schools and student outcomes changed. These constraints imposed tradeoffs and required choices. Moreover, the research team producing the MRCs was not bound by certain of these methodological requirements or design goals, and thus could make alternative choices. Despite making different choices, however, the analysis below shows that on balance the outcome measures common to both projects are extremely similar.
In brief, the Scorecard estimates are based on data from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) covering undergraduate students receiving federal aid.  NSLDS data provides information on certain characteristics of students, the calendar time and student’s reported grade level when they first received aid, and detailed information on the institution they attended (such as the 6- and 8-digit Office of Postsecondary Education Identification number OPEID). These data and identifiers are regularly used as the basis for reporting institution-specific student outcomes, like the Cohort Default Rate or disbursements of federal aid.  For purposes of constructing economic outcomes using these data, all undergraduate aid recipients were assigned an entry cohort—either the year they first received aid if a first-year college student, or an imputation for their entry year based on the year they were first aided and their academic level. (For instance, if a student self-reported entering their second undergraduate year in the first year they received aid, they would be assigned a cohort year for the previous year.[2]) If a student attended more than one institution as an undergraduate, that student was included in the cohorts of each institution (i.e. their outcomes were included in the average outcomes of each institution—just as is done with the Cohort Default Rate). These data were linked to information from administrative tax and education data at specific intervals post-entry (e.g. 6, 8, and 10 years after the cohort entry year). Adjacent cohorts were combined (e.g. entry cohorts in 2000 and 2001 were linked to outcomes in 2010 and 2011, respectively).  Individuals who are not currently in the labor market (defined as having zero earnings) are excluded. And institution-by-cohort specific measures like mean or median earnings and the fraction of students that earn more than $25,000 (among those working), were constructed for the cohorts (e.g. mean earnings for non-enrolled, employed aid recipients ten years after entry for the combined 2000 and 2001 cohorts). Each year, the sample was rolled forward one year, with the earlier cohort being dropped and a new cohort being added, allowing the sample to evolve over time.
This focus on aid recipients is natural for producing estimates related to aid outcomes, like student debt levels or the ratio of debt to earnings. Moreover, these data are regularly used to produce institution-specific accountability measures, like the Cohort Default Rate, which are familiar to stakeholders and authorized and regularly used to report institution-specific outcomes. Constructing the sample based on entry year and rolling forward one year allowed for comparisons within schools over time, to assess improvement or the effects of other changes on student outcomes.
The focus of and choices underlying the Scorecard also had several potential disadvantages, which were noted in the technical paper or by reviewers offering constructive criticism (e.g. Whitehurst and Chingos 2015).  These limitations, criticisms, and omissions of the Scorecard include the following specific to the methodology and data limitations. 
First, the Scorecard’s sample of students includes only federal student aid recipients. While these students are an obvious focus of aid policies, and comprise a majority of students at many institutions, high-income students whose families cover full tuition are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, schools with more generous financial aid often have a smaller share of students on federal financial aid, implying that the share and type of students included in the Scorecard vary across colleges.
Unfortunately, the information needed to assign students to a specific entry cohort at a specific educational institution and to report institution-specific data is not available at the same degree of reliability and uniformity for non-federal-aid recipients.  For instance, Form 1098-T (used to administer tax credits for tuition paid) may not identify specific institutions or campuses (e.g. within a state university system) and does not report information on the academic level or entry year of the student. In addition, certain disclosure standards prevented the publication of institution-specific data. Estimates based on aggregated statistics (as are used in the Mobility Report Cards) include an element of (deliberate) uncertainty in the outcomes, and subjectivity in terms estimation methodology.
Second, FAFSA family income may not be a reliable indicator of access or opportunity. FAFSA family income is measured differently depending on whether students are dependent or independent; it is missing for many that do not receive aid; and it can be misleading for those who are independent borrowers. Unfortunately, information on family background is generally only available for FAFSA applicants (aid recipients) who are dependents at the time of application. Mobility Report Cards provide a more comprehensive and uniform measure of family income, but only for the cohorts of students they are able to link back to their parents (e.g. those born after 1979.)
Mobility Report Cards
The above factors raised concerns about the Scorecard’s reliability and usefulness to stakeholders. In an effort to assess the validity and robustness of Scorecard measures using an alternative sample and with more consistent definitions of family income and more outcomes, we supported the analysis behind the study “Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility in the U.S.” (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, and Yagan 2017).
Perhaps most importantly, the Mobility Report Card (MRC) uses records from the Treasury Department on tuition-paying students in conjunction with Pell-grant records from the Department of Education in order to construct nearly universal attendance measures at all U.S. colleges between the ages of 18 and 22. Thus the MRC sample of students is more  comprehensive of this population relative to the Scorecard. However, older students are generally not included in the MRC sample and certain institutions cannot be separately identified in the MRC sample. Furthermore, the MRC methodology relies on producing estimates of institutional outcomes rather than producing actual data on institution outcomes. At certain institutions, particularly those that enroll a disproportionate share of older students (such as for-profit and community colleges) and where a large share students receive Title IV aid, the Scorecard provides a more comprehensive sample of student outcomes.[3]
Another area of difference is that the MRC organizes its analysis around entire birth cohorts who can be linked to parents in their adolescence. It then measures whether and where each member of the birth cohort attends college. By following full birth cohorts, cross-college comparisons of adult earnings in the MRC measure earnings at the same age (32-34), unlike the Scorecard which measures adult earnings across colleges at different points in the lifecycle, depending on when the students attended the college.  The advantage of the MRC approach is that it allows a comprehensive analysis of the outcomes of the entire birth cohort at regular intervals.  However, the disadvantage mentioned above is that there is no information on older cohorts born prior to 1980.
In addition, the MRC includes zero-earners in its earnings measures, whereas the Scorecard excludes them from their measures of earnings outcomes.[4] Because it is not possible to differentiate individuals who are involuntarily unemployed (e.g. who were laid off from a job) from those who are out of the labor force by choice (in school, raising children, or retired), the Scorecard focused on measuring earnings specifically for those who clearly were participating in the labor market.
Finally, family income in the MRC is measured consistently across cohorts using a detailed and relatively comprehensive measure of household income: total pre-tax income at the household level averaged between the kid ages of 15 and 19, as reflected on the parents’ tax forms.
The design choices made in developing the MRC come at the cost of published statistics not being exact and instead being granular estimates (see Chetty Friedman Saez Turner Yagan 2016) and of not being as easily replicable over time. However, the MRC’s design addresses many of the critiques made of the Scorecard. If the critiques of the Scorecard are quantitatively important, one should find that the MRC and Scorecard values differ substantially. In other words, the MRC data provide an estimate of how much the data constraints and methodological choices affect the data quality.
Comparison of the College Scorecard and Mobility Report Cards
The most basic test of the robustness of the Scorecard to the variations embodied in the MRC is to compare the main Scorecard adult earnings measure—median earnings of students ten years after they attend a college—with the analogous measure from the MRC: median earnings in 2014 (age 32-34) of the 1980-1982 birth cohort by college. For shorthand, we refer to these measures as Scorecard median earnings and MRC median earnings, respectively.
Figure 1 plots MRC median earnings versus Scorecard median earnings.[5] Both median earnings measures are plotted in thousands of 2015 dollars. Overlaid on the dots is the regression line on the underlying college-level data.

Figure 1
The graph shows an extremely tight, nearly-one-for-one relationship: a slope of 1.12 with an R2 of 0.92. Visually one can see that not only does each extra thousand dollars of Scorecard median earnings typically translate into an extra thousand dollars of MRC median earnings, but the levels line up very closely as well. Hence across the vast majority of colleges, Scorecard median earnings are very close to MRC median earnings.
The close correspondence between MRC median earnings and Scorecard median earnings can also be seen when examining college-level comparison lists. For example, among colleges with at least 500 students, almost exactly the same colleges appear in the top rankings using either measure.  (This is natural given the very high R2 reported in Figure 1.) Hence, the Scorecard and MRC share a very tight relationship.
In unreported analysis, we find that two offsetting effects tend to explain this very tight relationship between Scorecard median earnings and MRC median earnings. On the one hand, the MRC’s inclusion of students who earn nothing as adults somewhat reduces each college’s median adult earnings. On the other hand, the MRC’s inclusion of students from high-income families somewhat increases each college’s median adult earnings, as students from high-income families are somewhat more likely to earn high incomes as adults. The two competing effects tend to offset each other in practice, yielding MRC median earnings that are quite close to Scorecard median earnings.
While some schools are outliers, in the sense that the measures differ, those examples are often readily explained by differences in methodological choices. For instances, because the Scorecard conditions on having positive earnings, schools where an unusually high share of students voluntarily leave the labor force have different outcomes in the MRC than the Scorecard. The other important contributor to outliers is the MRC’s restriction to students enrolled between ages 18 and 22, which tends to exclude many older, mid-career workers. These individuals tend both to be employed, often have relatively high earnings, and tend to enroll at for-profit schools (or other schools aimed at providing mid-career credentials). The Scorecard includes these students, whereas the MRC tends to exclude them.
The College Scorecard was created to provide students, families, educators, and policymakers with new information on the outcomes of students attending each college in the United States, and improving the return on federal tax and expenditure programs. Mobility Report Cards expand the scope of the information on the outcomes and the characteristics of students attending American colleges. Our analysis finds a very high degree of agreement at the college level between Scorecard median adult earnings and Mobility Report Card median adult earnings, suggesting that the Scorecard is a reliable tool measuring the outcomes of students and institutions that benefit from federal student aid and tax expenditures.
Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner, and Danny Yagan. “Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility in the U.S.”. (2016).
Goodman, Joshua, Michael Hurwitz, and Jonathan Smith. “Access to Four-Year Public Colleges and Degree Completion.” Journal of Labor Economics (2017).
Whitehurst, Grover J. and Matthew M. Chingos. “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the College Scorecard.” Brookings Working Paper (2015).
Zimmerman, Seth D. "The returns to college admission for academically marginal students." Journal of Labor Economics 32.4 (2014): 711-754.
Adam Looney, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Analysis at the US Department of Treasury.

[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/rampage/wp/2015/02/17/why-do-americans-go-to-college-first-and-foremost-they-want-better-jobs
[2] This assignment was capped at two years, so that students reported entering their third, fourth, or fifth year were assigned a cohort two years prior.
[3] For instance, in the 2002 Scorecard entry cohort, 42 percent of students were over age 22 when they first received aid.    
[4] The Scorecard data base does include the fraction of borrowers without earnings, which allows for the computation of unconditional mean earnings.
[5] We also restrict to colleges with at least 100 MRC students on average across the 1980-1982 birth cohorts and to colleges that have observations in both the Scorecard and the MRC. For MRC colleges that are groups of Scorecard colleges, we use the count-weighted mean of Scorecard mean earnings across colleges within a group. See Chetty Friedman Saez Turner Yagan (2016) for grouping details.
http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_01_a_comparison_between_the_college_scoreca Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:36:25 +0300
<![CDATA[The Economic Security of American Households]]> Issue Brief Four: The Distribution and Evolution of the Social Safety Net and Social Insurance Benefits from 1990 to 2014​

Today, the Office of Economic Policy at the Treasury Department released the fourth in a series of briefs exploring the economic security of American households. This brief  focuses on the distribution of benefits from the social safety net and social insurance programs and how that distribution has changed since 1990.

The social safety net is largely defined as those programs that help protect individuals and households from negative economic shocks. As a result, eligibility for the social safety net programs is generally restricted to those whose incomes fall below certain threshold amounts and whose assets do not exceed certain amounts. While there are many programs that aim to protect individuals against negative economic shocks, in this brief, we focus on the following programs: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).   

Social insurance provides individuals with protection against economic risks, with benefits linked to certain triggers. Social insurance is provided to all individuals regardless of their income or wealth, although the benefit amounts may be tied to past work experience, income, or wealth. Social Security (retirement, survivor, and disability), Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance are the most well-known social insurance programs.

Over the past 25 years, there have been significant changes in the provision and distribution of benefits from safety net and social insurance programs. Some of these changes have been designed to reduce the work disincentives inherent in many programs, while other changes have expanded eligibility for benefits to individuals above the very bottom end of the income distribution. The past 25 years have also seen important changes in demographics and labor force participation patterns. Together, these changes have important implications for which individuals and households are eligible to receive benefits, the distribution of benefits by income, how much in benefits households receive, and the labor force participation of eligible individuals.

During the period from 1990 to 2014, among non-elderly households, the poorest households, households with children under the age of 18, and households with a disabled individual received the largest average benefits from the social safety net and social insurance programs.  

Elderly households and households with a disabled individual have experienced relatively little change in the distribution of benefits since 1990, but non-elderly non-disabled households with children under the age of 18 have experienced large changes in the distribution of benefits. These changes reflect the fact that the receipt of benefits for these households has become increasingly tied to their ability to find employment. As a result, non-disabled households with children just above the very bottom of the income distribution – in the second, third, and fourth deciles – have seen the largest growth in the average total benefits (see the figure below). While tying the receipt of benefits to employment reduces the disincentive effects of these programs on willingness to work, it may also reduce the ability of the safety net to respond to adverse macroeconomic conditions.  In particular, during periods of elevated unemployment, the safety net may be less effective in preventing individuals and households from falling into poverty. This limitation should be considered when designing the discretionary policy response to future macroeconomic shocks.

While the social safety net and social insurance programs have historically provided benefits to households with children and disabled households, non-elderly non-disabled households without children under age 18 have traditionally received few benefits. This continues to be true such that, across the income distribution, non-disabled households without children receive far less from the social safety net and social insurance programs than any other group (see the figure below). As a result, in the event of a negative income shock, there exists only a limited social safety net to prevent these households from falling into poverty. One reason that non-disabled households without children are less likely to receive benefits as income increases is that fewer of the social safety net and social insurance programs are available to households in this group. For example, the EITC provides material benefits to households with children in the bottom third of the income distribution, while the EITC provides very little benefit to non-disabled households without children. Moreover, non-disabled households without children have less access to cash welfare and SNAP.

Overall, though, the social safety and social insurance programs provide critical support to vulnerable American households. Moreover, according to the most comprehensive measures of poverty currently available, poverty in the United States would be significantly higher in the absence of these programs. In addition, these programs have contributed to a material reduction in the incidence of poverty since the late 1960s, when many of the social safety net programs were created. 

Karen Dynan is the Assistant Secretary of Economic Policy at the Department of the Treasury.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_01_the_economic_security_of_american_househ Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:36:25 +0300
<![CDATA[Secretary Lew Sends Letter to 115th Congress on Puerto Rico]]>

January 17, 2017


The Honorable Mitch McConnell

Majority Leader

United States Senate

Washington, DC  20510


Dear Mr. Leader: 

As the 115th Congress begins, we write to underscore the need for additional legislation early in this session to address the economic and fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico.  The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) provided Puerto Rico with important fiscal oversight and debt restructuring tools, and now the Oversight Board and Puerto Rico’s new Governor must take the critical next steps required by this federal legislation.  Working with the new Governor, the Oversight Board now must certify a Fiscal Plan and set a path to comprehensively restructure the debt before the expiration of PROMESA’s automatic stay.   Treasury has continued to provide both the Oversight Board and the new Governor with technical assistance as requested, and will remain able to do so after the transition to the next Administration.  

Despite the important progress achieved to date with bipartisan support, the work is not done.  As Puerto Rico moves forward on these next steps, Congress must enact measures recommended by both Republicans and Democrats that fix Puerto Rico’s inequitable health care financing structure and promote sustained economic growth.  Without congressional action to address these issues, Puerto Rico’s return to growth and opportunity will be a significant challenge.   Most urgently, Congress should address Puerto Rico’s “Medicaid cliff” funding issue before April as recommended last month by the Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth in Puerto Rico.  Failure to do so would jeopardize health care for up to 900,000 poor U.S. citizens living in Puerto Rico.


On December 20, the Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth in Puerto Rico, established by PROMESA, released its Final Report.  The bipartisan report provides an overview of the economic challenges facing Puerto Rico and a series of potential solutions that, if crafted well and enacted quickly, are necessary for a sustainable economic recovery.  It is important that Congress not only turn ideas into action, but in doing so, address Puerto Rico’s significant remaining economic and social challenges in meaningful ways to help put Puerto Rico on a path of sustained economic growth.

As the report acknowledges, Puerto Rico faces an imminent shortfall in health care funding that could leave up to 900,000 Americans without coverage if Congress does not act in the near future.  Puerto Rico’s already vulnerable health care system is stretched further by a Zika outbreak that, as of January 4, has resulted in over 34,000 cases, and will affect numerous women, children, and families for years to come.  It is time to provide a long-term solution to Puerto Rico’s historically inadequate federal Medicaid financing, which threatens the viability of Puerto Rico’s Medicaid program and worsens Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis.  If Congress fails to craft a long-term solution, immediate action is still needed to ensure full fiscal year 2018 financing to avoid the “Medicaid cliff” identified in the report.  Without action before April, Puerto Rico’s ability to execute contracts for Fiscal Year 2018 with its managed care organizations will be threatened, thereby putting at risk beginning July 1, 2017 the health care of up to 900,000 poor U.S. citizens living in Puerto Rico.

Additionally, Puerto Rico continues to suffer from double digit unemployment and a labor force participation rate that is only two-thirds that of the U.S. average.  A federally-financed, locally-administered Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in Puerto Rico would create incentives for work and increase participation in the formal economy – just as it has done for decades in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.  Instead of recommending the immediate enactment of an EITC, the Task Force only suggested Congress further explore the proposal.  We strongly encourage Congress to enact this powerful economic driver to bolster Puerto Rico’s future.  Our analysis of the situation over the last several years demonstrates that an EITC would be the most effective and powerful tool to address these structural challenges to economic growth.

Beyond those two major issues, the Task Force recommended a number of other policies that we agree should be enacted.  First, we appreciate the bipartisan recommendation for Congress to continue authorizing Treasury to provide technical assistance to Puerto Rico.  Furthermore, while we recommend a different approach to expand the Child Tax Credit to more Puerto Rican families, one that is locally administered, we welcome the Task Force recommendation for Congress to expand the Child Tax Credit in Puerto Rico, to the extent it is well-designed and supplements an EITC program for Puerto Rico.  We support the Task Force’s acknowledgment of the importance of data in benchmarking economic growth and fiscal developments in Puerto Rico and the recommendations to improve data quality and timeliness.  Finally, we are pleased with the recommendations on small business incentives, and the need to include Puerto Rico in funding and training programs that address Puerto Rico’s differential treatment in some Federal programs.  It is time for Congress to move quickly to put these recommendations into law.

Last summer, Republicans and Democrats in Congress took decisive action in PROMESA to help improve Puerto Rico’s fiscal position by establishing an independent oversight board and providing it with comprehensive debt restructuring tools.  As you know, these tools were provided to Puerto Rico as an alternative to a federal bailout and provide Puerto Rico’s government and the Oversight Board with comprehensive authorities to address the debt crisis. Members of Congress now must work together quickly to enact well-crafted legislation to encourage growth and opportunity for our fellow citizens in Puerto Rico.

The Treasury Department and the Department of Health and Human Services stand committed to working with you to achieving those goals throughout the remainder of the transition to the next Administration.




Jacob J. Lew                                       Sylvia M. Burwell

Secretary                                             Secretary

Department of the Treasury                Department of Health and Human Services


Identical letter sent to:

            The Honorable Charles E. Schumer

            The Honorable Paul D. Ryan

            The Honorable Nancy Pelosi​​​

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_01_secretary_lew_sends_letter_to_115th_cong Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:36:25 +0300
<![CDATA[2016 Financial Report of the U.S. Government]]> Today, Treasury released the 2016 US Financial Report, which can be found here: https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/finrep/fr/fr_index.htm

Please see the Secretary's letter below:

January 12, 2017
A Message from the Secretary
 The annual Financial Report of the U.S. Government provides to the public a comprehensive overview of the Government’s current financial position, as well as critical insight into our long term fiscal outlook. The Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Report, the final U.S. Financial Report of the Obama Administration, reflects an economy that has come a long way since 2008, with sustained private sector job growth and increasing vitality.
Under President Obama’s leadership, there has been substantial economic and fiscal progress, showing what is possible when strategic investment is paired with smart reforms. Labor market conditions continue to improve, we have added millions of jobs to the economy and GDP has grown steadily. Globally, the United States remains a driver of steady economic growth.
In Fiscal Year 2016, the Nation’s economic gains contributed to increased revenues and sustainable deficit financing for the next decade. The Government’s estimated long-term fiscal gap continues to be reduced by the provisions of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, Budget Control Act of 2011, and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2013. These and other measures support our economy, allow our government to operate more efficiently, and support long term fiscal health.
This Administration’s policies have created the space to address our country’s long term fiscal challenges; however, near term policies that reduce revenues or increase spending, such as through changes to our tax code or the Affordable Care Act, could increase the size of the fiscal gap and force more dramatic adjustments in later years. We must ensure that our prosperity is shared by all Americans, not just those at the top. I am proud of the work we have done as a country over the past eight years to address our economic challenges and am pleased to share this strong report.
Jacob J. Lew
Margaret Mulkerrin is the Press Assistant at the U.S. Department of Treasury.
http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_01_2016_financial_report_of_the_u_s_govern Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:36:25 +0300
<![CDATA[Unveiling the Future of Liberty]]>

Earlier today, I was honored to join Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and Deputy Secretary Sarah Bloom Raskin to unveil designs for the 2017 American Liberty Gold Coin.

The unveiling not only marked a historic milestone for the allegorical Lady Liberty, who has been featured on American coinage since the late 1790s, but also served to kick-off the Mint’s 225th anniversary—a year-long public awareness campaign about its mission, facilities and employees.

I am very proud of the fact that the United States Mint is rooted in the Constitution. Our founding fathers realized the critical need for our fledgling nation to have a respected monetary system, and over the last 225 years, the Mint has never failed in its mission to enable America’s growth and stability by protecting assets entrusted to us and manufacturing coins and medals to facilitate national commerce.

We have chosen “Remembering our Past, Embracing the Future” as the Mint’s theme for our 225th Anniversary year. This beautiful coin truly embodies that theme. The coin demonstrates our roots in the past through such traditional elements as the inscriptions United States of America, Liberty, E Pluribus Unum and In God We Trust. We boldly look to the future by casting Liberty in a new light, as an African-American woman wearing a crown of stars, looking forward to ever brighter chapters in our Nation’s history bookThe 2017 American Liberty Gold Coin is the first in a series of 24-karat gold coins the United States Mint will issue biennially. These coins will feature designs that depict an allegorical Liberty in a variety of contemporary forms including designs representing Asian-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and Indian-Americans among others to reflect the cultural and ethnic diversity of the United States.​

2017 American Liberty Gold Coin obverse (left) and reverse (right). (United States Mint Photos)


Rhett Jeppson is the Principal Deputy Director of the U.S. Mint.    

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_01_unveiling_the_future_of_liberty Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:36:25 +0300
<![CDATA[ГК "АЛОР": Аналитический прогноз]]> Открытие российского рынка состоится на отрицательной территории, вблизи уровней пятничного закрытия. Фондовые площадки Европы и США по-прежнему не проводят торги в связи с празднованием Страстной пятницы, снова оставляя отечественный рынок без главных ориентиров. В связи с этим рынок последует за площадками Азии, где торги проходят на «зеленой» территории, а также за фьючерсами на индексы США, которые, напротив, снижаются. Кроме того, в качестве ориентира выступят цены на нефть, однако торги на сырьевом рынке проходят довольно вяло, что не дает четких сигналов участникам отечественного рынка. В качестве основного ориентира выступят фьючерсы на индексы США, поэтому торги внутри дня будут проходить в рамках понижающегося тренда.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_11_gk_alor_analiticheskiy_prognoz Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:32:02 +0300
<![CDATA[Альфа-Банк: Ежедневный обзор]]> Вторник не оправдал ожидания рынков, понадеявшихся на психологический подъем инвесторов в день инаугурации президента США Б. Обамы. Не помогло и урегулирование российско-украинского газового конфликта. Рынки демонстрировали высокую волатильность, одновременно скатываясь на все более низкие ценовые уровни. На российском рынке ситуация усугубилась дефицитом рублевой ликвидности. Экстренный и сезонный спрос на рубли спровоцировал рост процентных ставок на рынке МБК до 20% в терминах кредитов overnight. Рубль к бивалютной корзине вырос до 37,4 руб., курс рубля на ММВБ к доллару снизился до 33,37 руб./долл., а к евро вырос до 43,3 руб./евро. На мировом валютном рынке евро снизился к доллару до 1,2895 долл./евро.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_01_11_alfa_bank_ezhednevniy_obzor Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:32:02 +0300
<![CDATA[24.02.2018 05:07 : Дональд Трамп призвал разрешить учителям носить в школе оружие]]> По мнению президента США, это станет мощным сдерживающим фактором для тех, кто замышляет атаку. Трамп накануне выступил на конференции представителей консервативных политических сил. Ранее в школе во Флориде один из бывших учеников открыл стрельбу, в результате которой погибли 17 человек, еще 14 были ранены.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_24_02_2018_05_07_donald_tramp_prizval Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:07:00 +0300
<![CDATA[24.02.2018 05:07 : США планируют открыть американское посольство в Иерусалиме в мае этого года]]> Это сообщили в Госдепартаменте. По данным агентства «Рейтер», это будет приурочено к 70-й годовщине провозглашения независимости Израиля.
Статус Иерусалима – один из ключевых вопросов в палестино-израильском конфликте.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_24_02_2018_05_07_ssha_planiruyut_otkrit Sat, 24 Feb 2018 05:07:00 +0300
<![CDATA[В США выставят на аукцион резюме Стива Джобса, написанное им с ошибками]]> На торгах в Бостоне выставят резюме основателя Apple Стива Джобса, которое он собственноручно написал в 18-летнем возрасте при устройстве на работу, пишет РИА Новости со ссылкой на заявление аукционного дома RR Auction.

Документ датирован 1973 годом. Он находится в «очень хорошем состоянии» и дополняется удостоверениями подлинности.

Из текста заявления неясно, на какую должность претендовал будущий предприниматель. Он указывает своими особыми способностями профессии инженера электронных технологий и инженера-проектировщика. При этом в тексте резюме много грамматических и пунктуационных ошибок. Например, Джобс пишет с маленькой буквы собственную фамилию.

Торги состоятся 8-15 марта. За резюме Стива Джобса организаторы планируют выручить более 50 тысяч долларов.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_v_ssha_vistavyat_na_aukcion_rezyume_stiva_d Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:59:09 +0300
<![CDATA[Иванка Трамп лично известила лидера Южной Кореи о новых санкциях против КНДР]]> http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_ivanka_tramp_lichno_izvestila_lidera_yuzhno Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:45:16 +0300 <![CDATA[Трамп обвинил Россию в «гуманитарном бесчинстве» в Сирии]]> http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_tramp_obvinil_rossiyu_v_gumanitarnom_bes Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:41:00 +0300 <![CDATA[Трамп: «Первый год работы моей администрации - лучший в истории США»]]> Президент США Дональд Трамп уверен, что работа администрации в первый год его правления, самая успешная за всю историю США. Как сообщает РИА Новости, об этом он заявил, выступая на конференции консерваторов в Вашингтоне.

"Честно говоря, у моей администрации, а не у меня был наиболее успешный первый год в истории среди всех президентов (США. — Авт.). Я верю в это!", — сказал Трамп. Далее он рассказал о введенных реформах, в частности о налоговой реформе, об отказе от невыгодных торговых отношений, а также о реформах в сфере здравоохранения.

Однако, высокая оценка Дональда Трампа расходится с общественным мнением. Так, согласно опубликованному 22 января агентством Gallup рейтингу, лишь 38,4% американцев одобряли работу Трампа в его первый год на посту президента. Сообщалось, что этот показатель на 10 процентных пунктов ниже, чем в среднем у его предшественников.  

Ранее «Свободная пресса» сообщила, что Дональд Трамп признался, что относится к России жестче бывшего президента США Барака Обамы. Об этом президент США написал в своем микроблоге в Twitter.

«Я более жесткий по отношению к России, чем Обама, просто посмотрите на факты», — признался Трамп.

Новости США: Политологи назвали Трампа худшим президентом за всю историю США

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_tramp_perviy_god_raboti_moey_administr Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:35:00 +0300
<![CDATA[Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет]]>

Неделя беспорядочных подскоков и просадок в ставках и акциях… для не слишком…

По итогам дня мы наблюдали старый знакомый паттерн: гэп на открытии рынка, затем слабость… но в этот раз во второй половине дня на рынок пришли покупатели, а не продавцы…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Dow и Small Caps сумели выйти на зеленую территорию по итогам недели, а Nasdaq взлетел к своим вершинам, достигнутым в среду (на фоне снижения доходностей облигаций) …

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Dow отскочил в зону своего 61,8%-ного ретрейсмента…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

S&P сумел возвыситься (и закрыть сессию) над своей 50DMA…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Кредитные рынки проявили заметную слабость на этой неделе, значительно отдалившись от риска в акциях…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Доходности трежерис двигались разнонаправленно, при этом доходности в середине кривой снизились, а доходности двухлетних и тридцатилетних облигаций выросли…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Кивая 2s10s уплощается две недели к ряду…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Странным образом ожидаемая инфляция (10-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate) резко подскочила сегодня на фоне роста акций… но доходности десятилетних облигаций соскользнули вниз…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

До этой недели доходности десятилетних облигаций росли в течение семи недель подряд, но их пятничное закрытие на отметке 2,8749% прервало это полосу непрерывного роста…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Как отмечает Bloomberg, это достаточно необычная ситуация. В последний раз такое случилось в мае 2008 года, а до этого — в мае 2004 года. Восьминедельная полоса непрерывного роста стала бы самой продолжительной с 1 апреля 1994 года, когда доходности десятилетних трежерис росли в течение девяти недель подряд. И вот как вел себя S&P 500 в течение тех девяти недель:

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

И мы отмечаем, что американские акции теперь “наиболее дорогие” относительно облигаций с 2008 года…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Индекс доллара незначительно снижался в последние два дня (по совпадению это снижение стартовало, когда китайцы вернулись со своих новогодних празднеств, тут же наложив запрет на местный VIX и проведя бэйл-аут Anbang)… но закрыл неделю ростом…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Обратите внимание, в каком узком диапазоне пребывал доллар в последние 36 часов.

WTI растет две недели подряд, но сила доллара ударила по меди и драгоценным металлам…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Биткоин вновь возвысился над отметкой $10 000 сегодня, и теперь он торгуется на уровнях начала февраля (прочие криптовалюты показали заметное снижение) …

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Nasdaq и Биткоин воссоединились в начале дня, но затем акции пошли в рост, а криптовалюта отправилась вниз…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

А может быть Биткоин – это опережающий индикатор для Dow?

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Ну и наконец, вы (все еще) здесь…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Бонус: На этой неделе баланс Федрезерва сократился на $23,2 млрд. – это самый стремительный темп его сокращения с марта 2012 года. Теперь размер баланса Феда наименьший с августа 2014 года…

Облигации прервали семинедельную полосу непрерывного снижения, а темп сокращения баланса Федрезерва оказался самым стремительным за 6 лет

Опубликовано 23.02.2018 г.

Источник: Bonds Break 7-Week Losing Streak As Fed Balance Sheet Tumbles Most In 6 Years


http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_obligacii_prervali_seminedelnuyu_polosu Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:25:49 +0300
<![CDATA[Mexican Gun Control Ensures Cartels Outgun The Good Guys]]> Authored by Ryan McMaken via The Mises Institute,

2017 may have been the worst year for homicide in Mexico since the government began keeping track in the 1990s. 

It's a safe bet that the homicide rate isn't coming anywhere near what it was in the years surrounding the revolution 100 years ago. But it may be the worst rate in several decades. 

German news site DW reports: 

The Interior Ministry said authorities across Mexico opened 29,168 murder cases, saying that it put the country's homicide rate at 20.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.

The highest figure ever recorded in Mexico before last year was in 2011, during the peak of the Mexican government's war on drugs. That year, authorities recorded 22,409 homicides.

Unfortunately, some observers think the Mexican state is fudging the numbers:

However, experts have cast doubt on the latest figures, saying the homicide rate is likely much higher.

Mexican security analysts Alejandro Hope told AP news agency that the figure is based on the number of murder investigations opened last year, not the number of victims.

Hope added that it also doesn't take into account that a killing may result in more than one victim. He placed the homicide rate closer to 24 per 100,000 inhabitants.

According to the official stats in recent years, the homicide rate in Mexico hit 22.6 per 100,000 in 2011, and then declined after that. If critics are right, and the current rate is near 24 per 100,000, that would be a new peak.



By comparison, the homicide rate in the United States was 5.3 per 100,000 in 2016 (the most recent data available) ranging from 1.3 per 100,000 in New Hampshire to 11 per 100,000 in Louisiana. 

Homicide rates vary far more wildly in Mexico, with rates ranging from around 1 per 100,000 in Yucatan state to over 100 per 100,000 in Colima state.

Why Are Rates So High?

Violent crime may be Mexico's largest problem for its economy, growth, and its standard of living. In recent decades, Mexico has moved beyond single-party political rule. It now has competitive elections in more than name only. It has several metropolitan areas which are — outside of the crime issue — considered good places to do business.  It is increasingly connected to the global economy. The UN ranks it "high" on its Human Development Index. Along with other rapidly modernizing Latin American Countries like Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Panama, it would be very wrong to call Mexico a "third world" country. 

So why the persistent violent crime? 

This is one of those issues that has no simple answer. Part of the problem is due to a lack of local control. Some is due to the Drug War — as is the case in the US and other countries. Part is due to demographics

This doesn't stop some commentators, though, from attempting to assign easy explanations to the problem. 

One such recent trend in polemics is found among gun-control advocates who attempt to blame Mexico's crime woes on the availability of small arms in the United States. 

Unlike the United States, though, Mexico has relatively strict gun laws. As Vox notes: 

Mexico is one of the few countries that, like the US, guarantees the right to bear arms in its constitution. Still, Mexico maintains some fairly strict gun laws: All guns must be registered through the federal government, carrying a gun requires a license, sales are legally limited to one store in Mexico City, and carrying licenses can be taken away at the federal government's discretion.

So, like much of Latin America, Mexico is a country with strict gun laws, but high homicide rates. 

So how to explain the problem? 

Well, in the case of Mexico, the answer for gun control activists is to blame the United States: "one way for Mexicans to get around their country's strict gun laws is to simply walk across the border." 

The logic proceeds accordingly: The presence of more guns means more homicide. And, although Mexico has strict gun laws, Mexico is unfortunately located close to the United States where guns can be easily purchased. Guns are then introduced into Mexico where they drive a higher homicide rate. 

There are some problems with this logic. Even if we account for all the black-market guns in Mexico, gun totals are still much higher in the US. That is, according to the 2007 Small Arms Survey, it is estimated that there are around 15 million privately-held guns in Mexico, on the high end. Even accounting for an additional increase since 2007, we're looking at a rate of fewer than 20 guns per 100 people in Mexico. In the United States, on the other hand, that total is around 100 guns per 100 people. 

So, if one is going to pin Mexico's violence problem on "more guns," they have to account for why there are more than five times as many guns in the US, with only a small fraction of the homicides. 

Moreover, the statistics allegedly showing that as much as 70 percent or even 90 percent of guns seized in Mexico come from the US is not true. That statistic is based only on seized guns that are also traced by the ATF. How many of all guns seized in Mexico come from the US? According to Stratfor, "almost 90 percent of the guns seized in Mexico in 2008 were not traced back to the United States." Nor does the Mexican government ask the ATF to trace all guns seized in Mexico. This is because many of those arms can be traced back to the Mexican government itself. 

After all, it's not as if Latin America has no locally produced firearms. The Small Arms Survey notes: 

Latin America has a long tradition of gun production, with some manufacturers tracing their history back many decades. Brazil has the largest arms industry in the region, followed by Argentina. Firearms are also produced by private or government-owned industries in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. While most of the production is intended to equip the military and law enforcement institutions, some of the production is for private use. Research shows that, "[w]ith the important exceptions of major exporters led by Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and above all Brazil, [Latin America’s] small arms producers tend to be niche manufacturers, serving captive local markets."

So Mexico contains local arms-producing manufacturers to the point that some are "major exporters" who also produce arms for government institutions. And government stockpiles are a source for black markets as well. 

Even worse, the same government institutions that work to keep firearms out of the hands of peaceful private citizens, are often in league with the cartels. As a recent New York Times article noted about local resistance to cartel-sown chaos, "Townspeople formed militias to eject both the cartel, which effectively controlled much of Michoacán, and the local police, who were seen as complicit."

In other words, there is often no clear line between law enforcement and the cartels themselves. 

Often, official law enforcement simply can't be bothered. Things are even worse when, as  one cartel member put it, "soldiers and cops are ... really on our side."

Thus, it shouldn't exactly be a surprise that many of the guns seized in Mexico are coming from official government sources.

It requires quite a bit of creativity to then take these facts and twist them into a narrative which concludes "too many guns in Texas leads to more Mexican homicide." If Texan guns are fueling homicide in neighboring jurisdictions, why aren't US states close to Texas experiencing similar problems? 

New Mexico, after all, is next to Texas. But New Mexico's homicide rate of 6.7 per 100,000 is a mere fraction of its neighbor to the south — Chihuahua state — where the homicide rate is over 40 per 100,000

Moreover, increases in gun totals over time in the United States have not shown increases in homicides. In fact, the opposite is true. According to statistics from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, new guns manufactured in the United States, since 2011, have been more than double what they were throughout most of the past thirty years. Total gun production rapidly increased from 2001 to 2013, yet, homicide rates were cut in half from the 1990s to today. Although homicide rates have trended up in the past two years, they remain near 50-year lows. 



Has Gun Control Helped Mexico?

It's difficult to see how greater gun restrictions have helped Mexico. In practice, the restrictions discourage ownership by peaceful people while ensuring that cartels and official state agencies are the only armed groups. And both groups are often in league with each other. Ordinary people are then caught defenseless in the crossfire. 

Attempts at blaming Mexican violence on American guns ignores the fact that there are several times more guns in the US, but without the Mexico-like homicide rates. 

Indeed, some American border towns have low homicide rates, even by American standards. The homicide rate in El Paso, Texas, for example, was a very low 2.7 per 100,000 in 2016. Just across the Rio Grande, the city of Juarez is one of the murder capitals of the world. Moreover, 80 percent of El Paso residents are of Hispanic — primarily Mexican — origin, meaning we can't even resort to a bigoted explanation about how Mexican ethnicity leads to more violence. 

So, why should it be outlandish to conclude that Mexican gun control might be an important factor? After all, on the southern side of the border, guns are reserved for cartels and often-corrupt police officials. Has this situation increased the quality of life of average Mexicans? It's hard to see how. 

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_mexican_gun_control_ensures_cartels_outg Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:20:00 +0300
<![CDATA[Трамп пошутил над своей прической]]> Трамп пошутил над своей прической

Вашингтон, 24 февраля. Президент США Дональд Трамп во время выступления перед участниками конференции консерваторов в Вашингтоне пошутил над своей прической. Об этом сообщает CNN.

По данным издания, на 14-й минуте выступления Трамп увидел экран, который транслировал его речь. Глава Белого дома заявил, что ему нравится, «как говорит этот парень». После этого президент США переключился на особенности своей прически.

«Я изо всех сил стараюсь скрыть эту залысину, ребята. Я правда стараюсь, но она не выглядит так уж плохо», — заявил Трамп.

После этого президент повернулся к зрителям спиной и продемонстрировал свой затылок.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_tramp_poshutil_nad_svoey_pricheskoy Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:18:32 +0300
<![CDATA[Шахназаров объяснил враждебную политику США в отношении России «паранойей» большой империи]]> Шахназаров объяснил враждебную политику США в отношении России «паранойей» большой империи

Москва, 24 февраля. Режиссер Карен Шахназаров объяснил политику США в отношении России свойственной большим империям «паранойей». Об этом сообщает портал «Экономика сегодня».

Режиссер отметил успехи России в последние три года, в том числе воссоединение с Крымом и укрепление позиций страны на Ближнем Востоке. По словам Шахназарова, Россия вслед за США может оправдать экспансию желанием лучшей жизни.

«Если хотим хорошо жить — надо. Весь Запад был построен на экспансии. Это дает американцам колоссальную экономическую энергию и безопасность. Поэтому, конечно, надо», — заявил Шахназаров.

Режиссер подчеркнул, что у США «может быть, складывается паранойя, свойственная большим империям», чем и объясняется отношение Вашингтона к Москве.

Напомним, президент России Владимир Путин неоднократно заявлял о необходимости улучшения отношений между Москвой и Вашингтоном. Ранее газета «Известия» сообщила, что пресс-секретарь главы государства Дмитрий Песков назвал Путина «последовательным сторонником реанимации» двусторонних отношений.

http://so-l.ru/news/y/2018_02_24_shahnazarov_obyasnil_vrazhdebnuyu_politiku Sat, 24 Feb 2018 04:07:11 +0300